Loading...
HomeMy WebLinkAbout01-2114 CRIMINALCOMMONWEALTH IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA THOMAS EDWARD QUACA OTN: H264271-0 NO. 01-2114 CRIMINAL TERM CHARGES: (1) ENDANGERING WELFARE OF CHILDREN (2) RECKLESS ENDANGERING ANOTHER PERSON (3)SIMPLE ASSAULT IN RE: OPINION PURSUANT TO PA. R.A.P. 1925 OLER, J., March 26, 2002. This criminal case arises out of a head trauma, preceded by rib fractures, suffered by a seven-week-old infant. The head trauma occurred on March 27, 2000, and the rib injuries occurred several weeks earlier. Allegedly, both sets of injuries were criminally caused by Defendant, who was acting as caretaker for the child during the periods in which they occurred. ~ At the conclusion of a jury trial at which the undersigned judge presided, Defendant was found guilty of recklessly endangering another person,2 a misdemeanor of the second degree, simple assault,3 a misdemeanor of the first degree, and endangering the welfare of a child.4 The last offense was graded a felony of the third degree by virtue of the jury's additional finding that there was a course of conduct on the part of Defendant of endangering the welfare of the child.5 ~ E.g., N.T. 7, Trial, September 6, 2001 (hereinafter N.T. ~. 2 Act of Dec. 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, § 1, 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 2705 (West 1998 & Supp. 2001). 3 Act of Dec. 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, § 1, as amended, 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 2701 (West 1998 & Supp. 2001). 4 Act of Dec. 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, § 1, as amended, 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 4304 (West 1998 & Supp. 2001). 5 Order of Ct., Sept. 10, 2001. Defendant has appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court from the judgment of sentence.6 In a statement of matters complained of on appeal, Defendant has expressed the grounds for the appeal as follows: 1. The Court erred in denying Defendant's Motion to Compel the Commonwealth to provide Pa.R. Evid. 404(b) evidence to the Defendant prior to trial. 2. The Court erred in finding Stephanie Foster competent to testify without an in camera hearing to determine competency. 3. The evidence presented at trial was insufficient for a finding of guilt on the charge of Endangering the Welfare of Children based upon a course of conduct. 4. The Court erred in failing to grant a mistrial when Ms. Foster[, the child's mother,] testified regarding her fear of Defendant.7 This opinion in support of the judgment of sentence is written pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a). STATEMENT OF FACTS This case arises out of an incident in which Defendant allegedly inflicted head trauma upon his seven-week-old son, Thomas Edward Quaca, Jr., on March 27, 2000, following the infliction of rib fractures several weeks earlier.8 The head trauma suffered by the infant included an acute fracture of the right parietal bone of the skull and brain hemorrhaging.9 During treatment for the head trauma, skeletal surveys were taken that 6 Def.'s Notice of Appeal, filed Nov. 15, 2001. With respect to the offense of endangering the welfare of a child, Defendant was sentenced to pay the costs of prosecution and to undergo a period of imprisonment of not less than 9 months nor more than 23 months, and, with respect to the offense of recklessly endangering another person, Defendant was sentenced to pay the costs of prosecution and to undergo a period imprisonment of not less than 4 months nor more than 23 months, the sentences to run concurrently with each other. Order of Ct., Oct. 23, 2001. No additional sentence was given for the offense of simple assault as it was deemed, for purposes of sentencing, to merge with the offense of recklessly endangering another person. Id 7 Def.'s Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal, filed Dec. 3, 2001. 8 N.T. 7. 9 N.T. 41, 48, 182. 2 suggested that the infant had suffered rib fractures several weeks prior to March 27, 2000.~° Prior to trial, and pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 404(b), Defendant filed a motion to compel the Commonwealth to provide notice of evidence of prior crimes, wrongs or acts that the Commonwealth intended to introduce at trial.~ In this regard, Defendant expressed concern that Stephanie Foster, an adult individual and the mother of the child, would testify about Defendant's prior convictions for assault.~2 Following a conference (not of record) with President Judge George E. Hoffer, the motion was denied by Judge Hoffer.~3 At the commencement of trial, Defendant raised the issue a second time, before the undersigned judge. The court declined to alter the earlier disposition of the motion following an agreement between counsel that the Commonwealth would not introduce such evidence at trial without first obtaining a ruling in favor of its admissibility. ~4 With respect to the allegations that Defendant criminally caused the head trauma suffered by the child on March 27, 2000, the Commonwealth presented testimony that, at the time the injuries occurred, Defendant was acting as sole caretaker of Thomas Edward Quaca, Jr., and that such injuries would not have been accidental.