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HomeMy WebLinkAboutCP-21-CR-0000647-2012 COMMONWEALTH : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEASE OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. : : : JOSEPH A. DUPPSTADT : CP-21-CR-0647-2012 IN RE: DEFENDANT’S POST-SENTENCE MOTION OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT Masland, J., June 21 2013:-- Following a two-day jury trial, Defendant, Joseph Aaron Duppstadt, was found guilty of Corruption of Minors on December 6, 2012. He was sentenced on January 29, 2013, to pay a $1,000 fine and to undergo imprisonment in a State Correctional Institution for not less than one year and no more than five years. Defendant filed a post-sentence motion requesting a judgment of acquittal, a new trial, and a modification 1 of sentence. Following hearing and argument on the motion on May 29, 2013, we deny the motion in all respects in accordance with this opinion and order of court. I. Facts At trial, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of two juveniles J.R. and C. B., and J.R.’s father, D.R., from which the following facts derive. On October 8, 2011, following an adult Rugby game, members of the team went to C.H.’s house for an “after 2 party.” At the “after party,” J.R. and C.B. were playing football when Defendant, who had not been playing with the boys, intercepted the football and, inexplicably, tackled 3 J.R. to the ground. While on the ground, Defendant put his leg over J.R. with enough 1 Defendant originally also filed a motion for acquittal based on the court’s failure to grant a Habeas Corpus Pretrial Petition which was abandoned as moot at the hearing. 2 Notes of Testimony. Dec. 6, 2012 at 91. 3 N.T. Dec. 6, 2012 at 96. CP-21-CR-0647-2012 4 force that J.R. was unable to get up. Defendant then began rubbing and touching 5 J.R.’s buttocks for approximately ten seconds. In reaction to the tackle and the 6 touching, J.R. stated, “get off me freak” to which the Defendant did not respond. Defendant then heard a car horn beep and said “there is my ride” and got up and 7 started running to the car. After J.R. was released from the ground he and C.B. ran 8 immediately to tell D.R. about the incident. D.R. was “taken off guard” by the boy’s report and would have confronted the 9 Defendant immediately had the Defendant not left the party. At rugby practice the following week, when D.R. confronted the Defendant with “what are you doing touching 10 my kid’s butt,” the Defendant denied any such touching. D.R. was “troubled” by the 11 incident and “wasn’t exactly sure what to make of it.” Eventually, after obtaining the 12 counsel of friends, D.R. reported the incident to the Pennsylvania State Police. Finally, with respect to the impact on J.R., when asked on cross if his son is “okay now,” D.R. responded “Yes,” but noted that, at the time of the incident, J.R. “wasn’t 13 comfortable” with what had happened. II. Discussion It is well settled that in considering a post sentencing motion the court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner and draws all reasonable inferences in the Commonwealth’s favor. Commonwealth v. 4 Id. 5 N.T. Dec. 6, 2012 at 96, 97. 6 N.T. Dec. 6, 2012 at 99. 7 N.T. Dec. 6, 2012 at 102. 8 N.T. Dec. 6, 2012 at 100. 9 N.T. Dec. 5, 2012 at 54, 55. 10 N.T. Dec. 5, 2012 at 67. 11 N.T. Dec. 5, 2012 at 66. 12 N.T. Dec. 5, 2012 at 57. 13 N.T. Dec. 5, 2012 at 73. -2- CP-21-CR-0647-2012 O’Bryon, 820 A.2d 1287, 1290 (Pa. Super. 2003). Furthermore, the trier of fact is the ultimate arbiter of the weight of the evidence and credibility of the witnesses. Commonwealth v. Griscavage, 517 A.2d 1256, 1257 (Pa. 1986). In order to obtain a conviction for the crime of corruption of minors, the Commonwealth must establish that the defendant “being of the age of 18 years and upwards, by any act corrupts or tends to corrupt the morals of any minor less than 18 years of age . . . .” 18 Pa.C.S. §6301(a)(1). “‘Tending to corrupt’ . . . is a broad term involving conduct toward a child in an unlimited variety of ways which tends to produce or to encourage or to continue conduct of the child which would amount to delinquent conduct.” Commonwealth v. Meszaros, 168 A.2d 781, 782 (Pa. Super. 1961); See also, Commonwealth v. Barnette, 760 A.2d 1166 (Pa. Super. 2000). Actions that tend to corrupt the morals of a minor are those that “would offend the common sense of the community and the sense of decency, propriety and morality which most people entertain.” Commonwealth v. DeWalt, 752 A.2d 915, 918 (Pa. Super. 2000). The Commonwealth need not prove that the defendant's acts actually corrupted the minor's morals, but only that they tended to do so. Commonwealth v. Pankraz, 554 A.2d 974, 976 (Pa. Super. 1989). A. Judgment of Acquittal In passing upon a post-verdict motion for judgment of acquittal, a trial court is limited to determining the presence or absence “of that quantum of evidence necessary to establish the elements of the crime.” Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 611 A.2d 301, 303 (Pa. Super. 