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HomeMy WebLinkAbout99-2989 civilROBERT J. BURYLO, and : COURT OF COMMON PLEAS SUSAN J. BURYLO, his wife, · CUMBERLAND COUNTY Plaintiffs, · v. : CIVIL ACTION-LAW DARREN J. ZIMMERMAN, a minor, : NO. 99-2989 CIVIL and LABAN G. ZIMMERMAN, JR., : Defendants : IN RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BEFORE HOFFER, P.J., HESS AND OLER, JJ. ORDER AND NOW, this lt. ~ day of February, 2000, the motion of the defendant for summary judgment is GRANTED. BY THE COURT: KfA. Hess, J. Stephen J. Hogg, Esquire Attomey for Plaintiffs Mark D. Schwartz, Esquire Attorney for Defendants :rlm ROBERT J. BURYLO, and : COURT OF COMMON PLEAS SUSAN J. BURYLO, his wife, : CUMBERLAND COUNTY Plaintiffs, · v. : CIVIL ACTION-LAW : DARREN J. ZIMMERMAN, a minor, · NO. 99-2989 CIVIL and LABAN G. ZIMMERMAN, JR., : Defendants : IN RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BEFORE HOFFER, P.J., HESS AND OLER, JJ. OPINION AND ORDER Defendant Darren Zimmerman's vehicle struck plaintiff Robert Burylo's vehicle on June 3, 1997 on Route 34 south of Carlisle. According to the portions of the summary judgment motion which have not been denied, the plaintiff, Robert Burylo, went to the Carlisle Hospital Emergency room immediately after the accident. Among other things, he was given X-rays. He was subsequently treated by Dr. David Wampler who referred the plaintiff for physical therapy at Alexander Spring Rehab Inc. beginning in June of 1997. The plaintiff continued to seek treatment from the date of the accident through the spring of 1998. On or about March 5, 1998, plaintiff, Robert J. Burylo, initiated an action against defendant Darren J. Zimmerman in the Cumberland County Court of Common Pleas by filing a complaint which was docketed at 98-1217 Civil.1 The complaint sought damages in the amount of $4,144.51, which the plaintiff claimed to incur as a result of the automobile accident between plaintiff and defendant. The complaint did not specify whether the damages sought were for personal injury or property damage. On June 18, ~ In that action he was not represented by current counsel. 99-2989 CIVIL 1998, plaintiff filed a praecipe to discontinue with the Cumberland County Prothonotary. The complaint was marked settled and discontinued without hearing or testimony. Concurrently with the discontinuance of the first action, plaintiff and defendant reached a settlement whereby defendant paid $1,000 to plaintiff. The instant action was initiated on May 17, 1999, when plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking damages for injuries allegedly resultant from the same automobile accident as referenced above. On or about November 18, 1999, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of all claims against them in this action as a matter of law. The issue before this Court is whether plaintiffs are permitted to file a second claim for personal injuries arising out of the same incident in which a claim for property damage was previously filed and discontinued. The law in Pennsylvania relating to bringing all causes of action against the same person arising from a transaction or occurrence is well settled. The Rules of Civil Procedure provide, in pertinent part: RULE 1020. PLEADING MORE THAN ONE CAUSE OF ACTION. ALTERNATIVE PLEADING. FAILURE TO JOIN. BAR (d)(1) If a transaction or occurrence gives rise to more than one cause of action against the same person, including causes of action in the alternative, they shall be joined in separate counts in the action against any such person. (d)(4) Failure to join a cause of action as required by subdivision (d)(1) of this Rule shall be deemed a waiver of that cause of action as against all parties to the action. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania addressed the issue of bringing all claims arising from a single transaction or occurrence in Fitzpatrick v. Branoff, 504 Pa. 169, 470 A.2d 521 (1983). The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated: 99-2989 CIVIL When personal injuries to a person and damages to his property arise from the same cause and the same tortious act, the person who has sustained such personal injuries and property damage must seek recovery for both in a single action, and if separate actions are instituted for each category of damage and a judgment is rendered in one of such actions the entry of such judgment has the effect of res judicata and bars recovery in the other action. Such is the view of a substantial majority of jurisdictions in the United States and to this view Pennsylvania has long adhered. See Fields v. Philadelphia Transit Co:, 273 Pa. 282, 117 A. 59 (1922); Fisher v. Hill, 368 Pa. 53, 81 A.2d 860 (1951); Saber v. Supplee Wills-Jones Milk Co., 181 Pa. Super. 167, 124 A.2d 620 (1956); citing Spinelli v. Maxwell, 430 Pa. 478,480-481,243 A.2d 425,427 (1968). This mandate is based on the doctrine of res judicata which provides that once a judgment is rendered, that judgment is conclusive between the parties with regard to all points of law directly related to the cause of action and affecting the matter before the court. Bearoff v. Bearoff Brothers, Inc., 458 Pa. 494, 498, 327 A.2d 72, 75 (1974); Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Borough of Lansdale, 283 Pa. Super. 378, 389, 424 A.2d 514,519(1981). While this may seem a harsh result, it is even more unjust to permit defendants to be subjected to repeated suits, when it is possible to litigate all matters at one time. Finality of judgment is the end sought and adherence to the policy articulated above will produce that result. Fitzr>atrick v. Branoff 470 A.2d at 523. _ However, the Fitzpatrick court recognized that there is one caveat to the general rule that all claims arising from the same transaction or occurrence must be brought simultaneously. There exists one caveat to this mandate, however. The requirement that an individual bring all his ripe claims simultaneously, does not preclude the institution of additional suits where the threshold for a personal injury action has not been reached at the time property damages claims are made. See Bond v. Gallen, 503 Pa. 286, 469 A.2d 556 (1983). If, at some later date, a personal injury claim arises the cause of action will not be barred. Fitzoatrick v. Branoff 470 A.2d at 523. _ 99-2989 CIVIL The "threshold" in the foregoing is a reference to a financial limit contained in the former Pennsylvania No-fault Motor Vehicle Act, 40 P.S. 1009.101 et seq. The Fitzpatrick case and the discovery role generally suggest that a second lawsuit for personal injuries can be filed under circumstances where the plaintiff's injuries were not discoverable, even by the exercise of due diligence, at the time that a prior lawsuit for property damages was settled. This is an issue, however, which we need not address in this case. There is no dispute that the plaintiff knew that he was injured in the automobile accident. He immediately sought treatment and his treatment continued throughout the time that he brought and then settled a prior action. Thus, because there is no factual dispute and because it is apparent that the current lawsuit is barred, we will grant the defendant's motion for summary judgment. ORDER AND NOW, this //,,* day of February, 2000, the motion of the defendant for summary judgment is GRANTED. B Y THE COURT, Hess, J. Stephen J. Hogg, Esquire For the Plaintiffs Mark D. Schwartz, Esquire For the Defendants :rlm