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HomeMy WebLinkAboutCP-21-CR-0002756-2009 COMMONWEALTH : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : V. : : MAMOUDOU SADAOU : CP-21-CR-2756-2009 IN RE: OPINION PURSUANT TO PENNSYLVANIA RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 1925 Masland, J., July 31, 2012:-- fter a jury trial on January 24, 25, and 26, 2012, the Defendant was A 1 convicted of Count 1 insurance fraud, and Count 4 criminal attempt to theft by 2 deception (creating a false impression). He was found not guilty of Count 5, 3 attempted theft by deception (failing to correct a false impression). On March 20, 2012, the Defendant was sentenced concurrently on both counts to time served to 23 month sentences, was given credit for 241 days previously served and paroled without supervision for the balance of his sentence. The Defendant filed a notice of appeal on April 11, 2012, and a concise statement of matters complained of on May 2, 2012, raising the following issues: a. The evidence did not establish that Mr. Sadaou intended to commit fraud against the insurance company. Although Mr. Sadaou speaks English, he cannot read anything written in the English language. This forced him to rely on others to help him. Testimony was presented that the person Mr. Sadaou relied upon was taking advantage of him. b. The evidence did not establish that Mr. Sadaou attempted to deceive the insurance company. Although Mr. Sadaou speaks English, he cannot read anything written in the English language. 1 18 Pa.C.S. § 4117(a)(2). 2 18 Pa.C.S. § 3922(a)(1). 3 By order of court at the inception of the trial, Counts 2 and 3 were deemed withdrawn. CP-21-CR-2756-2009 This forced him to rely on others to help him. The testimony was presented that the person Mr. Sadaou relied upon was taking advantage of him. I. Statement of Facts The Commonwealth’s case consisted of two witnesses and numerous documentary exhibits. We summarize the salient parts of the testimony, and exhibits below: In January of 2009, Ms. Snyder placed her 1997 Toyota Camry, for sale on Craigslist because it had stopped working and “it was going to cost too much 4 money [to fix].” Ms. Snyder identified the Defendant as the individual who purchased the car for the price of $1,180, with an odometer reading between 5 248,000 and 300,000 miles. This transaction was documented solely by the title 6 to the Camry, on which the signature of Ms. Snyder appeared. A few months after the sale, the Commonwealth’s second witness, Robert Simmonds, a senior investigator for Erie Insurance, interviewed Ms. Snyder. When she was shown a 7 document that purposed to be a bill of sale, Ms. Snyder emphatically denied that the signature on the document was her own, and, further, signed the document in the presence of Mr. Simmonds to demonstrate the difference in the signatures. Robert Simmonds then related his investigation. Noteworthy, is the fact that in addition to being an insurance investigator since 2006, he had previously served 24 years as a criminal investigator for Swatara Township in Dauphin 4 See Transcript of Proceedings, Jury Trial, January 24, 25 and 26, 2012 (hereafter “N.T. , Jan. 24, 2012”) at 31-32. 5 N.T. at 33, Jan. 24, 2012. 6 Commonwealth Exhibit 1; N.T. at 33-34, Jan. 24, 2012. 7 Commonwealth Exhibit 2. -2- CP-21-CR-2756-2009 8 County. Mr. Simmonds related that the Defendant had purchased a “garage policy” for the Defendant’s auto sales business in December of 2008 from the 9 Shiner Insurance Agency in Mechanicsburg. When the Defendant reported a claim for the loss of the subject vehicle on March 18, 2009, Fred Jones, a material damage adjuster, made an initial assessment and declared the car to be 10 a total loss due to fire. After the Defendant brought the title and bill of sale for the vehicle to a branch office of the insurance agent, Mr. Simmonds was 11 contacted to conduct an investigation. As part of his investigation, Mr. Simmonds examined Commonwealth’s Exhibit 2, the alleged bill of sale, which noted a purchase price of $4,500.00 and contained the statement “I, Nicole Snyder, sold my Toyota Camry, 1997, to 12 Mamoudou Auto Sales, LLC, 101 Trewick Street, Steelton, PA, 17113.” Mr. Simmonds met with the Defendant and advised him of various problems with the documentation, which included: 1. Mileage – the documentation presented by the Defendant indicated that the Toyota only had 122,180 miles; however, the car’s history demonstrated that it had 268,887 miles when purchased by Ms. Snyder. 2. Purchase price – The Defendant presented documents indicating he paid $4,500 for the vehicle; however, Mr. Simmonds noted that “[i]t made no sense to me that anyone in the used car business would 8 N.T. at 61-62. Jan. 25, 2012. 9 N.T. at 62. Jan. 25, 2012. 10 N.T. at 63-65. Jan. 25, 2012. 11 N.T. at 67. Jan. 25, 2012. 