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HomeMy WebLinkAbout2011-7482 BESSIE H. RONAN : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : : : v. : CIVIL ACTION – LAW : MANORCARE OF CARLISLE PA, : LLC D/B/A MANORCARE : HEALTH SERVICES, CARLISLE, : and HCR MANORCARE, INC. : and MANORCARE, INC. and HCR : HEALTHCARE, LLC and HCR II : HEALTHCARE, LLC and HCR III : HEALTHCARE, LLC and HCR IV : HEALTHCARE, LLC : Defendants : NO. 11-7482 CIVIL TERM IN RE: PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS OF DEFENDANTS, MANORCARE OF CARLISLE PA, LLC D/B/A MANORCARE HEALTH SERVICES, CARLISLE, HCR MANORCARE, INC., MANORCARE, INC., HCR HEALTHCARE, LLC, HCR II HEALTHCARE, LLC, HCR III HEALTHCARE, LLC, AND HCR IV HEALTHCARE, LLC TO PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT BEFORE EBERT, J, MASLAND, J. AND PLACEY, J. ORDER OF COURT th AND NOW , this 27 day of August, 2012, upon consideration of the preliminary objections of Defendant Manorcare to Plaintiff’s complaint, the briefs filed by the parties, oral argument, and the supplemental memoranda submitted by the parties, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DIRECTED that: 1.Defendant Manorcare’s preliminary objections to Plaintiff’s complaint are OVERRULED andDefendant Manorcare’s motion to move Plaintiff’s suit to DISMISSED arbitration is . By the Court, __________________________ M. L. Ebert, Jr., J. Ruben J. Krisztal, Esq. Attorney for Plaintiff John M. Skrocki, Esq. Attorney for Defendant Manorcare 2 BESSIE H. RONAN : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : : : v. : CIVIL ACTION – LAW : MANORCARE OF CARLISLE PA, : LLC D/B/A MANORCARE : HEALTH SERVICES, CARLISLE, : and HCR MANORCARE, INC. : and MANORCARE, INC. and HCR : HEALTHCARE, LLC and HCR II : HEALTHCARE, LLC and HCR III : HEALTHCARE, LLC and HCR IV : HEALTHCARE, LLC : Defendants : NO. 11-7482 CIVIL TERM IN RE: PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS OF DEFENDANTS, MANORCARE OF CARLISLE PA, LLC D/B/A MANORCARE HEALTH SERVICES, CARLISLE, HCR MANORCARE, INC., MANORCARE, INC., HCR HEALTHCARE, LLC, HCR II HEALTHCARE, LLC, HCR III HEALTHCARE, LLC, AND HCR IV HEALTHCARE, LLC TO PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT BEFORE EBERT,J., MASLAND, J. AND PLACEY, J. OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT EBERT, J., August 27, 2012 - Manorcare of Carlisle PA, LLC d/b/a Manorcare Health Services, Carlisle, HCR Manorcare, Inc., Manorcare, Inc., HCR Healthcare, LLC, HCR II Healthcare, LLC, HCR III Healthcare, LLC, and HCR IV Healthcare, LLC (“Defendant Manorcare”) have raised 12 the following preliminary objections to the complaint of Bessie H. Ronan (“Plaintiff”): 1 Prelim. Objs. of Defs., Manorcare of Carlisle PA, LLC d/b/a Manorcare Health Services, Carlisle, HCR Manorcare, Inc., Manorcare, Inc., HCR Healthcare, LLC, HCR II Healthcare, LLC, HCR III Healthcare, LLC, and HCR IV Healthcare, LLC to Pl.’s Compl., Dec. 16, 2011, (hereinafter “Prel. Objs. of Defs. Manorcare”); Prelim. Objs. of Defs., Manorcare of Carlisle PA, LLC d/b/a Manorcare Health Services, Carlisle, HCR Manorcare, Inc., Manorcare, Inc., HCR Healthcare, LLC, HCR II Healthcare, LLC, HCR III Healthcare, LLC, and HCR IV Healthcare, LLC to Pl.’s Compl., Dec. 16, 2011, (hereinafter “Defs. Mot. to Move Pl.’s Suit to Arbitration”). (1)Motion to move Plaintiff’s suit to arbitration; (2)Demurrer/motion to strike all allegations and claims for punitive damages; (3)Demurrer/motion to strike Count Two, a claim under crimes codes, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2713, Neglect of Care-Dependent Person; and, (4)Demurrer/motion to strike Count Three, a claim under 35 P.S. § 10225.101, et seq., a claim under the Pennsylvania Older Adults Protective Services Act (“the Act”). Accordingly, this Court will address each in turn. PROCEDURAL HISTORY On January 6, 2012, argument was heard regarding the preliminary objections of 3 Defendant Manorcare to Plaintiff’s complaint. On March 29, 2012, pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(6) and the accompanying note thereto, this