HomeMy WebLinkAbout2011-7702 (2)
SILVER SPRING TOWNSHIP, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
STATE CONSTABLE OFFICE, : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
HON. J. MICHAEL WARD, :
APPELLANT :
:
V. :
:
COMM. OF PENNSYLVANIA :
DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION, :
APPELLEE : NO. 11-7702 CIVIL
IN RE: OPINION PURSUANT TO Pa. R.A.P. 1925(a)
Ebert, Jr., J., August 21, 2012 –
Defendant appeals from an Order entered by this Court on July 11, 2012, which
denied J. Michael Ward’s Appeal of Suspension of Automobile Registration. The
Appellant filed its appeal on July 30, 2012. This Court by Order dated July 31, 2012,
ordered the Appellant to file a Concise Statement of Error Complained of on Appeal.
Appellant filed a “Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal, Rule
1925(b)(1)” on August 7, 2012. The statement is seventeen pages long and for all
intents and purposes appears to be a legal brief which reargues the case. The
Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal concludes by stating “Therefore, we
respectfully dissent from the Ruling of this Honorable Court.” Frankly, other than
Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal filed by pro se litigants, this
Court has never seen a “Concise Statement” in such a format as filed by this Appellant.
Clearly the Appellant’s Rule 1925 statement is far from concise and is replete
with argument. Such a statement of error may provide a basis to deny Appellate
review. See, LSI Title Agency v. Evaluation Services, 951 A.2d 384 (Pa.Super. 2008).
However, this Court does not find that the Appellant has shown a lack of good faith with
regard to its Rule 1925 statement. While this Court cannot in good candor state that the
issues presented in this appeal have any widespread impact for the Commonwealth or
its citizens, there is no appellate precedent available to resolve the matter.
It appears that Appellant is appealing on the basis that this Court’s decision was
“not supported by substantial evidence, or if (sic) there exists an error of law, or a
violation of the Constitution” (See Appellant’s Statement of Matters Complained of on
Appeal Rule 1925 (b)(1), p. 6). We feel that all of these issues have been addressed in
our previous opinion of July 11, 2012. Accordingly, that prior opinion is incorporated
herein.
By the Court,
M. L. Ebert, Jr., J.
Philip M. Intrieri, Esquire
Attorney for Appellant
Philip Bricknell, Esquire
Attorney for Dept. of Transportation
2
SILVER SPRING TOWNSHIP, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
STATE CONSTABLE OFFICE, : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
HON. J. MICHAEL WARD, :
APPELLANT :
:
V. :
:
COMM. OF PENNSYLVANIA :
DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION, :
APPELLEE : NO. 11-7702 CIVIL
ORDER OF COURT
th
AND NOW
, this 11 day of July, 2012, upon consideration of J. Michael Ward's
Appeal of Auto Registration Suspension, the briefs filed by the parties, and after
hearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DIRECTED
that J. Michael Ward's Appeal of
DENIED
Suspension of Automobile Registration is .
By the Court,
M. L. Ebert, Jr., J.
Philip M. Intrieri, Esquire
Attorney for Appellant
Philip Bricknell, Esquire
Attorney for Dept. of Transportation
3
SILVER SPRING TOWNSHIP, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
STATE CONSTABLE OFFICE, : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
HON. J. MICHAEL WARD, :
APPELLANT :
:
V. :
:
COMM. OF PENNSYLVANIA :
DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION, :
APPELLEE : NO. 11-7702 CIVIL
OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT
Ebert, Jr., J., July 11, 2012 –
Before us is an appeal of auto registration suspension issued by the Department
of Transportation on September 13, 2011, regarding registration plate number
MG-6104E. The suspension was issued because the required fee for the registration
was not paid. The questions to be addressed are: (1) whether an elected constable of a
township of the second class is exempt from paying a $36.00 registration fee to the
Pennsylvania Department of Transportation in order to secure a license plate for his car
and (2) whether an elected constable is entitled to a “municipal license plate.”
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On September 13, 2011, the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, Bureau
of Motor Vehicles wrote a letter to the “Silver Spring Township Constables Office.” The
letter was addressed to “Sir/Madam,” and indicated that the registration plate number
MG-6104E for a 1997 Chevrolet Station Wagon, Title number 52020851, had been
issued in error. The letter went on to advise that the registration plate was suspended
indefinitely pursuant to §1373(b) (2) of the Vehicle Code states:
(b) SUSPENSION WITHOUT HEARING. - The Department
may suspend a registration without providing the opportunity
4
for hearing in any of the following cases:
(2) The required fees have not been paid.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1373(b) (2)
An appeal of auto registration suspension was filed by Appellant Ward on
October 11, 2011. A hearing on the matter was held on December 14, 2011. The
parties were ordered to file briefs with the Court on or before January 20, 2012, and
were given until February 3, 2012, to file reply briefs. The matter is now before this
Court for final disposition.
FINDINGS OF FACT
After a hearing, the Court makes the following Findings of Fact:
1. Silver Spring Township is a Township of the Second Class located in
Cumberland County. It is not a Borough.
2. Appellant J. Michael Ward (hereinafter Ward) was appointed to serve as
constable in Silver Spring Township to fill a vacancy in the office by President Judge
Edgar B. Bayley on November 13, 2008.
3. Ward was elected constable for Silver Spring Township on November 3,
2009, pursuant to the provisions of 44 Pa.C.S.A. §714 (a) (1).
4. Ward began serving his six year term of office on January 4, 2010.
5. On February 9, 2009, Ward bought a 2001 Ford Crown Victoria from Robert
W. Bucher for $1,000.00.
6. Ward signed the Certificate of Title for a Vehicle, block D (Application for Title
and Lien Information) J. Michael Ward.
5
7. At the same time Ward, acting on his volition, chose to file with the
Department of Transportation, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, Form MV-4 (4/06) Assignment
of Title which listed the purchaser to be Silver Spring Township Constable Office, 15
Wheatland Drive, Mechanicsburg, PA 17050. This address is Ward’s home address.
8. Ward also filed an MV-4ST (5-00) form with the Bureau of Motor Vehicles
requesting a sales tax exemption for the purchase of this vehicle. The exemption code
listed on the form was Number 18. Municipal Authority. On the form below the
purchase price and exemption reason code block, were the handwritten words
“Municipal Tag Free.”
9. An examination of the form’s Sales Tax Information Exemption Reasons
Codes reveals that Code Number 18 is described as a “Municipal Authority created
under the Municipal Authority Act of 1935/1945.” The Court notes that this Act was
repealed on June 19, 2001. The Act was replaced by legislation now found at 53
Pa.C.S.A. §5601 et. seq.
10. The MV-4ST (5-00) form in block G-Certification is signed J. Michael Ward.
This signature appears under the words “Signature of First Purchaser or Authorized
Signer.” There was no title of the authorized signer entered on the form. The
certification stated among other things “If an exemption is claimed, the purchaser further
certifies that he/she is authorized to claim this exemption…I/we acknowledge that I/we
may be subject to a fine not exceeding $5,000.00 and imprisonment of not more than
two years for any false statement that I/we make on this form.”
6
11. Based on the information provided by Ward, the Bureau of Motor Vehicles of
the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation erroneously issued Municipal
Government plate MG-6104E to Ward for use on the Ford vehicle.
12. On November 18, 2010, Ward bought a 1997 Chevrolet Tahoe from Bobby
Rahal Honda for $6,200.00. Ward signed the Certificate of Title for a Vehicle, block D.
(Application for Title and Lien Information) J. Michael Ward.
13. At the same time, Ward, acting on his own volition, chose to file with the
Department of Transportation, Bureau of Motor Vehicles Form MV-4 (03/01) Block B
Reassignment of Title by Registered Dealer, which listed the Silver Spring Township
Constables Office, 15 Wheatland Drive, Mechanicsburg, PA 17050 as the purchaser or
business name. This address is Ward’s home address. The purchaser signature block
was signed J. Michael Ward.
14. Ward also filed an MV-4ST (4-10) form with the Bureau of Motor Vehicles
requesting a sales tax exemption for the purchase of this vehicle. The exemption listed
on the form was again Number 18 “Municipal Authority created under the Municipal
Authority Act of 1935/1945.”
15. Based on information provided by Ward, the Bureau of Motor Vehicles of the
Pennsylvania Department of Transportation erroneously allowed the transfer of
municipal government plate MG-6104E to Ward for use on the Chevrolet Tahoe vehicle.
16. Neither Ward’s Ford Crown Victoria or Chevrolet Tahoe would qualify as an
“emergency vehicle” under the provisions of 75 Pa.C.S.A. §102.
17. The use of a municipal government registration plate on Ward’s vehicle does
not in any demonstrable way enhance Ward’s safety as an elected constable.
7
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The “Silver Spring Township Constables (sic) Office” and/or the “Silver Spring
Township, State Constable Office” is not a political sub-division, a state or local
authority, or “the Commonwealth.”
2. J. Michael Ward, as an elected constable, is not eligible for a municipal
government license plate or any titling or registration fee exemption under the
Pennsylvania Vehicle Code.
DISCUSSION
This case brings to mind the oft used quote “Oh how the mighty have fallen.”
When examining this dispute, one finds that it has little to do with the payment of a
$36.00 vehicle registration fee. This case has everything to do with what Constables
perceive as their rightful status in the realm of Pennsylvania law enforcement.
A. The Role Of Constables In Law Enforcement
Appellant Ward, in his brief, has included a very interesting history of how the
position of Constable evolved. Indeed, it can be said that in medieval France the
Constable of France was the first officer of the crown of France and was responsible for
commanding the Army. Shakespeare makes reference to such a Constable in his play
Henry V which describes the English victory at the battle of Agincourt in 1415.
In England, following the Norman Conquest in 1066, a Constable was the person
responsible for keeping and maintaining the king’s arms in order to protect individual
settlements throughout the country. By the reign of King Stephen (1135 – 1154) a Lord
High Constable was appointed as one of the great officers of state and responsible for
8
command of the army. The jurist Bracton writing between 1220 and 1250 described the
role of the common constable as follows:
In whatever way they come and on whatever day, it is the
duty of the Constable to enroll everything in order, for he
has record as to the things he sees; but he cannot judge,
because there is no judgment at the Tower, since there
the third element of a judicial proceeding is lacking, namely
a judge and jurisdiction. He has record as to matters of
fact, but not matters of judgment and law.
Bracton On Laws and Customs of England
The position of Constable was brought to colonial Pennsylvania and in those
times played an important role in law enforcement. However, as the Appellant points
out in his brief, “the Constable’s long standing status as the primary law enforcement
officers at the local level were supplanted by the development of organized police
1
departments.” Consequently, the current definition of Constable used in Black’s Law
Dictionary is appropriate. A Constable is “a peace officer responsible for minor judicial
th
duties, such as serving writs and warrants…” Black’s Law Dictionary 329 (8 Edition
2004).
It is not disputed that constables have some law enforcement powers based in
common law. They do serve an important role in the minor judicial system, especially
at the magisterial district judge level. However, one must also recognize that there is a
vast difference between constables and more traditional police officers, such as the
state police, municipal police, and sheriffs.
This Court takes judicial notice of the public records which indicate that
Pennsylvania State Police undergo a basic training program consisting of 1,170 hours.
Municipal Police Officers trained under the Municipal Police Officers Education and
1
Appellant’s Brief, page 8.
9
Training Commission undergo 754 hours of basic training. Deputy Sheriffs who are
trained under the auspices of the Deputy Sheriff Education and Training Board have a
basic training program consisting of 760 hours. Constables, on the other hand, undergo
a basic training program of 80 hours which is administered by the Constables Education
and Training Board. While recognizing these differences, the training status of
constables does not dictate the result in this case.
B. A Constable Is Not A Political Sub-Division
The Pennsylvania state police, agents of the Office of Attorney General, county
sheriffs, county detectives and municipal police all have municipal government
registration plates on their vehicles. Appellant Ward argues that since he has law
enforcement powers, he should be afforded the same type of registration plate as all
other law enforcement agencies in the state, and be exempt from any titling or
registration fee.
Unfortunately, for Ward, all of those other agencies are directly tied to the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania or a political subdivision of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania (i.e., a county, township, or borough). Ward attempts to solve this
dilemma by creation of a fictional “political subdivision” called the “Silver Spring
Township State Constable Office.”
One need only examine the caption of this case, formulated by Appellant Ward,
to comprehend the underpinnings of his argument. Ward attempts to elevate his status
as an elected official to that of a political subdivision by use of the term “Silver Spring
Township State Constable Office.” Use of this term is exactly what led to the error in
registration of Ward’s vehicles in the first place. It is clear that when the Bureau of
10
Motor Vehicles saw the documents bearing the name Silver Spring Township first, it
was presumed that the registration was being made on behalf of Silver Spring
Township.
There is little doubt that if Silver Spring Township as a municipal corporation
chose to provide Ward with a vehicle, it could do so and that such a vehicle would bear
a Municipal Government (MG) registration plate. However, given an analysis of the
case law regarding constables which has clearly found them to be independent
contractors, it is highly unlikely that Silver Spring Township would ever do such a thing.
What does control are the appellate court decisions of this Commonwealth which
have explicitly stated that constables are not governmental or quasi-governmental
entities. The courts have repeatedly identified constables as private contractors. A
constable is a peace officer and belongs “analytically to the executive branch of the
government.” In re Act 147 of 1990, 582 Pa. 460, 463, 598 A.2d 985, 986-7 (1990);
citing Rosenwald v. Barbieri, 501 Pa. 563, 462 A.2d 644 (1983). However, a constable
does not act for or under the control of the Commonwealth. Id. A constable is not an
employee of the state, judiciary, county or municipality in which he works. Id. A
constable is an independent contractor. Id. Mr. Ward is a constable; consequently, he
is not an exempt governmental or quasi-governmental entity, and his vehicle is not
exempt from the cost of registration.
A comparison to the Cumberland County Sheriff’s Office is enlightening in this
matter. As pointed out in Black’s Law Dictionary, a constable is “a peace officer
responsible for minor judicial duties, such as serving writs and warrants, but with less
authority and smaller jurisdiction than a sheriff.” (Emphasis added) Black’s Law
11
th
Dictionary 329 (8 Edition 2004). The Sheriff of Cumberland County is a statutorily
created elected office. 16 Pa. C.S.A. §401(10). The current Sheriff of Cumberland
County received a certificate of election identical to the one presented to Ward
(Petitioner’s Exhibit C-6) which states that Ronny R. Anderson “was duly elected to the
office of Sheriff, Cumberland County.” However, unlike Ward’s vehicle, an examination
of the public records regarding the registration of the Sheriff’s vehicle lists the owner of
the vehicle as “County of Cumberland.” Note that the vehicle is not titled in the name of
the “Cumberland County Sheriff’s Office.”
Similarly, for the purposes of this discussion, one might consider the Office of
County District Attorney. Pursuant to the Commonwealth’s Attorney’s Act, “the District
Attorney shall be the chief law enforcement officer for the county in which he is elected.”
71 Pa.C.S.A. §732-206(a). There is no question that the elected District Attorney of
each county uses a vehicle in his work as chief law enforcement officer. He or she
attends hearings, supervises electronic wire-taps at wire-tap facilities, goes to and
personally views serious crime scenes, and often is present at the site where important
search warrants are executed, etc. Again, the District Attorney of Cumberland County,
for example, receives a certificate of election identical to the one presented to Ward.
The Court takes judicial notice that some counties have provided their elected District
Attorney with a government vehicle which is registered in the name of the county.
However, most elected District Attorneys utilize their personal vehicle for their work, pay
for the vehicle, and have a personal registration license plate on the vehicle. The
district attorney of Cumberland County does not hold himself out to be a political sub-
division called the “Cumberland County, District Attorney Office.”
12
In creating the fiction that the “office of Constable, Silver Spring Township” was a
political subdivision, even Ward was confused. On his MV-4ST(4-10) for the Chevrolet
Tahoe and the MV-4ST(5-00) for the Ford Crown Victoria requesting exemption from
payment of sales tax, Ward listed the exemption reason code as “18.” Code 18 refers
to a municipal authority created under the Municipal Authority Act of 1935/1945. Even a
cursory examination of these acts and their successor legislation found at 53 Pa.C.S.A.
