HomeMy WebLinkAbout92-1900 CriminalCOMMONWEALTH IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
V. 1900 CRIMINAL 1992
CHARGE: (A)RESISTING ARREST
(B)UNLAW POSS SM AMT
MARIJUANA
(C) DUI
(D)DISORDERLY CONDUCT
DAMON R. HOCKENSMITH
AFFIANT: PTL. DENNIS R. STUM
IN RE: DEFENDANT'S OMNIBUS PRETRIAL MOTION
BEFORE OLER. J
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this 21st day of January, 1993, upon
consideration of the Defendant's Omnibus Pretrial Motion for
Relief, in the form of a Motion to Suppress, based upon the
alleged unconstitutionality and illegality of a DUI sobriety
checkpoint and/or stop of the Defendant, the Defendant's motion
is DENIED.
By the Court,
I
J Wesley Ole', Jr., J;
ALISON TAYLOR, ESQUIRE
Assistant District Attorney
ARLA M. WALLER, ESQUIRE
Assistant Public Defender
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COMMONWEALTH IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
V. 1900 CRIMINAL 1992
CHARGE: (A)RESISTING ARREST
(B)UNLAW POSS SM AMT
MARIJUANA
(C) DUI
(D)DISORDERLY CONDUCT
DAMON R. HOCKENSMITH AFFIANT: PTL. DENNIS R. STUM
OLER, J.
IN RE: DEFENDANT'S OMNIBUS PRETRIAL MOTION
BEFORE OLER, J.
OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT
In the present criminal case in which the Defendant is
charged with resisting arrest, unlawful possession of a small
amount of marijuana, driving under the influence, and disorderly
conduct, an Omnibus Pretrial Motion has been filed on behalf of
the Defendant. The motion requests suppression of evidence
seized as a result of an allegedly unconstitutional DUI sobriety
checkpoint and/or allegedly illegal stop of Defendant. An
evidentiary hearing was held on the matter on January 21, 1993.
Based upon the evidence submitted at the hearing and the
allegations in combination with admissions in the Defendant's
motion and Commonwealth's answer, the following Findings of
Fact, Discussion, and Order of Court, are made and entered.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On September 12, 1992, the Defendant was arrested
and charged with the above -captioned offenses.
2. Prior to the Defendant's arrest, on that date a
DUI sobriety checkpoint was conducted in the area of 2881 Spring
Road, Middlesex Township, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania.
3. The said checkpoint had been authorized as to time
and place administratively by Police Chief William Weaver of the
North Middleton Township Police Department, Police Chief Barry
Sherman of the Middlesex Township Police Department, and John
Rich, Chief of the Cumberland County DUI Department, the latter
department being a unit or agency of the Cumberland County
District Attorney's Office.
4. The procedure employed by the aforesaid DUI
department at the said checkpoint was to stop all cars traveling
in each direction during the time that the checkpoint was in
operation; this procedure had been administratively determined
as aforesaid.
5. The time and location of the said checkpoint was
determined administratively on the basis of the high traffic
volume on the road, the number of prior DUI accidents in that
area, and the number of prior DUI arrests in that area.
6. The aforesaid checkpoint contained signs
announcing its presence in such a manner that warnings were
given 500 feet in advance of the checkpoint or better to
oncoming traffic, and the said checkpoint was clearly visible
well in advance of its location and was extremely well lit.
7. As indicated in the prior finding, the question of
which vehicles to stop at the roadblock was not left to the
discretion of police officers or other persons at the scene, but
instead was determined administratively and in this case was to
involve the stopping of all vehicles.
8. The checkpoint as to time and location and the
procedures employed on this particular occasion were in
substantial conformity with the policy and procedures set forth
in the Cumberland County District Attorney's Office, DUI
Department, Sobriety Checkpoint Policy and Procedures Manual,
which constitutes State's Exhibit 1.
9. The results and procedures employed with respect
to the said checkpoint are described in the DUI Sobriety
Checkpoint (SCP) report, constituting State's Exhibit 3.
10. Although not drawn to scale, the physical set-up
of the aforesaid checkpoint is shown in State's Exhibit 2.
