HomeMy WebLinkAbout2004-4173 Civil
MICHAEL DUBAICH
And TARA DAWN
HAZEN,
Plaintiffs
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
v.
CIVIL ACTION - LAW
RE/MAX REALTY
ASSOCIATES, INC.,
KIRK L. NACE, and
EK VENTURES, INC.,
Defendants
NO. 04-4173 CIVIL TERM
IN RE: DEFENDANTS' PRELIMINARY
OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT
BEFORE HESS, OLER and EBERT, JJ.
OPINION and ORDER OF COURT
OLER, 1., August 3,2006.
This case arises out of Plaintiffs' purchase and subdivision of certain realty
in Perry County, Pennsylvania. Plaintiffs' complaint contains counts against
Defendants (who were not the sellers) for "tort" (Count 1),1 breach of contract
(Count 11),2 fraud (Count 111),3 negligent or intentional infliction of emotional
distress (Count IV),4 "personal injury" (Count V),5 punitive damages (Count VI),6
violation of Pennsylvania's Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law
(Count VII),7 and violation of the federal Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
(Count VIII). 8
1 Plaintiffs' Complaint, filed March 17, 2006 ("Complaint") para. 7-11.
2 Id., para. 13-14.
3 Id., para. 101-08.
4 Id., para. 16-19.
SId., para. 19-20.
6 Id., para. 15-16.
7 Id., para. 20-22.
8 Id., para. 22-23.
In substance, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants fraudulently induced
Plaintiffs to purchase a tract of land and subject a portion of it to an exclusive
listing agreement with the unstated intention of forcing Plaintiffs to sell that
portion below market value to one of the Defendants when the listing agent's
duties under the agreement were not performed. 9 For disposition at this time are
preliminary objections filed by Defendants to Plaintiffs' complaint.
Defendants' preliminary objections consist of (1) a motion to dismiss
Plaintiff Tara Dawn Hazen as a party to the action on the basis of a "lack of
capacity to sue,,,lO (2) a demurrer as to all claims against Defendant EK Ventures,
Inc., on the basis of an absence of any allegations of wrongdoing on its part,l1 (3) a
demurrer as to all tort claims against all Defendants on the basis of the
incompatibility of such claims with the "gist-of-the-action doctrine,,,12 (4) a
demurrer as to Plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract against Defendants EK
Ventures, Inc., and Kirk L. Nace on the basis of an absence of allegations of their
being parties to any contract breached,13 (5) a demurrer as to Plaintiffs' claims for
attorney's fees except as they relate to Plaintiffs' claim under Pennsylvania's
Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, on the basis of an absence
of statutory or contractual authority therefor,14 (6) a motion to strike as without
legal foundation Plaintiffs' claims for punitive damages to the extent that they are
asserted as an independent cause of action or as a remedy for breach of contract, 15
(7) a demurrer as to Plaintiffs' claims for negligent or intentional infliction of
emotional distress in the absence of allegations of outrageous conduct or bystander
9 See generally Complaint.
10 Defendants' Preliminary Objections to Plaintiffs' Complaint, filed May 5, 2006 ("Preliminary
Objections") para. 1-3.
11 Id., para. 4-9.
12 Id., para. 10-16.
13 Id., para. 17-19.
14 Id., para. 21-23.15 Id., para. 24-28.
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status and physical harm,16 (8) a demurrer as to Plaintiffs' claim for "personal
injury," on the basis of the nonexistence in law of an independent tort of this
nature,17 (9) a demurrer as to Plaintiffs' claim under Pennsylvania's Unfair Trade
Practices and Consumer Protection Act on the basis of the absence of the element
of personal, family or household purpose requisite to such a cause of action, 18 (10)
a demurrer as to Plaintiff s claim under the federal Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act on the basis of the absence of the elements of a "federally related
mortgage loan," "settlement services," and non-business purpose loan requisite to
such a cause of action,19 and (11) a demurrer as to those portions of Plaintiffs'
complaint seeming to request damages for the dissolution of Plaintiffs' marriage,
on the basis of the legislative abolition of alienation-of-affection suits?O
Argument on Defendants' preliminary objections was held on May 17,2006.
