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HomeMy WebLinkAboutCP-21-CR-0001056-2012 COMMONWEALTH : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA v. : : SHARON ELIZABETH MYERS : CP-21-CR-1056-2012 IN RE: DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS OPINION and ORDER OF COURT Findings of Facts Peck, J., November 16, 2012. On the evening of October 17, 2011, at around 6:30 P.M., Jody Ann Schaefer was driving on South Pitt Street in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Ms. Schaefer observed a vehicle in front of her driving erratically at approximately ten to fifteen miles-per-hour. Ms. Schaefer observed the vehicle as it repeatedly drifted from the center of the street to within inches of the cars parked on the right-hand side of the street. Ms. Schaefer observed the vehicle sideswipe an unoccupied parked truck taking off the truck’s side mirror. At that point, Ms. Schaefer directed her daughter to call 911. Ms. Schaefer immediately thought that the person in the vehicle was having a medical emergency. Ms. Schaefer continued to follow the vehicle and she observed the vehicle continue to drive in the same erratic manner. Ms. Schaefer explained to the 911 dispatcher that she had observed a vehicle driving erratically, sideswipe a truck, and that she thought she may be witnessing a person who was too old to be driving, driving under the influence (“DUI”), or having a medical emergency. Ms. Schaefer observed the vehicle then pull into the opening of an alleyway, plow into the back end of an unoccupied parked car, and come to a stop. Ms. Schaefer pulled up beside the vehicle approximately six feet from the driver, Sharon Elizabeth Myers (“the Defendant”), whom she observed to be alone in the vehicle. Ms. Schaefer described the Defendant as having a “glassy stare” and appearing to be “pretty wasted”. Ms. Schaefer continued down the block, turned around, pulled into the alleyway across from the Defendant, and waited for the police to arrive. Ms. Schaefer observed the Defendant stagger up the sidewalk and enter a house. Officer Daniel Freedman of the Carlisle Police Department arrived within two minutes in uniform and on a marked police bicycle. Officer Freedman had received a dispatch describing the hit and run accident, its location, a description of the vehicle, that the vehicle was weaving slowly down the street, and that the vehicle had hit the side mirror of a truck. On his way to the reported location Officer Freedman observed a side mirror lying next to a truck on the side of South Pitt Street. Officer Freedman then saw the witness Ms. Schaefer and pulled up to her car. Ms. Schaefer told Officer Freedman that she was the one who had called in the hit and run. She pointed out the Defendant’s vehicle and the house, 222 South Pitt Street, where Defendant had entered. Ms. Schaefer described to Officer Freedman how she had observed the Defendant’s vehicle side swipe the truck and then plow into the parked car. Ms. Schaefer described to the Officer the condition of the Defendant but that she was unsure if the Defendant’s condition was alcohol induced or medically related. Ms. Schaefer described that she observed the Defendant staggering and having trouble walking down the sidewalk. Officer Freedman testified that he knew he was dealing with two obvious possibilities: a medical emergency or a DUI. Officer Freedman testified that a diabetic emergency would be consistent with what Ms. Schaefer had described. He testified that diabetic emergencies are fairly common and occur more routinely than the other types of medical emergencies he encounters. Officer Freedman went to the Defendant’s vehicle, had dispatch run the license plate, and confirmed that the registered owner of the vehicle had the same address as the house that Ms. Schaefer had seen the driver stumble into. Officer Freedman went to that residence and found the wooden main door of the residence open but that the external screen door was closed. Officer Freedman could see into the residence. He shouted into the house four or five times, “Carlisle Police Department. Can you come to the door please?” There was no answer. Officer Freedman then opened the screen door and leaned inside. He repeated the announcement a fifth or sixth time and then heard an incoherent mutter from inside. Officer Freedman then made the announcement two or 2 three more times and explained that he was investigating an accident and needed to talk with her if she could come to the door. Officer Freedman continued to get the muttered response. Officer Freedman testified he thought the muttered response was either a diabetic emergency or someone who was under the influence of an intoxicant. He testified that the individual’s wellbeing was his top priority and that he needed to check on her welfare and safety. Officer Freedman announced that he was going inside the residence. He went just inside the threshold of the house and stood by the doorway. He again announced his