Court issued an order 4 permitting additional limited discovery regarding the arbitration agreement at issue. Then on May 10, 2012, a motion to extend arbitration discovery until June 25, 2012 was 5 granted. Thereafter, the parties submitted supplemental memoranda of law addressing 6 this issue. The preliminary objections of Defendant Manorcare are now before this Court. STATEMENT OF FACTS On October 5, 2009, Plaintiff was admitted to Defendant Manorcare’s facility, 7 which provided long-term skilled nursing care. At the time of admission, Plaintiff had 2 Compl. In Civil Action, Nov. 29, 2011 (hereinafter “Pl.’s Compl.”). 3 Prel. Objs. of Defs. Manorcare; Defs. Mot. to Move Pl.’s Suit to Arbitration. 4 In Re: Prelim. Obj. Lmtd. Disc. Order of Ct., Mar. 29, 2012. 5 Order, May 10, 2012. 6 Pl.’s Suppl. Mem. of Law in Opposition to Defs.’ Arbitration-Related Prelim. Objs. to Pl.’s Compl., Jun. 25, 2012; Suppl. Mem. of Law of Manor Care Defs. in Support of Their Prelim. Objs. to Pl.’s Compl., Jun. 25, 2012; Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Suppl. Mem. of Law in Supp. of Arbitration-Related Prelim. Objs., Jul. 2, 2012; Second Suppl. Mem. of Law in Supp. of Manor Care Defs.’ Prelim. Objs. to Pl.’s Compl., Jul. 6, 2012. 7 Pl.’s Compl., ¶¶ 5, 20, 57. 2 8 just had back surgery, was taking pain medication, and was feeling sleepy. Plaintiff is 9 able to make her own decisions most of the time but sometimes will forget things. When Plaintiff was admitted to Harrisburg Hospital for her back surgery Joseph T. Ronan, Sr. (“Plaintiff’s Husband”) could not recall whether he signed paperwork but was 10 sure he had to sign something. Plaintiff’s Husband believed he was authorized or 11 allowed to sign off on documents on Plaintiff’s behalf. At Defendant Manorcare’s facility, Plaintiff’s Husband was asked to sign the 12 admission paperwork and did sign the admission paperwork. The admission paperwork 13 included Manorcare’s Arbitration Agreement (“the Manorcare Agreement”). The Manorcare Agreement is a voluntary agreement, and a patient who does not sign the agreement is still “allowed to live in, and receive services in, [Defendant Manorcare’s 14 facility].” Despite signing the Manorcare Agreement as “Patient’s Legal 15 Representative,” Plaintiff’s Husband was not Plaintiff’s power of attorney. At the time 16 of admission, Plaintiff did not have a power of attorney in place. Allyson O. Fox 17 signed the Manorcare Agreement as a representative of Defendant Manorcare. 8 Joseph T. Ronan, Sr., Dep. 13-14 (May 16, 2012)(hereinafter “Ronan Dep. __”). 9 Ronan Dep. 15. 10 Ronan Dep. 24-25. 11 Ronan Dep. 21. 12 Ronan Dep. 12. 13 Ronan Dep. 28; Defs. Mot. to Move Pl.’s Suit to Arbitration, Ex. B, 3. 14 Allyson O. Fox Dep. 24 (May 16, 2012)(hereinafter “Fox Dep. __”); Defs. Mot. to Move Pl.’s Suit to Arbitration, Ex. B, 3. 15 Ronan Dep. 20-21, 28; Defs. Mot. to Move Pl.’s Suit to Arbitration, Ex. B, 3, 6-7. 16 Ronan Dep. 20-21. 17 Fox Dep. 54; Defs. Mot. to Move Pl.’s Suit to Arbitration, Ex. B, 7. 3 Neither Ms. Fox nor Plaintiff’s Husband recall much of the signing of the 18 admission paperwork. Ms. Fox stated as part of the admission process that she always 19 asks for power of attorney documentation. Ms. Fox, however, was trained that any family member, next of kin, or a close friend that the resident designated as an 20 emergency contact or responsible party could sign the admission paperwork. 21 Plaintiff resided at Defendant Manorcare’s facility until October 28, 2009. During the residency of Plaintiff at Defendant Manorcare’s facility, Plaintiff avers Defendant Manorcare knowingly sacrificed the quality of care received by all residents, including Plaintiff, by failing to manage, care, monitor, document, chart, prevent, diagnose, and treat the injuries and illnesses suffered by Plaintiff, which included an infection in her surgical site as a result of lying in her own urine, a dehiscence at the 22 surgical site, dehydration, a urinary tract infection, poor hygiene, and severe pain. Plaintiff also avers Defendant Manorcare intentionally increased the number of sick, elderly and frail residents with greater health problems requiring more complex medical 23 care. Plaintiff avers Defendant Manorcare failed to provide resources necessary, 24 including sufficient staff, to meet the needs of the residents, including Plaintiff. Plaintiff avers Defendant Manorcare knowingly established staffing levels that created 25 recklessly high resident to nurse ratios. Plaintiff avers Defendant Manorcare knowingly disregarded patient acuity levels while making staffing decisions and knowingly disregarded the minimum time required by the staff to perform essential day-to-day 18 Fox Dep. 55; Ronan Dep.11-13 19 Fox Dep. 25-26. 20 Fox Dep. 25. 21 Pl.’s Compl., ¶ 68. 22 Pl.’s Compl., ¶ 44. 23 Pl.’s Compl., ¶ 35. 24 Pl.’s Compl., ¶ 38. 25 Pl.’s Compl., ¶ 39. 4 26 functions and treatments. Plaintiff avers the acts and omissions of Defendant Manorcare were motivated by a desire to increase profits by knowingly, recklessly, and with total disregard for the health and safety of the residents, reducing expenditures for needed staffing, training, supervision, and care to levels that would inevitably lead to 27 severe injuries, such as those suffered by Plaintiff. Plaintiff was also admitted to th Defendant Manorcare’s facility a second time on January 5, 2010, and Plaintiff’s 28 Husband again signed an arbitration agreement. DISCUSSION I. The Arbitration Agreement Defendant Manorcare has raised a preliminary objection pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(6) and moves to compel arbitration. An agreement for alternative dispute resolution, like an arbitration agreement, may be asserted by preliminary objection. Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(6)(See also the accompanying note). This Court will begin by addressing the validity of the Manorcare Agreement before addressing the remaining preliminary objections. “The Supreme Court of this Commonwealth as a matter of public policy favors the settlement of disputes by arbitration to promote the swift and orderly disposition of claims.” Elkins & Co. v. Suplee, 538 A.2d 883, 885 (Pa. Super. 1988). Nevertheless, for the reasons set forth below, this Court finds the Manorcare Agreement to be invalid and, therefore, this dispute cannot be settled through arbitration. A. The Manorcare Agreement is invalid. Defendant Manorcare seeks to compel arbitration of the pending action by binding Plaintiff to the Manorcare Agreement signed by Plaintiff’s Husband. Plaintiff’s Husband, who was not Plaintiff’s legal representative, signed the Manorcare Agreement 26 Pl.’s Compl., ¶ 40. 27 Pl.’s Compl., ¶ 41. 28 Ronan Dep. 25, 28. 5 when Plaintiff was admitted to Defendant Manorcare’s facility. Arbitration between the parties is required if this Court determines: (1) a valid agreement to arbitrate exists between the parties; and (2) the dispute involved is within the scope of the arbitration provision. Pittsburgh Logistics Sys., Inc. v. Prof’l Transp. and Logistics, Inc., 803 A.2d 776, 779 (Pa. Super. 2002). This Court does not find the Manorcare Agreement to be a valid arbitration agreement. Therefore, arbitration between the parties is not required. Further, because the Manorcare Agreement is found to be invalid, no determination of the scope of the agreement will be made. Defendant Manorcare argues that the Manorcare Agreement signed by Plaintiff’s Husband is binding on Plaintiff because there existed a principal-agent relationship between Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s Husband. As a matter of contract, no party can be forced to arbitrate unless that party has entered into an agreement to do so. Arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed to submit. However, a party can be compelled to arbitrate under an agreement, even if he or she did not sign that agreement, if common-law principles of agency and contract support such an obligation on his or her part. Array Healthcare Facilities Solutions Inc. v. Pesce, 2 Pa. D. & C. 5th 547, (Pa.Com.Pl. 2006)(internal citations to case law of the United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit omitted), affirmed by Pesce v. Array Healthcare, 931 A.2d 60 (Pa.Super. 