HomeMy WebLinkAbout95-612 orphansRANDALL L. VALK, · IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
Plaintiff/Petitioner · CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
:
vs. : ORPHANS' COURT DIVISION
:
DAUPHIN DEPOSIT BANK AND :
TRUST COMPANY, a division :
of DAUPHIN DEPOSIT CORP., :
and RICHARD P. VALK, :
Defendants/Respondents · NO. 21-95-612
DECREE NISI
AND NOW, this z '1 ° day of March, 2000, the petition of Randall L. Valk
seeking a citation for surcharge, including punitive damages, is DISMISSED.
BY THE COURT,
Michael L. Bangs, Esquire
For the Petitioner
David W. DeLuce, Esquire
For Dauphin Deposit
Bridget Montgomery, Esquire
For Richard Valk
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RANDALL L. VALK, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
Plaintiff/Petitioner · CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
:
vs. : ORPHANS' COURT DIVISION
:
DAUPHIN DEPOSIT BANK AND :
TRUST COMPANY, a division ·
of DAUPHIN DEPOSIT CORP., :
and RICHARD P. VALK, :
Defendants/Respondents : NO. 21-95-612
OPINION AND DECREE NISI
BEFORE HESS, J.
This cases arises Out of a Trust Agreement dated May 28, 1964. The trust was
established by Paul Valk and the res of the trust consisted of approximately ten percent of the
outstanding shares of Valk Manufacturing Company. Three separate trusts were established:
one for the petitioner, Randall L. Valk; one for his brother, Ted Valk; and the last for his brother,
Rich~d A. Valk. Each individual trust consisted of two thousand shares of stock.~ The res of
the trust, along with any accumulated income, was to be mined over to each beneficiary as each
turned age thirty-one. The co-trustees of the trust were the Dauphin Deposit Bank and Trust
Company and Richard P. Valk, Paul Valk's son and father of the three beneficiaries.
Before the court is the petition of Randall Valk seeking a surcharge, including punitive
damages, against the co-trustees alleging mismanagement of the trust. Also before the court are
the objections to the First and Final Account filed by the co-trustees on or about July 8, 1999.
The allegations of the petitioner are that Richard P. Valk, in his capacity as president of Valk
Manufacturing Company, did acts which caused a diminution in value and loss of income to the
l A reverse stock split lowering this number to 200 did nothing to change the value.
21-95-612 ORPHANS' COURT
trust shares. These included paying excess compensation to the officers of Valk Manufacturing,
failing to pay dividends, the misappropriation of a company patent and setting up a competing
leasing company. The petitioner also contends that his name was forged over the years by
Richard Valk. The petitioner also contends that Dauphin Deposit Bank and Trust Company, in
its role as co-trustee, failed to monitor or prevent these acts.
FINDINGS OF FACT
During the trial of this matter, which spanned more than two days, there was
disagreement among the witnesses as to some important facts. Given the considerable amount of
time which has elapsed between the occurrence of certain events and the date of the trial, in some
cases as long as fifteen to twenty years, we decline to suggest that any of the witnesses have been
willfully false in their testimony. Where, however, there are questions concerning the accuracy
of the testimony, we are prepared to resolve these issues of credibility in favor of the
respondents.
The Trust Agreement at issue in this case contains an exculpatory clause. It provides that
the trustees are not liable or responsible for any loss or depreciation in the trust assets resulting
from any error in judgment or from any act or omission except for their own willful misconduct.
We are satisfied that the petitioner has failed to demonstrate willful misconduct in this case.
Until 1991, Richard P. Valk was assisted in his corporate endeavors by John Hippensteel.
Valk Manufacturing, which makes snow plows, was divided into two divisions, the plow
division and blade division. Mr. Hippensteel had started with Paul Valk in October of 1952. By
1954, the corporation had erected a small building. By 1960, the corporation had begun to sell
21-95-612 ORPHANS' COURT
snow plows. From 1961 until his retirement in 1991, Mr. Hippensteel was in charge of the plow
division.
Initially, Valk products were shipped in vehicles leased from Keen Leasing, Inc., driven
by drivers employed by Valk. This changed when Richard P. Valk formed RPV Vehicle
Leasing, Inc. This corporation was able to lease vehicles to Valk Manufacturing under very
favorable terms. Its employees included drivers formerly employed by Valk. There were several
reasons why RPV Vehicle Leasing, Inc. was organized. First, there was a concern that a union
movement among Valk's drivers would spread throughout the entire plant. In addition, there
was concern that a catastrophic motor vehicle accident would expose Valk Manufacturing to
unacceptable liability. Finally, the terms which could be obtained through RPV Leasing were
favorable. As RPV Leasing became profitable, Mr. Valk's compensation package was adjusted
so that increasing proportions of his income were attributable to RPV Leasing and not to Valk.