11. At the aforesaid time and location, the Defendant,
Damon R. Hockensmith, was driving a vehicle which entered the
checkpoint and which stopped at the checkpoint in accordance
with directions of an officer, which directions were given to
all vehicles approaching that checkpoint.
12. The stop of the Defendant's vehicle was unusual in
that it was not a smooth stop but was a sudden one, which caused
his vehicle to rock.
13. The Defendant was asked by Middlesex Township
Police Officer James Sadler to produce identification, and the
Defendant displayed certain signs of intoxication.
14. The signs of intoxication displayed by the
Defendant included bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, a smell of
alcohol emanating from the car, and the flicking of a cigarette
at the officer.
15. In addition, the officer observed various beer
cans scattered in the Defendant's vehicle, and the Defendant
presented the officer with an expired driver's license.
16. The officer had probable cause, if such was
required, to believe that the Defendant was driving under the
influence of alcohol, and the officer also observed, through the
expired license, the possibility of an additional Vehicle Code
offense.
17. Based on the foregoing observations, the officer
properly directed the Defendant to a pull -off area where the
investigation continued.
18. In accordance with the allegation in the
Defendant's Omnibus Pretrial Motion for Relief and the Answer of
the Commonwealth, it is found that the Defendant submitted to
chemical analysis of his breath, the result of the analysis
being a reading of .192 percent blood alcohol level.
19. Sixteen police officers were present at the
aforesaid checkpoint as well as other personnel.
DISCUSSION
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held in
Commonwealth v. Blouse, Pa. , 611 A.2d 1177
(1992), that systematic, nondiscriminatory, nonarbitrary
roadblocks are constitutional under the Pennsylvania
Constitution, and that 75 Pa.C.S. Section 6308(b), authorizing
such roadblocks, does not offend the constitution. In Blouse,
the Court reviewed the following guidelines from the case of
Commonwealth v. Tarbert, 517 Pa. 277, 535 A.2d 1035 (1987):
[T]he conduct of the roadblock itself
can be such that it requires only a
momentary stop to allow the police to
make a brief but trained observation
of a vehicle's driver, without entailing
any physical search of the vehicle or
its occupants. To avoid unnecessary
surprise to motorists, the existence
of a roadblock can be so conducted as to be
ascertainable from a reasonable distance
or otherwise made knowable in advance.
The possibility of arbitrary roadblocks
can be significantly curtailed by the
institution of certain safeguards.
First, the very decision to hold a drunk -driver
roadblock, as well as the decision as
to its time and place, should be matters
reserved for prior administrative approval,
Thus removing the determination of those
matters from the discretion of police
officers in the field. In this connection
it is essential that the route selected
for the roadblock be one which, based on
local experience, is likely to be travelled
by intoxicated drivers. The time of the
roadblock should be governed by the same
consideration. Additionally, the question
of which vehicles to stop at the roadblock
should not be left to the unfettered discretion
of police officers at the scene, but instead
should be in accordance with objective
standards prefixed by administrative decision.
Commonwealth v. Blouse, Pa. , , 611 A.2d
1177, 1180 (1992). "Substantial compliance with the guidelines
is all that is required to reduce the intrusiveness of the
search to a constitutionally acceptable level." Id. at ,
611 A.2d at 1180.
In the present case, the Court finds that the
Commonwealth fully met the standards for a checkpoint set forth
in Blouse, and, further, that Officer Sadler had probable cause
to detain the Defendant for further investigation based upon the
officer's observations. For these reasons, the following Order
will be entered.
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this 21st day of January, 1993, upon
consideration of the Defendant's Omnibus Pretrial Motion for
Relief, in the form of a Motion to Suppress, based upon the
alleged unconstitutionality and illegality of a DUI sobriety
checkpoint and/or stop of the Defendant, the Defendant's motion
is DENIED.
By the Court,
J. Wesley Oler, Jr.
J.
ALISON TAYLOR, ESQUIRE
Assistant District Attorney
ARLA M. WALLER, ESQUIRE
Assistant Public Defender
wcy