HomeMy WebLinkAbout91-0985 CivilDON A. BAIR, SR., IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
Plaintiff CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
V.
ANGELO DASKALAKIS,
Defendant CIVIL ACTION - LAW
V.
DONALD A. BAIR, JR.,
Additional Defendant NO. 985 CIVIL 1991
IN RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR POST -TRIAL RELIEF
BEFORE OLER, J.
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this q f� day of October, 1993, after careful consideration of
Defendant's motion for post -trial relief, and for the reasons stated in the accompanying
Opinion, the motion is DENIED.
BY THE COURT,
Wesley Oler, 69 J.
James D. Flower, Jr., Esq.
11 East High Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
Attorney for Plaintiff
Joshua D. Lock, Esq.
106 Walnut Street
Harrisburg, PA 17101
Attorney for Defendant
:rc
DON A. BAIR, SR., IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
Plaintiff CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
V.
ANGELO DASKALAKIS,
Defendant CIVIL ACTION - LAW
V.
DONALD A. BAIR, JR.,
Additional Defendant NO. 985 CIVIL 1991
IN RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR POST -TRIAL RELIEF
BEFORE OLER, J.
OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT
Oler, J.
This case arises out of a claim for unpaid rent on a condominium unit. A non -
jury trial was held on July 15, 1993, resulting in a verdict in favor of Plaintiff and
against Defendant in the amount of $6,959.64.1 Defendant has filed a motion for post-
trial relief.'
Procedural History; Pleadings
This contract action was commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of
summons on March 22, 1991. Plaintiffs complaint was filed on October 23, 1991. The
complaint alleged (a) the lease of a condominium in Enola, Pennsylvania, to Defendant
by Plaintiffs assignor in November of 1989, for $100.00 per week, (b) Defendant's use
of the premises as a personal residence until March 19, 1991, and (c) his nonpayment
of rent from January 6, 1990.
1 A compulsory arbitration panel had previously found in favor of the Plaintiff and against
the Defendant in the amount of $7,102.86.
2 See Pa. R.C.P. 227.1.
No. 985 Civil 1991
Defendant filed an answer with new matter and joinder complaint on March 2,
1992. These pleadings (a) did not deny the Defendant's occupancy and nonpayment,
(b) alleged that Plaintiffs assignor had, without cause, breached an agreement to sell
Defendant the condominium, and (c) joined the said assignor as an additional
defendant. However, personal jurisdiction was never obtained over the additional
defendant.
On March 19, 1992, Plaintiff filed a reply to Defendant's new matter,
acknowledging the existence of the agreement of sale and attributing assignor's initial
inability to convey marketable title to Defendant to encumbrances upon the property.
Statement of Facts
At a trial held on Thursday, July 15, 1993, Plaintiff established through
testimony and exhibits the aforesaid facts as alleged in the complaint. He showed
further that when Defendant vacated the premises on March 19, 1991, he said that he
no longer intended to purchase the property and promised that he would pay the back
rent when he returned from a trip abroad. Plaintiff also established that Defendant
had changed the locks, left the premises in an odorous condition, and removed all of
the furniture, including some items belonging to Plaintiffs assignor. In addition,
Plaintiffs testimony supported the propositions that the agreed-upon rental figure of
$100.00 per week for the unit was not in excess of fair market value; that, with late
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No. 985 Civil 1991
charges of $10.00 per week,' a principal debt of about $7,000.00 had accrued on the
lease as of Defendant's vacation of the premises; that under the aforesaid agreement
of sale the damages recoverable by the buyer in the event of the seller's inability to
convey marketable title were limited to any down payment made and certain reliance
expenses;' that a down payment provided by Defendant had been returned to him;
and that the assignment from Plaintiff s assignor to Plaintiff expressly transferred "all
claims of whatsoever kind and nature which I may have against my former delinquent
tenant, Angelo Daskalakis, including but not limited to claims for unpaid rent,
damages, unpaid condominium fees and late charges, and municipal assessments for
water, trash and sewer."'
At trial, Defendant established that he had expended $475.00 in bank fees in
connection with an intended mortgage, as much as $400 in legal fees, and $300.00 for
a title search, for a total of $1175.00. He also testified that he eventually bought a
different condominium for $3,000.00 more than the purchase price agreed upon
between himself and Plaintiff's assignor
made the following adjudication:
At the conclusion of the trial, the Court
AND NOW, this 15th day of July, 1993, upon
consideration of the matter in the above -captioned case, and
s See Plaintiffs Exhibits 3, 7.
4 See Plaintiffs Exhibit 2.
s See Plaintiffs Exhibit 4.
