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HomeMy WebLinkAbout97-0926 civilFLORENCE K. DAVIDSON, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff · CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA vs. : CIVIL ACTION- LAW : NO. 97-0926 CIVIL JAY F. DAVIDSON, : Defendant : IN DIVORCE IN RE' EXCEPTIONS TO MASTER'S REPORT BEFORE HESS AND OLER, JJ. ORDER AND NOW, this / 2. ~' day of May, 2000, upon consideration of the plaintiff' s exceptions to the master's report and following argument thereon, for the reasons in the accompanying opinion, the exceptions are DENIED. An order divorcing the parties pursuant to Section 3301 (c) of the Divorce Code will be entered by the court upon submission, by either party, of a decree in the normal form. A decree addressing the economic issues in this case is entered of even date herewith. BY THE COURT, K~,n/A. Hess, J. Theresa Barrett Male, Esquire For the Plaintiff Samuel L. Andes, Esquire For the Defendant 'rim FLORENCE K. DAVIDSON, · IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff · CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA · vs. · CIIVIL ACTION- LAW · 97-0926 CIVIL JAY F. DAVIDSON, · Defendant · IN DIVORCE IN RE: EXCEPTIONS TO MASTER'S REPORT BEFORE HESS AND OLER, JJ. OPINION AND ORDER Before the court are the excePtions to the master's report filed in the above case. The primary focus of the exceptions is an objection to the manner in which the master divided an escrow fund which represents the proceeds of the sale of the marital residence. The defendant also excepts to the master's consideration of the increase in value of premarital assets during the course of the marriage. In brief, in dividing up the escrow fund, the master credited both parties with their contribution to the acquisition and maintenance of the residence and divided the escrow fund in proportion to the parties' contributions. The master then gave each side fifty percent of the increase in value of premarital assets. We are satisfied that the master's proposed resolution of this case is proper and will overrule the defendant's exceptions to the report. In a divorce action, a "Master's Report, although only advisory, is to be given the fullest consideration, particularly on the issue of credibility." See Margolis v. Margolis, 201 Pa. Super. 129, 132, 192 A.2d 228,230 (1993). Determining issues for credibility, the master's findings are given weight because, of course, it is he who heard and observed the witnesses. See Mott v. .Mott, 308 Pa. Super. 1, 3,453 A.2d 1038, 1039 (1982). The application of the lawto the facts, however, is a matter in which we need be less deferential. In fact, in that regard, this case is 97-0926 CIVIL somewhat unusual in that a legal question was submitted to the court for resolution prior to the master's hearing. That involved the enforceability of a prenuptial agreement which, at least in rough draft form, extended over seven hand-written pages. The matter of the enforceability of this agreement was dealt with in our opinion and order of July 27, 1999, and a supplemental memorandum was later forwarded to the master and made a part of the record. As noted in our earlier opinion, the agreement of the parties, executed on September 27, 1995, some two days Prior to their marriage, provided that the parties would contribute equally to the acquisition of marital real estate and that, in the event of divorce, each spouse was to receive half of the net proceeds. The agreement went on to recite that certain premarital assets of the parties would be preserved for the benefit of the children and grandchildren of the parties. The agreement, however, said nothing about the increase in value of these assets, clearly includable as marital property in accordance with the Divorce Code. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. 3501 (a). The prenuptial agreement also waived no rights of the parties under the Divorce Code. We went on to conclude that the prenuptial agreement was enforceable with respect to the several assets with which it dealt but that it did not prejudice the right of either party to seek equitable distribution or other rights under the Divorce Code to the extent that they were not addressed in the agreement. In reaching his recommendations, the master made the following findings of fact. Because we believe they are supported by the record, we adopt them. 1. The parties were married on September 29, 1995, and separated March 21, 1997. This is the second marriage for both parties. 2. Husband has four emancipated children to his prior marriage; wife has two emancipated children to her prior marriage. The parties have no children together. 97-0926 CIVIL 3. Husband is 65 years of age and resides at 1044 Swarthmore Road, New Cumberland, Pennsylvania, with a female friend. Husband pays her $700.00 a month for rent and pays most of the other expenses in the household inasmuch as his companion is not employed. 4. Husband graduated from high school and went on to obtain a Bachelors and Masters degree and a Ph.D. in Biology which he completed in 1997. He retired from Shippensburg University on January 6, 1996, as a professor in Biology. He had worked for the university for 31 and ½ years, previously working in the Shippensburg public schools for 8 years. 5. Husband's income consists of social security, payment from the Pennsylvania State Employees and School Employees retirement fund, and dividends and interest income bringing his total net monthly income to around $5,000.00. 6. Husband testified that he is in fairly good health considering his age although he does have some problems with his hearing, high blood pressure, and has recovered from a heart attack. He takes medication for his blood pressure. Husband also in March of 1999 had a blood clot and currently takes blood thinning medication. 7. Husband was under a support order through the Cumberland County Domestic Relations Office to pay wife $1,800.00 per month; however, a recent review by the support hearing officer resulted in a recommendation that the support be lowered to $200.00 per month. That matter is currently on appeal before the Court. 8. Wife is 67 years of age and resides at 2223 Aspen Drive, Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania, where she lives alone. 97-0926 CIVIL 9. Wife is a high school graduate and took business courses and has a certificate from Keystone Junior College which is a business school. She had worked as a secretary' full-time and then went to part-time employment as a receptionist. She has not worked during this marriage. 