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Home My WebLink About92-4337 CivilDOUGLAS HARTS and IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LYNN HARTS, CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA Plaintiffs V. CIVIL ACTION - LAW UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION Defendant NO. 4337 CIVIL 1992 IN RE: PETITION TO INTERVENE BEFORE OLER. J. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this j'{ III day of April, 1993, upon careful consideration of the arguments of counsel and the briefs presented in this matter, the Petition to Intervene of Memory Technologies, Inc., is GRANTED. BY THE COURT, J esley Oler, Jr. J. Joseph B. Sobel, Esq. Counsel for Plaintiffs George M. Evan, Esq. Counsel for Defendants Samuel L. Andes, Esq. Counsel for Memory Technologies, Inc. rc DOUGLAS HARTS and IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LYNN HARTS, CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA Plaintiffs V. CIVIL ACTION - LAW UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION Defendant NO. 4337 CIVIL 1992 IN RE: PETITION TO INTERVENE BEFORE OLER, J. ORDER OF COURT Oler, J. At issue in the instant matter is a petition to intervene of Memory Technologies, Inc. (MTI) in a civil action between insured homeowners and their insurer. For the reasons stated in this Opinion, the Petition will be granted. Statement of Facts. On November 1, 1991, Douglas and Lynn Harts (Plaintiffs) executed a promissory note in the principal amount of $81,600.00 in favor of MTI. Subsequent to this transaction, Plaintiffs' Camp Hill, Pennsylvania, residence was destroyed by fire. At the time of the fire, Plaintiffs' residence and contents were insured under a homeowner's policy issued by United Services Automobile Association (Defendant). On January 7, 1992, MTI entered judgment at No. 63 Civil 1992, Cumberland County Court of Common Pleas, against Plaintiffs for the principal amount of the promissory note and an attorney's commission, plus interest at the rate of eighteen percent per annum. Additionally, on January 7, 1992, MTI served a writ of execution on Defendant garnishing any proceeds due and owing to Plaintiffs under their No. 4337 Civil 1992 homeowner's policy.' Pursuant to negotiations between Plaintiffs and Defendant, a settlement was agreed upon regarding the amount due to Plaintiffs under their homeowner's policy for the destruction of their residence. MTI has filed the present petition seeking intervention in this case, in which Plaintiffs have sued the insurer for proceeds under the homeowner's policy, to protect its garnishment interest in the proceeds remaining under Plaintiffs' policy.2 MTI contends that it is entitled to intervene in the instant matter based upon the following arguments: (1) that it is situated so as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or an officer thereof, it being MTI's premise that the proceeds remaining under Plaintiff s homeowner's policy have come into constructive possession of the Sheriff of Cumberland County by virtue of MTPs garnishment;' and (2) that determination of the instant action may affect MTPs legally enforceable interest in the insurance proceeds remaining under Plaintiffs' homeowner's policy.' ' An examination of the docket in this matter reveals that no party has taken any action as of the present time to strike off or open the judgment entered by MTI against Plaintiffs. ' The proceeds remaining under Plaintiffs' homeowner's policy consist of the amount due to Plaintiffs for the contents of their home that were destroyed by fire. It appears at this stage that the proceeds due and owing to Plaintiffs for the contents of their home and the amount owed to MTI by Plaintiffs are roughly the same amount. ' See Pa. R.C.P. 2327(2). 4 See Pa. R.C.P. 2327(4). 2 No. 4337 Civil 1992 Plaintiffs filed an answer to MTI's petition to intervene, in which they requested that intervention be denied. However, they subsequently withdrew their answer to MTI's petition, and Plaintiffs are no longer opposing MTI's petition to intervene. Defendant has filed a brief opposing intervention by MTI premised upon the following arguments: (1) that MTI has no right to intervene; and (2) that MTPs interests in the insurance proceeds are adequately represented. A hearing on the issue of intervention was held on March 12, 1993. Statement of law. Any person not a party to an action may intervene at any time during the pendency of an action if such person: (1) will be subject to liability for indemnification upon the entry of a judgment against a party to the action; (2) will be adversely affected by the disposition of property in the custody of the courts; (3) could have joined the action as an original party; or (4) has a legally enforceable interest that may be affected by the disposition in the action. Pa. R.C.P. 2327. "[F]or the purpose of determining the actions to which the intervention Rules may apply, the word `action' means any civil action or proceeding at law ... which is subject to the Rules of Civil Procedure." 