HomeMy WebLinkAbout94-0106 Miscellaneous JOHN A. NIGRO, JR.,
Petitioner : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
v. . CUMBERLAND COUNTy, PENNSYLVANIA
ARTHUR AUXER, ROBERT :
BILOUs, GARy COONEy, :
and KENNETH LEWIs, :
Respondents :
: NO. 94-0106 MISCELLANEous TERM
IN RE: PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPus
BEFORE OLER j.
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this 5~day of December, 1994, upon Consideration of
Petitioner,s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and for the reasons
stated in the accompanying Opinion, the Petition is DENIED to the
extent that it seeks immediate release of Petitioner into general
population and GRANTED to the extent that Respondents are directed
not to extend Petitioner,s confinement in administrative custody by
means of a policy automaticall requiring his participation in each
administrative custody phase of the SMU program, with each phase
having a minimum period of 90 days·
BY THE COURT,
Clifford D. Swift, Esq.
Assistant Counsel
Department of Corrections
P.O. Box 598, 2520 Lisburn Road
Camp Hill, PA 17001-0598
Attorney for Respondents
~chael A. Scherer, Esq. West South Street
Carlisle, Pa 17013
Attorney for Petitioner
JOHN A. NIGRO, JR., : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
Petitioner : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
:
v.
:
ARTHUR AUXER, ROBERT :
BILOUS, GARY COONEY, :
and KENNETH LEWIS, :
Respondents : NO. 94-0106 MISCELLANEOUS TERM
IN RE: PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
BEFORE OLER, J.
OPINION and ORDER OF COURT
Oler, J.
This habeas corpus action~ arises out of an inmate's
administrative custody status in a "special management unit" in a
state correctional institution. Relief in the form of the inmate's
release from administrative custody and return to general
population, as well as such other remedial measures as are deemed
appropriate, is requested.
The inmate's claim is based upon an alleged failure of
officials of the special management unit to follow a Department of
Corrections administrative directive on placement and continuation
of an inmate in administrative custody - resulting in his exclusion
from general population and his ineligibility for parole. Defenses
to the claim include an alleged failure of the inmate to exhaust
administrative remedies and the absence of enforceable rights under
the directive.
A hearing on the matter was held on May 12, 1994, and July 21,
1994. For the reasons stated in this Opinion, the Petition will be
See Pa. R. Crim. P. 1701(b).
NO. 94-0106 MISCELLANEOUS TERM
denied in part and granted in part.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
Procedural history. On January 4, 1994, John Albert Nigro,
Jr. (Petitioner), filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, pro
se. By Order of Court dated January 14, 1994, Michael A. Scherer,
Esq., was appointed to represent Petitioner.
On March 23, 1994, Petitioner's counsel requested that a
hearing on the Petition be scheduled, and on March 24, 1994, a
hearing was set for May 12, 1994. Respondents filed preliminary
objections to the Petition on April 15, 1994. By Order of Court
dated April 18, 1994, consideration of the preliminary objections
was deferred to the hearing already scheduled for May 12, 1994.
On May 9, 1994, Petitioner filed a motion for continuance of
the hearing. In view of the pendency of the Petition since
January, the Court declined to grant a continuance, but advised the
parties by Order dated May 12, 1994, that it would consider a
motion to receive further testimony at the conclusion of the
scheduled hearing.
The scheduled hearing was held on May 12, 1994. At the
conclusion of the proceeding, the Court granted Petitioner's motion
to schedule an additional hearing date. This further proceeding
was held on July 21, 1994.
By Order of Court dated July 21, 1994, the record was left
NO. 94-0106 MISCELLANEOUS TERM
open for an additional period of two weeks to permit Petitioner to
supply certain exhibits; in addition, the stenographer was directed
to transcribe the notes of testimony of the hearing and counsel
were given three weeks after the filing of the transcript for
submission of briefs. On August 26, 1994, the final portion of the
transcript was filed. Counsel thereafter submitted briefs in
support of their respective positions.
