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Home My WebLink About92-0034 CivilROBERT W. BAKER, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. CIVIL ACTION - EQUITY SHAFFER TRUCKING, INC., NO. 34 EQUITY 1992 Defendant IN RE: DEFENDANT'S PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS BEFORE HOFFER, BAYLEY and OLER, JJ ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this JqK day of January, 1993, after careful consideration of Defendant's preliminary objections, the preliminary objections are SUSTAINED and Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED. BY THE COURT, Arthur T. McDermott, Esq. Attorney for Plaintiff Daniel K. Deardorff, Esq. Attorney for Defendant Robert W. Baker, Plaintiff 117 Regency Woods Carlisle, PA 17013 J ROBERT W. BAKER, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. CIVIL ACTION - EQUITY SHAFFER TRUCKING, INC., NO. 34 EQUITY 1992 Defendant IN RE: DEFENDANT'S PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS BEFORE HOFFER, BAYLEY and OLER, JJ. OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT Oler, J. The present action in equity is for specific performance of an alleged employment agreement between plaintiff employee and defendant employer. Defendant has filed preliminary objections to the complaint.' For the reasons stated in this Opinion, the preliminary objections must be sustained. Plaintiff's complaint alleges that, as defendant's employee, plaintiff sustained a work-related injury in June of 1991, at which time he was earning $500 for a 55 hour week.2 It avers that his return to work in November, as a regional shuttle driver at the same salary, was accompanied by execution of a Workers' Compensation form entitled Supplemental Agreement for Compensation for Disability or Permanent Injury.3 The Agreement, as attached to the complaint, provides in pertinent part as follows: ' Plaintiff's attorney obtained a rule to show cause why he should not be permitted to withdraw from this case on October 1, 1992. No response to the rule was filed by Plaintiff, but no motion to make the rule absolute has been filed. 2 Plaintiff's complaint, paragraph 3. 3 Plaintiff's complaint, paragraph 4 and Exhibit A. No. 34 Equity 1992 Whereas, the undersigned employer and employee are parties to a compensation agreement or award of the above number and it is now hereby agreed between the parties hereto that the status of the disability of the said employe changed on 11-25-91 as follows Employee returned to work at pre- injury wage or above. It is further agreed that on and after ---- compensation shall be payable to the said employe at the rate of --- per week for --- weeks; or, if the future period of disability is uncertain, then to continue at said rate until terminated by a further supplemental agreement, order of the Workmen's Compensation Board or Referee, or by final receipt. Further matters agreed upon NONE° In February of 1992, it is alleged, plaintiff received a modest salary increase,' but in July he was advised that due to his physical limitations and physical therapy schedule he must either resign or accept an assignment of another driving position.' A letter from the employer to this effect, attached to the complaint, reads in pertinent part as follows: ... Shaffer has willingly put forth a tremendous effort to meet your work assignment needs since your return on November 25, 1991. Your restricted use as a Regional Shuttle driver is impossible to circumvent while meeting the present demands of our customers during our busiest season.... Because you are a valuable employee, we have now offered you an open position as a second shift Hershey Shuttle Driver. This position does not ever require any physical labor, would not interfere with your physical therapy schedule, and therefore would not jeopardize our customer satisfaction.... Your 4 Plaintiff's complaint, Exhibit A. ' Plaintiff's complaint, paragraph 5. 6 Plaintiff's complaint, paragraph 6 and Exhibit B. N No. 34 Equity 1992 potential weekly compensation for a 55 hour work week could be greater as a Hershey Shuttle Driver. Bob, we must have your decision to accept this position or resign by Friday, July 10, 1992. We need to fill the position that we are offering you. Should your limitations be removed in the future, we would approve a request by you to return to the ... Regional Shuttle Division at that time.' The complaint alleges that plaintiff does not believe that compensation for the position proffered would equal his pre -injury wage.' It avers that defendant refused to accept a condition imposed by plaintiff for acceptance of the transfer that the employer guarantee that his level of income would equal or exceed the pre -injury level.' Plaintiff was thereafter terminated, according to the complaint.'O Relief requested in the complaint is that the Court "order the Defendant to specifically perform the terms of the Supplemental Agreement and restore [Plaintiff] to a position at his pre -injury wage or above."11 Defendant's preliminary objections are based upon legal insufficiency of the complaint (demurrer),12 it being ' Plaintiff's complaint, Exhibit B. ' Plaintiff's complaint, paragraph 7. ' Plaintiff's complaint, paragraph 8. to Plaintiff's complaint, paragraph 9. 