For the reasons stated in this opinion, the preliminary objections will be
sustained in part and denied in part.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The allegations of Plaintiffs' complaint will be summarized in the
succeeding paragraphs. This summary of the allegations is, of course, in no way
intended to represent an endorsement by the court of their factual accuracy.
Plaintiffs Michael Dubaich and Tara Dawn Hazen, formerly husband and
wife, are adult individuals residing at 188 Equitation Way, Millerstown, Perry
County, Pennsylvania? 1 Defendant RE/MAX Realty Associates, Inc., is "a
corporation and a franchise which is privately owned [and maintains] a business
16 Id., para. 29-36.
17 Id., para. 37-41.
18 Id., para. 42-48.
19 Id., para. 49-56.
20 Id., para. 57-61.
21 Plaintiffs' Complaint, para. 1.
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address of 3425 Market Street, Camp Hill, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania.,,22
Defendant Kirk L. Nace is an adult individual having a business address of 3425
Market Street, Camp Hill, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania.23 Defendant EK
Ventures, Inc., is a Pennsylvania corporation having an address of One South
Market Street, Duncannon, Perry County, Pennsylvania?4
At all times pertinent to the action, Defendant N ace was an agent of
Defendant RE/MAX25 and president of Defendant EK Ventures.26 All Defendants
were linked in a common "business relationship.,,27
On October 13, 2001, Plaintiffs entered into an agreement of sale with B.
Bruce Boyer and Wanda L. Boyer (the Boyer Agreement) for the purchase of
property in Tuscarora Township, Perry County, Pennsylvania, by Plaintiffs from
the Boyers for $250,000.00?8 Defendant RE/MAX was the listing broker as to the
property, Defendant Nace was the "designated agent" in this regard, and "the
terms of the Boyer Agreement were suggested and/or promoted by the Defendants
and such actions and representations were instrumental in Plaintiffs' decision to
not only purchase the Property but also in Plaintiff s decision to accept the terms
of the Boyer Agreement. ,,29
Under the agreement, Plaintiffs were to pay the Boyers $125,000.00 at
settlement and $125,000.00 within one year thereafter.3o "Closing" occurred on
22 Id., para. 2.
23 Id., para. 4.
24Id., para. 7.
25 Id., para. 5.
26 Id., para. 10 and Exhibit D.
27 Id., para. 11.
28 Id., para. 14 and Ex. A.
29 Id., para. 15.
30 Id., paras. 16-17.
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December 14,2001,31 and a mortgage in favor of the Boyers securing payment of
the balance of the purchase price in the amount of $125,000.00 was executed?2
In connection with this transaction, Defendants had recommended that
Plaintiffs subdivide the property purchased into four parcels: a fifty-acre tract
which would contain Plaintiffs' home and business; a ten-acre tract containing an
existing house and barn; and two one-and-a-half acre tracts.33 Based upon
representations by Defendant RE/MAX (a) that the ten-acre tract could be sold
within a year for more than the $125,000.00 balance which Plaintiffs owed to the
Boyers34 and (b) that Defendant RE/MAX would buy the property for $125,000.00
if it did not sell,35 this tract was immediately subjected to an exclusive listing
agreement signed by Plaintiff Michael Dubaich on behalf of the sellers, wherein
Defendant RE/MAX was identified as the broker and Defendant N ace was
identified as the "licensee.,,36 This listing agreement was executed by Defendant
