Loading...
HomeMy WebLinkAbout01-0965 CriminalCOMMONWEALTH VS. OMAR A. SANTOS JONES IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 01-0965 CRIMINAL OPINION PURSUANT TO RULE 1925 The Commonwealth has appealed from an order of this court granting the omnibus pretrial motion of Omar A. Santos Jones (Jones) to suppress evidence. In our suppression order, the court expressed the conclusion that the search in question was not the result of a validly obtained consent and was, otherwise, without probable cause. In its statement of matters complained of on appeal, the Commonwealth defines the issue as follows: Did the Suppression Court erroneously grant the defendant's omnibus pre-trial motion when the troopers, who had reasonable suspicion that the defendant would engage in criminal activity, obtained the defendant's voluntary consent to open the trunk and search his luggage for identification? At the hearing of the case, we found the following to be the facts. On the morning of February 9, 2001, Trooper Raphael Christopher (Christopher) of the Pennsylvania State Police pulled over a vehicle, driven by the defendant, for speeding. When the trooper approached the driver's side of the vehicle, he encountered the driver, Jones, who was accompanied by a female passenger. Trooper Christopher requested that Jones produce his owner's card, a license and insurance information. Instead, Jones handed Christopher a car rental agreement and told the trooper he did not have his driver's license with him. The trooper then asked for a name and a date of birth. The trooper then conducted a records check on the name and date of birth given him by the defendant. There was no listing for such a person in 01-0965 CRIMINAL PennDOT records. Jones then gave Trooper Christopher a similar name but a different date of birth. Again there was no record. In the meantime, Trooper Brian R. Overcash (Overcash) arrived on the scene. Trooper Christopher advised him that he had pulled Jones over for speeding and that Jones had not produced proof of his identity. Trooper Overcash then confronted Jones, telling the defendant that he would have to produce some sort of identification. Jones then indicated that he had a wallet in his car, possibly in a jacket pocket. The jacket was retrieved along with the wallet. While there was no photo identification in the wallet, there was a social security card. Jones was able to recite his social security number from memory and the number matched the one on the social security card. At that point, the troopers learned that the defendant was driving under suspension. Trooper Christopher returned to his patrol vehicle and began to prepare citations for the suspension and speeding violations. Despite the fact that the troopers were now satisfied enough with the defendant's identification to issue citations, the investigation continued. Trooper Overcash indicated that he had asked Jones's sister where they were coming from and in response she said they were returning from a three-day trip to Philadelphia. Overcash then indicated: ! asked Mr. Jones, ! said, you know, you are on a three-day trip. ! said you don't have credit cards, money, nothing in your wallet, identification. He said no. He said he had no luggage. He had the same clothes on for three days. ! said, well, do you mind showing me that you don't have any luggage in your vehicle. And he said no. He went, he retrieved the keys, came back, he opened the trunk. N.T. 35. With the trunk open, Trooper Overcash indicated he was able to see "a small black type carry-on luggage bag." Id. According to Overcash, the following then transpired: 2 01-0965 CRIMINAL [Jones] said that he forgot that bag was in the trunk. I said is there a possibility there is identification in that bag. His response was maybe. ! asked him if ! could take a look in the bag. He said yes. Go ahead. ! unzipped the bag. It was filled with marijuana. There was nothing else in it. No clothes, identification, nothing. ~ N.T. 36. When asked why he wanted to look inside the trunk of Jones's car, Overcash answered that he had a problem from the outset with what he perceived to be falsehoods from Jones. IN response to a question whether he was concerned there was contraband in the car, the trooper stated: ... my concerns were he was wanted, a possibility of a suspended license, or the possibility of contraband in the vehicle. They would be three normal scenarios for someone lying about their identification. So I would say it might have been a concern of mine. N.T. 40. Pennsylvania courts have recognized that there exists three levels of interactions between citizens and police officers. Com. v. Phinn, 761 A.2d 176, 181 (Pa. Super. 2000): The first of these is a "mere encounter" (or request for information) which need not be supported by any level of suspicion but carries no official compulsion to stop or respond. The second, an "investigative detention" must be supported by a reasonable suspicion; it subjects a person to a stop and period of detention, but does not involve such coercive conditions as to constitute the functional ~ The defendant, in his testimony, contends that he did not give consent to a search of either the trunk or the bag but, instead, opened both at the command of the police officer. Officer Christopher was unclear as to how these items were opened as he was seated in a nearby patrol vehicle presumably filling out citations. 01-0965 CRIMINAL equivalent of arrest. Finally, an arrest or "custodial detention" must be supported by probable cause. Com. v. Phinn, 761 A.2d at 181 (quoting Com. v. Ellis, 662 A.2d 1043 (Pa. 1995)). IN an apparent concession that the scenario involving Mr. Jones was an investigative detention, the Commonwealth asserts that the police had "reasonable suspicion that the defendant was engaged in criminal activity." We simply cannot agree with this assertion. Jones, who is African American, was stopped for speeding. He was operating a rental car. While the defendant was initially evasive concerning his identification, he ultimately produced a social security card the number of which he could recite from memory. IN this manner, the police learned that the defendant's license was under suspension. Nonetheless, a search of his vehicle continued until, eventually, controlled substances were found. As noted, Trooper Overcash thought there was "a possibility" of contraband in the vehicle. The question then is framed whether that "possibility" equates to a "reasonable suspicion." We know of no authority for the proposition that it does. The situation here presented is not unlike that in Com. v. Parker, 619 A.2d 735 (Pa. Super. 1993). IN that case, police stopped the defendant suspecting that he did not have a valid driver's license. Id. at 737. The policeman, Officer Milligan, then asked permission to search Parker's vehicle. Id. Milligan's reason for requesting the search was that he had assisted in arresting Parker for a drug offense at some time in the past. Id. The Superior Court observed that "Milligan did not articulate any facts which suggested that Parker had committed any offense at the time of the search, other than operating his vehicle without a license." Id. at 738. Thus, the search of his vehicle, even a consent search, was invalidated. A similar rationale served as the 4 01-0965 CRIMINAL basis for the entry of the suppression order in the instant case. March ,2002 Kevin A. Hess, J. Edmund Zigmund, Esquire Assistant District Attorney David J. DeFazio, Esquire 3 Gateway Center 20th Floor Pittsburgh, PA 15222 For the Defendant :rlm