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HomeMy WebLinkAbout98-2116 criminalCOMMONWEALTH : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA vs. : 98-2116 CRIMINAL : 98-2117 CRIMINAL : 98-2118 CRIMINAL : 98-2119 CRIMINAL : 98-2120 CRIMINAL JOSEPH WILLIAM WATKINS : 98-2122 CRIMINAL IN RE: OPINION PURSUANT TO RULE 1925 On July 21, 1999, the defendant was convicted of numerous charges of harassment by communication. These involved numerous harassing phone calls, many of which were of a sexual nature, made throughout Cumberland County. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of six to twenty-four years consisting of consecutive sentences of not less than three nor more than twelve months on twenty-four counts. On December 23, 1999, we filed an opinion and order denying the defendant's post- sentence motions. On January 24, 2000, we granted the defendant's request to reconsider his post-sentence motion and extended, by thirty days, the one-hundred twenty day disposition period for the post-sentence motion. This was to give the court the opportunity to address the defendant' s motion for modification of sentence. Following a hearing on February 15, 2000, the court declined to modify the sentence in this case. Thus, the motion to modify sentence was denied by implication of law on March 6, 2000. The defendant has since filed an appeal. In his statement of matters complained of on appeal, the defendant observes that the only issue raised in post-trial motions that the court has not discussed in a written opinion is the defendant's denial of his motion to modify sentence. He also now contends that, since the court failed to state in its sentencing order that the individual sentences were "aggregated," the sentences should be deemed to mn concurrently rather than consecutively. At the sentencing proceeding held in this case, the district attorney observed that the defendant's prior record made him a repeat felon and that the standard range sentence for each count was three to six months. One of the victims testified in this case and the defendant was given the opportunity to speak. He claimed that he did not receive a fair trial and claimed, himself, to be a victim. We then imposed the aforementioned sentence, noting that the sentence was in the standard range for each count and was based on our review of the presentence investigation report and the seriousness of the defendant's conduct. Interestingly, the defendant has since, through counsel, admitted his guilt of these offenses and apologized to his victims. This strikes us as a position which the defendant would better have taken prior to sentence rather than after. As noted by the Superior Court in Com. v. Delberto, 436 Pa. Super. 391,648 A.2d 16, 22 (1994)' The legislature of this Commonwealth has vested broad discretion in the trial court to impose an appropriate sentence in each case that comes before it .... It is only where an aggrieved party can articulate clear reasons why the sentence issued by the trial court compromises the sentencing scheme as a whole that we will find a "substantial question" and review the decision of the trial court. Specifically, "[w]e are inclined to find the presence of a substantial question where appellant advances a colorable argument that the trial judge's actions were either inconsistent with the specific provisions of the Sentencing Code, or contrary to the norms which underlie the sentencing process." Com. v. Zelinski, 392 Pa. Super. 489, 499-500, 573 A.2d 569, 574 (1990). It remains to be seen what specific sentencing violations the defendant will argue on appeal.~ Suffice it to say, he has cited none to this court. Finally, the defendant contends that since we failed to state in our sentencing order that the individual sentences were "aggregated," the sentences should be deemed to mn concurrently rather than consecutively. This contention is without merit. The sentences initially imposed in this case were specifically represented by the court to be aggregated. N.T. 9. Later, the defendant was returned to the courtroom and the same aggregate sentence was imposed though structured differently. Again, the court specifically noted that an aggregate sentence had been imposed. N.T. 12. In any event, we fail to see how a lack of aggregation is an argument that the -sentences imposed were concurrent. Aggregation has importance for the purpose of determining whether, in the end, the sentence is a county sentence or is under the jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole. See Com. v. Harris, 423 Pa. Super. 196, 20 A.2d 1175 (1993). April I~',2000 ~ ///~  A. Hess, J. Jaime Keating, Esquire Chief Deputy District Attorney Michael A. Scherer, Esquire For the Defendant 'rlm See Pa.R.A.P. 2119 (f).