§5601 et. seq., makes it clear that the tax exemption addressed at “18” relates to
Municipal Authorities. “Authority” is defined as a “body politic and corporate created
under this chapter; under the former act of June 28, 1935 (P.L. 463, No. 191), known as
the Municipal Authorities Act of 1935; or under the act of May 2, 1945 (P.L. 382, No.
164), known as the Municipal Authorities Act of 1945.” 53 Pa.C.S.A. §5602. The
purposes and powers of municipal authorities “shall be for the purposes of financing
working capitals; acquiring, holding, constructing, financing, improving, maintaining and
operating, owning or leasing, …projects of the kind enumerated in this statute.” 53
Pa.C.S.A. §5607. Generally, these authorities are responsible for acquiring equipment,
buildings, transportation, parks and recreation facilities, sewers, collection and removal
of refuse, incinerator plants and waterworks, etc. There is absolutely no doubt in this
Court’s mind that a constable is not a municipal authority. Accordingly, it was erroneous
for Ward to use this code to exempt himself from paying sales tax.
Even more interesting is the fact that according to Section A of Ward’s brief, his
primary argument is that he is entitled to a fee exemption because his “office” is a
political sub-division. This claim, however, is belied by the fact that when one examines
the two MV-MST forms filed by Ward to claim his exemption, he never used exemption
13
reason code “17” which is found directly above the code he did use which specifically
lists “Political subdivision of the Commonwealth.” Using Ward’s reasoning for example,
a second class township tax collector or auditor of Silver Spring Township who is
elected in the same manner as the constable for Silver Spring Township could claim
they are the Silver Spring Township Auditor Office or Silver Spring Township Tax
Collector Office. Thus they too, as a “political sub-division,” would be entitled to a free
municipal government plate. Again, if Silver Spring Township chose to purchase a
vehicle for use by these elected officials then a municipal government plate would be
appropriate. The speciousness of Ward’s argument may be highlighted by the
proposition that this Court could proclaim itself the “Cumberland County Court of
Common Pleas Judge Office” and thereby be entitled to a municipal government plate
for my personal car.
As appellant correctly points out in his brief, “an administrative agency’s
interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to controlling weight” and should not be
disregarded unless it is shown to be “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation.” Jackson v. The Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 522 A.2d 1187,
1189 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987). Given our determination that a constable is not a political
sub-division, the Department’s interpretation that a constable is not entitled to a fee
exemption is the correct interpretation and will be given deference. As pointed out by
the Department, numerous categories of vehicles and entities have been exempted
from title and registration fees or provided reduced rate processing fees. Clearly, the
legislature did not choose to include constables in these exemptions.
14
C. The Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel Is Not Applicable In This Case.
Ward asserts that the Department of Transportation is equitably estopped from
taking back the MG license plate which was erroneously issued to him and for requiring
him to pay the registration fee for the Chevrolet Tahoe he now owns. Equitable
estoppel, a doctrine sounding in equity recognizes that an informal promise – applied by
one’s words, deeds, or representations – that leads another to rely justifiably thereon to
his own injury or detriment may be enforced in equity. See, Novelty Knitting Mills, Inc.
v. Siskind, 457 A.2d 502 (Pa.1983).
The two essential elements of equitable estoppel are inducement and justifiable
reliance on that inducement. It is well-established ... that the burden rests on the party
asserting the estoppel to establish such estoppel by clear, precise and unequivocal
evidence. Id. at 504. In this case, Ward has not established by clear, precise and
unequivocal evidence that he was "somehow induced" to apply for a municipal
government registration plate.
This Court finds as fact that it was Ward who provided the Department of
Transportation with the information entered in block C of the form found in
Commonwealth Exhibit 1, page number 7, ("Silver Spring Twp Constables Office") when
he purchased his first vehicle. As is often stated, circumstantial evidence may be used
to establish the existence of any fact. This Court finds that Ward is the one who initially
supplied the information that led others to identify him as the "Silver Spring Township
Constable Office". It is highly unlikely that any car salesman or PennDOT official would
have recognized J. Michael Ward as a constable for Silver Spring Township. This is not
to belittle Constable Ward, but to point out that the idea of calling oneself the “Silver
15
Spring Township Constables Office,” definitely originated with Ward. Whether such
identification was intentional or unintentional, it led to a mistake by the Department of
Transportation.
