HomeMy WebLinkAbout2012-3049
JOHN MCCREA, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
PLAINTIFF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
:
V. :
:
PENN TOWNSHIP, BIG SPRING :
SCHOOL DISTRICT, AND :
PAN CAL 954 CENTERVILLE :
(UNIT B) LLC, :
DEFENDANTS : 12-3049 CIVIL TERM
IN RE: PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS OF DEFENDANTS PENN TOWNSHIP
AND BIG SPRING SCHOOL DISTRICT
TO THE AMENDED COMPLAINT OF PLAINTIFF
BEFORE HESS, P.J., MASLAND, J. AND PLACEY, J.
OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT
Masland, J., November 9, 2012:--
Before the court are the Preliminary Objections filed by Defendants Penn
Township and Big Spring School District to the Amended Complaint filed by
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Plaintiff, John McCrea. After briefing by the parties and argument en banc, we
will sustain the Defendants’ objections and dismiss the Amended Complaint for
lack of standing.
I. Background
At issue in this Declaratory Judgment action is a tax incentive ordinance
passed by Penn Township under Pennsylvania’s Local Economic Revitalization
Tax Assistance Act (LERTA). 72 P.S. §4722-26. In short, LERTA allows local
taxing authorities to grant tax exemptions to new construction projects in
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In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff named an additional Defendant PanCal 954 Centerville
(Unit B) LLC. Plaintiff contends this Defendant will be the primary beneficiary of the tax incentives
to which he objects. PanCal has not filed Preliminary Objections at this time.
12-3049 CIVIL TERM
deteriorated areas of economically depressed communities. 72 P.S. § 4723.
Penn Township, a largely rural township, decided to try to encourage warehouse
development in the portion of its territory in the vicinity of Interstate 81. To do so,
the Township devised a LERTA Ordinance that attached the “deteriorated” label
to certain property that was eligible for warehouse projects. After advertisement
and a public meeting, the Ordinance was passed. Following the passage of the
Ordinance, Big Spring School District adopted a resolution exempting from real
property taxation the value of improvements made within Penn Township’s
deteriorated zone. According to Plaintiff, these measures would afford
developers a real estate tax exemption in excess of $800,000.
Plaintiff brought this Declaratory Judgment action seeking to have the
Ordinance declared illegal and invalid, null and void. The Township and the
School District each filed Preliminary objections to the Amended Complaint. The
Township raises the following arguments:
Should the Plaintiff be barred from challenging the
validity of a township ordinance based on a case in
which he did not make an appearance at the Public
Hearing, and where he is not a resident of Penn
Township?
Is the Court without subject [matter] jurisdiction in
order to render a decision in a case in which no action
has been taken which causes harm to the Plaintiff?
The School District raises the following objection:
Whether Plaintiff has failed to state an actual case or
controversy which is ripe for review such that this
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this
action?
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12-3049 CIVIL TERM
Ultimately, we need not address all three objections, as we will dismiss Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint on the grounds that he lacks standing to bring this
Declaratory Action.
II. Discussion
To have standing to challenge a municipal ordinance, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that he is “aggrieved by the ordinance.” William Penn Parking
Garage, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 346 A.2d 269, 280 (Pa. 1975). Our Supreme
Court has described that status as follows:
The core concept, of course, is that a person who is
not adversely affected in any way by the matter he
seeks to challenge is not ‘aggrieved’ thereby and has
no standing to obtain a judicial resolution of his
challenge. In particular, it is not sufficient for the
person claiming to be ‘aggrieved’ to assert the
common interest of all citizens in procuring obedience
to the law.
Id. at 280-81 (emphasis added).
Here, Plaintiff avers the following in his Amended Complaint:
Plaintiff will be adversely impacted by having the Big
Spring School District lose more than $800,000 in real
estate tax revenue over the five years exemption
period, in that Plaintiff will be required to make up a
percentage of the $800,000 in lost tax revenues by
increased real property taxes on real estate owned by
him…
Am. Compl. ¶19. Plaintiff identifies no other way he is aggrieved other than
potentially increased tax liability that he will share pro rata with all the other
taxpayers in the School District.
In his brief in opposition to the Preliminary Objections, Plaintiff further
demonstrates that the harm he complains of is not unique to him. Ironically, in
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12-3049 CIVIL TERM
combating the argument that he does not reside in Penn Township, Plaintiff
confirms that (if there is any harm at all) all taxpayers are similarly situated.
Both Penn Township and Big Spring School District
appear to have lost sight of the fact that the action of
Penn Township in enacting its LERTA Ordinance will
have a deleterious financial impact on taxpayers of
the entire Big Spring School District, not just on those
taxpayers who reside in Penn Township.
Br. at 4 (emphasis added). Plaintiff has failed to aver any facts sufficient to
demonstrated any harm unique to him that would confer on him aggrieved status
and standing to seek a declaratory judgment.
Ultimately, Plaintiff has a tax policy disagreement with Penn Township and
the Big Spring School District. His remedy is in the political process, not the
courts. To paraphrase Chief Justice Roberts of the Supreme Court of the United
States, where a tax exemption is lawful, it is not our role to forbid it, or to pass
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upon its wisdom or fairness.
III. Conclusion
In conclusion, Plaintiff was not aggrieved by the passage of the LERTA
Ordinance and therefore lacks standing to challenge it via the instant Declaratory
Judgment Action. Accordingly, his Amended Complaint is dismissed.
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this day of November, 2012, upon consideration of
the Defendants’ Preliminary Objections, Plaintiff’s response thereto, briefing by
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“
Because the Constitution permits such a tax, it is not our role to forbid it, or to pass upon its
wisdom or fairness.” National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566,
2600 (2012).
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12-3049 CIVIL TERM
SUSTAINED
the parties, and argument en banc, the Objections are and the
DISMISSED
Amended Complaint is .
By the Court,
Albert H. Masland, J.
John McCrea, Pro se
P.O. Box 341
Newville, PA 17241
Marcus A. McKnight, III, Esquire
For Penn Township
Philip H. Spare, Esquire
For Big Spring School District
PAN CAL 954 Centerville (Unit B), LLC
125 Locust Street
Harrisburg, PA 17101 :sal
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JOHN MCCREA, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
PLAINTIFF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
:
V. :
:
PENN TOWNSHIP, BIG SPRING :
SCHOOL DISTRICT, AND :
PAN CAL 954 CENTERVILLE :
(UNIT B) LLC, :
DEFENDANTS : 12-3049 CIVIL TERM
IN RE: PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS OF DEFENDANTS PENN TOWNSHIP
AND BIG SPRING SCHOOL DISTRICT
TO THE AMENDED COMPLAINT OF PLAINTIFF
BEFORE HESS, P.J., MASLAND, J. AND PLACEY, J.
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this day of November, 2012, upon consideration of
the Defendants’ Preliminary Objections, Plaintiff’s response thereto, briefing by
SUSTAINED
the parties, and argument en banc, the Objections are and the
DISMISSED
Amended Complaint is .
By the Court,
Albert H. Masland, J.
John McCrea, Pro se
P.O. Box 341
Newville, PA 17241
Marcus A. McKnight, III, Esquire
For Penn Township
Philip H. Spare, Esquire
For Big Spring School District
PAN CAL 954 Centerville (Unit B), LLC
125 Locust Street
Harrisburg, PA 17101 :sal