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HomeMy WebLinkAbout2011-804 CHALMERS A. SIMPSON, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA PLAINTIFF : : V. : : SCI-CAMP HILL et al. : OFFICER KANE, SGT. HOUSER : MEDICAL : DEFENDANTS : NO. 11-804 CIVIL IN RE: PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS ORDER OF COURT nd AND NOW , this 2 day of October, 2012, upon consideration of Respondent’s Preliminary Objections in the nature of a demurrer and raising failure to exhaust SUSTAINED statutory remedies, the Preliminary Objections are and the Complaint is DISMISSED . By the Court, _________________________ M. L. Ebert, Jr., J. Chalmers Simpson Plaintiff Travis S. Anderson, Esquire Attorney for Defendants CHALMERS A. SIMPSON, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA PLAINTIFF : : V. : : SCI-CAMP HILL et al. : OFFICER KANE, SGT. HOUSER : MEDICAL : DEFENDANTS : NO. 11-804 CIVIL IN RE: PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS OPINION and ORDER OF COURT Ebert, J., October 2, 2012 - PROCEDURAL HISTORY On October 21, 2011, Plaintiff Chalmers A. Simpson filed a pro se Application to 1 File Civil Complaint. This Court denied the application, authorizing the Plaintiff to file a 2 civil action pursuant to the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. The Plaintiff 3 petitioned the Court, and was granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis. It must be noted that no formal complaint has ever been filed. The Plaintiff is a pro se inmate of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections. He did file an “APPLICATION TO FILE CIVIL COMPLAINT.” The Defendants have chosen to file preliminary objections to the averments set for in the Plaintiff’s pro se “APPLICATION TO FILE 4 CIVIL COMPLAINT.” Both parties submitted briefs and oral argument was waived. 1 Application to File Civil Complaint, filed October 21, 2011 2 Order of Court, filed December 1, 2011 3 Order of Court, filed December 1, 2011 4 Preliminary Objections, filed March 12, 2012. In the Plaintiff’s application to file civil complaint he alleges: 51) The actions of all defendants did violate Plaintiff’s EIGHTH AMENDMENT RIGHT, SCI CAMP HILL STAFF should have provided a system of ready access to Plaintiff’s medical need prior to the accident taking place. 52) The PRISON OFFICIALS did show deliberate indifference and did not take Plaintiff serious [sic] when he state that he would pass out, when medical did not reply and Plaintiff was not able to make the situation known to medical staff, office KANE OR SGT. HOUSER should have contacted medical which they both failed to do. 54) Plaintiff had a right to have a safe environment and safe conditions th while confined at SCI CAMP HILL between May 17. [sic] 2010 thru [sic] th September 9, 2010. The Plaintiff is seeking punitive, compensatory and nominal damages for the “infliction of the psychological harm”. He also seeks damages for all the physical 5 ailments he alleges he sustained while at SCI. DISCUSSION Preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer test the legal sufficiency of the complaint. When considering preliminary objections, all material facts set forth in the challenged pleadings are admitted as true, as well as all inferences reasonably deducible therefrom. Preliminary objections which seek the dismissal of a cause of action should be sustained only in cases in which it is clear and free from doubt that the pleader will be unable to prove facts legally sufficient to establish the right to relief. If 5 Application to File Civil Complaint, filed October21, 2011, paragraphs 81 – 84 2 any doubt exists as to whether a demurrer should be sustained, it should be resolved in favor of overruling the preliminary objections. Feingold v. Hendrzak, 15 A.3d 937, 941 (Pa. Super. 2011) citing Haun v. Community Health Systems, Inc., 14 A.3d 120, 123 (Pa. Super. 2011). I. The Plaintiff has failed to follow the grievance procedure as outline in the PLRA. Under the Pennsylvania Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), a) Limitations on remedies for Federal claims--Prison conditions litigation filed in or remanded to a court of this Commonwealth alleging in whole or in part a violation of Federal law shall be subject to any limitations on remedies established by Federal law or Federal courts with respect to the Federal claims. 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 6603(a). The Federal PLRA provides: (a) Applicability of administrative remedies -- No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined to any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This exhaustion requirement is mandatory and “applies to all prisoners seeking redress for prison circumstances or occurrences.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 520 (2002). Exhaustion under the PLRA requires proper exhaustion, meaning that a prisoner must comply with procedural rules, including filing deadlines, as a precondition to filing a civil suit in federal court, regardless of the relief offered through the administrative process. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88 (2006); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741(2001). Thus, a prisoner may file a civil action concerning 3 conditions of confinement under federal law only after he has exhausted the prison's administrative remedies. Banks v. York, 515 F.Supp.2d 89, 116-17 (D.D.C. 2007) citing Jackson v. District of Columbia, 254 F.3d 262, 269 (D.C.Cir. 2001). Even when the prisoner seeks relief not available in grievance proceedings, notably money damages, exhaustion is a prerequisite to suit. Porter, 534 U.S. at 524; see Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). Exhaustion is now required for all “action [s] ... brought with respect to prison conditions,” whether under § 1983 or “any other Federal law.” Id.; Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (1994 ed.) with 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (1994 ed., Supp. V). The doctrine requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies preserves the integrity of the administrative process by requiring the administrative agency charged with broad regulatory and remedial powers to address issues within its expertise before judicial review attaches. LeGrande v. Commonwealth Dept. of Corrections, 894 A.2d 219, 222 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006); see Muir v. Alexander, 858 A.2d 653 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004). As such, a court is without power to act until all administrative remedies have been exhausted. Village Charter Sch. v. Chester Upland School District, 813 A.2d 20 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002). In the present case, the Plaintiff argues a section 1983 deprivation of an Eighth Amendment right; therefore, the Plaintiff is in state court with a violation of a federal law. As such, the Federal PLRA requires exhaustion of administrative remedies. Pennsylvania has an established grievance system under which the Plaintiff must comply. 4 (a) The Department will maintain an inmate grievance system which will permit any inmate to seek review of problems which the inmate experiences during the course of confinement. The system will provide for review and resolution of inmate grievances at the most decentralized level possible. It will also provide for review of the initial decision making and for possible appeal to the Central Office of the Department. 37 Pa. Code § 93.9 DC-ADM 804--Inmate Grievance System The Plaintiff alleges no process under which he filed a grievance against a named person/s for the medical services provided to him or the health and safety condition of the prison. Therefore, the preliminary objections based on the Eighth Amendment violations are granted. However, this Court will address each preliminary objection as it applies to each of the Plaintiff’s claims. II. State Correctional Institute of Camp Hill and SCI’s Medical Department are not “persons” under a Section 1983 civil rights violation. Punitive damages are generally consistent with a Section 1983 claim. Telepo v. Martin, 257 F.R.D. 76, 77-78 (M.D. Pa. 2009); see Graham v. Hotter, Civ. A. No. 05- 2679, 2006 WL 3831375, at *4 (M.D.Pa. Dec. 28, 2006) (Kane, J.) (citing Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 55 (1983) (Brennan, J.)); Martin A. Schwartz & Kathryn R. Urbonya, Section 1983 Litigation Punitive Damages § XXI[B], at 192-93 (2d ed.2008). The 6 Plaintiff seeks compensatory, punitive and nominal damages. 6 Application to File Civil Complaint, filed October 21, 2011 5 In the Third Circuit, it is well-settled that a prison or correctional facility is not a “person” that is subject to suit under federal civil rights laws. Regan v. Upper Darby Township et. al. 2009 WL 650384 (3d Cir. 2009) (unpublished opinion); see also Adams v. Hunsberger, 262 Fed. App’x 478, 481 (3d Cir. March 11, 2008) (unpublished opinion) (“The District Court properly concluded that [the plaintiffs’] claims against the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections were barred, as it is not a ‘person’ within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”); Phippen v. Nish, 223 Fed. App’x 191, 192 (3d Cir.2007) 7 (unpublished opinion) (noting same with respect to state correctional institution). Other jurisdictions have held the same that a § 1983 action may be maintained only against a “person” who has deprived another of rights under the Constitution. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Jails, courts, corporations and law firms are not “persons” within the meaning of § 1983. Reynolds v. Darrah, 11 CIV. 5885 JGK, 2011 WL 4582430 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2011); see generally Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (state is not a “person” for the purpose of § 1983 claims). Additionally, a prison’s medical department is not a “person” under §1983. Regan v. Upper Darby Township et. al., supra.; see Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991 (3d Cir.1973) (New Jersey prison medical department held not a “person” under § 1983). In Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, the United States Supreme Court reiterated its position that state agencies are not “persons” subject to liability in §1983 actions brought in federal court. The Court noted that a §1983 suit against a state official's office was “no different from a suit against the State itself.” 491 U.S. at 71. 7 Federal unpublished opinions are used in this opinion pursuant to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 32.1(a), 28 USCA Rule 32.1, Citing Judicial Dispositions. 