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HomeMy WebLinkAboutCP-21-CR-0000738-2012 COMMONWEALTH : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : MARQUIS DAVIS : CP-21-CR-738-2012 IN RE: OMNIBUS PRE-TRIAL MOTION FINDINGS OF FACTS Peck, J., August 29, 2013. On February 24, 2012, Sergeant James Lynam of the Pennsylvania State Police initiated a traffic stop of a vehicle used by Marquis Davis (the “Defendant”) on the 1 Harrisburg Pike in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. The traffic stop led to the consent search of the Defendant’s vehicle, a search incident to arrest of the Defendant’s person, and eventually a warranted search of the Defendant’s hotel room. As a result, Defendant was charged with: (1) Unlawful Delivery, Manufacture, Possession with Intent to Deliver a Schedule II Controlled Substance – Cocaine; (2) Unlawful Delivery, Manufacture, Possession with Intent to Deliver a Schedule I Controlled Substance – Marijuana; and (3) Unlawful Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. The Defendant’s motion contests the search of Defendant’s vehicle and seeks to suppress all contraband resulting therefrom. On the morning of the incident, Sergeant Lynam was at the Red Roof Inn to 2 execute an active bench warrant for an employee of the hotel. In attempting to determine if the subject of the bench warrant was at the hotel, Sergeant Lynam ran the registrations 1 Notes of Testimony, 8-9, 14, 18 (filed Jan. 2, 2013 and Apr. 11, 2013) (hereinafter “N.T. at __). 2 N.T. at 9. of vehicles parked in the hotel’s parking lot, including a vehicle with an expired 3 temporary registration belonging to a resident of Philadelphia. Sergeant Lynam testified that after running the registration of that vehicle, he 4 spoke to the manager of the hotel. Sergeant Lynam testified that the manager named the Defendant as the operator of that vehicle and stated the Defendant had rented, with daily 5 cash payments, two rooms on the second floor. The Defendant was not the registered 6 owner of the vehicle. Sergeant Lynam testified he was informed by the manager that 7 there was a lot of traffic in and out of the rooms rented by the Defendant. Sergeant Lynam testified that, based on his training and experience, the information obtained from 8 the manager made him suspicious of drug activity. Sergeant Lynam then reviewed the 9 criminal histories of both the vehicle’s registered owner and the Defendant. The Defendant’s criminal history included four prior contacts for violations of the Drug 10 Device and Cosmetic Act in Pennsylvania. Nikunj Vimawala, the manager of the hotel, offered some testimony contrary to Sergeant Lynam’s but his testimony primarily revealed his inability to recall the day in 3 N.T. at 9-10. 4 N.T. at 13. 5 N.T. at 13-15. 6 N.T. at 14. 7 N.T. at 14-15. 8 N.T. at 16. 9 N.T. at 16. 10 N.T. at 89. 2 11 question. Mr. Vimawala testified that the hotel does not take vehicular information and that he could not have known what vehicle the Defendant was driving because there is no 12 visual of the parking lot from the hotel’s front desk. Mr. Vimawala testified that he would not have been able to determine that a vehicle belonged to the occupants of any 13 particular room. Sergeant Lynam initiated surveillance of the vehicle and Trooper John Brumbaugh 14 continued the surveillance. Trooper Brumbaugh notified Sergeant Lynam when the vehicle left the hotel parking lot and Sergeant Lynam located the vehicle on the 15 Harrisburg Pike in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. Sergeant Lynam initiated a traffic stop of the vehicle on the basis of the expired temporary registration and a 16 nonfunctioning brake light. There were three individuals in the vehicle, including the Defendant who was 17 sitting in the front passenger seat. Sergeant Lynam requested the identification from all of the vehicle’s occupants and confirmed that the registered owner of the vehicle was not 18 in the vehicle. The Defendant told Sergeant Lynam that he was from Philadelphia, was in the area looking for a job, and that he had permission to operate the vehicle from the 11 N.T. at 122. 12 N.T. at 122-124. 13 N.T. at 124. 14 N.T. at 16-17, 116. 15 N.T. at 17-18. 16 N.T. at 18. 17 N.T. at 21. 18 N.T. at 22-24. 3 19 registered owner. When asked, the Defendant denied renting a hotel room, then said he 20 was staying at the Quality Inn on the first floor. Sergeant Lynam testified that the Defendant appeared overly nervous, spoke rapidly, was fidgety, and failed to maintain 21 eye contact. Sergeant Lynam testified he had reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot based on his experience in the field and all of the circumstances, including: the Defendant’s lies concerning the hotel where he was staying, the Defendant’s ability to pay cash for the hotel room while unemployed, the Defendant’s explanation for being in 22 the area, the Defendant’s behavior, and the Defendant’s criminal history. Sergeant Lynam summoned the assistance of Trooper Michael Bruce, who arrived 23 in a separate vehicle. Sergeant Lynam asked the Defendant to exit the vehicle and he 24 complied. Sergeant Lynam asked for consent to search the vehicle, he explained to the Defendant numerous times that he had a right to refuse the consent search, and he 25 provided the Defendant with a Waiver of Rights and Consent to Search form. The 26 Defendant was not under arrest at the time.It was, however, Sergeant Lynam’s 19 N.T. at 25, 34, 41. 