Statement of facts. The Petitioner is Joseph Albert Nigro,
Jr., an inmate housed in the special management unit (SMU) of the
State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill.2 Respondents are
various officials or officers with the Department of Corrections.3
Petitioner is presently serving a sentence of one and a half
to five years,4 his minimum sentence having expired on January 11,
1994, and his maximum sentence to expire on or about July 21,
1997.5 He arrived at the State Correctional Institution at Camp
Hill on February 1, 1993.6
At the time of his arrival at Camp Hill, Petitioner was on
disciplinary custody status as a result of misconducts at the State
2 N.T. 10, Hearing, May 12, 1994. This institution is in
Cumberland County.
See Respondents' Exhibit 2, Hearing, May 12, 1994.
N.T. 20, Hearing, May 12, 1994.
N.T. 10, Hearing, May 12, 1994.
N.T. 21, Hearing, May 12, 1994.
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NO. 94-0106 MISCELLANEOUS TERM
Correctional Institution at Huntingdon;7 he had been transferred to
the State Correctional Institution at Huntingdon as a result of
misconducts at the State Correctional Institution at Dallas.8 In
recommending his transfer to Camp Hill, the superintendent at
Huntingdon characterized Petitioner's history of behavior as
"atrocious" and "deplorable."9
The special management unit at Camp Hill in which Petitioner
was and is housed is described by its manager as follows:
The Special Management Unit originally
started as a pilot project for the Department
of Corrections because of overcrowding to the
restrictive housing unit facilities throughout
Pennsylvania. The restricted housing units
didn't provide the necessary staff and the
involvement to reintegrate certain inmates
back into the general population. The SMU
provides that opportunity. It provides
inmates who were held in AC. status or DC
status and couldn't get along in the
restricted housing units, where they received
several misconducts that they wouldn't be
placed back in general population[.]~°
The formal definition of an SMU is "a special unit within
designated Department of Corrections institutions designed to
safely and humanely handle inmates whose behavior presents a
serious threat to the safety and security of the facility, staff,
N.T. 21, Hearing, May 12, 1994.
Respondents' Exhibit 1, Hearing, May 12, 1994.
Respondents' Exhibit 1, Hearing, May 12, 1994.
N.T. 46, Hearing, May 12, 1994.
4
NO. 94-0106 MISCELLANEOUS TERM
other inmates or him or herself.''~
Inmates typically comprising the population of the SMU at Camp
Hill are
[i]nmates that have been a problem at the
various facilities .... [M]ost of the inmates
in the SMU have been transferred from one
facility to another because of their behavior.
For the most part, they've either assaulted
other staff or inmates.~2
An inmate housed in the SMU in Camp Hill is necessarily on
either disciplinary custody status or administrative custody
status.~3 Disciplinary custody is a "restrictive status of
confinement to which inmates found guilty of Class I misconducts
may be committed."~4 Administrative custody is "[a] status of
confinement for non-disciplinary reasons which provides closer
supervision, control, and protection than is provided for in
general population."~s Disciplinary custody is "punishment for
misconduct," whereas administrative custody is "a status arising
out of a person's danger to other persons or guards or a danger to
~ Petitioner's Exhibit 2, Hearing, May 12, 1994 (Department
of Corrections Policy Statement, DC-ADM 802).
~2 N.T. 48-49, Hearing, May 12, 1994.
~3 Petitioner's Exhibit 1, Hearing, May 12, 1994 (Special
Management Unit Manual).
~4 Petitioner's Exhibit 2, Hearing, May 12, 1994 (Department
of Corrections Policy Statement, DC-ADM 802).
~s Petitioner's Exhibit 2, Hearing, May 12, 1994 (Department
of Corrections Policy Statement, DC-ADM 802).
5
NO. 94-0106 MISCELLANEOUS TERM
himself or herself."~6
An inmate housed in the SMU at Camp Hill is, at a given time,
in one of four "phases" of the SMU program. The phases are
graduated in degree of restrictiveness and the program is
ostensibly designed to lead to an SMU resident's reentry into
general population.~7 Phase V of the program is disciplinary
custody, and Phases IV through II are progressively less
restrictive forms of administrative custody.~8 Phase I involves a
sort of conditional release into general population.~9
The invariable practice at the SMU at Camp Hill is that an
inmate in Phase V (disciplinary custody) must, following completion
of his disciplinary custody period, proceed through Phases IV, III
and II (administrative custody), prior to any reentry into general
population.2° The standard practice also is that Phases IV, III,
and II have durations of no less than 90 days each.2~ Consequently,
~6 N.T. 48, Hearing, May 12, 1994.