~5 Defendant, in an interview conducted by a caseworker from Cumberland County Children and Youth Services, stated that he was sole caretaker for the child when the harm was occasioned, but that the injuries had occurred accidentally when the child fell from a one- or two-foot high "pile of pillows and blankets," on which Defendant had l0 N.T. 41, 53-54. ~ Def.'s Mot. To Compel the Commonwealth To File Notice Pursuant to PA.R.E. 404(b), filed Sept. 4, 2001. ~2 N.T. 3-11. ~3 Order of Ct., Sept. 6, 2001 (Hoffer, P.J.). ~4 N.T. 3-11. The Commonwealth did not ask for such a ruling during the course of the trial. ~ E.g., N.T. 20-21. Defendant was living with, but was not married to, the child's mother, Stephanie Foster, and watched the child while Foster was at work. N.T. 20-21. 3 placed him to facilitate feeding.16 Defendant claimed that he was in another room when the injuries occurred, and that he returned to find the child on the floor. After the child's head began to swell from the trauma, Defendant contacted Foster and Defendant's mother, who both arrived shortly thereafter and took the child to the haspital.17 Danielle Baal, M.D., an expert in the area of pediatrics and pediatric radiology,la testified that a fall from the "pile," as described and reenacted by Defendant, could not have caused the injuries suffered by the child.19 According to Dr. Baal's testimony, a fall from two feet onto a carpeted floor could not have caused a skull fracture, and, based on the described location of the "pile" in the room, the child could not have struck his head on furniture during such a fall.2° Further, Dr. Baal testified that a skull fracture of the type incurred was more commonly associated with the intentional application of force to the area afthe injury, that is, to the infant's skull.21 Paul Kanev, M.D., an expert in the field of pediatric neurasurgery and the physician who treated Thomas Edward Quaca, Jr.,22 testified that the child's injuries were "nanaccidental" and that Defendant's version of events was unfeasible.23 This evidence, pertaining to the incident of March 27, 2000, clearly supported the verdict of guilty of simple assault, recklessly endangering another person and endangering the welfare of a child. Defendant, however, challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for the jury's additional finding that Defendant had engaged in a course of 16 N.T. 20-23. 17 N.T. 20-23. la N.T. 35-37. 19 N.T. 45-47, 51-53, 70-72. 20 N.T. 51-53. Dr. Baal testified that, even on a non-carpeted floor, a fall of under three feet would not cause a skull fracture to a seven-week-old infant. N.T. 46. 21 N.T. 45-47. 22 N.T. 175-81. 23 N.T. 185, 190-195. 4 conduct of endangering the welfare of the chitd.24 With respect to this aspect of the case, the Commonwealth presented evidence that the rib fractures suffered by the child several weeks before March 27, 2000, were not accidental and that they occurred when Defendant was acting as sole caretaker of Thomas Edward Quaca, Jr.25 Dr. Beat testified that, based on her review of both a skeletal survey taken after the March 27, 2000, incident and a radiograph taken on February 23, 2000, the child had previously suffered fractures to three of his lower-left ribs.26 Based on the healing of the ribs that had occurred by March 27, 2000, she estimated that the rib injuries had been caused approximately two to three weeks eartier.27 Dr. Beat testified that these types of fractures did not normally occur in the absence of intentionally inflicted injury and that "the only time [doctors] see [this type of injury] in this age group is abuse, babies that had been abused.''28 The caseworker for Cumberland County Children and Youth Services who interviewed Defendant shortly after the incident testified that Defendant had told her that the only persons who had acted as sole caretaker for the infant were Defendant, Foster and Defendant's parents.29 The caseworker's testimony concerning her interview with Defendant may be summarized as follows: When the caseworker initially brought up the 24 Order of Ct., Sept. 10, 2001; see Def.'s Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal, filed Dec. 3,2001. 25 N.T. 26-27, 55-59, 81-87, 121-32. 26 N.T. 55-56. The radiograph taken on February 23, 2000, showed that no rib fractures had occurred before that date. N.T. 55. Although Defendant attempted to evoke testimony from Dr. Beat that the quality of the radiograph of February 23, 2000, was substandard, Dr. Beat reiterated that the quality of the items she reviewed was "quite good" and that her experience allowed her to make an accurate estimation of the time at which the rib fractures had occurred. N.T. 62-64. 27 N.T. 56. 28 N.T. 58-59. Dr. Beat testified that these injuries would be difficult to detect by a parent because the only obvious symptom would be increased irritability. N.T. 58. 29 N.T. 26-27. According to the testimony, Defendant also stated that Fester's mother had been alone with the infant for brief periods, but that she had not acted as caretaker for the child. N.T. 26-27. 