11 Plaintiff's complaint, claim for relief. 12 See Pa. R.C.P. 1028(a)(4). 3 No. 34 Equity 1992 argued that the Supplemental Agreement does not guarantee employment; and upon lack of subject matter jurisdiction,13 it being argued that the principles of exclusive jurisdiction14 and employer immunity's contained in the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act 16 preclude entertainment of the action by this Court. Statement of law. With respect to the legal sufficiency of Plaintiff's claim to be entitled to continued employment by virtue of the Workers' Compensation form attached to the complaint, it may be noted that the proposition that the Workmen's Compensation Act was intended to guarantee employment, as opposed to payment of compensation benefits, has not been judicially accepted. Macken v. Lord Corp., 6 D. & C.4th 131 (Crawford Co. 1990), aff'd, 402 Pa. Super. 1, 585 A.2d 1106 (1991). Thus, an injured employee is not protected against termination when he or she refuses to accept a 13 See Pa. R.C.P. 1028(a)(1). 14 See Hyzy v. Pittsburgh Coal Co., 384 Pa. 316, 121 A.2d 85 (1956) (disposition of issue of exclusivity of jurisdiction on preliminary objections). 1s See 3 Barbieri, Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Immunity of Employer §1.14, at 186 (1991 Supp.) ("Immunity is not an affirmative defense, but goes to the subject jurisdiction of the Court ...."). 16 Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §§1 et seq. (Main Vol. & 1992 Supp.). 4 No. 34 Equity 1992 certain assignment. 17 A supplemental agreement under the Act may be indicative of liability on the part of an employer as to payment of compensation benefits,18 but the Act can not be construed as providing a returning worker with permanent employment at a definite wage.19 With respect to subject matter jurisdiction of the instant action, it has been said that "[t]he workmen's compensation authorities are the exclusive agency for the handling of all matters arising out of workmen's compensation injuries. The trial courts have no trial jurisdiction." 2 Barbieri, Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation §6.00(2), at 12 (1975). "A reading of [the Workmen's Compensation Act] and its many amendments makes it manifest that the legislation ... was designed and intended to establish exclusive jurisdiction, practice and procedure in all matters pertaining to such subject matter.... The statutory provisions relate to both cases commenced by petition and to agreements for compensation." American Casualty Co. of Reading v. Kligerman, 365 Pa. 168, 172, 74 A.2d 169, 172 (1950) (emphasis deleted). To the extent that an employee alleges that his 17 Macken v. Lord Corp., 402 Pa. Super. 1, 585 A.2d 1106 (1991). le See Williams v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, _ Pa. Commw. , 601 A.2d 473 (1991). 19 See Macken v. Lord Corp., 402 Pa. Super. 1, 585 A.2d 1106 (1991). 5 No. 34 Equity 1992 compensation payments have been effectively suspended in violation of the Act, an exclusive remedy is provided therein.20 In addition, "[t]he liability of an employer under [the Workmen's Compensation Act is] exclusive and in place of any and all other liability to such employes ...." Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §481(a). Application of law to facts. An examination of the Plaintiff's complaint in the present case leads to a conclusion that the worker's compensation form appended to the complaint can not reasonably be construed to support a cause of action for continuous employment at a definite wage. The plaintiff's cause of action, if one exists, pertains to an obligation to furnish workers' compensation payments as a result of a work-related injury, a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the workmen's compensation authorities and as to which the employer is immune to suit in a different context. For these reasons, the following Order must be entered: ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this 14th day of January, 1993, after careful consideration of Defendant's preliminary objections, the 20 See Macken v. Lord Corp., 402 Pa. Super. 1, 585 A.2d 1106 (1991). 1.1 No. 34 Equity 1992 preliminary objections are SUSTAINED and Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED. Arthur T. McDermott, Esq. Attorney for Plaintiff Daniel K. Deardorff, Esq. Attorney for Defendant Robert W. Baker, Plaintiff 117 Regency Woods Carlisle, PA 17013 BY THE COURT, s/J. Wesley Oler, Jr. J. 7