20 N.T. at 25, 128. 21 N.T. at 32-33. 22 N.T. at 40-41, 82; Com. Ex. 4. 23 N.T. at 26-28. 24 N.T. at 38. 25 N.T. at 35, 82; Com. Ex. 1-A. 26 N.T. at 55. 4 27 intention to detain the Defendant to investigate the matter further.The Defendant signed 28 the consent form and gave Sergeant Lynam verbal consent to search the vehicle. The Defendant testified that he believed Sergeant Lynam would not let him go, so 29 he let him search the car. The Defendant testified he was informed by Sergeant Lynam 30 he did not have to agree to the search. The Defendant testified he did not believe he was 31 free to leave at this time. After consent was obtained, Sergeant Lynam summoned Corporal Housel and his 32 police dog to the scene to assist in the search of the vehicle. Trooper Bruce did not 33 address the Defendant until consent was obtained. The other two occupants were asked to exit the vehicle and a pat-down search of the Defendant and the other occupants of the 34 vehicle was conducted. The Defendant and the other occupants of the vehicle were not handcuffed but were directed to sit on the curb while the search of the vehicle was 35 conducted. 36 After the pat down, the police dog searched the vehicle and did not alert. Sergeant Lynam and Corporal Housel then conducted a hand search of the vehicle, 27 N.T. at 81. 28 N.T. at 35, 133. 29 N.T. at 132. 30 N.T. at 132. 31 N.T. at 133. 32 N.T. at 29, 32. 33 N.T. at 31. 34 N.T. at 38-39, 43-46. 35 N.T. at 43. 36 N.T. at 46-47. 5 37 searching the interior passenger compartment and the trunk. Inside the vehicle, they discovered ammunition and drug paraphernalia, comprising of a plastic bong and a blue 38 metal grinder. 39 Sergeant Lynam then asked the Defendant for consent to search his hotel room. 40 The Defendant did not give a clear consent. The Defendant and the other occupants of 41 the vehicle were placed into custody and transported individually to the Carlisle Station. Sergeant Lynam conducted a more thorough search of the Defendant’s person at the Carlisle Station and discovered nineteen glassine baggies containing crack cocaine, 42 cash, and two keys to the Red Roof Inn. Trooper Brumbaugh then Mirandized the 43 Defendant at the Carlisle Station before any interrogation. In response to Trooper Brumbaugh’s question the Defendant then offered a statement that all the drugs he has 44 are the ones that were found on him. Thereafter, Trooper Schmitt applied for and received approval for a search warrant 45 for the two hotel rooms. The basis for the search warrant was the drug paraphernalia found in the vehicle during the traffic stop and the crack cocaine found in the 37 N.T. at 47. 38 N.T. at 48, 50; Com. Ex. 1-B. 39 N.T. at 57. 40 N.T. at 58. 41 N.T. at 64. 42 N.T. at 49-50, 52. 43 N.T. at 109-110. 44 N.T. at 112-113, 118. 45 N.T. at 58, 105-106; Com. Ex. 2-A. 6 46 Defendant’s possession. A search of the hotel rooms revealed a clear plastic bag containing suspected crack cocaine, rolling papers, a multi-colored metal grinder, a 47 marijuana roach, and cash. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW This Court finds that the Defendant, while under an investigative detention, freely and voluntarily consented to the search of his vehicle. This Court found the testimony of Sergeant Lynam, Trooper Brumbaugh, and Trooper Schmitt to be credible. Furthermore, the video of the incident from Sergeant Lynam’s dash camera, entered as an exhibit, corroborated each Trooper’s testimony. This Court found the testimony of the Defendant lacking credibility. This Court found the testimony of Mr. Vimawala to be mostly unhelpful as it was clear from his demeanor that he did not wish to be involved in the matter, and, accordingly provided little information in response to questions asked of him. It is well settled that an officer may stop a motor vehicle if the officer reasonably believes that a provision of the Motor Vehicle Code is being violated. Commonwealth v. Muhammed, 992 A.2d 897, 900 (Pa. Super. 2010). In the present case, Defendant’s vehicle had a nonfunctioning brake light and an expired temporary registration, which are violations of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4303(b) and 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1301(a), respectively. Therefore, the stop was valid. 46 N.T. at 107-108. 47 N.T. at 63; Com. Ex. 2-B. 7 When an officer stops a vehicle for investigatory purposes, the vehicle and its occupants are considered seized and this seizure is subject to constitutional constraints. Commonwealth v. Muhammed, 992 A.2d at 900. Sergeant Lynam had reasonable and articulable grounds to stop the vehicle in which the Defendant was riding as a passenger, but in order to justify detaining the Defendant for further questioning, Sergeant Lynam must have been able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the reasonable inferences from those facts, reasonably indicate that criminal activity might have been afoot. See Commonwealth v. Francis, 700 A.2d 1326, 1328 (Pa. Super. 