12 N.T. at 68. Jan. 25, 2012. -3- CP-21-CR-2756-2009 have paid that amount of money for a car of that age with extreme mileage on it.” 3. Bill of sale – The alleged bill of sale presented by the Defendant was actually an odometer disclosure statement, which did not even have the signature of the alleged seller in the correct location. 4. Towing receipt – Defendant presented a towing receipt from Colonial Towing located in the Lower Paxton Township area of Dauphin County; however, based on Mr. Simmonds experience, he realized the unlikelihood of that business being engaged to tow a vehicle that burnt up in a separate area of the county. When questioned regarding that the Defendant said the tow slip was incorrect, took it back and stuffed it 13 into his briefcase. In short, Mr. Simmonds questioned the documentation and advised the Defendant that to process his claim he would need to present a genuine bill of 14 sale for the vehicle. In response, several days later the Defendant faxed a bill of sale to Mr. Simmonds that indicated the Toyota was sold to the Defendant’s auto sale business by an entirely different individual, Amadou Ide, as opposed to 15 Ms. Snyder. On the following day, the Defendant called Mr. Simmonds to ensure that he had received the faxed bill of sale and continued to press Mr. 16 Simmonds for settlement on the car. Mr. Simmonds informed the Defendant that he would need to talk to Mr. Ide and the Defendant responded that he would 13 N.T. at 68-71. 14 N.T. at 75. 15 N.T. at 76. 16 N.T. at 76. -4- CP-21-CR-2756-2009 17 have the individual call Mr. Simmonds. Mr. Simmonds did receive a call from an individual claiming to be Mr. Ide; however, Mr. Simmonds was unsuccessful in his efforts to meet with Mr. Ide to verify his existence and to authenticate the 18 documents presented. Finally, for the purposes of our sufficiency of the evidence analysis, the following dates are significant: 1. The date of the loss/fire was February 27, 2009; 2. The Defendant filed his claim on March 18, 2009; 3. Mr. Simmonds first interviewed the Defendant on March 25, 2009 at which time he presented the aforesaid documents. 4. The Defendant faxed the second bill of sale to Mr. Simmonds on March 30, 2009; and 5. The Defendant contacted his agent, Mr. Shriner, on April 9, 2009 to 19 inform him that the Defendant wished to withdraw the claim. II. Discussion A. Sufficiency of the Evidence On a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the law is well settled. All of the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner. Commonwealth v. Strouse, 909 A.2d 368 (Pa. Super. 2006).“Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict when it establishes each material element of the crime charged and the commission thereof by the accused, 17 N.T. at 78. 18 N.T. at 79-81. 19 N.T. at 83 and 96. -5- CP-21-CR-2756-2009 beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Duncan, 932 A.2d 226, 231 (Pa. Super. 2007). Furthermore, the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocent nor establish the Defendant’s guilt to a mathematical certainty. Id. Finally, if the trier of fact, while passing upon the credibility of the witnesses and weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Toland, 995 A.2d 1242 (Pa. Super. 2010). Against this standard, we will now examine the statutes at issue. B. Insurance Fraud We find that the evidence presented at trial, when viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that all of the elements of insurance fraud had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The Commonwealth had to prove the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: First, that the defendant presented or caused to be presented to an insurer a statement forming a part of or in support of an insurance claim. Second, that the statement contained false, incomplete, or misleading information concerning any fact or thing material to the claim. Material information means information the agency would regularly rely on in making its official determination or findings. Third, that the defendant acted knowingly and with the intent to defraud the insurer or self-insured. The crime of insurance fraud is complete when the defendant intentionally makes any oral or written misrepresentation to an insurer intending to create or establish a false claim; create a misleading impression as to the facts of a claim; or to mislead the insurer into believing that the defendant is entitled to insurance benefits under any claim or is entitled to receive continuing insurance benefits after an -6- CP-21-CR-2756-2009 otherwise valid claim has been established. The insurer need incur no financial loss. [Pa.SSJI (Crim.) 15.4117A.] With respect to insurance fraud, the Defendant’s concise statement of matters complained of essentially argues that because, allegedly, he cannot read anything written in English he is forced to rely on others to help him. Although the Defendant certainly proffered such testimony at trial, clearly, the jury found the testimony of the