Furthermore, this Court finds that Ward did not rely upon obtaining a municipal
government registration plate before he outfitted his personal vehicle to be a "police
vehicle". Again, it is clear that Ward wanted to have all the accoutrements of a
municipal police department patrol vehicle. It is reasonable to believe that Ward
believes that all of this police equipment - the cage, magnetic identification stars,
computer, etc., is essential to him performing his duties as a township constable. Given
this belief he would have purchased these things even if he would have had to pay the
$36.00 fee for a registration plate.
As pointed out by the Commonwealth, the Department of Transportation is not
seeking payment for any of the past registration fees from 2009, 2010 and 2011. They
simply want him to pay the $36.00 to register his Chevrolet Tahoe this year and in the
future. If anything, the Department's actions of mistakenly exempting Ward gave him
the benefit of not paying a registration fee for several years.
The Department made a mistake based on information supplied or implied by
Ward. Equitable estoppel is an equitable remedy and it is not intended to perpetuate
mistakes or to bar parties from correcting mistakes. In short, the doctrine has no
application in this case.
D. There Is No Constitutional Bar to Ward Paying His Vehicle Registration Fee.
While this Court admires the creative advocacy of Ward's counsel, the short
answer to this issue is that an administrative mistake based on misinformation supplied
16
or implied by Ward does not create a constitutional right. The $36.00 vehicle
registration fee, as noted at trial, is paid by a vast majority of the constables elected in
this state. This argument might have greater merit if, for example, the legislature had
granted constables a statutory exemption from registration fees and then during Ward’s
six year term of office they revoked the exemption. See Stilp v. Com., 905 A.2d 918 (Pa.
2006). Obviously this is not the situation presented by this case. Ward, not being a
political subdivision or municipal authority, was simply not entitled to any titling or
registration fee exemption or eligible for a municipal government license plate. Never
having been eligible, he cannot now say that an administrative mistake gave birth to a
constitutional right.
E. Use Of A Municipal Government Registration Plate Does Not Enhance
Ward's Safety.
Generally, Ward testified that he had large magnetic signs on the side of his
vehicle identifying him as a state constable and that anyone looking at the vehicle's
interior would know it is a police type vehicle. However, he claims that the municipal
government license plate is necessary to identify the vehicle as a law enforcement
vehicle to other police officers. He also testified that sometimes he doesn't want people
to immediately identify him as a constable and therefore removes the magnetic
constable identification stars.
This Court, before being elected to the position of judge, served as the Director
of the Bureau of Criminal Investigation for the Pennsylvania Attorney General's Office
in the early 1990's. Interestingly, that Bureau spent a good deal of time insuring that its
law enforcement agent vehicles were equipped with "confidential plates". These are
17
plates which make no reference to being a state or municipal government vehicle and
look like every other citizen's license plate. License plates do not make law
enforcement officials safe. What does make them safe is the simple act of coordinating
their law enforcement activities with the local police before they actually perform
them. This is very simple to do with either a radio call or cell phone call to the local
municipal police department, the State Police, or the county 911 center. In any regard,
this Court finds that payment of a $36.00 vehicle registration fee and the display of a
standard citizen vehicle registration plate on Ward’s vehicle will have no effect on
Constable Ward's safety in any demonstrable way.
CONCLUSION
Neither the "Silver Spring Township Constables (sic) Office" or the "Silver Spring
Township, State Constable Office" is a political sub-division, state or local authority, or
"the Commonwealth". J. Michael Ward, as an elected constable, is not eligible for a
municipal government license plate or any titling or registration fee exemption under the
Pennsylvania Vehicle Code.
ORDER OF COURT
th
AND NOW
, this 11 day of July, 2012, upon consideration of J. Michael Ward's
Appeal of Auto Registration Suspension, the briefs filed by the parties, and after
hearing,
18
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DIRECTED
that J. Michael Ward's Appeal of
DENIED
Suspension of Automobile Registration is .
By the Court,
M. L. Ebert, Jr., J.
Philip M. Intrieri, Esquire
Attorney for Appellant
Philip Bricknell, Esquire
Attorney for Dept. of Transportation
19