2007), reargument denied (Jul. 20, 2007). “The burden of establishing an agency relationship rests with the party asserting the relationship.” Basile v. H & R Block, Inc., 761 A.2d 1115, 1120 (Pa. 2000). With regard to the relationship of husband and wife, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania has held that: Neither husband nor wife by virtue of the relation has power to act as agent for the other. The relation is of such a nature, however, that circumstances which in the case of strangers would not indicate the creation of authority or apparent authority may indicate it in the case of husband or wife. Thus, a husband habitually permitted by his wife to attend to some of her business 6 matters may be found to have authority to transact all of her business affairs. Lapio v. Robbins, 729 A.2d 1229, 1234 (Pa. Super. 1999)(citing Restatement, Agency 2d § 22(b)). “That is, the existence of an agency does not arise from the marital relationship itself; however, it may be implied from the attending circumstances and does not require evidence of an explicit, specific authorization.” Id. At the time of Plaintiff’s admission, other than the marital relationship itself, there was no evidence presented that Defendant Manorcare knew of any attending circumstances that may have implied the existence of an agency relationship. “An agency relationship can be created through actual authority, apparent authority or authority by estoppel.” Carr v. Immaculate Mary Nursing Home, 15 Pa. th D&C 5 415 (Pa. Com. Pl. 2010)(citing Bolus v. United Penn Bank, 525 A.2d 1215, 1221 (1987)). Defendant Manorcare contends that the agency relationship was created through apparent authority. “[A]pparent authority exists where a principal, by words or conduct, leads people with whom the alleged agent deals to believe the principal has granted agent the authority he or she purports to exercise.” Carr v. Immaculate Mary th Nursing Home, 15 Pa. D&C 5 415 (Pa.Com.Pl. 2010)(citing Turner Hydraulics Inc. v. Susquehanna Constr. Corp., 606 A.2d 532, 535 (1992)). Defendant Manorcare’s argument, however, focuses on the actions of Plaintiff’s Husband, the purported agent, in attempting to establish apparent authority. As the case law makes clear, it is through the words or conduct of the principal that agency through apparent authority is created. “An agent cannot, simply by his own words, invest himself with apparent authority. Such authority emanates from the action of the principal and not the agent.” Turnway Corp. v. Soffer, 336 A.2d 871, 876 (Pa. 1975)(citing Jennings v. Pittsburgh Mercantile Co., 202 A.2d 51, 54 (Pa. 1964)). Defendant Manorcare cites Chighizola v. Beverly Enter. Inc., 79 Pa. D. & C.4th 416 (Pa. Com. Pl. 2006) a Common Pleas Court case compelling arbitration and holding that the arbitration agreement signed by the daughter of the decedent had authority to bind the decedent’s estate to arbitration. A trial court decision from a different county 7 provides no binding precedent for this county’s trial court. Castle Pre-Cast Superior Walls of Delaware, Inc. v. Strauss-Hammer, 416 Pa.Super. 53, 610 A.2d 503 (Pa.Super. 1992). This Court choses to follow the reasoning of two more recently decided Court of Common Pleas decisions that reach the opposite conclusion. The first decision is Kazimer v. Manor Care of Carlisle PA LLC, 2010 WL 8585411 (Pa. Com. Pl. 2010), a Cumberland County case, decided by President Judge Kevin A. Hess. In that case, the court held that the untimeliness of the defendant’s preliminary objections justified their dismissal. Id. The court also held that the defendant failed to show the patient’s husband had authority to bind the patient to arbitration. Id. The patient’s husband signed an agreement for the patient without the authority to do so. Id. The agreement contained a mandatory arbitration provision. Id. The record in that case did not show the patient gave authority to her husband to act as her agent. Id. The patient was not