~7 Petitioner's Exhibit 1, Hearing, May 12, 1994 (Special
Management Unit Manual); see N.T. 54-55, Hearing, May 12, 1994.
~8 Petitioner's Exhibit 1, Hearing, May 12, 1994 (Special
Management Unit Manual).
~9 N.T. 23-24, Hearing, July 21, 1994.
20 Petitioner's Exhibit 1, May 12, 1994 (Special Management
Unit Manual); see N.T. 47, 59-60, Hearing, May 12, 1994; N.T. 11,
Hearing, July 21, 1994.
~ N.T. 15, 59, Hearing, May 12, 1994; N.T. 6, Hearing, July
21, 1994. Phase I apparently also usually lasts 90 days. N.T. 24,
Hearing, July 21, 1994.
6
NO. 94-0106 MISCELLANEOUS TERM
inmates entering the SMU are told to expect a minimum period of
nine months in Phases IV, III and II, following expiration of any
disciplinary custody period.22 Even if the 90-days-per-phase policy
were discarded, the timing of status reviews is such that each of
the three phases would last at least 30 days, for a minimum total
of 90 days in administrative custody.23
An inmate's status in administrative custody in the SMU
program is reviewed, at least nominally, every 30 days by a
"program review committee."24 By appointment of the institution's
superintendent, the committee typically consists of the SMU unit
manager, the lieutenant assigned to the SMU, and the inmate's
counselor.~5
It is apparently the practice of the Parole Board not to
authorize parole for an inmate housed in the SMU - i.e., in Phase
V (disciplinary custody) or Phases IV, III or II (administrative
custody) of the SMU program.~6
Evidence adduced at the hearings herein established a number
of facts concerning (a) Petitioner's history in terms of status in
~ N.T. 13, 57, 59, Hearing, May 12, 1994; N.T. 27, Hearing,
July 21, 1994.
N.T. 59-60, Hearing, May 12, 199'4.
N.T. 53, Hearing, May 12, 1994.
N.T. 62-63, Hearing, May 12, 1994.
N.T. 27, Hearing, May 12, 1994; N.T. 29, Hearing, July 21,
1994.
7
NO. 94-0106 MISCELLANEOUS TERM
the SMU program, (b) the procedures relating to administrative
custody employed in his case, (c) administrative appeals taken by
him from decisions of his program review committee, (d) a certain
parole-related interview in which he participated, and (e) a
certain federal lawsuit commenced by him. These matters will be
discussed seriatim.
From February 1, 1993, until September 23, 1993, Petitioner
was in Phase V (disciplinary custody)' of the SMU program; he then
proceeded into Phase IV (administrative custody).27 While in Phase
IV, he filed the instant Petition.2° Because of misconducts,
however, he returned twice to Phase V status, and was in Phase V as
of the time of both proceedings herein.29 An anticipated date of
September 7, 1994, for his return to Phase IV status existed as of
the second hearing.3° The prospect upon any such return to Phase
IV was for nine additional months of administrative custody in the
SMU as he proceeded through Phases IV, III and II of the program.3~
When Petitioner initially passed from disciplinary custody in
Phase V to administrative custody in Phase IV, the only explanation
N.T. 11, 53, Hearing, May 12, 1994.
N.T. 44, Hearing, July 21, 1994.
N.T. 37, 63, Hearing, May 12, 1994; N.T. 31, Hearing, July
21, 1994.
30 N.T. 45, Hearing, July 21, 1994.
3~ N.T. 34, Hearing, July 21, 1994.
8
NO. 94-0106 MISCELLANEOUS TERM
given for his placement in the latter phase, according to his
testimony, was that the program of the SMU required it.32
Petitioner also testified that only following a 30-day review in
February, 1994, did a "review slip" f~nally state that he was
considered a threat to Department of Corrections facilities.3~ In
addition, according to Petitioner's testimony, only recently have
SMU inmates been permitted to make statements at their
administrative custody hearings.34
Petitioner apparently appealed to the superintendent of the
institution from decisions of the program review committee which
provided for his confinement in administrative custody.~5 He
apparently did not appeal from the superintendent's adverse
decisions on this subject, to an entity called the "Central Office
Review Committee.''~6
On March 21, 1994, Petitioner was interviewed by a person
named Brenda Johnson regarding parole.~7 However, he was never seen
N.T. 18, Hearing, May 12, 1994.