By the late 1980s, Mr. Valk's total annual income exceeded a million dollars. As much
as half of this income came from RPV Leasing and royalty payments.2 Because of earlier
discovery orders entered in this case, the plaintiff s expert was required to rely on estimates of
Mr. Valk's income from Valk Manufacturing for a period of more than twelve years.
Nonetheless, the record of this case shows that Mr. Valk's income grew from $160,056 in 1971
to $546,008 in 1989. The petitioner's conclusion that Mr. Valk's compensation was excessive is
based on the Executive Compensation Assessor produced by the Economic Research Institute.
2 The royalty payments were made in connection with a patent for a snow plow. This patent had been obtained by
Mr. Hippensteel and had been formulated with the assistance of employees of the Valk Manufacturing Company.
At the direction of Mr. Richard Valk, this patent was held by RPV Leasing. Despite his promise to do so in the first
few pages of his report, the petitioner's expert, Robert J. Murphy, C.P.A., fails to demonstrate specifically how the
appropriation of this company patent adversely affected the value of Randall Valk's stock. Instead, these royalty
payments are simply a part of the alleged "excessive compensation" paid to Richard Valk. Because we are satisfied
that Mr. Valk's compensation is not excessive, we will not address the matter of the patent further.
21-95-612 ORPHANS' COURT
The figures cited, however, are based on a mean of incomes of chief operating and chief
executive officers. Moreover, the corporations involved were not necessarily closely held family
corporations like Valk Manufacturing. We are satisfied that excessive compensation has simply
not been established in this case.
This corporation has been run by Mr. Richard Valk on a sound financial basis. Since
1974 it has been essentially debt-free. It is clear, therefore, that much of the growth of Valk
Manufacturing has been accomplished on a cash basis. It is rare that closely held corporations
such as this one declare dividends. While Mr. Valk has, in recent years, spent time in Florida, it
is clear that his management of the company has been very much "hands on."
The petitioner complains, among other things, about "add-backs" as a way of determining
manager bonuses. The add-backs were used to reflect the expenses of the corporation. They
were attributed to the divisions with an eye to obtaining a more accurate picture of profitability.
This, in mm, assisted in the computation of bonuses and fostered healthy competition between
the divisions.
In the meantime, the petitioner argues that the nature and amounts of the "add-backs"
reflect a history of excessive discretionary expenses paid out by the corporation. One such
expense involved the salary of a captain to pilot a yacht. This yacht was used to woo potential
customers of Valk Manufacturing. It was also used for management seminars for company
personnel. We are unable to conclude that this expense, or any other cited in this case, is so
disproportionate to the benefit derived as to be excessive.
Petitioner also contends that, over the years, he was not told about his trust shares, and
that there was a deliberate attempt to keep from him his shares of stock. While he may not have
learned of the specifics of the trust, we are satisfied that this is as much his fault as anyone else's.
21-95-612 ORPHANS' COURT
Mr. Randall Valk expressed little or no interest in the affairs of Valk Manufacturing over the
years. After some years away from the company, he was asked to return to work at the plant and
failed to do so. We are satisfied that, had he exercised any diligence, he would have known of
the existence of his trust fund as early as 1982, if not earlier.
In 1982 all of the shareholders of Valk Manufacturing Company, including Randall Valk,
entered into a shareholders agreement. An exhibit to the shareholders agreement set out the
shares of common stock owned by each shareholder and reflected the 200 shares then held in
trust for the petitioner. The provisions of the shareholders agreement were explained by the
corporate attorney, Elliott Braverman, Esquire. Even before the execution of the shareholders
agreements in 1982, the fact that there were stocks being held in trust for the Valk sons was the
subject of discussion at the family dinner table. Mr. Ted P. Valk, currently the majority
shareholder of Valk Manufacturing, recollected that even as a young man he was aware of and
proud of his ownership interest, albeit small, in the Valk Manufacturing Company.
It is tree that sometime after Mr. Randall Valk's thirty-first birthday, the stock held in
trust for him was put in his name. In order to accomplish this, Mr. Richard Valk signed a receipt
for the stock using Randall Valk's name. Following a half-hearted effort on the part of the
trustee to notify the beneficiary, the stock was placed in a vault, at Valk Manufacturing, for safe
keeping. While we certainly do not condone these activities, the petitioner has neither alleged
nor proven any damages which flow from the delay in his receiving his stock.
Finally, we find as fact that the petitioner has suffered no loss in the book value of the
stock. Instead, during the life of the trust, the stock not only increased in value, but markedly so.