Nace.37
Pursuant to a prearranged plan among Defendants,38 the property was not
marketed with a view toward selling it to a third party,39 as a result of which
Defendants successfully forced a distress sale below market value to Defendant
EK Ventures, Inc.4o
In the process, Defendants attempted to enlist Plaintiffs' assistance III
defrauding the lender that financed the purchase by Defendant EK Ventures by
31 Id., para. 16.
32 Id., para. 14 and Ex. A.
33 Id., para. 18.
34 Id., paras. 18,22.
35 Id., paras. 18,24.
36 Id., para. 23; See also paras. 20-21 regarding the other three listing agreements.
37 Id., para. 46 and Ex. F.
38 Id., para. 38.
39 Id., paras. 28-30.
40 Id., paras. 36-37,40.
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inflating the purchase price to support a larger loan commensurate with the
property's market value41 and in the process forged Plaintiffs' signatures on
certain documents.42 A revised listing agreement dated December 12, 2002, with
Defendant RE/MAX identified as the broker and Defendant N ace identified as the
"licensee," for the inflated price was signed on behalf of the sellers by Plaintiff
Michael Dubaich, with the omission of Plaintiff Tara Dawn Hazen's signature in
this instance being intended to signal her displeasure with the deception.43 This
listing agreement was also executed by Defendant Nace.44 Ultimately, the device
of an inflated realtor's commission was utilized as part of the deception.45
The aforesaid conduct of Defendants resulted in financial loss to Plaintiffs,
an aggravation of a preexisting illness in Plaintiff Michael Dubaich, and emotional
distress leading to the Plaintiffs' divorce.46 Punitive damages are demanded as to
each claim asserted in the complaint,47 and attorney's fees are expressly demanded
as to the claim under Pennsylvania's Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer
Protection Law48 and impliedly requested on several other claims.49 As noted,
Defendants have filed preliminary objections to Plaintiffs' complaint, raising
numerous Issues.
DISCUSSION
General. In considering a preliminary objection to a complaint in the
nature of a demurrer, a court is to "accept all material facts set forth in the
complaint[,] as well as all the inferences reasonably deducible therefrom[,] as
41 Id., paras. 41-42.
42 Id., para. 47.
43 Id., para 53.
44 See Ex. G.
45 Complaint, para 45.
46 Id., para. 56.
47 Id., para. 129.
48 Id., para. 145.
49 Id., paras. 76, 100, 108.
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true." Powell v. Drumheller, 539 Pa. 484, 489, 653 A.2d 619, 621 (1995). A
preliminary objection to a complaint in the nature of a demurrer should be
sustained only when, "on the facts averred, the law says with certainty that no
recovery is possible." Id If any doubt exists as to whether a demurrer should be
sustained, "this doubt should be resolved in favor of the "non-moving party."
Presbyterian Medical Center v. Budd, 2003 PA Super 347, ,-r6, 832 A.2d 1066,
1070.
Incapacity of Plaintiff Tara Dawn Hazen. Nothing in Plaintiffs complaint
would lead to a conclusion that Plaintiff Tara Dawn Hazen lacks capacity to sue in
the usual sense of that term. To the extent that Defendant's request that she be
dismissed from the action is based upon the absence of her signature on certain
documents, it is premature to conclude that her interest was not understood by the
parties to have been represented by her husband's execution of the documents.
See generally Guy v. Liederbach, 501 Pa. 47, 459 A.2d 744 (1983); Davin v.
Davin, 842 A.2d 469 (Pa. Super. 2004). Accordingly, Defendants' preliminary
objection based upon Plaintiff Hazen's alleged lack of capacity to sue will be
denied.
Demurrer As to All Claims against Defendant EK Ventures. The gist of
Plaintiffs' complaint is that Defendants successfully conspired to force Plaintiffs
to sell property at a distress price through the instrumentality of the
nonperformance of an exclusive listing agreement. Given this allegation, it would
be premature to dismiss the complaint against a given defendant on the theory that
no cause of action could exist against it.
Demurrer to Tort Claims Based upon Gist-o.fthe-Action Doctrine. The
purpose of the gist-of-the-action doctrine is to maintain the distinction between
contract and tort claims. Etoll, Inc. v. Elias/Savion Advertising, Inc., 2002 P A
Super 347, ,-r14, 811 A.2d 10, 14. Even though tort and contract claims derive
from the common law, distinct differences exist between the two causes of action.
Id (noting that tort actions arise from duties imposed by law for public policy
7
reasons and that contract claims arise from duties created by agreement of the
parties ).