mentally impaired at the time her husband signed the arbitration agreement. Id. There were no actions taken to induce the defendant’s belief that the patient’s husband was acting as the patient’s agent. Id. th The second decision is Carr v. Immaculate Mary Nursing Home, 15 Pa. D&C 5 415 (Pa. Com. Pl. 2010), a Philadelphia County case. In that case, the court held there was insufficient evidence to find the patient's wife had authority to bind the patient to arbitration. Id. The patient was admitted to a nursing facility with symptoms of dementia. Id. On admission, the patient’s wife executed an agreement containing a binding, mandatory arbitration clause. Id. The patient’s wife signed as the designated “responsible person” on the patient’s behalf. Id. The patient’s wife did not have power of attorney, and had not been appointed legal guardian. Id. There was no evidence of a writing expressly granting the patient's wife actual authority. Id. There was no evidence showing the patient knew of the arbitration clause, authorized his wife to sign the agreement, or otherwise agreed to arbitrate. Id. There was no evidence of the patient’s conduct when the agreement was executed. Id. In the instant case, there is no indication that Plaintiff was mentally impaired at the time Plaintiff’s Husband signed the Manorcare Agreement. The facts show that Plaintiff 8 was able to make her own decisions and was, therefore, capable of signing the Manorcare Agreement herself. While Plaintiff was sleepy at the time of admission, there was no evidence of Plaintiff’s conduct when the Manorcare Agreement was executed. Plaintiff did not have a power of attorney, and Plaintiff’s Husband was not Plaintiff’s legal representative. No facts were presented to indicate that Plaintiff, by words or conduct, lead Defendant Manorcare to believe she had granted her husband the authority to sign the Manorcare Agreement. There were no actions taken to induce Defendant Manorcare’s belief that Plaintiff’s Husband was acting as the Plaintiff’s agent. There was no evidence showing the patient knew of the Manorcare Agreement, or otherwise agreed to arbitrate. Defendant Manorcare failed to establish that Plaintiff’s Husband had any authority to bind Plaintiff to arbitration. This Court does not find the Manorcare Agreement to be a valid arbitration agreement between Defendant Manocare and Plaintiff. Therefore, Defendant Manorcare’s preliminary objection is overruled and its motion to move Plaintiff’s suit to arbitration is denied. II. The Remaining Preliminary Objections Having found the Manorcare Agreement to be invalid, this Court will now address Defendant Manorcare’s remaining preliminary objections. A. Standard of Review for Preliminary Objections in General When considering the appropriateness of a ruling on preliminary objections, the court must accept as true all well-pled material facts set forth in the complaint along with all reasonably deducible inferences from those facts. Schuylkill Navy v. Langbord, 728 A.2d 964, 968 (Pa. Super. 1999). Such an inquiry assesses the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Id. In reviewing the complaint, “only well pleaded material facts are admitted and not conclusions of law.” McKeeman v. Corestates Bank, N.A., 751 A.2d 655, 658 (Pa. Super. 2000). Preliminary objections will be sustained only if they are clear and free of doubt. Id. When ruling on a preliminary objection, any doubt should be resolved against the objecting party. Koken v. Steinberg, 825 A.2d 723, 726 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). The court 9 must be able to say with certainty that upon the facts averred, the law will not permit recovery. Schuylkill Navy, 728 A.2d at 968. Even where a trial court sustains preliminary objections on their merits, it is generally an abuse of discretion to dismiss the complaint without leave to amend. Harley Davidson Motor Co., Inc. v. Hartman, 442 A.2d 284, 286 (Pa. Super. 1982). A trial court’s decision regarding preliminary objections will be reversed only where there has been an error of law or abuse of discretion. Cooper v. Frankford Health Care Sys., Inc., 960 A.2d 134, 144 (Pa. Super. 