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HomeMy WebLinkAbout1988-0928 VASILIKI M. BAKER, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PLAINTIFF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : V. : : RANDALL K. BAKER, : DEFENDANT : 88-0928 CIVIL TERM IN RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO ENFORCE PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AND SEPARATION AGREEMENT MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT Masland, J., July 3, 2012:-- Before the court is Plaintiff’s motion to enforce the property settlement and separation agreement that was incorporated in the divorce decree dated July 27, 1988. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks to enforce the provisions of paragraph 5.04 titled “Education of Children,” and require Defendant to pay the sum of $92,079, which Plaintiff calculates to be one-half of the college expenses incurred by the parties’ three children. Plaintiff also seeks reasonable attorney fees pursuant to the property settlement agreement and the award of any other relief that is proper and just. Defendant, in his answer and new matter claims that the relief sought by Plaintiff is time-barred by the four year statute of limitations governing contract disputes as set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 5525(a)(8). For the reasons set forth below, we are persuaded that Plaintiff is entitled to a portion of the relief requested. Factual Background The parties are the parents of three children: Athanasia Baker (“Athanasia”), born November 25, 1976; Alexandra Baker (“Alexandra”), born 88-0928 CIVIL TERM June 2, 1980; and William Baker (“William”), born August 16, 1986. When the parties entered into the property settlement and separation agreement (“Agreement”) dated July 12, 1988, Athanasia was 11, Alexandra was 8, and William was not quite two years old. The Agreement was drafted by Plaintiff’s attorney and although Defendant could recall few details regarding his counsel’s explanation of the Agreement, paragraph 7.01 clearly notes “[t]he provisions of this agreement and thier [sic] legal affect have been fully explained to the parties by their respective counsel … [and] each party acknowledges that he or she has received independent legal advice from counsel of his or her selection and that each fully understands the facts and has been fully informed as to his or her legal rights and obligations ….” Furthermore, we note that Defendant’s signature was notarized by his counsel’s then secretary and current partner. Therefore, whether Defendant recalls signing the document in his attorney’s office, we are satisfied that he did. The details may elude them after all these years, but the parties were well aware of the import of the Agreement when it was executed. In particular, the parties were aware of the specific language in paragraph 5.04, which we set forth in its entirety: Husband and wife each agree to assume one-half of the financial responsibility associated with the education of the children and agrees to share in the cost of a college education if the child is so inclined so long as the child and Wife cooperate in all reasonalbe [sic] efforts as may be requested by Husband to obtain scholarships, grants, low interest loans, work study grants, etc. Husband’s obligation hereunder shall be limited to the reasonable and necessary expenses at the appropriate institution for tuition, room and board, books, necessary incidentals and reasonable transportation expenses between said -2- 88-0928 CIVIL TERM institution and the child’s residence; However [sic] Husband shall not be obligated to pay any additional support payments directly to Wife from and after a date three months following the child’s granduation th [sic] from high school or the child’s 18 birthday, whichever shall last occur. If either Husband or Wife is financially incapable of meeting this obligation to the children, said party shall petition the Court to conduct a hearing to make a determination of the [sic] whether this provision should be modified. Against this backdrop, we will briefly sketch the college experience of the parties’ three children. Athanasia attended the Pennsylvania State University between 1995 and 1998, receiving a bachelor’s degree in comparative literature. The total cost for her education was $29,925, of which $9,200 was paid though loans made to the Plaintiff and $17,125 was paid through loans made to Athanasia. Both loans were paid in full in December 2002. Alexandra graduated from Shippensburg University in 2002 with a bachelor’s degree in elementary education. The total cost for her education was $23,602, of which $5,600 was paid through loans made to Plaintiff and $18,002 was paid through loans made to Alexandra. Plaintiff’s loans have been paid in full; however, Alexandra’s portion was not fully paid as of the date of the hearing, with approximately $18,000 outstanding. William attended Blue Ridge Community College in 2006 and 2007. After taking some time off, he attended Full Sail University from 2007 through 2010 and received a bachelor’s degree in recording arts. The cost for William’s education was $134,231 of which $105,231 was paid through loans made to Plaintiff (Plaintiff’s Exhibit No. 4) and $29,000 in loans made to William (Plaintiff’s Exhibit No. 8). -3- 88-0928 CIVIL TERM DISCUSSION In determining Defendant’s obligation under the terms of the Agreement, we turn first to his claim that the action is time-barred by the Statute of Limitations, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5525(a)(8). Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s obligation was ongoing, commencing with Athanasia’s education and concluding with William’s, and therefore, the four year statute should not toll until after William’s education concluded. Neither the cases cited by Plaintiff nor a logical interpretation of the Agreement support her position. In the cases cited, the parties were faced with ongoing obligations involving mortgage and life insurance payments. Miller v. Miller, 983 A.2d 736, 738 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009); Crispo v. Crispo, 909 A.2 308, 309 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006). In the present case, although the language might appear to create an ongoing obligation with respect to all three children, it is clearly dependent on the individual and unique inclinations of each child. In essence, the Agreement requires an assessment of each child’s needs and abilities. Clearly, the phrase “if the child is so inclined” demands individual consideration. Similarly, the requirement of “the child and wife [to] cooperate” in obtaining loans demands individual action. Finally, the responsibility of Husband to request “child and wife” to seek assistance contemplates distinct actions with respect to each child. Therefore, we find Plaintiff’s argument that Defendant had a seamless obligation over the fifteen years of the children’s education to be unavailing. Rather, the -4- 