1992). To determine the legal sufficiency of evidence supporting a jury's verdict of guilty, this Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to -3- CP-21-CR-0647-2012 the Commonwealth and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor. Id. This Court must then examine whether the evidence is sufficient to permit a jury to determine that each and every element of the crime charged has been established beyond a reasonable doubt. See, Commonwealth v. Aulisio, 522 A.2d 1075, 1079 (Pa. 1987); See also, Commonwealth v. Smith, 568 A.2d 600, 602 (Pa. 1989). It is the function of the jury to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses and to determine the weight to be accorded to the evidence produced. See, Commonwealth v. Guest, 456 A.2d 1345, 1347 (Pa. 1983). See also; Commonwealth v. Rose, 344 A.2d 824, 826 (Pa. 1975). The jury is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence introduced at trial. Id. The question of any doubt is for the fact finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances. Commonwealth v. Seibert, 622 A.2d 361, 363 (Pa. Super. 1993). The crux of Defendant’s argument is that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that his acts tended to corrupt J.R. in a way that would produce, encourage or continue delinquent conduct on the part of the minor. The Defendant relies on Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 442 A.2d 803 (Pa. Super. 1982), in which the defendant exposed his penis to a 7-year-old girl, shook it, and put his fingers to his mouth, a gesture indicating that the child should remain silent. There was no evidence that Mr. Rodriquez was aroused or masturbating and his actions were insufficient to sustain a conviction for corruption of a minor. Id. at 805. The instant case is distinguishable primarily because there was no physical contact of a sexual nature between the defendant and the victim in Rodriguez. Here, the Defendant did have physical contact -4- CP-21-CR-0647-2012 14 with the victim, and, as described below, the contact was such that the jury could conclude it was both sexual and corrupting in nature. The jury reasonably determined that Defendant’s act of tackling J.R. to the ground, placing his leg over J.R.’s body so he could not get up, and groping his buttocks in an “inappropriate manner” for a period of ten seconds tended to corrupt J.R. In finding this, the jury could reasonably believe that exposing an eight-year-old boy to sexual physical touching offended their sense of decency, propriety, and morality as such conduct is self-evidently inappropriate. Moreover, the immediate alarm this contact engendered in both boys demonstrated that this was much more than a mere football tackling incident. The young boys knew that the guy with the ball does not do the tackling. But, more importantly, they knew the difference between a tackle and a grope and would not have rushed off to find an adult otherwise. This was a freakish and alarming incident that had a significant and immediate impact on an eight year old and his nine year old friend. Because a reasonable jury could have found that the Commonwealth had sufficient evidence to prove every element, Defendant’s post-sentencing motion for acquittal based on insufficient evidence is denied. B. New Trial Defendant argues that he should be granted a new trial because the jury’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence. In Brown, the court held that, A trial court will grant a new trial when it believes the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and resulted in a miscarriage of justice. . . . [a] new trial should be awarded when the jury’s verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of 14 N.T. Dec. 6 2012 at 96, 97. -5- CP-21-CR-0647-2012 justice and the award of a new trial is imperative so that right may be given another opportunity to prevail. Commonwealth v. Brown, 648 A.2d 1177, 1189-90 (Pa. 1994). The jury, as finder of fact, found the evidence and testimony presented by the Commonwealth to be credible. This did not shock our sense of justice or cause us to fall out of our chair. This issue was of obvious import to the jury as noted by their request for more guidance on what the corruption charge really meant. Therefore, we supplemented the charge with the following: “[a]ctions that tend to corrupt the morals of a minor are those that would offend the common sense of a community and the sense of decency, 15 propriety, and morality which most people entertain.” This language was used in the case of Commonwealth v. Randall, 133 A.2d 276, 280 (Pa. Super. 