6 “Will establishes that the State and arms of the State, which have traditionally enjoyed Eleventh Amendment immunity, are not subject to suit under §1983 in either federal or state court.” Thomas v. Pennsylvania, 375 F. Supp. 2d 406, 409-10 (M.D. Pa. 2005) quoting Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 365 (1990). In the present case, the Plaintiff seeks punitive and compensatory damages against the Defendants. Since monetary damages are usually associated with Section 1983 claims, the Plaintiff’s complaint raises a §1983 claim based on a violation of the 8 Eighth Amendment. Furthermore, while it is unclear in the Plaintiff’s complaint whether he is seeking relief under section 1983, his brief avers that the Defendants are 9 “’persons’” subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. 1983”. Therefore, based on caselaw, the Department of Corrections and the Medical Department are not proper parties and the Defendants’ preliminary objections as pertaining to SCI-Camp Hill and the Medical Department are sustained. III. The Plaintiff did not properly include specific medical personnel in his complaint and failed to allege any facts that suggest Officer Cain and Sergeant Houser denied the Plaintiff medical care. The Plaintiff’s allegation of Eighth Amendment violations as it pertains to the specific treatment he received and/or was denied from August 7, 2010, through August 10, 2010, during his stay in the medical department fails to state a specific person/s who allegedly denied him proper treatment. Weaver v. Franklin County, 918 A.2d 194, 201 8 No Complaint was filed, but the Plaintiff filed an Application to File Civil Complaint, filed October 21, 2011, and this Court has accepted it as a Complaint. 9 Brief and/or Legal Memorandum, dated July 15, 2012, paragraph Y)(3) 7 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (§1983 civil right violation claim fails because Plaintiff cannot identify with specificity the employees who allegedly committed the wrongful acts). Furthermore, the Plaintiff avers no facts that remotely suggest Defendants Officer Cain or Sergeant Houser were involved in providing or denying medical assistance. Regardless, the Plaintiff has failed to set forth a cognizable claim for inadequate medical care in that he failed to show deliberate indifference to serious medical needs such that would offend “evolving standards of decency.” Wareham v. Jeffes, 564 A.2d 1314 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1989) citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A complaint that a health care professional has been negligent in the diagnosis or treatment of a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment rising to the level of cruel and unusual punishment under the United States Constitution, Amendment VIII. Id. at 1323. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner. Id. In Estelle, a prisoner brought a section 1983 action against the State Correctional Department’s medical director and two correctional officials claiming inadequate medical treatment for a lower back injury he had sustained. The prisoner had received some medical care but disputed the adequacy of it. The Court held that a question of whether x-rays or additional diagnostic techniques or forms of treatment are indicated is a matter for medical judgment. The failure to provide certain treatments may be medical malpractice, but it does not represent cruel and unusual punishment. Id. In essence the Plaintiff in the present case is complaining that while his ankle was x-rayed, his back was not; while his ankle was casted at the medical facility at the 8 prison, he should have been treated at an emergency room; and while the prison’s medical employees provided him with a cane, he wanted a wheelchair. These are all issues that question the form of treatment and do not rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment. As such, the Defendants’ preliminary objections relating to his claim that there is an Eighth Amendment violation as it pertains to deliberate indifference to the Plaintiff’s alleged serious medical needs are sustained. IV. The Plaintiff has failed to sustain his burden in showing Officer Cain and Sergeant Houser displayed deliberate indifference to his need to remain on a bottom tier because of a medical condition. A violation of the Eighth Amendment requires both an act that rises to the level of cruel and unusual punishment and a culpable state of mind. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298–99 (1991). The Supreme Court has established that “deliberate indifference” is necessary to find culpability, and this requires that the defendant knew of an excessive risk and disregarded it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 837 (1994). A prison official who actually knew of a substantial risk to an inmate’s health or safety may be found free from liability if he or she responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted. Arocho v. County of Lehigh, 922 A.2d 1010, 1016 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) citing Farmer, supra. at 844. In the present case, neither Office Cain nor Sgt. Houser denied or delayed the Plaintiff medical treatment. Taking Plaintiff’s averments as true, the Plaintiff states that “Sgt. Houser went to check [with the Medical Department] and came back stating that 9 10 “there’s nothing listed.” Further, when Plaintiff warned Officer Cain and Sgt. Houser that he would get dizzy if forced to walk to a higher tier, both prison officials told the 11 Plaintiff that he would have to contact “medical”. There are no allegations that Plaintiff told Officer Cain and/or Sgt. Houser that he tried to contact “medical” without success. 