Commonwealth to be far more credible in unanimously finding him guilty of this offense. With respect to the elements there was a plethora of facts to show that (1) the Defendant presented documents to the insurer to support a claim for the loss of a vehicle; (2) the documents contained numerous false statements including, the purchase price, the mileage, and the nature of the transaction itself; and (3) that the Defendant acted knowingly and with the intent to defraud the insurance company. After working in automobile sales for over 25 years, 10 of which were in the United States, the jury clearly found it unbelievable that the Defendant would have unknowingly or unwittingly taken the actions he did with respect to submitting a bogus insurance claim. The court, like the jury, found the Defendant’s testimony to be substantially incredible and we submit the record is replete with evidence that the Defendant intended to defraud his insurance carrier. -7- CP-21-CR-2756-2009 C. Attempted Theft by Deception The evidence presented at trial amply supported the jury’s finding that the Defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of attempted theft by deception by creating a false impression. Turning to the elements, we presented the jury with the following, noting they must find: First, that the defendant intentionally attempted to obtain an inflated amount of insurance proceeds for his Toyota Camry. Under the law, a person acts intentionally when it is his or her conscious object to engage in conduct of a particular nature to achieve a particular result. Second, that the insurance proceeds were the property of another person, and in this case, that the other person was Erie Insurance Company. Under the law, property of another includes property in which any person other than the defendant has an interest on which the defendant is not privileged to infringe. Also, a person includes not only individuals but also corporations and other legal entities. Third, that the defendant committed a deception with regard to the property. By deception, we mean the defendant attempted to obtain an inflated amount of insurance proceeds by intentionally crating or reinforcing a false impression as to the value of the Toyota Camry. The deception or false impression must be relied upon by the victim. [Pa.SSJI (Crim.) 15.3922A. See N.T. at 156-157.] The factual basis for this offense is substantially the same as that for insurance fraud. Again, the Commonwealth set forth sufficient facts to show that the Defendant desired to obtain far more than the actual value of the Toyota Camry from his insurance company (submitting a $4,500 value when he purchased the car for $1,180), second, that those proceeds were clearly the -8- CP-21-CR-2756-2009 property of the insurance company, and third, that all of the Defendant’s actions constituted a deception regarding the true value of the vehicle. Finally, we note that the Defendant was found guilty of attempted theft by deception. We submit there was more than sufficient evidence to show that the Defendant committed numerous acts that constituted a substantial step toward the commission of theft by deception. The remaining element is directed to the Defendant’s mental state. “Intent can be proven by direct or circumstances; it may be inferred from acts or conduct or from the attend circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Lewis, 911A.2d 558, 564 (Pa. Super. 2006). If not from the totality of circumstances, it would be quite easy for the jury to infer that the Defendant’s presentation of bogus and inconsistent documentation on two separate occasions confirmed his intent to commit the crime of theft. Furthermore, the fact that the Defendant attempted to withdraw his claim, after realizing his goose was cooked, supports the finding of intent, in that he knew the 20 documentation he had presented was false. III. Conclusion Given the totality of circumstances surrounding Defendant’s ploy, the evidence was more than sufficient for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant was guilty of both insurance fraud and attempted theft by deception by creating a false impression. It is axiomatic in sufficiency of the evidence claims, that a verdict is only against the weight of the evidence if it is so 20 It appears from the jury’s finding of not guilty on Count 5 that the Defendant’s late “nevermind” raised sufficient doubt about his failure to correct a false impression. However, this only serves to confirm the fact that there was no doubt that he had intentionally created the false impression in the first place. -9- CP-21-CR-2756-2009 contrary to the evidence that it shocks one’s sense of justice. Commonwealth v. Charlton, 902 A.2d 554, 561 (Pa. Super. 2006). This verdict does not shock our sense of justice. By the Court, Albert H. Masland, J. Matthew Smith, Esquire Assistant District Attorney Arla M. Waller, Esquire For Defendant :saa -10-