presence and asked whether the Defendant was alright. Officer Freedman could see from where he was standing into a doorway to a small bathroom. Officer Freedman observed the Defendant on her hands and knees in this doorway. Officer Freedman observed that the Defendant had blood on her head and that the blood was running down and covering the front of her face. Officer Freedman observed what appeared to be a hand smear of blood on the doorjamb to the bathroom. He went back to help her and to ascertain the extent of her head wound. Defendant at that point stated the wound was from an earlier curling iron accident. Officer Freedman sat the Defendant down at her kitchen table and called for emergency medical services (“EMS”). Criminal charges were subsequently brought against Defendant which included: (1) Driving Under the Influence, General Impairment, (second); (2) Driving Under the Influence, General Impairment, with Accident, (second); (3) Driving Under the Influence, Highest Rate of Alcohol, (second); and, (4) Accident Involving Damage to Unattended Vehicle or Property. Conclusions of Law Under the circumstances, this Court finds it plainly reasonable for Officer Freedman to have entered the house to check on the Defendant’s wellbeing. Officer Freedman reasonably believed at the time that the Defendant may have been having a medical emergency and needed immediate emergency assistance. This Court found the testimony of Ms. Schaefer and Officer Freedman regarding their encounter with the Defendant to be credible. 3 The ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness. See Michigan v. Fisher, 130 S.Ct. 546, 548 (U.S. 2009). “Therefore, although searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable, that presumption can be overcome.” Id. (internal citations omitted). “For example, the exigencies of the situation may make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable.” Id. (internal citations omitted). One such exigency is “the need to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury.” Michigan v. Fisher, 130 S.Ct. at 548 (internal citations omitted). “Thus, law enforcement officers may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury.” Id. (internal citations omitted). “This ‘emergency aid exception’ does not depend on the officer’s subjective intent or the seriousness of any crime they are investigating when the emergency arises.” Id. “It requires only an objectively reasonable basis for believing that a person within the house is in need of immediate aid.” Id. (internal citations omitted). “Officers do not need ironclad proof of a ‘likely serious, life- threatening injury’ to invoke the emergency aid exception.” Id. at 549. This Court finds the officer’s entry to the Defendant’s residence plainly reasonable under the circumstances. Minutes after its occurrence, Officer Freedman spoke with an identified witness at the scene of the accident and learned that the witness had seen the Defendant side swipe a truck, collide with a parked car, stagger into a house and that she was concerned the Defendant was having a medical emergency. Officer Freedman’s observations of the scene and the Defendant’s vehicle corroborated the witness’s account of what she had seen. Based on the above, Officer Freedman had an objectively reasonable basis to believe that the Defendant was either having a medical emergency that caused the collision, had been injured in the collision, or both. It was objectively reasonable for Officer Freedman to believe that the Defendant may have needed 4 1 immediate medical assistance. Officer Freedman announced his presence through a screen door, heard muttered responses as if someone was having an issue, entered just inside the doorway to the house and found the Defendant on her hands and knees with a bleeding head injury that needed medical attention for which Officer Freedman called EMS. Accordingly, the Defendant’s motion to suppress is denied. BY THE COURT, s/ Christylee L. Peck, Christylee L. Peck, J. John C. Dailey, Esq. Senior Assistant District Attorney Edward F. Spreha, Jr., Esq. Attorney for the Defendant 1 Based on a totality of the circumstances, Officer’s Freedman’s warrantless entry into the Defendant’s home also may have been justified on the basis that Officer Freedman acted under exigent circumstances and possessed probable cause to believe that the Defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol. Com. v. Fickes, 969 A.2d 1251, 1258-59 (Pa. Super. 2009). 5 COMMONWEALTH : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA v. : : SHARON ELIZABETH MYERS : CP-21-CR-1056-2012 IN RE: DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS ORDER OF COURT th AND NOW, this 16 day of November, 2012, for the reasons set forth in the DENIED. accompanying opinion, Defendant’s Motion to Suppress is BY THE COURT, _______________________ Christylee L. Peck, J. John C. Dailey, Esq. Senior Assistant District Attorney Edward F. Spreha, Jr., Esq. Attorney for the Defendant