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HomeMy WebLinkAbout92-0349 CivilROBERT C. HODGE, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. CIVIL ACTION - LAW ANNIE E. HINE and ENGLAND JEEP MOTORS, INC., Defendants NO. 349 CIVIL 1992 IN RE: ADJUDICATION BEFORE OLER J. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this 9'4day of September, 1993, upon consideration of Plaintiff s amended complaint for fraud and for return of a gift made in contemplation of marriage, the Court finds in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff on the counts for fraud, and in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant Annie E. Hine on the count for return of a gift made in contemplation of marriage. Defendant Hine is directed to transfer title to and possession of the motor vehicle (Vehicle Identification No. WDBBA48D5HAO56377) to Plaintiff, upon his reimbursing her in the amount of $4,000.00. BY THE COURT, J. Vesley Oler, Jr. J. R. Mark Thomas, Esq. 54 East Main Street Mechanicsburg, PA 17055 Attorney for Plaintiff Jeffrey L. Stoner, Esq. 831 Market Street P.O. Box 222 Lemoyne, PA 17043 Attorney for Defendant :rc ROBERT C. HODGE, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. CIVIL ACTION - LAW ANNIE E. HINE and ENGLAND JEEP MOTORS, INC., Defendants NO. 349 CIVIL 1992 IN RE: ADJUDICATION BEFORE OLER, J. OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT The present case for fraud and return of a gift made in contemplation of marriage arises out of a failed relationship between Robert C. Hodge (Plaintiff) and Annie E. Hine (Defendant Hine). The gift in question is a 1987 Mercedes Benz convertible, purchased from England Jeep Motors, Inc. (Defendant England Jeep) and currently titled in the name of Defendant Hine. A nonjury trial was held before the undersigned judge on August 16, 1993, and August 27, 1993. Based upon the evidence presented at trial, the following Findings of Fact, Discussion and Order of Court are made and entered: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. Plaintiff is Robert C. Hodge, 51, a resident of Cary, North Carolina, and employee of Sherrill Enterprises, Inc., which operates Sherrill's University of Cosmetology and Hairstyling in Raleigh, North Carolina. 2. Defendant Hine is Annie E. Hine, 33, a resident of Carlisle, Pennsylvania, and a public school teacher. 3. Defendant England Jeep is England Jeep Motors, Inc., an automobile dealership having offices at 6039 Carlisle Pike, Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania, and A No. 349 Civil 1992 owned by Alvin H. (Harold) England. 4. In March of 1990, Plaintiff and his wife separated, without fault on the part of Plaintiff; they were divorced in March of 1991. 5. In the fall of 1990, Plaintiff and Defendant Hine became romantically involved. 6. Defendant Hine, whose duties as a school teacher included coaching girls' basketball, had been a friend of the Plaintiffs family, which included two daughters. 7. Defendant Hine had also been an employee of Defendant England Jeep and was acquainted with its owner. 8. After dating Plaintiff briefly, Defendant Hine discontinued this relationship, with the explanation that she was attached to someone named John. 9. In January or February of 1991, the relationship resumed when Defendant Hine told Plaintiff that she and John had decided to date others. 10. Shortly after the relationship resumed, Plaintiff and Defendant Hine began discussing marriage, with Plaintiff being left with the impression that the question remaining to be decided was one of scheduling and with Defendant Hine being aware that Plaintiff expected them to be married. 11. Defendant Hine told Plaintiff that she wanted to be married on a cruise, with no family or friends present, and the spring of 1992 was discussed as a favorable time because basketball season would have ended. 2 No. 349 Civil 1992 12. Certain property owned by Plaintiff — a baby grand piano, crystal and china — was moved into the residence of Defendant Hine. 13. At the end of April or beginning of May, 1991, Defendant Hine saw a 1987 Mercedes Benz convertible in the lot of a certain car dealership in Cumberland County, and was immediately attracted to it. 14. She called Plaintiff and told him about the Mercedes. 15. They went to look at the car. 16. Upon discovering that the Mercedes was about to be sold at auction, Defendant Hine, after securing Plaintiff's approval, made arrangements with the owner of Defendant England Jeep for his company's acquisition of the car from the aforesaid dealership; Defendant Hine promised that the car would then be immediately purchased from England Jeep at cost. 17. The advantage of this arrangement from a buyer's standpoint was that it avoided the uncertainties involved in an auction and provided a wholesale, or dealer's, price of $33,000. 18. Both Plaintiff and Defendant Hine gave assurances to the owner of Defendant England Jeep that his company would not suffer a loss in the transaction. 19. Defendant England Jeep purchased the car for $33,000. 20. On June 3, 1991, the Mercedes was purchased from Defendant England Jeep in the names of Plaintiff and Defendant Hine for $33,000; the purchase price, 3 No. 349 Civil 1992 sales tax and incidental fees were paid by Plaintiff by means of a check for $12,274 and a trade-in of his 1988 Mercedes Benz sedan, valued at $21,500. 