In 1965, the book value of Randall L. Valk's shares was $5,098.40. By April 30, 1998, the
outstanding shares of the company owned by Randall L. Valk had a book value of $132, 292.
21-95-612 ORPHANS' COURT
The value of each share had gone from $2.55 per share to $661.46 per share representing a rate
of return over the period of 10.37 percent.
DISCUSSION WITH CONCLUSIONS
The petitioner makes much of the fact that Mr. Richard Valk put his own self-interest
ahead of his role as trustee. It is tree that as head of a profitable company he was able to earn a
comfortable living for himself. To the extent that this represented any conflict of interest with
the trust, it was one understood by Paul Valk at the time the trust was formed. A settlor may
waive the rule requiring a trustee to have undivided loyalty. The role can also be waived by
implication, "where he knowingly places his trustee in a position which might conflict with the
interest of the trust or its beneficiaries, and gives the trustee power to act in that dual capacity."
Estate of McCredy, 323 Pa. Super. 268,470 A.2d 585 (1983 citing, inter alia, In re Kellogg's
Trust, 35 Misc. 2nd 541,230 NYS.2d 836 (1962)) (family trust holding stock of family
corporation). Here, as noted in the briefs filed by the respondents, the settlor created the family
business and later placed some of the shares of that business in trust for his three grandsons. The
settlor designated Richard P. Valk as trustee with the full knowledge and expectation that
management and control of the family business would be taken over by him after the settlor
stepped down. "Such succession, in addition to being fully intended by the Settlor when he
created the Trust, was vital to the continued success of the family business. The Settlor would
certainly not have risked the success of the business by exempting his son and future successor
from its management for the sole purpose of making him Trustee over some minority shares of
that business, the value of which was dependent on such a successful future." Brief in support of
Dauphin Deposit Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 13-14.
21-95-612 ORPHANS' COURT
The fact that Mr. Richard Valk may have chosen to pay himself well and that that self-
interest might somehow have conflicted with his role as trustee becomes an even less significant
consideration when one considers the degree to which the value of Randall Valk's stock has
increased during the existence of the trust. Here, in other words, there was not only no loss to
the trust but a substantial gain. As noted by the court in Estate of Pew, 655 A.2d 521 (Pa. Super.
1994 at page 543):
A trustee cannot be surcharged for a breach of duty
unless the breach of duty caused a loss to the trust. One
who seeks to surcharge the trustee for breach of trust
must bear the burden of proving the particulars of the
tmstee's wrongful conduct. The propriety of an
investment by a trustee must be judged as it appeared at
the time it was made and not as viewed in the light of
subsequent events. The mere retention of stocks which
the trustee received from the settlor is not, in itself'
negligence. Especially when such stocks have produced
a high rate of return for the trust over an extended
number of years. Hindsight is not the test of liability for
surcharge. To make afiersight the sole judge of the
tmstee's prudence would be manifestly unfair. (citations
omitted)
Estate of Pew, 655 A.2d at 543-44.
Thus, since there is no loss in this case, we seriously question whether the petitioner
may now question any of the corporate decisions of Mr. Valk. Assuming that he can, however,
under the terms of the trust agreement, the trustees are liable only for willful misconduct in the
management of the trust. While there is a question as to whether the management of the trust
extends to the operation of the corporation, we need not finally resolve it as we find no willful
misconduct in any event.
We reach the following conclusions with regard to the points raised by the petitioner:
21-95-612 ORPHANS' COURT
1. There was no active concealment of the existence of the trust.
2. The reasons for the formation of RPV Corporation were valid. The conduct of that
company's operations was legitimate and not detrimental to Valk Manufacturing Company.
3. The plaintiff suffered no damage by virtue of the compensation of the officers of the
corporation.
4. To the extent that any business decisions regarding a patent or the payment of
expenses inured to the benefit of Mr. Richard Valk, they did not operate to the detriment of the
corporation and were not, in any event, instances of willful misconduct with respect to his
management of the trust.
5. The management of Valk Manufacturing Company and particularly its failure to pay
dividends was consistent with commonly accepted business practices.
6. The stock, which comprised the corpus of the trust, increased in value during the life
of the trust.
7. No liability and no damages of any kind have been established with respect to the
respondent, Dauphin Deposit Bank and Trust Company.
DECREE NISI
AND NOW, this ~ q ' day of March, 2000, the petition of Randall L. Valk
seeking a citation for surcharge, including punitive damages, is DISMISSED.
BY THE COURT,
K~~,t,t~. Hess, J.
21-95-612 ORPHANS' COURT
Michael L. Bangs, Esquire
For the Petitioner
David W. DeLuce, Esquire
For Dauphin Deposit
Bridget Montgomery, Esquire
For Richard Valk
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