3 Standard Pa. Practice 2d §14:228, at 362-363 (1981). It should be noted, however, that there is no right to intervene unless the person seeking to intervene falls into one of the categories set forth in the rule. Fraenzl v. Secretary of Commonwealth, 83 Pa. Commw. 539, 541, 478 A.2d 903, 904 (1984). In the instant case, Petitioner seeks intervention pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 2327(2) 3 No. 4337 Civil 1992 and (4). Accordingly, a closer review of these subsections is necessary. Under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 2327(2), intervention may be granted if the petitioner will be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court. It has been stated that intervention under Pa. R.C.P. 2327(2) "will generally be confined to situations where property has been taken in execution and is in the possession of the sheriff...." 7 Goodrich Amram 2d §2327:6, at 355 (1992). A petitioner seeking intervention under Pa. R.C.P. 2327(2) must show, however, that he or she will be adversely affected by the action of the court before intervention will be granted. Id. Under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 2327(4), a person who possesses a legally enforceable interest that may be affected by the proceedings may be permitted to intervene in the action. It should be noted that the term legally enforceable interest has not been precisely defined by judicial interpretation. In Re Pennsylvania Crime Commission, 453 Pa. 513, 520, 309 A.2d 401, 406 (1973). The expression is said to owe "its origin to the desire of the courts to prevent the curious and meddlesome from interfering with litigation not affecting their rights. The result is a flexible although uncertain rule whose application in a given case calls for the careful exercise of discretion and a consideration of all the circumstances involved." Id. at 520, 309 A.2d at 406. "Whether intervention should be permitted following a hearing on the petition 4 No. 4337 Civil 1992 is a matter that lies within the discretion of the trial court and its decision ... will not be altered on appeal unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion." 7 Goodrich Amram §2329:3, at 383 (1992). The scope of the Court's discretion in this regard is limited, however, "since ... [Pa. R.C.P. 2329, which relates to action of the court upon a petition to intervene,] does not state the situations in which intervention may be granted but, instead specifies the instances in which the court may properly refuse the petition and, therefore, by implication requires allowance of the petition in all other instances." Id. A petition for intervention may be refused, pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 2329, if. (1) the claim or defense of the petitioner is not in subordination to and in recognition of the propriety of the action; or (2) the interest of the petitioner is already adequately represented; or (3) the petitioner has unduly delayed in making application for intervention or the intervention will unduly delay, embarrass or prejudice the trial or the adjudication of the rights of the parties. It should be noted that "denial of intervention on the ground of adequacy of representation is not, under the rule, mandatory, but is permissive." 3 Standard Pa. Practice §14:244, at 392-393 (1981). Application of law to facts. In the instant matter, MTI could be adversely affected by any distribution of the remaining insurance proceeds, which arguably are in the constructive custody of an officer of this Court by virtue of MTI's legally enforceable garnishment interest in the proceeds. In addition, the Court can not find that MTI's interest will be adequately protected by Plaintiffs, where Plaintiffs will be 5 No. 4337 Civil 1992 receiving little, if any, of the recovery and where Plaintiffs themselves believe intervention is warranted, and can not find that any other ground for denying intervention is extant. For these reasons, the following Order will be entered: ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this day of April, 1993, upon careful consideration of the arguments of counsel and the briefs presented in this matter, the Petition of Memory Technologies, Inc., to Intervene is GRANTED. BY THE COURT, J. J.Wesley Oler, Jr: "/ J.12 Joseph B. Sobel, Esq. Counsel for Plaintiffs George M. Evan, Esq. Counsel for Defendants Samuel L. Andes, Esq. Counsel for Memory Technologies, Inc. :rc