10. Wife testified that she has been suffering from severe depression for which she takes medication, has a thyroid problem, and blood pressure problems for which she also takes medication. Wife also has short-term memory problems. 11. Wife's income consists of a widow's pension from the Teamsters Union, social security, and an annuity from Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. The annuity payment will terminate in December 1999. Wife also has some interest and dividend income. The Master finds that her net monthly income is between $1,690.00 and $1,800.00 per month. The support office computed her monthly income to be $1,800.00 net per month but the Master is not aware of how the hearing officer arrived at that income. 12. The parties submitted Joint Exhibits 1 and 2 showing assets of husband and wife. The only marital assets are the Dauphin Deposit checking account and the escrow monies held from the sale of the marital residence. The Dauphin Deposit account was valued at the time of separation at $509.14 and the monies in the escrow account as of June 20, 1999, total $146,762.67. In addition to the proceeds from the sale of the home, two checks were deposited following the hearing for rent that was paid by the current occupants and owners of the property in the total amount of $1,740.00. 13. The nonmarital assets held by husband increased in value from the time of marriage until the time of separation in the amount of $28,413.48. The nonmarital assets held by wife 97-0926 CIVIL increased in value from the time of marriage until the time of separation in the amount of $4,452.16. 14. When the parties purchased the marital residence at 282 Ridge Hill Road, Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania, husband.contributed $90,000.00 toward the down payment and $6,266.70 toward closing costs. When wife sold her premarital residence she paid off the balance remaining on the mortgage at 282 Ridge Hill Road, Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania, in the amount of $60,854.24. 15. Husband contributed in excess of $17,000.00 to pay for improvements to the marital residence; wife contributed $1,500.00 for blinds. 16. The Master finds that the marital residence had a rental value of $900.00 per month. Husband occupied the residence after the parties separated until the current owners moved in and during his occupancy husband paid the mortgage payment which included taxes and insurance in 'the amount of $551.00 per month. Wife has raised a rental value claim and the Master has considered her claim in the determination of the percentage of distribution but has not used a precise computation of what the value of that claim would be in terms of dollars and cents. 17. Wife has incurred counsel fees for the divorce proceedings in excess of $3,500.00 plus costs of $45.00. The fees did not include the preparation and the hearing before the Master. Wife currently owes $1,000.00 on the last statement that her attorney rendered. 18. No objection has been made by either party in these proceedings to the method and adequacy of service of any of the pleadings in the divorce action nor has either party or counsel objected to the jurisdiction of this Court to act in these proceedings. · 97-0926 CIVIL As can be gleaned from the foregoing, the husband's contributions to the marital residence totaled $113,599.75. The wife's contributions totaled $62,354.24. It is the plaintiff's position that his wife's share of the proceeds should be reduced by the amount of the wife's shortfall in contributing to the "total cost" of the jointly owned home. The escrowed sales proceeds, however, are approximately $147,000.00, itself a $29,000.00 shortfall. By applying the plaintiff' s methods, the wife bears the entire brunt of the husband having contributed more to the house than it was worth. This approach is clearly unsound. What the master chose to do, instead, was to divide the escrow account in proportion to the contributions of the partieS. This resulted in a sixty-four percent share of the escrow account going to the husband and a thirty-six percent share of the escrow account going to the wife. This approach makes sense in a situation where the proceeds of the sale are insufficient to cover the total contributions of the parties. We also agree with the master that the parties should split equally the increase in value of their assets. We understand the plaintiff's arguments in connection with this matter but take issue with his contention that the proposed resolution of this case requires that the parties "had the legal sophistication to reserve the principle of their marital assets to their children, while treating the appreciation of those assets as a marital asset subject to equitable distribution." Treating the appreciation of premarital assets as marital property occurs by operation of law · unless the parties agree to do otherwise. It is, perhaps, their lack of legal sophistication which results in the wife's sharing in the increase of assets of her husband which he had intended to leave to his children. Nonetheless, it is not for us to rewrite the Divorce Code when parties fail to apprehend its provisions. 97-0926 CIVIL In reaching his decision concerning a 50/50 split, the divorce master carefully considered the various factors set forth in Section 3502(a) of the Domestic Relations Code. We agree with the analysis and will not reiterate it here. Suffice it to say that he found that both parties were in their mid sixties. They had had a relatively brief marital relationship and that the economic circumstances of the husband are relatively superior to those of the wife. In fact, given the husband's financial advantages, an equal division is more than fair to him. For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff's exceptions to the master's report will be denied. ORDER AND NOW, this ! Z '~- day of May, 2000, upon consideration of the plaintiff's exceptions to the master's report and following argument thereon, for the reasons in the accompanying opinion, the exceptions are DENIED. An order divorcing the parties pursuant to Section 3301 (c) of the Divorce Code will be entered by the court upon submission, by either party, of a decree in the normal form. A decree addressing the economic issues in this case is entered of even date herewith. BY THE COURT, Kevi~. Hess, J. Theresa Barrett Male, Esquire For the Plaintiff Samuel L. Andes, Esquire · For the Defendant 'rlm