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HomeMy WebLinkAbout2004-4331 Civil SELINA D. RAMSEY, PARENT AND NATURAL GUARDIAN OF SANTANA D. & TROY H. RAMSEY, PLAINTIFFS IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. AMY BARNETTE, DEFENDANT V. DUAINE RAMSEY AND TRICIA STOUGHTON, ADDITIONAL DEFENDANTS 04-4331 CIVIL TERM IN RE: MOTIONS OF DEFENDANT AMY BARNETTE AND ADDITIONAL DEFENDANT TRISHA STOUGHTON FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BEFORE BAYLEY. J. AND HESS. J. OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT Bayley, J., July 24, 2006:-- Plaintiff Selina D. Ramsey filed a complaint as parent and guardian of Santana D. and Troy H. Ramsey, against defendant Amy Barnette. On October 5,2002, Duaine Ramsey was operating a Volkswagen on the Pennsylvania Turnpike that was owned by Amy Barnette, a friend of Ramsey's girlfriend, Tricia Stoughton. Ramsey struck a deer and lost control of the vehicle. Santana and Troy were with their father, Duaine Ramsey, and sustained injuries as a result of the accident. As to Amy Barnette, plaintiff alleges in her complaint: 04-4331 CIVIL TERM At all times pertinent hereto, defendant did permit Duaine A. Ramsey to operate the vehicle. At all times pertinent hereto, defendant knew, or should have known, that Mr. Ramsey exhibited a propensity to excessively consume alcohol and operate an automobile in an intoxicated condition. At all times pertinent hereto, defendant knew, or should have known, that Mr. Ramsey intended to or was likely to use the 1990 Volkswagen Fox and to operate the said automobile in such a manner as to create an unreasonable risk of harm to passengers, including the minor plaintiffs. Barnette joined Tricia Stoughton and Duaine Ramsey as additional defendants. As to Tricia Stoughton, defendant alleges in her joinder complaint: Additional Defendant, Tricia Stoughton, negligently entrusted the vehicle to Additional Defendant, Duaine Ramsey, against the specific instructions of Defendant, Amy Barnette; Additional Defendant, Tricia Stoughton, negligently entrusted the vehicle when she knew or should have known that Mr. Ramsey was intoxicated and incapable of safely driving the vehicle; Additional Defendant, Tricia Stoughton, negligently entrusted the vehicle when she knew or should have known that Mr. Ramsey was a careless and reckless driver; Additional Defendant, Tricia Stoughton, negligently entrusted the vehicle when she knew or should have known that Mr. Ramsey would negligently operate the motor vehicle. Barnette and Stoughton filed motions for summary judgment as to the causes of action against them for negligent entrustment. The motions were briefed and argued on July 12, 2006. In Washington v. Baxter, 719 A.2d 733 (Pa. 1998), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania set forth the standard for deciding a motion for summary judgment. A court: . .. must view the record in the light most favorable to the non- moving party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue -2- 04-4331 CIVIL TERM of material fact must be resolved against the moving party. Pennsylvania State University v. County of Centre, 532 Pa. 142, 143-145,615 A.2d 303,304 (1992). In order to withstand a motion for summary judgment, a non-moving party "must adduce sufficient evidence on an issue essential to his case and on which he bears the burden of proof such that a jury could return a verdict in his favor. Failure to adduce this evidence establishes that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Ertrel v. Patriot-News Co., 544 Pa. 93,101-102,674 A.2d 1038,1042 (1996). In Ferry v. Fisher, 709 A.2d 399 (Pa. Super. 1998), the Superior Court of Pennsylvania stated: Section 308 of The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines the tort of negligent entrustment, which has been adopted in this Commonwealth, as follows: S 308. Permitting Improper Persons to Use Things or Engage in Activities It is negligence to permit a third person to use a thing or to engage in an activity which is under the control of the actor, if the actor knows or should know that such person intends or is likely to use the thing or to conduct himself in the activity in such a manner as to create an unreasonable risk of harm to others. Restatement (Second) of Torts S 308 (emphasis added); Christiansen v. Silfies, 446 Pa.Super. 464, 667 A.2d 396 (1995). Under a theory of negligent entrustment, liability is imposed upon a defendant because of his or her own actions in relation to the instrumentality or activity under his or her control. Silfies, 446 Pa.Super. at 472, 667 A.2d at 400. The entrustor's liability is not dependent on, derivative of, or imputed from the entrustee's actual liability for damages. Id.; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts S 308. There is evidence in the record that Barnette wanted to sell her Volkswagen. She was a friend of Stoughton, and knew that Stoughton's boyfriend, Duaine Ramsey, a mechanic, was interested in purchasing the car and that he wanted to examine and -3- 04-4331 CIVIL TERM test drive it. Barnette let Stoughton use the car approximately a week prior to the accident. On October 5, 2002, Ramsey was driving the car to Stoughton's residence when the accident occurred. When