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Home My WebLink About92-0584 CivilTANDY COMPUTER LEASING, a Division of TANDY ELECTRONICS, INC., Plaintiff V. PRIMERO, INC. and MICHAEL STANOVICH, Defendants IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW NO. 584 CIVIL 1992 IN RE: DEFENDANT'S PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS BEFORE HOFFER HESS and OLER JJ. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this 23rd day of February, 1993, upon consideration of Defendant's Preliminary Objections to Plaintiffs Complaint, and of the briefs and oral arguments presented on the matter, Defendant's Preliminary Objections are DISMISSED. Defendant is granted twenty days within which to file an answer. BY THE COURT, J. - Wham T. Wilson, Esq. LEGG & WILSON 7 South High Street P.O. Box 553 West Chester, PA 19381 Attorney for Plaintiff Gerard M. Mackarevich, Esq. GOLDBERG, KATZMAN & SHIPMAN, P.C. 320 E. Market Street P.O. Box 1268 Harrisburg, PA 17108-1268 Attorney for Defendant :rc TANDY COMPUTER LEASING, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF a Division of TANDY CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA ELECTRONICS, INC., Plaintiff V. CIVIL ACTION - LAW PRIMERO, INC. and MICHAEL STANOVICH, Defendants NO. 584 CIVIL 1992 IN RE: DEFENDANT'S PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS BEFORE HOFFER, HESS, and OLER, JJ. OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT Oler, J. At issue in the present case are preliminary objections filed by Michael Stanovich (Defendant) to a complaint filled by Tandy Computer Leasing (Plaintiff). Based upon the averments contained in Plaintiff s Complaint and the reasons set forth in this Opinion, Defendant's preliminary objections are denied. In its Complaint, Plaintiff avers that on December 3, 1987, Primero, Inc. (Primero) contracted with Plaintiff for the lease of computer equipment.' Plaintiff also avers that at that time, Defendant signed an agreement in which he guaranteed payment of Primero's obligations under the lease.' It is further alleged that, on December 4, 1987, the equipment covered by the lease between Plaintiff and Primero was delivered to Primero.' ' Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraph 4. A copy of this lease is attached to Plaintiff's Complaint as Exhibit A. ' Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraph 5. A copy of this "Individual Personal Guaranty' is attached to Plaintiff's Complaint as Exhibit B. This document identifies Defendant as president of one of Primero's divisions. s Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraph 6. No. 584 Civil 1992 Plaintiff further avers that payments were not made under the lease as of January 1, 1988, and pursuant to the lease were thus "delinquent from on or after January 16, 1988.i4 Consequently, Plaintiff contends that "[m]onthly rent payments which were late on or after February 16,1988 ... total $9,351.20."' Furthermore, under the lease agreement, Plaintiff contends it is entitled to "liquidated damages of 20% of the purchase price of the equipment ... plus interest on the amount owed at 1.5% per month."' Based upon these contentions, Plaintiff is demanding judgment in its favor "for $10,859.75 with interest at 1.5% per month, attorneys fees and the costs of this action. "' Defendant has filed the present preliminary objections in the form of a motion to strike or, in the alternative, a motion for a more speck pleading. Defendant contends (1) that Plaintiff has not pleaded all the material facts upon which its cause of action is based; (2) that Plaintiff has not averred the performance of conditions 4 Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraph 7. Under the terms of the lease, Primero is to be deemed in default of the lease if it fails to pay any amount due thereunder within fifteen days after the due date. See Plaintiff's Complaint, Exhibit A, paragraph 11. s Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraph 8. Pursuant to Paragraph 12 of the lease, upon Primero's default, Plaintiff has the right to "declare due, sue for and recover all rents ... then accrued or thereafter accruing for the entire lease term." Plaintiff's Complaint, Exhibit A, paragraph 12. 6 Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraphs 9, 10. 7 Plaintiff's Complaint, ad damnum clause. There appears to be an error of $200 in Plaintiff's arithmetic, and, in actuality, it is demanding judgment in the amount of $10,659.79. See Plaintiff's Brief, at 3-4. 2 No. 584 Civil 1992 precedent; and (3) that Plaintiff has failed to state whether the relief sought exceeds the jurisdictional amount for compulsory arbitration.' With respect to Defendant's contention that Plaintiffs complaint fails to set forth the material facts upon which its cause of action is based, Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1019(a) requires that "[t]he material facts upon which a cause of action .. is based shall be stated in a concise and summary form." In determining the sufficiency of the averments in a pleading, "[a] trial court has broad discretion ... since the standard of pleading set forth in Rule 1019(a) is incapable of precise measurement." 