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No. 985 Civil 1991
following a nonjury trial, the Court finds in favor of the
Plaintiff, Don A. Bair, Sr., and against the Defendant ... in
the amount of $6,959.64. This figure credits the Defendant
with a setoff of $1,175.00 in connection with Defendant's
new matter and counterclaim and applies an interest rate
of six percent to the rental and late payments due to the
Plaintiff, said interest rate being applied up until today's
date.
In so ordering, the Court gave Defendant the benefit of the doubt on the factual issue
of whether he reasonably decided to forgo the purchase of the condominium owned by
Plaintiff's assignor after certain liens were discovered,' and on the legal issue of
whether Plaintiffs recovery for unpaid rent on the leasehold should be reduced by an
obligation of the assignor on the separate agreement of sale.
Defendant's motion for post -trial relief seeks judgment n.o.v., a molding of the
verdict, or a new trial. The motion is premised upon the following three grounds: (a)
that the Court erred in computing lost rental damages on the basis of a $100 -per -week
figure, since no evidence was presented that such a figure was fair, reasonable and
customary; (b) that the Court erred in failing to reduce Plaintiff's award by $3,000.00,
the amount by which Defendant's expenditure for another condominium exceeded the
purchase price agreed upon between Plaintiff's assignor and Defendant; and (c) that
the Court erred in including an award of interest to Plaintiff, because the assignment
of rights from Plaintiffs assignor to Plaintiff did not encompass interest.
° Plaintiff testified that such liens would have been removed at settlement; however, the
Court believes that the assignor's financial difficulties substantially delayed any such
settlement.
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No. 985 Civil 1991
DISCUSSION
With respect to the premise that the Court erred in computing lost rental
damages on the basis of a $100 per week figure, it must be remembered that this was
the amount provided for in the lease. "[I]t is not the function of the judiciary to
change the obligations of a contract which the parties have seen fit to make." 4
Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts §610A, at 513 (3d ed. 1961). Even if the
Plaintiffs claim were for some reason to be regarded as quasi -contractual, there was
testimony tending to show that the figure was not in excess of market value.
With respect to the premise that the Court erred in failing to credit Defendant
with the sum of $3,000.00 as a result of his expenditure of that amount for a different
condominium, it is believed that such a result would be inconsistent with the express
terms as to seller's liability set forth in the aforesaid agreement of sale. As previously
noted, "[c]ourts may not rewrite [a] contract for the parties." Id. In addition, the two
condominium units were not identical, and it is far from clear that the second unit did
not have an additional value of $3,000.00.
Finally, with respect to the premise that the Court erred in including an award
of interest to Plaintiff because the assignment did not encompass interest, several
factors militate against acceptance of Defendant's position. First, "[i]n general,
liquidated damages bear interest .... [W]here a definite time has been fixed for the
payment of money, the law imposes an obligation on the debtor to pay damages by way
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No. 985 Civil 1991
of interest at the legal rate for the detention of the money after it should have been
paid." 11 P.L.E. Damages §34, at 133-34 (1970). Second, "generally the rules
ordinarily applicable to the interpretation of contracts are applied [to assignments]."
3 Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts §431, at 175 (3d ed. 1960). In this
regard, "the guiding principle, polestar or lodestar of [contract] interpretation ... is ...
[t]o ascertain the will, or intent, of the maker." 4 Williston, A Treatise on the Law of
Contracts §600, at 284-85 (3d ed. 1961). "The language of a contract must be
understood to mean what it clearly expresses." Id. §609, at 403. Third, "[i]n case of
doubt, an assignment is interpreted most strictly against the assignor ...." 3 Williston,
A Treatise on the Law of Contracts, §431, at 175 (3d ed. 1960).
Thus, interest at the legal rate was due on any award of past rent against
Defendant. An interpretation of the assignment to Plaintiff of "all claims of
whatsoever kind and nature which [assignor has] against [his] former delinquent
tenant, Angelo Daskalakis," that would exclude such interest would be inconsistent
with the rule that assignments are to be understood in accordance with their clear
language and with the probable intent of the maker, as well as with the rule that any
ambiguity in an assignment is to be interpreted most strictly against the assignor.
For these reasons, Defendant's motion for post -trial relief must be denied and
the following Order will be entered:
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No. 985 Civil 1991
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this day of October, 1993, after careful consideration of
Defendant's motion for post -trial relief, and for the reasons stated in the accompanying
Opinion, the motion is DENIED.
James D. Flower, Jr., Esq.
11 East High Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
Attorney for Plaintiff
Joshua D. Lock, Esq.
106 Walnut Street
Harrisburg, PA 17101
Attorney for Defendant
:rc
BY THE COURT,
s/ J. Wesley Oler. Jr.
J. Wesley Oler, Jr. J.
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