21. The plan was that Defendant Hine would contribute $4,000 toward the purchase price by means of a sale of her Volkswagen Jetta and it appears that this amount was eventually paid to Plaintiff in full. 22. The plan further was that a Jeep Cherokee would also be purchased in joint names, and that, upon Plaintiffs return from North Carolina, the Mercedes Benz convertible would be the car Defendant Hine would drive most often and the Cherokee would be the car Plaintiff would drive most often. 23. A problem developed with respect to insurance covering residents from different states, as a result of which it was decided to title each vehicle in the name of the intended primary driver. 24. To this end, Plaintiff purchased the Jeep Cherokee in his name alone, although his understanding that he would be with Defendant Hine in its use was evidenced by his purchase of a trailer hitch to accommodate her boat. 25. To the same end, on June 24, 1991, Plaintiff and Defendant Hine executed a Vehicle Sales and Use Tax Return/Application for Registration, in connection with the conveyance of the Mercedes Benz convertible into her name alone. 26. Under "Relationship to Applicant" on the said form, they authorized the words "Husband and Wife to Wife" to be inserted, after being told that if they were 4 No. 349 Civil 1992 married or intended to be married such a response would properly avoid a sales tax. 27. Almost immediately after executing the paperwork for this conveyance, Plaintiff began to experience concern as to Defendant Hine's commitment to their relationship; one catalyst for the concern was what he perceived to be an intimate tone of her voice in speaking with another person on the telephone, and a second precipitating factor was certain eye contact which he had observed between her and another. 28. Acting upon this concern, Plaintiff attempted to have Defendant England Jeep effect alien in his favor upon the Mercedes, but by the time of his contact the paperwork had already been sent in to the Commonwealth. 29. The Commonwealth issued the certificate of title to the Mercedes in favor of Defendant Hine on June 28, 1991. 30. Shortly thereafter, Defendant Hine effectively terminated the relationship between her and Defendant. 31. The Court accepts the Plaintiff s version of Defendant Hine's explanation for her termination of the relationship, which is contained in the record and which casts some doubt on whether her attachment to Plaintiff was as strong as either may have thought. 32. After her termination of the relationship, Defendant Hine returned the piano, crystal and china from her residence; she also promised to reimburse Plaintiff 5 No. 349 Civil 1992 for the Mercedes, but has not done so. 33. In the year of the gift, 1991, Plaintiff's adjusted gross income did not exceed $100,318; in prior years, he had been more successful. 34. The gift of the Mercedes Benz convertible by Plaintiff to Defendant Hine was made in contemplation of marriage. 35. No fraud on the part of either Defendant has been proven. DISCUSSION Fraud. "[T]he essential elements of actionable fraud consist of `(1) a misrepresentation, (2) a fraudulent utterance thereof, (3) an intention by the maker that the recipient would thereby be induced to act, (4) justifiable reliance by the recipient upon the misrepresentation, and (5) damage to the recipient as the proximate result."' 16 P.L.E. Fraud §2, at 392 (1959), quoting Neuman v. Corn Exchange National Bank & Trust Co., 356 Pa. 442, 450, 51 A.2d 759, 763 (1947). "Fraudulent intent is a necessary element in every actionable fraud. Fraud cannot be predicated on mere mistake." Id. §8, at 400. "It has been stated that fraud must be established by evidence that is `clear and convincing[,'] that fraud must be `clearly' proved, and that a charge of fraud must be established by evidence that is `clear and satisfactory' or `clear and precise,' or by evidence that is `clear, precise, and indubitable[.']" Id. §30, at 422-23 (citations omitted); see Snell v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, State Examining Board, 490 Pa. 0 No. 349 Civil 1992 277, 416 A.2d 468 (1980); Carlson v. Sherwood, 416 Pa. 286, 206 A.2d 19 (1965). In the present case, it appears to the Court that Defendant England Jeep was attempting to do a favor for both Plaintiff and Defendant Hine,' and has unfortunately become a victim of their falling out. None of the elements of actionable fraud can be said to any degree to have been proven against this corporate defendant. With respect to Defendant Hine, it is believed that her inspiration of Plaintiff to purchase an automobile for her was less the result of a fraudulent intent than of an honest mistake as to her commitment to the relationship. As a consequence, it can not be said that all of the elements of fraud have been established as to her by evidence that is clear, precise and indubitable. Gift made in contemplation of marriage. "A gift may be validly qualified or conditioned if public policy is not offended and if, notwithstanding the qualification or condition, there is a transfer in praesenti. The condition may be an implied one." 17 P.L.E. Gifts §9, at 116 (1986). For instance, "[a]n engagement ring is given subject to the implied condition that the gift will be returned if a failure of the marriage to take place occurs because of death, disability, the donee's breach of contract, or dissolution of the contract by mutual consent." Id., at 118. "If an executed transfer is shown, and it is claimed that a condition was annexed 1 Defendants' brief puts it more strongly: "The only thing England Jeep Motors and its agents or employees can be accused of in this action is doing exactly what the Plaintiff asked of them." Defendants' Brief on Relevant Law, at 5. V4 No. 349 Civil 1992 to the transfer, the burden of showing the condition is upon him who claims that the same was attached to the gift." 17 P.L.E. Gifts §41, at 145 (1986). In the context of a gift allegedly made in contemplation of marriage and evidenced by a written agreement, it has been said that "Mo prove that such a gift, absolute on its face, was conditional requires parol evidence [that is clear, precise and indubitable]." Stanger v. Epler, 382 Pa. 411, 417, 115 A.2d 197, 200 (1955). "The conceptual basis of a cause of action based on the right to return of gifts made on the condition of subsequent marriage was explained in Ruehling v. Hornung, 98 Pa. Super. 