Under this doctrine, for a breach of contract claim to constitute an
actionable tort, the wrong "ascribed to the defendant must be the gist of the action,
the contract being collateral." Id "[T]he gist of the action is contractual where
the parties' obligations are defined by the terms of the contract, and not by the
larger social policies embodied by the law of torts." Air Products and Chemicals,
Inc. v. Eaton Metal Products Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 329, 342 (E.D. Pa. 2003)
(citation omitted).
Courts applying the gist-of-the-action doctrine have found the gist of the
action to be contractual where fraud in the performance of a contract defines the
claim and to be tortious where fraud in the inducement of the contract
characterizes it. See, e.g., id In the present case, where (a) the non-performance
of a listing agreement is alleged to have been one aspect of a conspiracy to defraud
and (b) this conspiracy is alleged to have preceded the execution of a series of
contracts by Plaintiffs, it can not be said that the tort of fraud is merely incidental
to Plaintiffs' contractual claim.
Contract Claims against Defendant EK Ventures and Defendant Nace. In
general, "[i]n Pennsylvania, a person who is not a party to a contract cannot be
held liable for a breach by one of the parties to a contract. Fleetway Leasing Co.
v. Wright, 697 A.2d 1000, 1003 (Pa. Super. 1997). In addition, "[i]t is a basic
tenet of agency law that an individual acting as an agent for a disclosed principal
is not personally liable on a contract between the principal and a third party unless
the agent specifically agrees to assume liability." Casey v. GAF Corp., 828 A.2d
362, 369 (Pa. Super. 2003). Where fraud is involved, however, this general rule is
not always applied. Testerman v. Buck, 340 Md. 569,667 A.2d 649 (1995).
In the present case, with respect to Defendant EK Ventures, Plaintiffs'
complaint is devoid of allegations which would warrant a finding of breach of
contract; accordingly, this aspect of Plaintiffs' complaint will be dismissed. On
8
the other hand, with respect to Defendant N ace, it can not be said with certainty
that no recovery is possible on a contract theory; accordingly, the request for
dismissal of this claim will not be granted.
Attorney's fees. In Pennsylvania, attorney's fees associated with litigation
are recoverable by a successful party only on the basis of (1) the existence of a
clear agreement between the parties providing for their recovery, (2) express
statutory authorization, or (3) some otherwise established exception. Merlino v.
Delaware County, 556 Pa. 422, 425, 728 A.2d 949, 951 (1999). Although
statutory authority exists for a recovery of attorney's fees under Pennsylvania's
Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law,50 such an award is not
authorized for other claims in Plaintiffs' complaint where they seem to be
requested, and the request for this form of relief as to those claims will
accordingly be stricken.
Punitive Damages. Punitive damages, as a general rule, are not recoverable
for breach of contract. Thorsen v. Iron and Glass Bank, 328 Pa. Super. 135,143,
476 A.2d 928, 932 (1984). Nor is there an independent cause of action for
punitive damages. Kirkbride v. Lisbon Contractors, Inc., 521 Pa. 97, 101, 555
A.2d 800, 802 (1989); Cumberland County Children & Youth Services, 802 A.2d
1239, 1252 (Pa. Commw. 2003). Accordingly, Plaintiffs' independently-stated
claim for punitive damages will be dismissed, and Plaintiffs' demands for punitive
damages as they relate to their breach of contract claims will be stricken.
Negligent or Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. Section 313 of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(1) If [an] actor unintentionally causes emotional distress
to another, he is subject to liability to the other for resulting
illness or bodily harm if the actor
(a) should have realized that his conduct involved an
umeasonable risk of causing the distress, otherwise than by
knowledge of the harm or peril of a third person, and
50 See 73 P.S. ~ 201-9.2(a).
9
(b) from facts known to him should have realized the distress,
if it were caused, might result in illness or bodily harm.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) has no application to
illness or bodily harm of another which is caused by emotional
distress arising solely from harm or peril to a third person,
unless the negligence of the actor has otherwise created an
umeasonable risk of bodily harm to the other.
It is apparent that an essential element of any claim for negligent infliction
of emotional distress is negligence. Brown v. Philadelphia College of Osteopathic
Medicine, 760 A.2d 863, 868 (Pa. Super. 2000). Such negligence is conduct that
"violat[ es] a duty of care designed to protect another from a fright or other
emotional disturbance which the actor should recognize as involving an
umeasonable risk of bodily harm. . .." Restatement (Second) of Restatement of
Torts, 9346(1); see Crivellaro v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 341 Pa. Super.
173, 178, 491 A.2d 207, 209 (1985).
In the case sub judice, while it may be argued that Defendants violated a
duty toward Plaintiffs by the commission of fraud, breach of contract, or other
economic wrong, the aspect of an umeasonable risk of bodily harm characteristic
of negligent infliction of emotional distress cases is not present. For this reason,
Defendants' preliminary objection to this claim will be granted.
The type of outrageous or extreme conduct requisite for a claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress is conduct that exceeds "all possible
bounds of decency, and [is] regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a
civilized society." Hoy v. Angelone, 554 Pa.. 134, 151, 720 A.2d 745, 754 (1998).
In this regard, it has been observed that
[i]t has not been enough that the defendant has acted with
intent which is tortious or even criminal, or that he has
intended to inflict emotional distress, or even that his conduct
has been characterized by "malice," or a degree of aggravation
that would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for another
tort.
Id
10
In the present case, the alleged perpetration of an economic fraud upon
Plaintiffs, in the form and of the magnitude asserted, does not rise to the level of
conduct fairly described as exceeding "all possible bounds of decency" and
"utterly intolerable in a civilized society." Accordingly, Plaintiffs' claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress will also be dismissed.
"Personal injury" claim. "Personal injury" may be a compensable item of
damage with respect to a given cause of action, but, like punitive damages, it is not
itself an independent cause of action. F or this reason, Plaintiffs' count for
"personal injury" will be dismissed.
Alleged violation of Pennsylvania's Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer
Protection Law. Under Section 9.2(a) of Pennsylvania's Unfair Trade Practices
and Consumer Protection Law, the circumstances under which a private action
may be brought for a violation of the act are limited as follows:
Any person who purchases or leases goods or services
primarily for personal family or household purposes and
thereby suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property,
real or personal, as a result of the use or employment by any
person of a method, act or practice declared unlawful by
section 3 of this act, may bring a private action to recover
actual damages or one hundred dollars ($100), whichever is
greater. . .. The court may award to plaintiff, in addition to
other relief provided in this section, costs and reasonable
.c 51
attorney ~ees.
Pennsylvania's Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law is
intended, as the name suggests, to be protective in nature. Limiting its application
in an overly restrictive way is not to be encouraged. Valley Forge Towers South
Condominium v. Ron-Ike Roam Insulators, Inc., 393 Pa. Super. 339, 345, 574
A.2d 641, 646 (1990).
In the present case, it would be premature to conclude that the transactions
of which Plaintiffs complain, arising out of a purchase of land intended, in part,
5173 P.S. ~ 201-9.2(a).
11
for a personal residence, were not entered into by Plaintiffs primarily for personal
family or household purposes. For this reason, Defendants' preliminary objection
to Plaintiffs' claim under Pennsylvania's Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer
Protection Law will be denied.
Alleged violation of federal Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act. The
federal Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act is intended, inter alia, to effect
"significant reforms in the real estate settlement process... to insure that
consumers through the Nation are protected from unnecessarily high settlement
charges caused by certain abusive practices that have developed in some areas of
the country." 12 U.S.C. s2601(a). The act prohibits various practices, 52 and has
reference to "federally related mortgage loans"53 and "settlement services,,,54 both
of which are broadly defined. 55 The act does not apply to loans "primarily for
business. ,,56
In the present case, Plaintiffs' complaint alleges generally that their claim
against Defendants is encompassed by this federal law. 57 The particulars of this
contention, with respect to the statutory areas raised by Defendants in their
preliminary objections, are neither confirmed nor refuted by more specific
allegations of the pleading. As a result, it can not be said at this point, with
certainty, that no recovery by Plaintiffs is possible on their federal claim. For this
reason Defendants' demurrer to the claim will not be granted. 58
52 See e.g., 12 U.S.c. ~~ 2603, 2607.
5324 CFR ~3500.5(a); 12 U.S.c. 2601(1).
54 12 USC 2602(3).
55 See eg., 12 U.S.c. ~~ 2603, 2607.
5624 CFR 2500.5(b)(2); 12 CFR 226.3(a).
57 Complaint, para. 146-52.
58 A demurrer is not, of course, a substitute for a motion for a more specific pleading. Cf
McNally v. Eynoyer, 1 Pa. D. & C.4th 372,375 (Lancaster Co. 1988); see also Goodrich Amram
2d 1017(b): 12, at 256 (1991).
12
Dissolution of parties' marrzage. Plaintiffs' response in their brief to
Defendants' preliminary objection to a reference in Plaintiffs' complaint to the
dissolution of Plaintiffs' marriage is that it represents a mere pleading of evidence
as opposed to a demand for relief for alienation of affections. 59 It is well settled,
however, that "evidence from which material facts may be inferred should not be
alleged in a pleading." 2 Goodrich Amram 2d s1019(a):6, at 257 (2001) (citations
omitted). Accordingly, this "evidentiary" reference will be stricken.
F or the foregoing reasons, the following order will be entered.
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this 3rd day of August, 2006, upon consideration of
Defendants' preliminary objections to Plaintiffs' complaint, and for the reasons
stated in the accompanying opinion, it is ordered and directed as follows:
1. Plaintiffs' requests for attorney's fees are stricken with
the exception of the request contained in Count VII (claim
under Pennsylvania's Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer
Protection Law);
2. Count II (breach of contract) IS dismissed as to
Defendant EK Ventures, Inc.;
3. The demand for punitive damages in Count II (breach of
contract) is stricken;
4. Count V (claim for "personal injury") is dismissed;
5. Count VI (claim for punitive damages) is dismissed;
6. The reference to the Plaintiffs' divorce is stricken; and
7. In all other respects, Defendant's preliminary objections
are denied.
59 Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Preliminary Objections, submitted May 12,2006, at 17-19.
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BY THE COURT,
s/ 1. Wesley Oler, Jr.
1. Wesley Oler, Jr., 1.
Richard P. Mislitsky, Esq.
One West High Street
P.O. Box 1290
Carlisle, P A 17013
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Jonathan H. Rudd, Esq.
100 Pine Street
P.O. Box 1166
Harrisburg, P A 17108-1166
Attorney for Defendants
14
15
MICHAEL DUBAICH
And TARA DAWN
HAZEN,
Plaintiffs
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
v.
CIVIL ACTION - LAW
RE/MAX REALTY
ASSOCIATES, INC.,
KIRK L. NACE, and
EK VENTURES, INC.,
Defendants
NO. 04-4173 CIVIL TERM
IN RE: DEFENDANTS' PRELIMINARY
OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT
BEFORE HESS, OLER and EBERT, JJ.
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this 3rd day of August, 2006, upon consideration of
Defendants' preliminary objections to Plaintiffs' complaint, and for the reasons
stated in the accompanying opinion, it is ordered and directed as follows:
1. Plaintiffs' requests for attorney's fees are stricken with
the exception of the request contained in Count VII (claim
under Pennsylvania's Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer
Protection Law);
2. Count II (breach of contract) IS dismissed as to
Defendant EK Ventures, Inc.;
3. The demand for punitive damages in Count II (breach of
contract) is stricken;
4. Count V (claim for "personal injury") is dismissed;
5. Count VI (claim for punitive damages) is dismissed;
6. The reference to the Plaintiffs' divorce is stricken; and
7. In all other respects, Defendant's preliminary objections
are denied.
BY THE COURT,
1. Wesley Oler, Jr., 1.
Richard P. Mislitsky, Esq.
One West High Street
P.O. Box 1290
Carlisle, P A 17013
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Jonathan H. Rudd, Esq.
100 Pine Street
P.O. Box 1166
Harrisburg, P A 17108-1166
Attorney for Defendants