2008). B. Standard of Review for a Demurrer A demurrer, under Pa.R.C.P. Rule 1028(a)(4), is an assertion that a complaint does not set forth a cause of action or a claim on which relief can be granted. Lerner v. Lerner, 954 A.2d 1229, 1234 (Pa. Super. 2008). In ruling on a demurrer, the court may consider only matters that arise out of the complaint itself; it cannot supply a fact missing in the complaint. Hess v. Fox Rothschild, LLP, 925 A.2d 798, 805 (Pa. Super. 2007). In evaluating a demurrer, all material facts set forth in the complaint and all inferences reasonably deducible therefrom must be admitted as true. Id. at 806. The question presented by a demurrer is whether, based on the facts averred, the law says with certainty that the contested pleading is legally insufficient and no recovery is possible. Schuylkill Navy, 728 A.2d at 968. If there is any doubt as to whether a demurrer should be sustained, the doubt should be resolved in favor of overruling it. Lerner, 954 A.2d at 1234. Therefore, a preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer may be properly granted only where the contested pleading is legally insufficient. Hess, 925 A.2d at 805. C. Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to justify an award of punitive damages Defendant Manorcare contends that all allegations and claims for punitive damages by Plaintiff in her complaint are legally insufficient and, therefore, should be stricken. This Court, accepting as true all well-pled material facts set forth in Plaintiff’s complaint along with all reasonably deducible inferences from those facts, finds Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages legally sufficient and, therefore, Defendant Manorcare’s preliminary objection is overruled. 10 “Our case law makes it clear that punitive damages are an ‘extreme remedy’ available in only the most exceptional matters.” Phillips v. Cricket Lighters, 883 A.2d 439, 445 (Pa. 2005). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated that “[p]unitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of the defendant's evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of others.” SHV Coal, Inc. v. Continental Grain Co., 587 A.2d 702, 704 (Pa. 1991)(citing REST 2d TORTS § 908(2)). Under Pennsylvania law, the only type of reckless conduct sufficient to create a jury question on the issue of punitive damages arises where the defendant “knows, or has reason to know, ... of facts which create a high degree of risk of physical harm to another, and deliberately proceeds to act, or to fail to act, in conscious disregard of, or indifference to, that risk.” Id. at 704-705, (citing REST 2d TORTS § 500 Comment (a)). “The determination of whether a person's actions arise to outrageous conduct lies within the sound discretion of the fact-finder.” Id. at 705. In Scampone v. Grane Healthcare Co., 11 A.3d 967, 991. (Pa. Super. 2010), the defendants’ nursing home “was chronically understaffed.” The defendants’ “employees not only were aware of the understaffing that was leading to improper patient care, they deliberately altered records to hide that substandard care.” Id. at 991-992. “The effects of understaffing was specifically connected to [the decedent’s] care.” Id. at 992. The decedent was in deplorable condition at the end of her stay at the nursing home and there was a lack of nursing care prior to her death. Id. at 971, 991-992. The Pennsylvania Superior Court found that the defendants “acted with reckless disregard to the rights of others and created an unreasonable risk of physical harm to the residents of the nursing home” and “there was sufficient evidence of misconduct … to warrant submission of the issue of punitive damages to the jury.” Id. at 971, 991. In Capriotti v. Beverly Enterprises Pennsylvania, Inc., 72 Pa. D. & C.4th 564, 568 (Pa.Com.Pl. 2004), the plaintiff brought a negligence and malpractice action against a corporate defendants’ facility where the plaintiff had received long-term nursing care. The