5 subject of the rib fractures, Defendant denied any knowledge of any injuries, but then stated that Foster's four-year-old child, Ryan, might have caused the injuries while removing the child from a swing.3° Later, when the caseworker reiterated the suspicious nature of the injuries, Defendant stated that neither he nor his parents could have caused the injuries and that Foster was the "number one suspect." Defendant added that "[s]he is very violent [and] I can't cover up for her.''3~ He alleged that he had been attacked by Foster previously, and that, although "I have left some marks on her[,] ... that is only when we argue and she comes after me." He later admitted that he had never seen Foster be violent with any of her children.32 Following this testimony, the Commonwealth proffered Foster as a witness, who, according to the Commonwealth's offer of proof, would testify that Defendant had previously threatened the child. Defendant objected, challenging Foster's competency to testify on the ground that she did not understand the duty to tell the truth.33 Defendant based this objection on prior testimony by Foster, given at a dependency hearing, in which she stated that she "didn't remember" Defendant's previous threats toward the child.34 This statement, it was argued by Defendant, conflicted with her proffered testimony and established her incompetency on the aforementioned ground.35 The court, believing that "the objection [went] more to the weight of the evidence" than to its admissibility, denied the objection)6 The Commonwealth indicated that it planned to address the subject of inconsistency by eliciting testimony that Foster "knew she [would have] to go home with 30 N.T. 82-84. 3~ N.T. 85-86. 32 N.T. 86-87. 33 N.T. 121-22. 34 N.T. 121-22, 132. 35 N.T. 121-22. 36 N.T. 123. 6 [Defendant] that night [after testifying at the hearing].''37 Defendant expressed concern that, through this testimony, the Commonwealth might introduce inadmissible evidence of prior crimes of Defendant, specifically other instances of abuse. In response, the Commonwealth "admonished" Foster to state only that she had been fearful of testifying truthfully at the previous proceeding and not to explain why she was fearful.38 Foster was called as a witness and testified that, when the infant cried, Defendant would "get very upset" and "violent." According to Foster's testimony, Defendant had previously cursed at the child and threatened to "smash his little fucking head into the wall.''39 Foster testified that, at all times during which she was at home and acting as caretaker for the infant, the child had sustained no injuries, specifically none to the rib 40 area. During direct examination by the Commonwealth, and in response to questions regarding Foster's inconsistent statements in the prior hearing, Foster testified as follows: Well, at that time I was still in a relationship with [Defendant]. At that time I wasn't working, he was the sole supporter for him and I, and I was afraid that if I said something to incriminate him that he would be violent with me later at home.4~ Defendant at this point moved for a mistrial on the ground that the testimony introduced evidence that Defendant had "been violent in the past toward [Foster,] which is what prompted her to be fearful of [Defendant]" at the time of the prior hearing.42 The Commonwealth responded that Foster's testimony could be considered to be 37 N.T. 123. 38 N.T. 123-25, 133. 39 N.T. 129. According to the testimony of the caseworker, Defendant had admitted that he would often get extremely frustrated from the baby's crying, so much so that Ryan, Foster's four-year-old son, would tell Defendant to "go sit in the other chair," away from the infant. N.T. 81. 40 N.T. 130. Foster testified that she left the child with Defendant out of necessity, because her work schedule required it. N.T. 129. 4~ N.T. 132. 42 N.T. 133. 7 "speculation" as to possible future acts of violence and not specific allegations of past abuse. The court denied the motion for a mistrial but, upon Defendant's request, and with the Commonwealth's concurrence, issued a curative instruction to the jury to disregard Foster's remark.43 DISCUSSION Statement of Law General. Section4304 of the Crimes Code, which defines the offense of endangering the welfare of a child, provides as follows: (a) Offense defined.--A parent, guardian, or other person supervising the welfare of a child under 18 years of age commits an offense if he knowingly endangers the welfare of the child by violating a duty of care, protection or support. 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 4304. This offense requires the Commonwealth to establish that "the accused is aware of his/her duty to protect the child[,].., is aware [of]... circumstances that could threaten the child's physical or psychological welfare[, and].., has taken action [that]... cannot reasonably be expected to protect the child's welfare." Commonwealth v. Mackert, 781 A.2d 178, 187 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001). Generally, all three elements are satisfied in situations in which a caretaker has engaged in physical abuse of the child. E.g., id at 187-88. With respect to the grading of the offense, the section provides as follows: (b) Grading.--An offense under this section constitutes a misdemeanor of the first degree. However, where there is a course of conduct of endangering the welfare of a child, the offense constitutes a felony of the third degree. 