12 Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges that the medical staff failed to log in “vital information”. The logical inference is that the “vital information” is Plaintiff’s claimed medical condition that he gets dizzy walking up stairs. None of the facts alleged nor inferences drawn from them suggest that Officer Cain and/or Sgt. Houser knew of an excessive risk that Plaintiff had a medical condition that would potentially cause him harm by walking up steps. Neither is there any evidence that they disregarded an excessive risk that Plaintiff would fall walking up stairs because he was medically unable to do so. Conversely, if Officer Cain had checked the Plaintiff’s medical records, like Sgt. Houser did, according to the Plaintiff, since that information was not written in the medical records, Officer Cain would not have discovered the Plaintiff’s proclaimed medical condition. Therefore, the Defendants’ preliminary objections as they pertain to the Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment violation in that Officer Cain and Sgt. Houser were deliberately indifferent to the Plaintiff’s medical needs are sustained. 10 Affidavit to File Civil Complaint, filed October 21, 2011, paragraph 7 11 Affidavit to File Civil Complaint, filed October 21, 2011, paragraphs 8, 16 12 Affidavit to File Civil Complaint, filed October 21, 2011, paragraph 53 10 V. Accepting Plaintiff’s averments as true, legally insufficient evidence exists to establish an Eighth Amendment claim against Officer Cain and Sgt. Houser as it pertains to living conditions. “A prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Arocho, supra. 922 at 1016 quoting Farmer, supra. 511 U.S. at 837. The Court explained further that “prison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted.” Arocho, supra. quoting Farmer at 844. Therefore, an official who is not aware of a substantial risk cannot be held liable under the Eighth Amendment. However, the Courts have presumed subjective knowledge if it could be shown that inmates had suffered numerous injuries in the prison. Arocho, supra. at 1016-17 citing Farmer at 842; see also Beers–Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 133 (3d Cir.2001) (“[S]ubjective knowledge on the part of the official can be proved by circumstantial evidence to the effect that the excessive risk was so obvious that the official must have known of the risk.”). Negligence, clearly, is inadequate to support an Eighth Amendment claim. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 305 (1991); Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004). To be liable under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a defendant must have some 11 measure of personal responsibility for the alleged constitutional deprivation. Antonelli v. Sheahan, 863 F. Supp. 756, 762-63 (N.D. Ill. 1994) aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 81 F.3d 1422 (7th Cir. 1996) citing Cygnar v. City of Chicago, 865 F.2d 827, 847 (7th Cir. 1989). “There is no doctrine of superior's liability in §1983 actions; instead, the official must actually have participated in the constitutional wrongdoing.” Cygnar at 847. “Failure to take corrective action cannot in and of itself violate §1983.” Antonelli, supra. quoting Soderbeck v. Burnett County, 752 F.2d 285, 293 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1117 (1985). Some district courts have held that pest infestation of prison cells is not serious. Robinson v. Illinois State Correctional Center, 890 F.Supp. 715, 720 (N.D.Ill.1995); Hines v. Sheahan, 845 F.Supp. 1265, 1269 (N.D.Ill.1994). However, where pest infestation is a prolonged deprivation seriously impacting a prisoner’s health, there is a th potential constitutional violation. Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422 (7 Cir. 1996) (an allegation of sixteen months of infestation and significant physical harm implicates constitutional violation). Eighth Amendment claims apply to allegations of inadequate cooling and ventilation. Chandler, supra. at 1294. However, the Courts are concerned with both the “severity” and the “duration” of the prisoner's exposure to inadequate cooling and ventilation. Id. at 1295. A prisoner's mere discomfort, without more, does not offend the Eighth Amendment. Id. In Dixon v. Godinez, 114 F.3d 640 (7th Cir.1997), an appellate court affirmed summary judgment for mere allegations of poor ventilation, where the prisoner did not provide medical or scientific sources to support his allegation of a medical condition. Similarly, in Woods v. Edwards, 51 F.3d 577 (5th Cir.1995), an 12 appellate court affirmed district court’s granting summary judgment where the prisoner claimed among other things “that his cell was inadequately cooled and that the high temperature, while uncomfortable in itself, also contributed to [his] health problems.” The prisoner had not presented medical evidence sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment violation. Id. at 581. To the contrary, in Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir.1996), the appellate court reversed the lower court’s granting of summary judgment where the prisoner alleged the foul smell of feces and urine, vomit and body odors as evidence of poor ventilation. In Plaintiff’s complaint, he submits the following facts in support of his claim that he was denied “basic human needs”: 56) …inadequate cooling and heating, improper ventalation [sic], a clean housing area, rat and roach infested housing unit where he was forced to sleep and remain in while being confined at SCI CAMP HILL between May thth 17, 2010 thru [sic] September 9, 2010. 