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HomeMy WebLinkAbout2005-5043 VALERIE D. BEANE, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : : v. : CIVIL ACTION - LAW : CRAIG D. BEANE, : Defendant : NO. 05-5043 CIVIL TERM IN RE: DEFENDANT’S PETITION TO REVIEW AND TERMINATE AWARD OF ALIMONY ORDER OF COURT th AND NOW , this 13 day of June, 2012, upon consideration of Defendant, Craig D. Beane’s Petition to Review and Terminate Award of Alimony, the Plaintiff’s Answer thereto, and after hearing and consideration of the briefs filed by the Parties, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DIRECTED that the Defendant’s Petition is GRANTEDTERMINATED . Defendant’s payment of alimony is effective July 1, 2011. By the Court, M. L. Ebert, Jr., J. Hilary P. Vesell, Esquire Attorney for Plaintiff Jeanne Costopoulos, Esquire Attorney for Defendant VALERIE D. BEANE, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : : v. : CIVIL ACTION - LAW : CRAIG D. BEANE, : Defendant : NO. 05-5043 CIVIL TERM IN RE: DEFENDANT’S PETITION TO REVIEW AND TERMINATE AWARD OF ALIMONY OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT Ebert, J., June 13, 2012 - Background Valerie D. Beane (“Plaintiff”) and Craig D. Beane (“Defendant”) were married on February 4, 2000. The marriage was the third for both parties. The parties have been separated at least since February of 2005 when Plaintiff moved out of the marital residence. Plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce on September 26, 2005. A Decree in Divorce was issued on February 28, 2008. Hearings were held on December 18, 2006, August 17, 2007, and September 14, 2007 before Divorce Master E. Robert Elicker. Mr. Elicker filed his report on October 9, 2007. On October 17, 2007, Defendant filed Exceptions to the Master’s Report. On December 19, 2007, this Court denied the Exceptions and entered an Order confirming alimony as determined in the Master’s Report. On February 28, 2008, this Court issued an order accepting the Recommendation of the Master as the Final Order of Court, requiring Defendant to pay Plaintiff $600 per month alimony for an indefinite duration. On October 6, 2008, Defendant filed a Petition to Review and Terminate Award of Alimony. On June 11, 2009, an Order was entered denying the Petition to Review and Terminate Award of Alimony. 1 On June 8, 2011, Defendant filed a Petition to Review and Terminate Award of Alimony. In addition to other reasons for termination of alimony averred by the Defendant, the Defendant stated that he was retiring from his employment with the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania on June 24, 2011. On October 19, 2011, a hearing was held on the new Petition to Review and Terminate Alimony. On March 19, 2012, a Stipulation for the Entry of “Domestic Relations Order” was filed to provide Plaintiff with her portion of Defendant’s Pennsylvania State Employee pension. Discussion “[T]he Divorce Code expressly provides that any alimony order may be modified, suspended, terminated, reinstated or a new order made upon changed circumstances.” McFadden v. McFadden, 563 A.2d 180, 183 (Pa. Super. 1989) (internal quotations omitted). An obligor may seek a modification of an existing alimony order when the changed economic circumstances are continuous and substantial. Id. at 182. “Pennsylvania case law clearly establishes that retirement can serve as the basis for the changed circumstances of a substantial and continuing nature necessary to modify an alimony award.” Id. at 183 (noting that voluntary retirement qualifies as a substantial change). In considering a modification of an alimony award “the court must consider all relevant, including those statutorily prescribed for at 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701, Alimony, (b) Relevant Factors (1)-(17).” Isralsky v. Isralsky, 824 A.2d 1178, 1188 (Pa. Super. 2003). The factors enumerated in section 3701 used in determining the “nature, amount, duration and manner of payment of alimony” are as follows: (1) The relative earning and earning capacities of the parties. (2) The ages and the physical, mental and emotional conditions of the parties. 2 (3) The sources of income of both parties, including, but not limited to, medical, retirement, insurance or other benefits. (4) The expectations and inheritances of the parties. (5) The duration of the marriage. (6) The contribution by one party to the education, training or increased earning power of the other party. (7) The extent to which the earning power, expenses or financial obligations of a party will be affected by reason of serving as the custodian of a minor child. (8) The standard of living of the parties established during the marriage. (9) The relative education of the parties and the time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party seeking alimony to find appropriate employment. (10) The relative assets and liabilities of the parties. (11) The property brought to the marriage by either party. (12) The contribution of a spouse as homemaker. (13) The relative needs of the parties. (14) The marital misconduct of either of the parties during the marriage. The marital misconduct of either of the parties from the date of final separation shall not be considered by the court in its determinations relative to alimony except that the court shall consider the abuse of one party by the other party. As used in this paragraph, “abuse” shall have the meaning given to it under section 6102 (relating to definitions). (15) The Federal, State and local tax ramifications of the alimony award. (16) Whether the party seeking alimony lacks sufficient property, including, but not limited to, property distributed under Chapter 35 (relating to property rights), to provide for the party's reasonable needs. (17) Whether the party seeking alimony is incapable of self-support through appropriate employment. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(b)(1)-(17). 3 After a review of the record, this Court grants Defendant’s request to terminate alimony. Defendant’s voluntary good faith retirement is a change in his economic situation that is both continuous and substantial. See McFadden, 563 A.2d at 183. Defendant’s changed circumstances allow him the opportunity to demonstrate why the existing alimony order should be modified or terminated. See id. at 184. An analysis of all factors in light of the record has led this Court to conclude that Defendant’s obligation to provide alimony to Plaintiff should be terminated. In the case sub judice, the determinative factors weigh in favor of terminating the existing alimony order. Although only a few changes have occurred since the previous denial of Defendant’s request to terminate alimony, those changes are significant enough to warrant a termination of Defendant’s alimony obligation. Since October 2008, Defendant’s expenses have increased while his income has decreased. Since June 24, 2011, Defendant’s income has decreased from approximately $4,400 a month in wages to $3,049.52 in gross monthly annuity 1 payments from retirement. The gross monthly annuity payments are then reduced pursuant to a March 19, 2012, Domestic Relations Order by 8.384% leaving Defendant with a new gross 2 monthly annuity payment of $2,793.85. The new gross monthly annuity payment is then further reduced by health insurance and federal taxes leaving Defendant with a net monthly annuity 34 payment of $2,377.90. Defendant’s monthly expenses are $2,415.81. Defendant does not 5 have any other source of income. Defendant has been remarried for the past two years and now spends his time taking care of his wife and their household. The wife has developed a 1 Notes of Testimony, 5, 8 [hereinafter N.T. __]; Defendant’s Exhibit 1 [hereinafter Pet.’s Ex. __]. 2 Stipulation for the Entry of “Domestic Relations Order”, filed Mar. 20, 2012. 3 Pet.’s Ex. 1. 4 N.T. 8; Pet.’s Ex. 3. Monthly expenses minus attorney fees, health care, and federal taxes. 5 N.T. 5. 4 degenerative joint disease, fibromyalgia and thyroid problems. She further underwent knee 6 surgery in April of 2011. Additionally, Plaintiff’s overall condition has improved since the previous petition to terminate alimony. Plaintiff is now able to enjoy leisurely activities such as crafts, going on 7 walks, and bike riding which were previously limited due to medical issues. Also, Plaintiff is 8 working two times per month cleaning. Plaintiff maintains that much of her time is spent caring for her 33 year old “mentally ill” son. There was no medical evidence provided to establish the son’s mental illness. The Court does note however that he does not live with the Plaintiff and lives by himself. When asked “in what ways are you taking care of him?” she stated “right now, letting him see the ruins that I am going through as far as the alcoholism. Just being there for 9 him.” This Court finds this claim unpersuasive. Furthermore, the record does not indicate that 1) Plaintiff contributed overly significantly to the marital estate, 2) made extraordinary contributions as the homemaking spouse, or 3) was a factor in increasing Defendant’s earning capacity during marriage. Regarding the length of marriage, while Defendant and Plaintiff were married from 2000 to 2008, they separated after 10 approximately 5 years. Defendant has been paying alimony to Plaintiff since 2007. Thus, Defendant has now been paying Plaintiff alimony for the same amount of time they were actually together. Although this Court is sympathetic to Plaintiff’s medical conditions, it is clear that she 11 began drinking alcohol at age 15 or 16 and was an alcoholic before she married the Defendant. 6 N.T. 4, 11. 7 N.T. 19-20. 8 N.T. 18. 9 N.T. 19. 10 N.T. 4, 7, 14. 11 N.T. 18-19. 5 This Court simply does not accept Plaintiff’s claim that her medical problems are all attributable to her marriage. The Plaintiff only sees her neurologist two times a year and states that even though she is “now clean” from alcohol abuse, she cannot work other than the two days each month when she does some cleaning. Given the length of time that Defendant and Plaintiff actually lived together in comparison to the amount of time Defendant has been paying alimony, it would be inequitable to require the Defendant to continue to pay alimony with a reduced income. See Teodorski v. Teodorski, 857 A.2d 194, 201 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citing DeMarco v. DeMarco, 787 A.2d 1072, 1081 (Pa. Super. 2001)). Plaintiff will continue to receive her entitled portion of Defendant’s benefits under the State Employees Retirement System as set forth in the March 19, 2012, Domestic Relations Order. Therefore, after a review of the record in consideration of section 3701(b) factors, this Court finds that Defendant’s alimony obligation is terminated. Accordingly, the following Order is entered: th AND NOW , this 13 day of June, 2012, upon consideration of Defendant, Craig D. Beane’s Petition to Review and Terminate Award of Alimony, the Plaintiff’s Answer thereto, and after hearing and consideration of the briefs filed by the Parties, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DIRECTED that the Defendant’s Petition is GRANTEDTERMINATED . Defendant’s payment of alimony is effective July 1, 2011. By the Court, M. L. Ebert, Jr., J. Hilary P. Vesell, Esquire Attorney for Plaintiff 6 Jeanne Costopoulos, Esquire Attorney for Defendant 7