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 4304. A "course of conduct" of child endangerment may be established by proof that the accused engaged in two related but separate events, both of which constitute a violation under the statute. See Act of Dec. 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, § 1, as amended, 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 5504(t) (West 1998 & Supp. 2001) (defining "course of conduct" as a "pattern of actions composed of more than one act over a period of time, 43 N.T. 133-34. however short, evidencing a continuity of conduct."); see a/so Act of Dec. 6, 1972, P.L. 1339, No. 290, § 3, 1 Pa. C.S.A. § 1921(c) (West 1998 & Supp. 2001) (stating that, when meaning of phrase is clear in one section of a statute, meaning will be used in interpreting same phrase in other sections). Prior Notice of Other Crimes, Evidence 404(b), the Commonwealth Wrongs or Acta'. Under Pennsylvania Rule of is required to "provide reasonable notice in advance of trial.., of any.., evidence [of other crimes, wrongs or acts] it intends to introduce at trial." Pa. R. Evid. 404(b)(4). This notice provision "is intended to reduce surprise and promote early resolution on [issues] of admissibility" when the Commonwealth plans to introduce evidence that may be subject to challenge under Rule 404. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b); see Pa. R. Evid. 404 cmt. (stating that Pa. R. Evid. 404 is "consistent" with Fed. R. Evid. 404). Competency. Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 601(b), which establishes the circumstances in which a proffered witness may be judged incompetent to testify, provides, in pertinent part, as follows: A person is incompetent to testify if the Court finds that because of a mental condition or immaturity the person: (4) does not sufficiently understand the duty to tell the truth. Pa. R. Evid. 601(b). When a valid objection to the competency of the witness is raised, the court has an obligation to hold a hearing on the matter. Common~vealth v. Dolhancryk, 273 Pa. Super. 217, 225, 417 A.2d 246, 250 (1979). However, this obligation arises only if the evidence suggests that the witness suffers from a "mental condition" that impairs his or her ability to tell the truth. Pa. R. Evid. 601(b); see Dolhancryk, 273 Pa. Super. at 225, 417 A.2d at 250. Evidence that a witness made false statements in past proceedings is not sufficient to require a hearing because such evidence bears "only on... credibility, not [the witness's] ability to tell the truth." Id. 9 Sufficiency of the Evidence. In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial, the proper test is "whether, viewing the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and drawing all reasonable inferences in the Commonwealth's favor, there is sufficient evidence to enable the trier of fact to find every element of the [crime] charged beyond a reasonable doubt." Common~vealth v. Jones, 449 Pa. Super. 58, 61, 672 A.2d 1353, 1354 (1996) (quoting Commomvea/th v. Carter, 329 Pa. Super. 490, 495-96, 478 A.2d 1286, 1288 (1984)). The trier of fact is "free to believe all, part or none of the evidence." Common,yea/th v. Petaccio, 764 A.2d 582, 585 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (quoting Common,yea/th v. Griscavage, 512 Pa. 540, 543, 517 A.2d 1256, 1257 (1986)). Motion for Mistria/. "Whether to declare a mistrial is a decision which rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, whose exercise thereof will not be reversed absent an abuse of such discretion." Common,yea/th v. Bonace, 391 Pa. Super. 602, 608, 571 A.2d 1079, 1082 (1990). Although clear statements of prior, unrelated criminal conduct of the defendant often warrant the declaration of a mistrial, mere "'passing references" to prior criminal activity do not require granting a motion for mistrial "unless the record illustrates definitively that prejudice resulted from the reference." Id. at 608-09, 571 A.2d at 1082 (quoting Commomvealth v. Nichols, 485 Pa. 1, 4, 400 A.2d 1281, 1282 (1979)). In determining the prejudicial effect of the statement, relevant considerations include the nature of the remark, whether it was "intentionally elicited by the Commonwealth," and whether an immediate curative instruction was given. Bonace, 391 Pa. Super. at 608-09, 571 A.2d at 1082. Application of Law to Facts Prior Notice of Other Crimes, Wrongs or Acta'. In the present case, it is believed that President Judge Hoffer properly denied Defendant's motion to require the Commonwealth to provide notification of evidence concerning Defendant's prior assaults.44 Under Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 404(b), the Commonwealth is required 44 Defendant's "Motion To Compel the Commonwealth To File Notice Pursuant to PA.R.E. 404(b)" was unclear in terms of the specific evidence Defendant believed that 10 to notify Defendant only when it intends to introduce evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts at trial. In this case, the Commonwealth indicated at the outset of trial that it did not intend to introduce evidence of the type that concerned Defendant and, in fact, had counseled its witnesses to refrain from giving testimony suggestive of prior criminal assaults of the Defendant. Nor did the Commonwealth in fact introduce such evidence at trial. While Foster's testimony