61) By Plaintiff having to live under these conditions, along with a heated cell above 100% [sic] degrees did cause Plaintiff to be seriously injured on th August 7, 2010. 69) … Plaintiff [sic] rights were violated by him being confined in a [sic] unsanitized cell with inadequate cooling area that he rust all over the wall, led [sic] in the paint, rats and roaches each night that would eat his food that was purchased from the comminsary [sic] while he tried [sic] to sleep at night and was unable to because he was afraid that he would be attacked by rats again or another cocker [sic] roach may climb in the bad [sic] were [sic] he slept at [sic]. 13 77) The actions of the prison officials caused Plaintiff to suffer a back injury, left side injury, left ankle and leg injury, and left foot injury that was the result of him passing out which was caused from him being forced to climb up and down the stairs, also being placed on the top tear on B- BLOCK. Application to File Civil Complaint, filed October 21, 2011. In the present case, the Plaintiff alleges extreme heat above 100 degrees between May and September. If presumed to be true, for approximately 4 months the Plaintiff lived in extreme temperatures. Like the prisoners in Dixon and Woods, the Plaintiff has failed to show that this heat contributed to his medical condition. The th Plaintiff avers that the heat contributed to his falling on August 7 and contributed to the injuries he sustained. The Plaintiff has provided no medical support that the heat conditions contributed to his fall. To the contrary, the Plaintiff alleges that he came into SCI-Camp Hill with the pre-existing condition of dizziness; that he told “medical” he had this medical condition; he told Officer Cain and Sgt. Houser he had this medical condition; and that in fact, when he was forced to walk up the stairs he passed out from his medical condition and received the multiple injuries. Furthermore, the statement made by Officer Cain and Sgt. Houser, if taken as true, that “this is an old block, there is no air …” shows they knew of a ventilation problem or a cooling problem. However, it does not show that they knew of an excessive risk to the prisoner’s health and safety. It does not show they knew of extreme temperatures of 100 degrees between the months of May and September. 14 With regard to the allegations of rat and cockroach infestation, the defendant does raise specific facts that could survive a preliminary objection. The statement made by Officer Cain and Sgt. Houser, if taken as true that “this is an old block, … we know all about the rats and roaches here so deal with it” shows that the allegation of a vermin condition may have existed. However, the Plaintiff alleges no facts that suggest Officer Cain and Sgt. Houser knew the extent of the rat infestation as alleged by Plaintiff. Specifically, that the rats were eating his commissary food and that he was afraid to go to sleep. At most, their knowledge and presumed failure to act may constitute negligence, but nothing beyond that. Additionally, to support a section 1983 claim, Officer Cain and Sgt. Houser must have had some measure of personal responsibility for the alleged constitutional deprivation. Cygnar, supra. The Plaintiff makes no allegation that the two officers had any type of responsibility to fix the conditions as described by the Plaintiff. Therefore, the Defendants’ preliminary objections as it pertains to the heating conditions, improper ventilation, lead paint, rusty walls, and rat and cockroach infestation, are sustained. VI. The Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Officer Cain and Sgt. Houser regarding any involvement in lost or stolen property. The Plaintiff alleges that on August 10, 2010, property, valued at $23.00, was th taken from his cell. On August 17, the Plaintiff complained to a counselor and on the th 24, he filed a civil complaint. It is not clear under what theory he seeks relief. Regardless, his complaint is void of any facts that remotely suggest Officer Cain and/or 15 Sgt. Houser were involved in this incident. Therefore, the Defendants’ preliminary objections with regard to the allegation of lost or stolen property are sustained. Accordingly, the following Order will be entered: nd AND NOW , this 2 day of October, 2012, upon consideration of Respondent’s Preliminary Objections in the nature of a demurrer and raising failure to exhaust SUSTAINED statutory remedies, the Preliminary Objections are and the Complaint is DISMISSED . By the Court, M.L. Ebert, Jr., J. Chalmers Simpson Plaintiff Travis S. Anderson, Esquire Attorney for Defendants 16