N.T. 19, Hearing, May 12, 1994.
N.T. 35, Hearing, May 12, 1994.
N.T. 41, Hearing, May 12, 1994; N.T. 47, Hearing, July 21,
1994.
N.T. 41, Hearing, May 12, 1994; N.T. 47-48, Hearing, July
21, 1994.
N.T. 35, Hearing, May 12, 1994; N.T. 35, Hearing, July 21,
1994.
9
NO. 94-0106 MISCELLANEOUS TERM
by the Parole Board,TM and the import of the interview, if any, is
unclear from the record.
Prior to commencement of the present habeas corpus action,
Petitioner filed a civil rights action in the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania - against
Respondents herein, inter alios.TM In the federal action, he
challenged his status in administrative custody on the basis of the
department's failure to follow the provisions of the administrative
directive referred to initially herein, resulting in his exclusion
from general population and ineligibility for parole.4° On July 15,
1994, United States Magistrate J. Andrew Smyser recommended
dismissal of the action on the ground that the directive did not
create a federally protected liberty interest.4~ No further
information on the federal action appears in the record of this
case.
In this habeas corpus action, Petitioner maintains that his
placement and continuation in administrative custody has been
inconsistent with the administrative directive referred to above,
38 N.T. 36, Hearing, July 21, 1994.
39 Respondents' Exhibit 2, Hearing, July 21, 1994. The
federal action was filed on December 22, 1993. Id.
40 Respondents' Exhibit 2, Hearing, July 21, 1994. A reading
of Respondents' Exhibit 2 suggests that Petitioner's recollection
that his federal complaint did not include as a ground for relief
the unavailability of parole to a prisoner housed in the SMU is
inaccurate. See N.T. 36, Hearing, July 21, 1994.
~ Respondents' Exhibit 2, Hearing, July 21, 1994 (Department
of Corrections Policy Statement, DC-ADM 802).
10
NO. 94-0106 MISCELLANEOUS TERM
in that (a) authorities did not provide a rationale for his
confinement in such custody, (b) the program review committee
overseeing his case was not composed of the proper persons, and (c)
the extended period of administrative custody provided for under
the SMU program precludes release from such custody in
circumstances where the directive provides for release.42
STATEMENT OF LAW
Administrative Directive 802. In 1970, twenty-one individual
prisoners and an unincorporated association of prisoners of the
Commonwealth, at six state penitentiaries, brought a class action
against various state officials, challenging conditions of
confinement at the six institutions.43 The State Correctional
Institution at Camp Hill, however, was not among the facilities
involved.~
This action was resolved by a May, 1978, consent decree~s and
several subsequent orders.~ In a section entitled""Compliance with
Administrative Directives," the decree provides that "Defendants
42 Brief of Petitioner John Nigro, Jr.
~ See Imprisoned Citizens Union v. Shapp, 451 F. Supp. 893,
894 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Brief for Respondents at 14.
~ See Imprisoned Citizens Union v. Shapp, 451 F. Supp. 893,
894 (E.D. Pa. 1978)
~ See Imprisoned Citizens Union v. Shapp, 451 F. Supp. 893,
894 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
4~ Unfortunately, the consent decree and some of the related
orders are not contained in the present record, nor are they
reported. This Court has taken judicial notice of the decree and
these orders.
11
NO. 94-0106 MISCELLANEOUS TERM
shall comply with the regulations of the Bureau of Corrections
(hereinafter the 'Administrative Directives') and the amendments
and additions thereto."47 By a stipulation accepted by the federal
court in May of 1983, certain procedural and substantive rules of
the type asserted by Petitioner herein regarding administrative
custody were also agreed to by the parties.48
Although the federal decree and related orders do not by their
terms apply to institutions other than the six involved in the
suit, a regulation promulgated by the Department of Corrections on
the subject of restricted housing units and an administrative
directive issued by the Commissioner of Corrections on
administrative custody are not so limited. The regulation
provides, in part, as follows:
Confinement in a Restricted Housing Unit
(RHU), other than under procedures established
for inmate discipline, will not be done for
punitive purposes. The Department of
Corrections will maintain written procedures
which describe the reasons for housing an
inmate in the RHU and require due process in
accord with established principles of law for
an inmate who is housed in the RHU. Ail
inmates confined in the RHU will be reviewed
periodically by institution staff.