that she had feared Defendant might be "violent" arguably suggested that Defendant had a temper, this oblique expression, with no identification of a specific prior act, did not implicate Rule 404(b). The Commonwealth was not required to notify Defendant of bad acts that it neither intended to introduce nor did introduce. In addition, any alleged impropriety in the pretrial denial of Defendant's Rule 404(b) motion fell short, as the record developed, of producing the prejudicial effect of the admission of a prior criminal history that might have rendered the error reversible. See Commonwealth v. Stallworth, 781 A.2d ii0, ii8 n.2 (Pa. 2001) (finding that defendant had not established requisite prejudice and was not entitled to relief for Commonwealth's failure to provide Rule 404(b) notice of testimonial evidence of Defendant's prior threats when defense counsel should have been aware of the prior threats and had been given an opportunity at trial to object to each witness). Indeed, even the oblique testimony of Foster as to her fear of Defendant was withdrawn from the jury's consideration by a curative instruction. Competency. In the present case, Defendant did not present evidence to support a valid claim that Stephanie Foster was incompetent to testify. When a party objects to a the Commonwealth intended to introduce. See N.T. 3-12. However, discussions on the record at the commencement of trial when Defendant renewed the motion, and the absence of objection on the part of Defendant during trial to Commonwealth evidence of angry behavior by Defendant directed toward the child, indicated that the motion was addressed to Defendant's history of criminal assaults upon others. Prior violence toward the child, of course, was an "intrinsic" element of the felony offense of endangering the welfare of a child -- not misbehavior distinct from the crime encompassed by the "other crimes, wrongs or acts" language of Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 404. Pa. R. Evid. 404 cmt.; accord Fed. R. Evid. 404(b); see Commonwealth v. Roefaro, 456 Pa. Super. 588, 593,691 A.2d 472, 474 (1997). ii witness's competency to testify, the proponent is required to present evidence that the incompetency results from a "mental condition or immaturity." Here, Defendant made no allegations and presented no evidence that Foster, an adult individual, suffered from any condition, mental or otherwise, that would suggest that she could not understand the duty to tell the truth. In fact, Foster's explanation of her reasons for previously testifying untruthfully showed that she was and had been conscious of her duty and wished to explain why she had consciously disregarded it. Because Defendant did not make a preliminary showing that the allegations of incompetency were based on mental condition or immaturity, the court was not required to conduct a competency hearing. See Do/hancryk, 273 Pa. Super. at 225-26, 417 A.2d at 250 (stating that prior inconsistencies in testimony bear on credibility, not competency); see a/xo Pa. R. Evid. 601(a) ("Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided by statute or in these Rules."). SufJiciency of the Evidence. In the present case, the evidence, considered in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, was sufficient to allow the jury to find that Defendant had engaged in a course of conduct of endangering the welfare of the child. As stated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court: [W]here an adult is given sole custody of a child of tender years for a period of time, and, during that time the child sustains injuries which may have been caused by a criminal agency, the [jury] may examine any explanation offered and, if they find that explanation to be wanting, they may reject it and find the person having custody of the child responsible for the wounds. Commonwealth v. Meredith, 490 Pa. 303, 306, 416 A.2d 481, 482-83 (1980). Here, Defendant was properly found responsible for causing the head trauma on March 27, 2000, and it would appear that he does not contest this aspect of the verdict.45 With respect to the rib fractures suffered by the child several weeks earlier (i.e., the course of conduct aspect of the verdict), the Commonwealth presented expert testimony that the 45 See Order of Ct., Sept. 10, 2001; see Def.'s Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal, filed Dec. 3,2001. 12 injuries were intentionally inflicted. Defendant admitted that, during this period, only he and Foster acted as sole caretakers for the child, and Foster testified that she had never harmed the child. Thus, the jury acted within reasonable limits in concluding that the rib fractures were also caused by Defendant. See id Because the evidence supported the allegations that Defendant had criminally caused both the skull fracture on March 27, 2000, and the rib fractures several weeks earlier, the evidence was sufficient for a jury to find that the Defendant had engaged in a course of conduct of endangering the welfare of a child. See Mackert, 781 A.2d at 186-88 (holding that evidence that the Defendant was sole caretaker of child during period and that child suffered successive injuries during that period was sufficient to support finding of course of conduct of endangering the welfare of children). