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HomeMy WebLinkAbout93-0034 CivilRAPHAEL L. CHIEKE, Plaintiff' IN THE COURT OF COM V. CUMBERLAND COUN ON PLEAS OF • �'1',M PENNSYLVAN� HOBART AUTO BODY, CIVIL ACTION -LAW Defendant NO. 34 CIVIL 1993 IN RE' DEFENDANT'S PRELIMINARY O BEFORE SHEELY p J B`IECTI�NS and OLER J. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this 13t4 day o f August Defendant's P , 1993, upon careful consideration of reliminary Objections, as well as the briefs and oral submitted on the arguments matter, it is ORDERED as follows: 1• Defendant's preliminary objection in the form of a motion to strike Other respects, the paragraphs 3, 5, 11, and 12 of Plaintiff's Complaint as drafted is to in all motion to strike is DENIED. 2• Defendant's Preliminary objections based upon lack of s e GRANTED as indicated in the accompan n P cificity are 3'i g opinion. 3• Plaintiff is granted 20 days within which to file an amended complaint, BY THE COURT, Raphael K. Chieke le ' 4241 VV'ams,Pro Se esy Oler, J J burg Drive Harrisburg, PA 17109 Plaintiff Fred H. Hait, Esq. 200 North Hanover Street Carlisle, PA 17013 Attorney for Defendant RAPHAEL L. CHIEKE, Plaintiff V. HOBART AUTO BODY, Defendant Oler, J. IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW NO. 34 CIVIL 1993 IN RE: DEFENDANT'S PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS BEFORE SHEELY. P.J., and OLER. J. OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT At issue in the present case are preliminary objections filed by Hobart Auto Body (Defendant) in response to a complaint filed by Raphael K. Chieke (Plaintiff). For the reasons set forth in this Opinion, Defendant's preliminary objections are granted, and Plaintiff is granted 20 days in which to file an amended complaint. Plaintiff is a pro se litigant who commenced this action by filing a complaint against Defendant on January 12, 1993. The facts, as alleged in Plaintiff s complaint, may be summarized as follows: In June, 1991, Plaintiff took his automobile to a certain mechanic for repairs and a recommendation of "a good body shop."' In March, 1992, this individual completed the mechanical work on Plaintiffs automobile and recommended one Ed Hobart of "Hobart Auto Body" to perform the "body work" on Plaintiffs car.' Subsequently, Plaintiff met with Mr. Hobart to discuss the work to be done on 1 Plaintiffs Complaint, paragraph 1. 2 Plaintiff"s Complaint, paragraph 2. No. 34 Civil 1993 the automobile.' At that time, Mr. Hobart told Plaintiff that he would contact him with an estimate for the cost of the "body work."' When Plaintiff did not hear from Mr. Hobart after two days, he contacted him and was given an estimate of $1,800.5 Both parties thereafter agreed to a price of $1,700, and, after refusing Plaintiffs request to "write the work order," Mr. Hobart began working on Plaintiff's car.' In May, 1992, Plaintiff contacted Mr. Hobart to ascertain when he could pick up his car.' At this time, Mr. Hobart told Plaintiff that he was not charging tag on the services rendered, and, therefore, Plaintiff should bring cash to pay for the work done on the automobile.' On May 15, 1992, Plaintiff went to pick up his automobile from Mr. Hobart.9 However, since some molding on the trunk of the automobile was missing, and since Mr. Hobart had not sanded or buffed the automobile, Plaintiff gave Mr. Hobart only $1,600 of the agreed upon price and retained $100 until such time as the job was 3 Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraph 3. It should be noted that although Plaintiff has named Hobart Auto Body as the Defendant in the caption of his complaint, he refers to Mr. Hobart as the Defendant in the text of his complaint. 4 Id. 5 Id. 6 Id. 7 Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraph 4. a Id. 9 Id. 2 No. 34 Civil 1993 finished.10 Additionally, Plaintiff avers that Mr. Hobart denied Plaintiff's request that he give him a receipt for the payment, indicating that, if he were to do so, he would have to charge Plaintiff tax on the services rendered." During the months of July and August, 1992, Plaintiff contacted Mr. Hobart several times regarding the missing piece of molding and the sanding and buffing of his automobile.12 After being told several times by Mr. Hobart that he could not find the molding, Plaintiff purchased it himself." On September 15, 1992, Plaintiff brought his automobile back to Mr. Hobart to be sanded and buffed and to have the molding put on the trunk.14 Additionally, Mr. Hobart was to repair "the rust on the back glass" and to paint the door linings and rear bumper of Plaintiffs automobile.16 When Plaintiff picked up his automobile on September 18, 1992, Mr. Hobart had painted the door linings and had put the molding on the trunk.18 Mr. Hobart charged Plaintiff an additional $50 for these services. 17 10 Plaintiff% Complaint, paragraph 4. 11 Id. 12 Plaintifrs Complaint, paragraph 7. 13 Id. 14 Plaintifrs Complaint, paragraph 8. 15 Id. 16 Plaintifrs Complaint, paragraph 9. 17 Id. 91 No. 34 Civil 1993 Furthermore, Plaintiff later discovered that Mr. Hobart had jammed the lock on the trunk when replacing the molding.18 When Plaintiff went to pick up his automobile on the aforesaid date, Mr. Hobart insisted on payment in cash from Plaintiff.19 Since Mr. Hobart would not release Plaintiff's car and was "hostile and intimidating to Plaintiff and his wife," Plaintiff went to a nearby bank to obtain $150 in cash." Plaintiff further alleges that Mr. Hobart did not sand and buff his automobile and that Mr. Hobart did not repair "the rust on the back glass" of the automobile.21 Rather, Plaintiff avers, Mr. Hobart "damaged Plaintiff s air-conditioning system having used Plaintiff's car to drag race. 1122 Additionally, Plaintiff avers that on October 2, 1992, when he and his wife took his automobile back to Mr. Hobart to have the trunk lock fixed, Mr. Hobart became "hostile and threatening to Plaintiff and his wife to the extent that they had to run away leaving their car behind."' Subsequently, Plaintiff filed a 'verbal complaint" " Plaintiffs Complaint, paragraph 9. is Plaintiffs Complaint, paragraph 10. 20 Id. 21 Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraph 11. 22 Id. Plaintiff bases this allegation on the fact that he saw Mr. Hobart washing mud off of his car. ' Plaintiffs Complaint, paragraph 12. 4 No. 34 Civil 1993 against Mr. Hobart with a "nearby Magistrate.i" In his complaint, Plaintiff also avers that "Mr.Hobart is currently under investigation by the [Pennsylvania] State Attorney General and the [Pennsylvania] Department of Revenue for this and other only cash dealings."' Furthermore, Plaintiff has attempted to incorporate his pleading from proceedings below before a district justice into his present complaint and has attached portions thereof to the complaint as exhibits." Defendant has filed the present preliminary objections in the form of a motion for a more specific pleading, a motion to strike portions of Plaintiff's complaint, and a demurrer. More specifically, Defendant has filed a motion for a more specific pleading based upon the following grounds: 1) the complaint does not properly identify the parties to the action, 2) the complaint does not specify the nature of the "body work" to be performed by Defendant, and 3) paragraph 13 of the complaint makes reference to exhibits not attached to the complaint.27 Defendant has also requested the Court to strike portions of Plaintiffs complaint contending that 1) the complaint violates Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1022 (which requires, as far as 24 id. 2" Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraph 5. zs Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraph 13. 27 Defendant's Preliminary Objections, paragraphs 1-3. 6i No. 34 Civil 1993 practicable, only one allegation per paragraph); that 2) the complaint improperly refers to proceedings at the district justice level; and that 3) paragraphs 3, 5, and 12, and 13 of the complaint (relating to Defendant's character as a "gentle man," an alleged investigation of Defendant by the Pennsylvania Department of Revenue and the Pennsylvania Attorney General, and the proceedings at the district justice level) allege impertinent matter.28 Finally, Defendant has filed a demurrer to Plaintiffs complaint, contending that it fails to set forth a cause of action." With respect to Defendant's contention that Plaintiff s complaint fails to properly identify the parties, Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1018 requires that "[e]very pleading shall contain a caption setting forth ... the name of all the parties." In this regard, "[i]t is essential that a complaint set forth the names of all the parties to an action, since, if the action is commenced by complaint, the failure to name the parties would exclude them from the action." 2 Goodrich Amram 2d, §1018:3 at 292 (1991). However, it should be noted that "[n]o action or proceeding may be dismissed by reason of an erroneous caption or docketing, but the court on motion of any party or on its own motion may correct the caption or direct appropriate docketing." Order of Pennsylvania Supreme Court, February 8, 1969; see Pa. R.C.P. 1018. In the present case, Plaintiff s complaint names Hobart Auto Body as the 2" Defendant's Preliminary Objections, paragraphs 4-6. 29 Defendant's Preliminary Objections, paragraph 7. on No. 34 Civil 1993 Defendant. However, the text of Plaintiff s complaint refers to Mr. Hobart, not Hobart Auto Body, as the Defendant. Moreover, Plaintiff's complaint fails to state where Hobart Auto Body is located and in what capacity Mr. Hobart is associated with Hobart Auto Body.30 As such, we must agree with Defendant's contention that Plaintiffs complaint fails to adequately identify the parties to the action. With respect to Defendant's contention that Plaintiff's complaint lacks specificity in defining the nature of the "body work" that was to be performed by Mr. Hobart, Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1019(a) mandates that "[t]he material facts on which a cause of action... is based shall be stated in a concise and summary form." Under the requirements of this rule, "[n]ot only must [the] pleadings put an opponent on notice of what he or she will be called upon to meet at trial, they must also form the issues in an action so that the proof at trial may be restricted to those issues." 2 Goodrich Amram 2d, §1019:2 at 310-11 (1991). "Generally speaking, a pleading should be sufficiently speck so as to enable an opposing party to prepare his or her response." 2 Goodrich Amram 2d, §1019:4 at 313 (1991). In the present case, upon reviewing Plaintiff's complaint, we cannot say that it sufficiently specifies the "body work" which Defendant was hired to perform. As such, 30 Defendant's Brief states that "even though it is not of record, Hobart Auto Body is a fictitious name registered to an entity in another county, and not to the entity at 600 Centerville Road, Newville." Defendant's Brief, at 2. Since the averments of Plaintiff's complaint make no reference to the nature and identity of Hobart Auto Body, we cannot address this issue here. 7 No. 34 Civil 1993 we believe that Defendant will not be able to adequately prepare a response indicating, for instance, which portions of the specified work he or it had completed. Moreover, since the allegations of the complaint are not specific, they do not adequately put Defendant on notice of what he or it will be required to meet at trial.sl Defendant has also filed a motion to strike portions of Plaintiffs complaint, contending that "[t]he [c]omplaint flagrantly violates [Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure] 1022 which requires that each paragraph contain as far as practicable only one material allegation."" When a challenge to a complaint arises under Rule 1022, "the test of compliance is the difficulty or impossibility one has in answering the complaint." General State Authority v. Sutter Corp., 24 Pa. Commw. 391, 394, 356 A.2d 377, 380 (1976). Based upon the specific language of Rule 1022, as well as the test set forth above, we must agree with Defendant that paragraphs 3, 11, and 12 of Plaintiffs complaint are not in compliance with Rule 1022.33 Although not every paragraph of 31 With respect to Defendant's contention that paragraph 13 of Plaintiffs complaint makes reference to exhibits which are not attached to the complaint, we fail to see a basis for such a preliminary objection. Our copy of Plaintiff's complaint contains both of the exhibits referred to in paragraph 13 of the complaint. 32 Defendant's Preliminary Objections, paragraph 4. The language used by Defendant is substantially equivalent to that set forth in Rule 1022. 33 Defendant's preliminary objection generally states that Plaintiff's complaint does not comply with Rule 1022. However, Defendant's brief only challenges paragraphs 3, 11, and 12 of Plaintiff's complaint. See C.C.R.P. 210-7. -J No. 34 Civil 1993 a complaint which contains more than one allegation of material fact should be regarded as materially defective, the aforementioned paragraphs of the current complaint contain substantially more than one allegation of material fact." As such, we are compelled to grant Defendant's motion to strike paragraphs 3, 11, and 12 of the complaint as drafted. Defendant also moves to strike paragraphs 3, 5, 12, and 13 of Plaintiff's complaint, contending that the allegations contained therein are impertinent to Plaintiff s cause of action. In this regard, it has been noted in Pennsylvania that the "right to strike impertinent matter should be sparingly exercised; where the matter is impertinent but not injurious, it need not be stricken." 2 Goodrich Amram 2d, §1017(b):16 at 261 (1991). If the challenged allegations are not prejudicial to the objecting party, the "matter may be treated as mere surplusage and ignored." Id. a' The following is an example of the paragraphs of Plaintiff's complaint to which Defendant has filed preliminary objections: Noteworthy again on September 18, 1992, Defendant did not sand or buff Plaintiffs car as agreed upon. Also, Defendant did not repair the rust on the back glass. Instead, Defendant damaged Plaintiff's air-conditioning system having used Plaintiff's car to drag race, because Plaintiff saw Defendant on the day he came to pick up his car washing off mud from Plaintiff's car. Plaintiff has paid Defendant a total of $1750.00 in cash. Defendant has not fulfilled his own end of the agreement. Additionally, Defendant has committed wrongful act by his insistence for cash payments, including not providing Plaintiff with any receipts for the work Defendant performed. Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraph 11. 0 No. 34 Civil 1993 Moreover, "a preliminary objection in the nature of a motion to strike off a pleading should be overruled unless a party can affirmatively show prejudice." Id. In light of this standard, and upon review of the Plaintiff s complaint, we believe that the only allegation contained in the complaint which is prejudicial to Defendant as well as impertinent is that which states that "Mr. Hobart is currently under investigation by the [Pennsylvania] State Attorney General and the [Pennsylvania] Department of Revenue for this and other only cash dealings.i35 Consequently, the paragraph setting forth this allegation, specifically paragraph 5, will be stricken from Plaintiff s complaint." Finally, Defendant has also filed a preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer contending that Plaintiff s complaint does not state with sufficient specificity the work which Defendant was obligated to perform for Plaintiff.37 Defendant contends that "the [c]omplaint only states that Defendant was to do `bodywork' for Plaintiff with no further details supplied," and, as such, it "should be dismissed ... for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted."" 35 Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraph 5. 36 Although Defendant has also challenged other allegations in Plaintiff's complaint, namely those making reference to the proceedings before the district justice and those making reference to Mr. Hobart's character as a "gentle man," we do not believe that such allegations rise to the level of prejudice warranting that they be stricken from the complaint. 37 Defendant's Brief, at 7. 38 Id. 10 No. 34 Civil 1993 It is well settled in Pennsylvania that, in ruling on a preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer, a trial court must accept as true "all material facts set forth in the complaint as well as all inferences reasonably deducible therefrom." Eckell v. Wilson, 409 Pa. Super. 132, 135, 597 A.2d 696, 698 (1991), allocatur denied, 530 Pa. 643, 607 A.2d 253 (1992). "The question presented by a demurrer is whether, on the facts averred, the law says with certainty that no recovery is possible." Vattimo v. Lower Bucks Hospital, Inc., 502 Pa. 241, 244, 465 A.2d 1231, 1232 (1983). Moreover, a demurrer should be sustained only if it is clear that "plaintiff has ... failed to state a claim on which relief may be granted." Eckell v. Wilson, 409 Pa. Super. 132, 135, 597 A.2d 696, 698 (1991), allocatur denied, 530 Pa. 643, 607 A.2d 253 (1992). Additionally, when dealing with a pro se complaint, the court is to hold the allegations thereof "to a less stringent standard than that applied to the formal pleadings drafted by attorneys.... If a fair reading of the [complaint] leads to the conclusion that [the plaintiff] has pleaded facts which may entitle him to relief, the preliminary objections will not be sustained." Reider v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Bureau of Corrections, 93 Pa. Commw. 326, 328, 502 A.2d 272, 273 (1985). It should also be noted that, generally, "a demurrer will not be sustained on the ground that a pleading is not sufficiently specific ...." 2 Goodrich Amram 2d §1017(b):27, at 272 (1991). Moreover, "[w]hen a demurrer is improperly filed instead of a motion [for a more specific pleading], the court may disregard the title of the 11 No. 34 Civil 1993 objection and regard it as bearing the title of the objection which should have been filed." 2 Anderson, Pennsylvania Civil Practice §1017.148, at 537 (1976). In other words, "[w]hen a preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer is in fact a motion for a more specific statement the court ... will treat it as such." Id. at 537-38. To maintain a cause of action for breach of contract, the complaint must allege "the existence of a contract (including its essential terms), a breach of duty imposed by the contract and resultant damages." General State Authority v. Coleman Cable and Wire Co., 27 Pa. Commw. 385, 388-89, 365 A.2d 1347, 1349 (1976). Furthermore, "every element of a contract must be specifically pleaded [in the complaint], ... and ... when an oral contract is pleaded, clarity is important." Snaith v. Snaith, 282 Pa. Super. 450, 455, 422 A.2d 1379, 1382 (1980). Moreover, "[a] cause of action founded on an oral contract should specifically aver the time, place, and date when the contract was made." Kisher and Sons, Inc. v. Resperski, 63 Luzerne 253, 255 (1973). Upon reviewing Plaintiffs complaint, we are constrained to find that it does not allege, with any degree of specificity, the essential terms of the oral contract between Plaintiff and Defendant. Plaintiffs complaint does not allege the tasks which Defendant was to perform on the automobile. Nor does it clearly allege how Defendant breached the terms of the oral contract. Consequently, we must sustain Defendant's preliminary objection for lack of specificity in the areas noted. 12 No. 34 Civil 1993 ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this /96Cday of August, 1993, upon careful consideration of Defendant's Preliminary Objections, as well as the briefs and oral arguments submitted on the matter, it is ORDERED as follows: 1. Defendant's preliminary objection in the form of a motion to strike paragraphs 3, 5, 11, and 12 of Plaintiff's Complaint as drafted is GRANTED; in all other respects, the motion to strike is DENIED. 2. Defendant's preliminary objections based upon lack of specificity are GRANTED as indicated in the accompanying opinion. 3. Plaintiff is granted 20 days within which to file an amended complaint. Raphael K. Chieke, Pro Se 4241 Williamsburg Drive Harrisburg, PA 17109 Plaintiff Fred H. Hait, Esq. 200 North Hanover Street Carlisle, PA 17013 Attorney for Defendant :rc BY THE COURT, s/ J. Wesley Oler. Jr J. Wesley Oler, Jr. J. 13