37 Pa. Code §93.11(b) (1984) (emphasis added).~9
"7 Consent Decree, May 22, 1978, ~Section V, Paragraph 1,
Imprisoned Citizens Union v. Shapp, Nos. 70-3054, 71-513, 71-1006,
70-1545 (E.D. Pa. 1978); see note 46 supra.
~8 Order, May 11, 1983, Imprisoned Citizens Union v. Shapp,
Nos. 70-3054, 71-513, 71-1006, 70-1545 (E.D. Pa. 1983); see note 46
supra.
~ The regulation in question also states that "[n]o inmate
shall have a right to be housed in a particular institution or in
12
NO. 94-0106 MISCELLANEOUS TERM
In accordance with this regulation, an administrative
directive known as DC-ADM 802 was issued by the Commissioner of
Corrections. This directive regarding administrative custody was
intended to establish "an Administrative Hearing process which
provides clear notice to inmates of the reason for their
confinement and outlines a fair hearing process."5° The directive
applies "to all Restricted Housing Units, Administrative Custody
Units and Special Management Units within the Department of
Corrections.,,5~
The directive (a) enumerates specific reasons which will
justify transfer of an inmate into administrative custody, (b)
establishes a program review committee composed of two deputy
superintendents and the inmate program director or unit manager, or
"appropriate substitutes" designated by the superintendent, (c)
provides for a hearing by the committee upon an inmate's initial
placement in administrative custody, at which the rationale for
placement is to be explained to the inmate, he or she is to be
allowed to respond, and a decision is to be based on "a valid
security reason," and from which the inmate may appeal to the
superintendent and then to a Central Office Review Committee, and
(d) provides for 30-day reviews of an inmate's status in
a particular area within an institution." 37 Pa. Code §93.11(a)
(1984).
50 Petitioner's Exhibit 2, Hearing, May 12, 1994 (Department
of Corrections Policy Statement, DC-ADM 802).
5~ Petitioner's Exhibit 2, Hearing, May 12, 1994 (Department
of Corrections Policy Statement, DC-ADM 802).
13
NO. 94-0106 MISCELLANEOUS TERM
administrative custody by the committee,s2
With respect to these periodic reviews, the directive further
states as follows:
Specific items should be evaluated in making
the decision whether to continue or release an
inmate from Administrative Custody:
a. Time in RHU
b. Number, type and frequency of
misconducts
c. Continued public or institution
risk
d. Safety of the inmate, other
inmates and staff
e. Behavior in RHU including
sanitation, personal hygiene and
grooming, response to authority,
response to other inmates and
response to verbal and written
orders
f. Recommendation of RHU and
treatment staffs3
Under the directive, a decision following a 30-day review by
the committee to continue an inmate's administrative custody status
is to be automatically reviewed by the institution's
superintendent.54 In addition, a formal report to, and review by,
the Regional Deputy Commissioner of the Department of Corrections
~2 Petitioner's Exhibit 2, Hearing, May 12, 1994 (Department
of Corrections Policy Statement, DC-ADM 802).
s3 Petitioner's Exhibit 2, Hearing, May 12, 1994 (Department
of Corrections Policy Statement, DC-ADM 802).
s4 Petitioner's Exhibit 2, Hearing, May 12, 1994 (Department
of Corrections Policy Statement, DC-ADM 802).
14
NO. 94-0106 MISCELLANEOUS TERM
is to be undertaken where an inmate is retained in administrative
custody beyond a 90-day period.Ss
Finally, the directive contains this provision, entitled
"Rights under this Directive":
This directive sets out policy and procedure.