Barnette let Stoughton use her car, she did not inquire about Ramsey's driving status or ability to drive. Stoughton had, on several occasions, witnessed Ramsey drink alcohol before driving and had ridden with him after he consumed alcohol. On the day of the accident, Ramsey drank beer before driving Barnette's Volkswagen and drank more beer while he was driving, before he struck the deer. He was a licensed driver. His license has never been suspended, and he has never been arrested for driving under the influence. This evidence is sufficient to raise an issue as to whether Barnette and Stoughton granted Ramsey permission to drive the Volkswagen. "The necessary permission may be in the form of express or implied affirmative consent, or it may result by implication from the relationship of the parties or a course of conduct in which the parties have mutually acquiesced." Snyder v. Carlson, 135 Pa. Super. 390 (1939). Here, there is evidence supporting implied permission for Ramsey to drive the Volkswagen. Barnette lent it to her friend, Stoughton, because Ramsey was interested in purchasing the vehicle. That creates the inference that Ramsey would drive the vehicle for the purpose of determining whether to purchase it. However, permission satisfies only the first element of negligent entrustment. The second inclusive element of the tort is that the entrustor knew, or should have known, that the third person intended to or was likely to use the thing or conduct himself in such a manner as to -4- 04-4331 CIVIL TERM create an unreasonable risk of harm to others. In Ferry, the defendant was driving a vehicle that he was considering purchasing from a car dealership when an accident occurred and the plaintiff suffered injuries. The plaintiff sued the car dealership on a cause of action for negligent entrustment. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that plaintiff failed to satisfy the second element of negligent entrustment because there was insufficient evidence to prove that plaintiff knew or had reason to know that defendant "was either an incompetent or unfit driver." Id. In the case sub judice, plaintiff has not produced evidence that either Barnette or Stoughton knew or should have known that Ramsey intended to or was likely to drive the Volkswagen in a manner as to create an unreasonable risk or harm to others, i.e., that he was an incompetent or unfit driver. The only evidence of Barnette's knowledge of Ramsey is that he was Stoughton's boyfriend, he was a mechanic, he was interested in purchasing the Volkswagen, and he wanted to examine and test drive it. Given these circumstances, like the car dealership in Ferry, she had no duty to make specific inquires into his driving abilities before letting him drive her car. There is no evidence that Stoughton had ever seen Ramsey drive a vehicle while intoxicated or drink alcohol while driving a vehicle. It is not unlawful for an adult to drink and then drive unless the amount of alcohol intake reaches the point where the person is driving under the influence. What the record shows Stoughton knew about Ramsey's driving habits, which is that he would sometimes drink and then drive, is not sufficient to raise an issue as to whether she knew or should have known that Ramsey intended to or was likely to -5- 04-4331 CIVIL TERM drive the Volkswagen in such a manner as to create an unreasonable risk of harm to others. Accordingly, the motions for summary judgment will be granted. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this day of July, 2006, IT IS ORDERED: (1) The motion of defendant, Amy Barnette, for summary judgment on plaintiff's claim that she is liable on a cause of action for negligent entrustment, IS GRANTED. (2) The motion of additional defendant, Trisha Stoughton, for summary judgment on defendant's claim that she is liable on a cause of action for negligent entrustment, IS GRANTED. By the Court, Edgar B. Bayley, J. Jan G. Sulcove, Esquire For Plaintiffs Kevin D. Rauch, Esquire F or Defendant John R. Ninosky, Esquire For Additional Defendant Tricia Stoughton Brigid Q. Alford, Esquire For Additional Defendant Duaine Ramsey :sal -6- SELINA D. RAMSEY, PARENT AND NATURAL GUARDIAN OF SANTANA D. & TROY H. RAMSEY, PLAINTIFFS IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. AMY BARNETTE, DEFENDANT V. DUAINE RAMSEY AND TRICIA STOUGHTON, ADDITIONAL DEFENDANTS 04-4331 CIVIL TERM IN RE: MOTIONS OF DEFENDANT AMY BARNETTE AND ADDITIONAL DEFENDANT TRISHA STOUGHTON FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BEFORE BAYLEY. J. AND HESS. J. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this day of July, 2006, IT IS ORDERED: (1) The motion of defendant, Amy Barnette, for summary judgment on plaintiff's claim that she is liable on a cause of action for negligent entrustment, IS GRANTED. (2) The motion of additional defendant, Trisha Stoughton, for summary judgment on defendant's claim that she is liable on a cause of action for negligent entrustment, IS GRANTED. 04-4331 CIVIL TERM Jan G. Sulcove, Esquire For Plaintiffs Kevin D. Rauch, Esquire F or Defendant John R. Ninosky, Esquire For Additional Defendant Tricia Stoughton Brigid Q. Alford, Esquire For Additional Defendant Duaine Ramsey :sal By the Court, Edgar B. Bayley, J. -2-