1957), and therefore is an adequate and proper interpretation of what a juror should know and consider. With that in hand, it was reasonable for the jury to find that Defendant’s acts of rubbing and touching J.R.’s buttocks for approximately 10 seconds and placing his leg over J.R.’s body so that he could not get up, could have easily tended to corrupt J.R. as discussed above. Once again, the fact that both minors were alarmed by Defendant’s conduct reveals that it was of a nature that could tend to corrupt their morals. The minors were not only uncomfortable with what happened at the time, but maintained and expressed discomfort at trial with what had occurred. Therefore, this Court does not find that the verdict was so contrary to the weight of the evidence that it shocks its sense of justice. Rather, having given the jury the guidance they need to apply the facts to the law, we 15 N.T. Dec. 6, 2012 at 192. -6- CP-21-CR-0647-2012 are satisfied that their decision is supported by the evidence. As a result, Defendant’s motion for a new trial is denied. C. Modification of Sentence Defendant’s last argument is that his sentence should be modified. Sentencing is a matter vested within the sound discretion of the trial court, excessive sentences imposed outside of the standard range guidelines, as well as excessive sentences imposed within the standard guidelines, can amount to an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Simpson, 510 A.2d 760, 761-62 (Pa. Super. 1986). While sentencing is a matter vested within the discretion of the trial court, a reviewing court may disturb the sentence if the trial court abuses its discretion. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 861 A.2d 877, 280 (Pa. Super. 2008). A sentencing court commits an abuse of discretion where it fails to consider the factors set forth in 42 P.S. 9721(b). See Commonwealth v. Fullin, 892 A.2d 843, 847 (Pa. Super. 2006). At sentencing, Defendant received a $1,000 fine and a period of incarceration in 16 a State Correctional Institution for not less than one nor more than five years. On the positive side, we took into account the Defendant’s efforts to start a new life with a wife and child; however, the fact that this is Defendant’s second sexually-related offense and that he served his maximum sentence on the first one caused us great concern when 17 considering his rehabilitative needs. Thus, we determined that services in the county would not address his or society’s needs and that appropriate minimum sentence, within 18 the standard range of 6 to 16 months, was 12 months. 16 N.T. Jan. 29, 2013 at 7. 17 Id. 18 Id. -7- CP-21-CR-0647-2012 Defendant complains that the court did not consider other factors enumerated in 42 P.S. 9721(b), which states, in pertinent part, “the court shall follow the general principle that the sentence imposed should call for confinement that is consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721. In fact, the court performed all these “calculations” – the Defendant just does not like the sum of the parts as we found them to be. With respect to the impact on the victim the court stated, “Mr. Deyo may be correct in that the minors involved in this case … may not have been traumatized by this 19 incident … [but] that remains to be seen.” As noted above, the eight-year-old victim, his father and his friend were upset, alarmed and uncomfortable. Without a crystal ball we cannot say what the victim may experience as he matures, but we are comfortable not only with the jury’s conclusion that Defendant’s actions tended to corrupt, but also with our sentence, which will ensure that, for a time, Defendant will not engage in any further acts that could harm the most innocent among us. In short, the Defendant should be thankful that his minimum sentence was only 12 months. Therefore, because the court examined all the relevant factors and the sentence falls within the standard range, the Defendant’s motion for a modification of sentence is denied. III. Conclusion In closing, there was sufficient evidence presented at trial such that a reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore, Defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal is denied. Furthermore, since the weight of the evidence is in favor of a guilty verdict and the jury reasonably determined that all 19 N.T. Jan. 29, 2013 at 6. -8- CP-21-CR-0647-2012 elements of the offense were satisfied, the verdict was not a miscarriage of justice. Therefore, we deny Defendant’s motion for a new trial. Lastly, the sentence was within the standard range for the offense and the court factored in the totality of the circumstances when calculating its sentence. Thus, Defendant’s motion for a modification of sentence is denied. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this day of June, 2013, after hearing and argument, DENIED. Defendant’s Post-Sentence Motions are By the Court, Albert H. Masland, J. Christin J. Mehrtens-Carlin, Esquire For the Commonwealth Drew F. Deyo, Esquire For Defendant -9- COMMONWEALTH : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEASE OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. : : : JOSEPH A. DUPPSTADT : CP-21-CR-0647-2012 IN RE: DEFENDANT’S POST-SENTENCE MOTION ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this day of June, 2013, after hearing and argument, DENIED. Defendant’s Post-Sentence Motions are By the Court, Albert H. Masland, J. Christin J. Mehrtens-Carlin, Esquire For the Commonwealth Drew F. Deyo, Esquire For Defendant