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Home My WebLink About2011-8757 KENNETH G. HUSTON, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PLAINTIFF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : : V. : : GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE : COMPANY, : DEFENDANT : 11-8757 CIVIL TERM IN RE: OPINION PURSUANT TO PENNSYLVANIA RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 1925 Masland, J., July 10, 2012:-- Plaintiff, Kenneth Huston, appeals the order of an en banc panel of this Court granting the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by Defendant, Geico General Insurance Company. Plaintiff complains of the following matter on appeal: The holding in Rump v. Aetna Casualty Surety Company, 710 A.2d 1093 (Pa. 1998) was applied in error to the instant case in granting Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. Rump applies solely to 75 Pa. C.S.A. §1705(d)(1)(ii), whereas 75 Pa. C.S.A. §1705(d)(1)(i) dealing with DUI drivers was not ruled upon. Plaintiff contends that the 75 Pa. C.S.A. §1705(d)(1)(i) exception to the limited tort limitation applies to the instant case. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not intend for the holding in Rump to bar innocent victims of drunk drivers from recovering pain and suffering damages. Concise Statement, filed May 5, 2012. I. Standard of Review For the purposes of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, we limit our consideration to the pleadings and relevant documents attached thereto, accepting as true all well-pleaded facts. Wachovia v. Ferretti, 935 A.2d 565, 570 11-8757 CIVIL TERM (Pa. Super. 2007). We may only enter judgment on the pleadings when there are no disputed factual issues and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. Here, the relevant facts are not in dispute. This appeal presents the narrow issue of whether a plaintiff who has elected the limited tort option on his motor vehicle insurance may nonetheless recover non-economic loss damages from his uninsured motorist benefits where the defendant tortfeasor was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI). Following consideration of Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and briefing by the parties, we conclude that the tortfeasor’s DUI conviction does not enable Plaintiff to recover noneconomic loss damages in a claim for uninsured motorist benefits. II. Discussion A. Statutory Provisions The Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (Law) generally prevents a plaintiff who elects the limited tort option from recovering noneconomic damages. However, the Law allows such a recovery under certain limited circumstances. The Law provides, in relevant part: (1) An individual otherwise bound by the limited tort election who sustains damages in a motor vehicle accident as the consequence of the fault of another person may recover damages as if the individual damaged had elected the full tort alternative whenever the person at fault: (i) is convicted or accepts Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition (ARD) for driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance in that accident …. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1705(d)(1)(i) (emphasis added). However, the Law also states: -2- 11-8757 CIVIL TERM A person precluded from maintaining an action for noneconomic damages under section 1705 (relating to election of tort options) may not recover from uninsured motorist coverage or underinsured motorist coverage for noneconomic damages. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1731(d)(2). B. Supreme Court Precedent The parties disagree upon the appropriate interplay between these related statutory provisions. The parties do, however, agree on the controlling case law. Specifically, both rely on Rump v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 710 A.2d 1093 (Pa. 1998). After reviewing this case, an en banc panel of this Court agreed with Defendant Insurer that Rump precluded Plaintiff’s claim for noneconomic damages from his uninsured motorist benefits. The court believes the Superior Court should agree. In Rump, our Supreme Court held “a driver who elects limited tort coverage is unable to collect noneconomic damages from uninsured or underinsured motorist provisions of his insurance policy for any accidents set forth in paragraph 1 of 75 Pa.C.S. §1705(d) because of the limitation at 75 Pa.C.S. §1731(d)(2).” Id. at 1096. Here, Plaintiff seeks to distinguish Rump on the basis that the case was limited to only one of the section 1705(d) exceptions and that the Supreme Court explicitly declined to rule on the DUI tortfeasor exception. See id. at 1095 n.4. Plaintiff essentially makes an equitable argument that “[t]he Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not intend for the holding in Rump to bar innocent victims of drunk drivers from recovering pain and suffering damages.” Concise Statement, filed May 5, 2012. We disagree. -3- 11-8757 CIVIL TERM We believe it is inappropriate to limit Rump’s application to its particular facts. Instead, all limited tort electors should be bound to their choice and be precluded from recovering noneconomic damages pursuant to their uninsured and underinsured motorist benefits policies. We find strong support for this conclusion in our Supreme Court’s discussion of the policy goals of the Law. Our Supreme Court explained: This conclusion is consistent with the policy behind the enactment of the [Law], the concern over the spiraling costs of insurance to residents of Pennsylvania. … However, the limitation placed on these four exceptions by 75 Pa.C.S. § 1731(d)(2) reflects a legislative determination that allowing uninsured claims under the four exceptions would not deter or punish unacceptable conduct or level the playing field between parties. Instead, allowing such a recovery from the “limited tort” driver's uninsured or underinsured provisions of his policy would act to eliminate the cost savings associated with choosing the limited tort option because it would have an upward effect on insurance rates charged to Pennsylvania insureds. Id. at 1097. Clearly, the Supreme Court determined the General Assembly intended to preclude limited tort electors from recovering noneconomic damages from their underinsured motorist policies regardless of the statutory exceptions that allow such a plaintiff to recover noneconomic damages from certain tortfeasors. We believe this distinction also answers Plaintiff’s equitable argument. The Law unequivocally permits him to recover noneconomic damages from the DUI tortfeasor that caused his injuries. Such a result is consistent with the General Assembly’s conclusion “that the importance of limiting insurance costs were -4- 11-8757 CIVIL TERM outweighed by the need to punish or deter tortfeasors who drove under the influence ….” Id. No such punitive or deterrent purpose would be served by permitting Plaintiff to recover such damages from his own uninsured motorist policy. Instead, allowing such a practice would contravene the clear policy goals of the Law. III. Conclusion For these reasons, the Superior Court should affirm this Court’s grant of judgment on the pleadings in favor of the Defendant insurance company. By the Court, Albert H. Masland, J. Karl E. Rominger, Esquire For Plaintiff Joseph R. D’Annunzio, Esquire 4309 Linglestown Road, Suite 211 Harrisburg, PA 17013 For Defendant :saa -5-