plaintiff “averr[ed] that the corporate defendants, in an attempt to maximize profits, knowingly acted with reckless disregard for the health and well-being of the facility 11 residents by increasing the number of acutely ill residents while grossly under-staffing and under-funding the facility and failing to appropriately train the staff.” Id. at 575- 576. The court held that “the plaintiffs ... pleaded sufficient facts which, if believed, would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages.” Id. Similar to the factual situation of Scampone and Capriotti, Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant ManorCare, motivated by a desire to increase profits, knowingly reduced expenditures for needed staffing, training, supervision, and care to levels that it knew created recklessly high resident to nurse ratios that inevitably would lead to severe injuries, such as those suffered by Plaintiff. Plaintiff has averred facts that establish Defendant Manorcare knew that understaffing created a high degree of risk of physical harm to its patients and deliberately proceeded to understaff its facility in conscious disregard to that risk in order to maximize its profits. This Court cannot say with certainty that upon the facts averred that the law will not permit Plaintiff to recover punitive damages. This Court holds that Plaintiff has averred sufficient facts of outrageous conduct to sustain the claim for punitive damages and, therefore, Defendant Manorcare’s preliminary objections are overruled. D. Plaintiff’s claim for negligence for violations of Neglect of a Care- per se Dependent Person, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2713, and Plaintiff’s claim for negligence for violations of the Pennsylvania Older Adults per se Protective Services Act (“theAct”) are legally sufficient. Defendant Manorcare contends that Plaintiff’s claims of negligence per se for violations of 18 Pa.C.S. § 2713, Neglect of Care-Dependent Person and for violations of the Act are legally insufficient and, therefore, should be stricken. This Court, accepting as true all well-pled material facts set forth in Plaintiff’s complaint along with all reasonably deducible inferences from those facts, finds that Plaintiff’s claims for negligence per se against Defendant Manorcare for violations of 18 Pa.C.S. § 2713, Neglect of Care-Dependent Person, and for violations of the Act are legally sufficient and, therefore, Defendant Manorcare’s preliminary objections to these claims are overruled. 12 Judge Edward E. Guido of the Cumberland County Court of Common Pleas recently adopted the reasoning of Judge Carmen D. Minora in South v. Osprey Ridge Healthcare Ctr., et al., Court of Common Pleas Lackawanna County, 10 CV 5688, when 29 addressing these same two issues before his court. Like Judge Guido, this Court also finds the well-reasoned opinion of Judge Minora in South to be persuasive in this case on these two issues and, therefore, adopt his reasoning in finding Plaintiff’s claims of negligence per se for violations of Neglect of a Care-Dependent Person, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2713, and for violations of the Act to be legally sufficient. Defendant Manorcare’s preliminary objections, therefore, are overruled. Accordingly, the following order is entered: ORDER OF COURT th AND NOW , this 27 day of August, 2012, upon consideration of the preliminary objections of Defendant Manorcare to Plaintiff’s complaint, the briefs filed by the parties, oral argument, and the supplemental memoranda submitted by the parties, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DIRECTED that: 1. Defendant Manorcare’s preliminary objections to Plaintiff’s complaint are OVERRULED andDefendant Manorcare’s motion to move Plaintiff’s suit to DISMISSED arbitration is . By the Court, __________________________ M. L. Ebert, Jr., J. Ruben J. Krisztal, Esq. Attorney for Plaintiff John M. Skrocki, Esq. Attorney for Defendant Manorcare 29 In Re: Defs.’ Prelim. Objs. Before Guido, Oler, JJ., Order of Court, Jan. 10, 2012 (re: No. 2010 – 6924 Civil Term). 13