88-0928 CIVIL TERM parties created three related but distinct contingency agreements to pay for the education of the children. We next examine the obligation for each child to determine if it falls within the statute of limitations. Athanasia’s bill for college was finalized in 1998, and although Alexandra still owes approximately $18,000, her final bill, and hence Defendant’s obligation, was set in 2002. The rights and obligations for both Athanasia’s and Alexandra’s college expenses were fully established well over four years before Plaintiff’s petition was filed. Therefore, the claim for reimbursement for the daughters’ expenses fails. Although Defendant argued against any moral, ethical or equitable obligations he may have to pay for the education of his daughters, his only defense for the obligation to William, which is clearly within the statute of limitations, is that it is just not fair. Defendant would have us read into the Agreement that the children should only attend state-owned or state-related institutions in order to keep the cost down. In fact, there were no appropriate state-owned or state-related institutions in the Commonwealth. Given William’s unique interests and talents (training for a career in the recording arts), his expenses at Full Sail University were “reasonable and necessary” under the terms of the Agreement. Furthermore, William complied with his obligation to “cooperate in all reasonalbe [sic] efforts as may be requested by Husband” with respect to the costs involved. Although the communication between Father and son may be somewhat strained, William’s statements were credible regarding his discussion -5- 88-0928 CIVIL TERM with his Father regarding his intentions. Importantly, Defendant neither encouraged nor discouraged William before he attended Full Sail. Nor, did he demand any specific cost-saving actions by William. He may complain about the cost now, but his failure to speak out constitutes an implicit agreement with Williams’s intentions. Perhaps, Defendant did not protest because he assumed no one would demand his assistance, as was the case with his daughters. Plaintiff may have been lax in pursuing the other claims, but that does not preclude her claim for Williams’s expenses. Next, we look at Defendant’s argument that the Agreement is ambiguous with respect to what Defendant should contribute. On the one hand, the Defendant is required to “assume one-half of the financial responsibility associated with the education of the children” and, in the next phrase, he agrees to “share in the cost of a college education.” This may not have been artfully drafted, but it is sufficiently clear for our purposes. We conclude that the first phrase focused on secondary education while the second phrase was clearly related to college alone. Thus, the Defendant must “share” in the cost of William’s education. Finally, we turn to the issue of counsel fees. Paragraph 7.02 awards counsel fees to the prevailing party “in the event that future legal proceedings of any nature may be necessary.” (Emphasis added.) With respect to the issue of who prevailed, given the split decision, both parties can rightfully claim that they prevailed. Under the circumstances of this case, it is both reasonable and logical that the parties remain responsible for their own legal expenses. -6- 88-0928 CIVIL TERM Additionally, we question whether the filing of this enforcement action was absolutely “necessary.” The testimony indicated that neither Plaintiff nor the children discussed reimbursement with the Defendant since Alexandra did so in 2002. Sadly, we are all too familiar with situations where civil conversation between the parties is not possible. However, we suggest that it is time to stop swallowing rat poison and hope that the other person dies. In particular, we hope that there will be some meaningful communication regarding the manner in which Defendant meets his obligation under our order. Additional litigation over that issue will be draining and counterproductive. Instead, mediation may be an appropriate tool to resolve any impasse. Regardless, we find that neither party is entitled to an award of counsel fees at this juncture. CONCLUSION The parties were aware of the obligation under the Agreement to share in the college education of their children in 1988. Although Plaintiff pursued enforcement well over a day late with respect to their daughters, neither she nor William should be a dollar short. Therefore, we find that Defendant’s “share” of William’s college expenses is fifty percent; however, his share shall be equal to Plaintiff’s. Therefore, Defendant will be responsible for fifty percent of the loan taken out by Plaintiff and, to the extent that Plaintiff makes contributions to William on the loan William has secured, Defendant shall match said amount with an identical contribution to William. Accordingly we enter the following order. -7- 88-0928 CIVIL TERM ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this day of July, 2012, following a hearing and argument by counsel, Plaintiff’s Petition to Enforce the Property Settlement and GRANTED IN PART DENIED IN Separation Agreement dated July 12, 1988 is and PART. The Defendant’s obligation to share in the college expenses of Athanasia and DENIED Alexandra is as being time-barred. The Defendant’s obligation to share in the GRANTED college expenses of William is and he is directed to meet his obligation as follows: 1. With respect to the loan secured by Plaintiff, unless the parties otherwise agree on a schedule of payments, Defendant shall be obligated to pay one- half of Plaintiff’s monthly obligation, including those payments made prior to the date of this order. In lieu of monthly payments, Defendant may elect to pay Plaintiff a sum equal to one-half of the outstanding principal, with no prepayment penalty. 2. With respect to the loan secured by William, unless the parties otherwise agree, Defendant shall equally match any payments made by Plaintiff to William. Defendant shall do so within thirty (30) days of receiving notice from William that Plaintiff has made a payment towards the loan obligation. 3. Any dispute regarding the payments due under the order shall first be submitted to mediation. If the parties are unable to agree on a mediator, they shall notify the court and one shall be selected for them. No other relief is awarded to either party. -8- 88-0928 CIVIL TERM By the Court, Albert H. Masland, J. Lori K. Serratelli, Esquire For Plaintiff Max J. Smith, Jr., Esquire For Defendant :saa -9- VASILIKI M. BAKER, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PLAINTIFF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : V. : : RANDALL K. BAKER, : DEFENDANT : 88-0928 CIVIL TERM IN RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO ENFORCE PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AND SEPARATION AGREEMENT ORDER OF COURT By the Court, Albert H. Masland, J. Lori K. Serratelli, Esquire For Plaintiff Max J. Smith, Jr., Esquire For Defendant :saa