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HomeMy WebLinkAboutCP-21-JV-0000174-2012 2IN THE MATTER OF : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF D.J. C., JR., : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA born January 24, 1995 : : CP-21-JV-174-2012 OPINION PURSUANT TO RULE 1925 BEFORE HESS, P.J. In this case, the juvenile, D.J.C., Jr., (David) was found guilty on a charge of theft by unlawful taking, graded as a misdemeanor of the first degree. He was adjudicated delinquent and has been committed to the Manos House Drug and Alcohol Treatment Program. Through counsel, the juvenile filed a post-dispositional motion which was denied by order of November 19, 2012. The juvenile has appealed from our order denying his post-dispositional motion. We understand that the contention on appeal is that we erred in denying the juvenile’s motion to suppress evidence. The adjudication in this case stems from an incident that occurred at the end of August 2012. Some vases and other personal items were stolen from one Anna Gensler. The juvenile’s mother, Jennifer C., resided with Ms. Gensler at the time. David would visit the home on occasion. The theft was investigated by Sgt. Brian Curtis of the Mechanicsburg Police Department. He went to the Gensler residence and interviewed both Ms. Gensler and the juvenile’s mother. Both indicated that they believed David had taken the items. The officer proceeded to a residence that he knew David frequented. The officer confronted the juvenile and told David that he wanted to talk to him about the incident that his mother and Ms. Gensler had reported. Sgt. Curtis then transported David back to his mother’s residence. While David was transported, he was not handcuffed. It should be noted that David was seventeen years old at the time of the incident. During the meeting with David’s mother, Sgt. Curtis read and explained Miranda warnings to both of them. He then allowed David and his mother some time alone to discuss the constitutional rights that had been explained. In the meantime, both David and his mother had signed the form indicating that they had understood the Miranda warnings. After conferring with his mother, David made a statement to Sgt. Curtis in which he admitted taking the missing property. After that, he accompanied the police officer in an attempt to recover some of the items. During their time alone, David admitted to his mother that he had committed the theft. His mother counseled him to admit his involvement to the police but warned him that, if he did so, charges would no doubt be filed. It is clear, however, given his age and experience, that David had his own independent understanding of what would happen. From the testimony at the suppression hearing, we concluded that David’s statement was completely voluntary and uncoerced. In his post-dispositional motion, the juvenile, through counsel, acknowledges that a warrantless arrest for theft is permissible under Pennsylvania law. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. 3904. He correctly asserts that, notwithstanding the statutory provision, the arrest must be supported by probable cause. Because the officer did not have probable cause and because the confession was procured after the defendant was unlawfully arrested, David’s counsel insists that the confession of the juvenile should have been suppressed. 2 Our initial inclination in this case was to treat the pick-up of David by Sgt. Curtis as an investigative detention rather than an arrest. In an investigative detention, the citizen faces an “official compulsion to stop and respond.” Com. v. DeHart, 745 A.2d 633, 636 (Pa.Super. 2000). However, the detention must be temporary unless probable cause emerges and must “not possess the coercive conditions consistent with a formal arrest.” Id. In order to conduct an investigative detention, the police require only reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity. Id. Here, the police had a report of a theft. Both the victim and the juvenile’s mother indicated their belief that David had committed the theft. The juvenile was detained only so long as was necessary to transport him to his mother’s for the purpose of further inquiry. While we were unable to locate an appellate case with similar facts, we continue to remain satisfied that the transportation of a juvenile for the purpose similar to those sub judice is not offensive to either the United States or the Pennsylvania Constitution. Even assuming, however, that David’s arrest was unlawful, that does not end the inquiry. The law in this Commonwealth is that: It is undisputed appellant’s arrest on the expired warrant was illegal; however, not “ ‘all confessions or admissions secured from an illegally arrested person are per se inadmissible as trial evidence.’ ” Com. v. McFeely, 509 Pa. 394, 502 A.2d 167, 170 (1985) quoting Com. v. Bishop, 425 Pa. 175, 228 A.2d 661, 665 (1967); see also United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 98 S.Ct. 1054, 55 L.Ed.2d 268 (1978); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). Whether such evidence is admissible depends on the facts in each case, considering the following factors: (1)whether Miranda warnings were given; (2)the “temporal proximity of the arrest and 3 the confession”; (3) “the presence of intervening circumstances”; and, (4) “the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct”. The voluntariness of the statement is, of course, a threshold requirement, and the confession must also be “free of any element of coerciveness due to the unlawful arrest.” McFeely, at 170 (quoting Commonwealth v. Bogan, 482 Pa. 151, 393 A.2d 424, 427 (1978) (citations omitted)). Commonwealth v. Smith, 995 A.2d 1143, 1152 (Pa. 2010). We address seriatim the four factors stated above. First, Miranda warnings were given. In addition, the officer explained them to the juvenile who was in the presence of his mother. David had the opportunity to discuss the warnings with an interested adult. Ultimately, David’s statement cannot be argued to be a “product” of an unlawful arrest. Second, David had been detained by Sgt. Curtis only long enough to be brought to his mother. There is no indication that David made a statement simply to extricate himself from police detention. Third, in the intervening time between his detention and his statement, David was given Miranda warnings and had the opportunity to speak to his mother. Finally, the record is totally devoid of any official misconduct on the part of Sgt. Curtis. It is clear that he acted in good faith and believed he was well within his authority to transport a child to discuss an allegation of wrong-doing with a parent. For these reasons, even if David was unlawfully detained (a conclusion which we cannot bring ourselves to reach), the detention did not taint the subsequent confession to the degree that the juvenile’s statement became inadmissible. January , 2013 _______________________________ Kevin A. Hess, P. J. 4 Jonathan Birbeck, Esquire Chief Deputy District Attorney Ron Turo, Esquire Juvenile Public Defender Juvenile Probation :rlm 5