2 Goodrich Amram 2d §1019(a):10, at 325 (1991). In exercising this discretion, the trial court must keep in mind that "[i]t is not the function of a pleading to be an all- inclusive narrative of events underlying a claim or defense; a party need only plead those material facts necessary to sustain a recovery ... which at the same time enables an opponent to respond." 2 Goodrich Amram 2d §1019(a):4, at 318-19 (1991). Moreover, "[t]he requirements of Rule 1019(a) are satisfied if the allegations in a pleading contain averments of all facts that a party will eventually have to prove in order to prevail, and those facts are sufficiently specific so as to enable the parties served to prepare a response thereto." Id. In the present action, we believe that Plaintiff's complaint does set forth the material facts, which if proven, could entitle Plaintiff to sustain a recovery. Not only ' Defendant's Preliminary Objections, paragraph 2-4. 91 No. 584 Civil 1992 has Plaintiff pleaded the existence of a lease agreement between itself and Primero, but it has also pleaded that Defendant had signed an "Individual Personal Guaranty" in which Defendant guaranteed payment of Primero's obligations under the lease agreement." Moreover, Plaintiff has averred that Primero and Defendant were "delinquent" in making payments under the lease agreement.10 Furthermore, Plaintiff has provided a basis for its calculation of the damages which it is seeking." With reference to Defendant's contention that Plaintiff has not averred the occurrence of conditions precedent, it should be noted that "[t]here is no requirement that the pleader aver the satisfaction of conditions precedent when in fact the contract does not include any conditions precedent." 2A Anderson Pennsylvania Civil Practice §1019.44, at 199 (1969). Moreover, a plaintiff need only plead "that conditions precedent have been satisfied when the satisfaction thereof is an essential part of his cause of action." Id. at 198. In the present case, Plaintiff has averred that the equipment described in the lease agreement was delivered to Primero on December 4, 1987.12 Under the lease s Plaintiffs Complaint, paragraphs 4, 5, Exhibit B. to Plaintiffs Complaint, paragraph 7. " Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraphs 8-10. By reference to the terms of the lease agreement, one can ascertain those provisions which provide for the specific recovery which Plaintiff is seeking. Although this may not be the most organized pleading of the material facts, we believe that it does meet the requirements of Rule 1019(a). " Plaintiffs Complaint, paragraph 6. 4 No. 584 Civil 1992 agreement between Plaintiff and Primero, this was the only express condition precedent to Primero's obligation to pay and Defendant's guaranty of this obligation." Consequently, we believe that Plaintiff has made sufficient averments in connection with conditions precedent to withstand Defendant's preliminary objections. Finally, with respect to Defendant's contention that Plaintiff has failed to state whether the remedy which it is seeking exceeds the jurisdictional amount for compulsory arbitration, it is noted that Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1021(c) provides that "[i]n counties having rules governing compulsory arbitration the plaintiff shall also state whether the amount claimed does or does not exceed the jurisdictional amount requiring arbitration referral by local rule." In the present case, Plaintiffs Complaint does fail to comply with this rule. However, the amount of recovery which Plaintiff is seeking is clearly set forth in the Complaint, and the application of the compulsory arbitration rules can be determined therefrom.14 The Court is unwilling to delay this action by requiring formal compliance with Rule 1021(c) when it is evident on the face of Plaintiffs Complaint that such compliance is not necessary to protect is Plaintiff's Complaint, Exhibit A. is In Cumberland County, any case in which the amount in controversy is $10,000 or less must be submitted to arbitration. Cumberland County Rule of Court 1301-1. This Rule has recently been amended so that cases for which the amount in controversy is less than or equal to $25,000 must be submitted to compulsory arbitration. However, this amendment did not go into effect until February 1, 1993. M No. 584 Civil 1992 the substantive rights of Defendant. See Pa. R.C.P. 126; see also Barnes v. Rural Opportunities, Inc., 3100 Civil 1991, slip. op., at 14-15 (Cumberland Co. 1992). ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this 23rd day of February, 1993, upon consideration of Defendant's Preliminary Objections to Plaintiff's Complaint, and of the briefs and oral arguments presented on the matter, Defendant's Preliminary Objections are DISMISSED. Defendant is granted twenty days in which to file an answer. BY THE COURT, s/ J. Wesley Oler, Jr. J. William T. Wilson, Esq. LEGG & WILSON 7 South High Street P.O. Box 553 West Chester, PA 19381 Attorney for Plaintiff Gerard M. Mackarevich, Esq. GOLDBERG, KATZMAN & SHIPMAN, P.C. 320 E. Market Street P.O. Box 1268 Harrisburg, PA 17108-1268 Attorney for Defendant :rc 0