It does not create rights in any person nor
should it be interpreted or applied in such a
manner as to abridge the rights of any
individual. The directive should be
interpreted to have sufficient flexibility so
as to be consistent with law and to permit the
accomplishment of the purpose of the
directives and policies of the Department of
Corrections.s6
Exhaustion of administrative remedies. It has been said that
"Habeas Corpus is ... an extraordinary remedy and is available
after other remedies have been exhausted or are ineffectual or
nonexistent." Commonwealth v. Maute, 263. Pa. Super. 220, 229, 397
A.2d 826, 830 (1979). "[H]abeas corpus should not be entertained
... to correct prison conditions which can be remedied through an
appeal to prison authorities or to an administrative agency."
Commonwealth ex rel. Bryant v. Hendrick, 444 Pa. 83, 90, 280 A.2d
110, 113 (1971).
APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS
An application of the law recited above to the facts of the
present case militates against granting relief to Petitioner on his
claim that authorities failed to provide reasons for his initial
s5 Petitioner's Exhibit 2, Hearing, May 12, 1994 (Department
of Corrections Policy Statement, DC-ADM 802).
s6 Petitioner's Exhibit 2, Hearing, May 12, 1994 (Department
of Corrections Policy Statement, DC-ADM 802).
15
NO. 94-0106 MISCELLANEOUS TERM
placement and for his continued status in administrative custody.
In this regard, the propriety of his initial placement in
administrative custody has become somewhat moot by virtue of his
return to disciplinary custody status in the meantime;s7
furthermore, Petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies by appealing his placement beyond the superintendent's
level. Most recently, it may be noted, the program review
committee did in fact provide a rationale for its decision to
continue Petitioner in administrative custody.
Similarly unavailing to Petitioner is his argument for relief
based upon an allegedly improper composition of the SMU program
review committee. Under Administrative Directive 802, designees of
the institution's superintendent may constitute the committee in
lieu of the persons otherwise provided for.
Petitioner's third argument, however, based upon the extended
period of administrative custody effectuated by the SMU requirement
that an inmate participate in each of the aforesaid phases and by
its policy of continuing each phase for at least 90 days, is more
compelling. The effect of this program can be, as Petitioner
testified, the subjection of inmates housed at the SMU in Camp Hill
to "an .extra nine-month period [of administrative custody] that no
one else in the State of Pennsylvania would be inflicted upon,"
notwithstanding the existence of a uniform directive on the
~ Cf. Bronson v. Domovich, 427 Pa. Super. 312, 628 A.2d 1177
(1993).
16
NO. 94-0106 MISCELLANEOUS TERM
subject,s8
Such a result is not consistent with the mandatory language of
the directive, nor with its apparent purpose to reintroduce an
inmate into general population within a minimal period after the
reason for administrative custody ceases. Nor is sUch a result
compatible with the Department of Corrections regulation precluding
the presence of a punitive element in administrative custody, or
with its direction that a written procedure be devised with respect
to restricted housing. For these reasons, the Court is in
agreement with Petitioner that the procedures of Administrative
Directive 802 are more than merely permissive and should be
generally followed within the SMU program.59
At the same time, a considerable amount of discretion must be
left to prison officials in such matters, and nothing in this
Opinion is intended to mandate a specific result following a given
periodic review by the program review committee of Petitioner's
status in the SMU. In accordance with the foregoing, the following
Order will be entered:
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this ~day of December, 1994, upon consideration of
Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and for the reasons
stated in the accompanying Opinion, the Petition is DENIED to the
extent that it seeks immediate release of Petitioner into general
s8 N.T. 14, Hearing, May 12, 1994.
~ Cf. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 103 S. Ct. 864, 74 L.
Ed.2d 675 (1983).
17
population and GRANTED to the extent that Respondents are directed
not to extend Petitioner's confinement in administrative custody by
means of a policy automatically requiring his participation in each
administrative custody phase of the SMU program, with each phase
having a minimum period of 90 days.
BY THE COURT,
s/ J. Wesley Oler, Jr.
J. Wesley Oler, Jr., J.
Clifford D. Swift, Esq.
Assistant Counsel
Department of Corrections
P.O. Box 598, 2520 Lisburn Road
Camp Hill, PA 17001-0598
Attorney for Respondents
Michael A. Scherer, Esq.
17 West South Street
Carlisle, Pa 17013
Attorney for Petitioner
:re
18