1997). Furthermore, Pennsylvania courts have held that “upon producing a valid driver's license and registration, a driver must be allowed to proceed without further delay, unless the police have “reasonable grounds to suspect an illegal transaction in drugs or other serious crime.” Id. In Commonwealth v. Francis the combination of inconsistent information produced by the defendant, concerning both his car and his identity, along with the suspicious behavior noticed by the trooper, gave rise to the reasonable inference that criminal activity was underway. Id. at 1329. Likewise, Sergeant Lynam testified that he reasonably suspected that criminal activity was underway basedonthe Defendant’s lies concerning the hotel where he was staying, the reported high volume of traffic to the Defendant’s hotel room, the Defendant’s ability to pay cash for the hotel room while unemployed, the Defendant’s explanation for being in the area, the Defendant’s overly nervous, fidgety behavior, and the Defendant’s criminal history. This information provided Sergeant Lynam with specific and articulable facts which, taken together with 8 the reasonable inferences arising therefrom reasonably indicated that criminal activity was underway. Having found that the continued detention of the Defendant was supported by reasonable suspicion, the question still remains whether the Defendant voluntarily consented to the search of his vehicle. It is well settled that “a search warrant is not needed when a person with the requisite authority unequivocally and specifically consents to a search.” Commonwealth v. Rosas, 875 A.2d 341, 349 (Pa. Super. 2005) (internal citation omitted). In each case, it must be determined based on the totality of the circumstances whether an individual has voluntarily consented to a search. Id. The consent must be “the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice—not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied, or a will overborne—under the totality of the circumstances.” Id. (internal citation omitted). In Commonwealth v. Rosas, the Superior Court found that the defendant, who was stopped for a Motor Vehicle Code violation and subsequently detained in handcuffs, gave voluntary consent to the trooper to search his vehicle. 875 A.2d at 350. The Superior Court iterated the following factors to be taken into consideration in making the determination of whether consent is free and voluntary:  the person's knowledge of the right to refuse to consent to the search;  the maturity, sophistication and mental or emotional state of the defendant (including age, intelligence and capacity to exercise free will); and  the presence or absence of physical contact or police direction of the subject's movements, the demeanor of the police officer, the manner of expression used by the officer in addressing the subject, the location of the encounter, and the content of the interrogatories or statements. 9 Commonwealth v. Rosas, 875 A.2d at 349 (citing Commonwealth v. Strickler, 757 A.2d 884, 897–898, 901 (Pa. 2000). Applying those factors to the instant case, it is clear that the Defendant knew he had a right to refuse to give his consent to search. Sergeant Lynam explained to the Defendant numerous times that he had a right to refuse the consent search. The Defendant testified he was informed by Sergeant Lynam he did not have to agree to the search. Sergeant Lynam provided the Defendant with a Waiver of Rights and Consent to Search form which the Defendant signed. The Defendant also gave Sergeant Lynam verbal consent to search the vehicle. This Court found the Defendant, who testified on his own behalf, to have the requisite maturity, intelligence, mental capacity, and emotional competency to exercise his own free will. The location of the encounter was on a busy road during daylight hours. During the encounter the demeanor of each of the troopers was non-threatening, the troopers did not draw their weapons, and the Defendant was not handcuffed. The Defendant was addressed by the troopers in a calm manner. The record indicates that the Sergeant Lynam’s requests to search were made in a non-coercive way and that, under a totality of the circumstances, the Defendant’s consent was voluntarily given as a product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice. This Court, therefore, holds the evidence found in the Defendant's car was the result of a lawful search. Accordingly, the following order is entered: 10 ORDER OF COURT th AND NOW, this 29 day of August, 2013, upon consideration of the above motion, following hearings held on October 26, 2012, and March 15, 2013, and after viewing the police cruiser video of the stop of the vehicle, for the reasons set forth in the accompanying opinion, it is hereby ordered that the Defendant’s Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion is DENIED. BY THE COURT, s/ Christylee L. Peck_ Christylee L. Peck, J. Jaime M. Keating, Esq. First Assistant District Attorney Daniel J. Sodus, Esq. Senior Assistant District Attorney Lawrence J. Rosen, Esq. 1101 N. Front St. Harrisburg, PA 17102 Attorney for the Defendant 11