535 (1930),[2] subsequently endorsed in Stanger v. Epler, 382 Pa. 411, 115 A.2d 197 (1955).['] The law of conditional gifts creates a cause of action distinct from breach of promise to marry suits. Its recognition in the common law is based upon an implied condition theory. A gift given in contemplation of marriage, such as an engagement ring, was not final but conditioned upon the occurrence of the wedding." Ferraro v. Singh, 343 Pa. Super. 576, 580-81, 495 A.2d 946, 948 (1985). 2 In Ruehling, the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed a compulsory nonsuit entered against a plaintiff seeking return of an engagement ring when the expected marriage did not occur, but affirmed the nonsuit as to two other gifts, where it was not shown that the defendant had terminated the engagement, inter alia. ' In Stanger, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed a decree returning certain funds to a donor, where the record did not support, by clear, precise and indubitable evidence, a conclusion that the gift was conditioned upon the marriage anticipated by the donor. The Court, however, noted that gifts may be recoverable where expressly conditioned upon marriage, or where "induced" by the donee's promise to marry the donor. Stanger v. Epler, 382 Pa. 411, 416, 115 A.2d 197, 199 (1955). 0 No. 349 Civil 1992 "`A gift to a person to whom the donor is engaged to be married, made in contemplation of marriage, although absolute in form, is conditional; and upon breach of the marriage engagement by the donee the property may be recovered by the donor."' Semenza v. Alfano, 443 Pa. 201, 204, 279 A.2d 29, 31 (1971), quoting Stanger v. Epler, 382 Pa. 411, 415, 115 A.2d 197, 199 (1955). "The promise to return an antenuptial gift made in contemplation of marriage if the marriage does not take place is a fictitious promise implied in law. There need not be any promissory assent, either written or unwritten." Id. Gifts recoverable as having been made in contemplation of marriage are not limited to engagement rings. Thus, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has applied the rule to real estate conveyed by a donee's former husband in anticipation of remarriage, noting as follows: [W]e find it most difficult to believe, under the circumstances here present, that a former husband of limited income would purchase a $28,000.00 home for himself and his former wife, mutually agree as to decor and furnishings, only for the purpose of providing the former wife with a gift, as defendant would have us believe.' In the present case, a number of factors support a similar conclusion and result. These include the donee's awareness of the donor's expectation of marriage, her solicitation of his interest in the car on her behalf, the purchase of two vehicles with 4 Semenza v. Alfano, 443 Pa. 201, 205, 279 A.2d 29, 31 (1971), quoting opinion of lower court en banc. m No. 349 Civil 1992 what appears to have been a family purpose in mind, the parties' use of the term "husband and wife" on paperwork in connection with the gift, the very substantial nature of the gift, and the donee's promise to pay for the car after terminating the relationship. Defendants, in their brief, point out that in Stanger u. Epler, 382 Pa. 411, 415, 115 A.2d 197, 199 (1955), the rule is reiterated that "if [a] gift is made simply for the purpose of introducing the donor to the donee's acquaintance and to gain her favor, the property is not recoverable, although marriage does not ensue."' The facts in the present case, however, are more compelling in Plaintiff s favor than those of Stanger, which involved, inter alia, a married donee. The evidence in support of the proposition that the Mercedes Benz convertible falls within the category of recoverable gifts made in contemplation of marriage is, in the Court's view, clear, precise and indubitable. For this reason, the following Order will be entered: ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this '16C day of September, 1993, upon consideration of Plaintiff s amended complaint for fraud and for return of a gift made in contemplation of marriage, the Court finds in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff on the counts for fraud, and in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant Annie E. Hine on the count s Defendants' Brief on Relevant Law, at 2-3. 10 No. 349 Civil 1992 for return of a gift made in contemplation of marriage. Defendant Hine is directed to transfer title to and possession of the motor vehicle (Vehicle Identification No. WDBBA48D5HAO56377) to Plaintiff, upon his reimbursing her in the amount of $4,000.00. R. Mark Thomas, Esq. 54 East Main Street Mechanicsburg, PA 17055 Attorney for Plaintiff Jeffrey L. Stoner, Esq. 831 Market Street P.O. Box 222 Lemoyne, PA 17043 Attorney for Defendant :rc BY THE COURT, J. Wesley Oler, J . 11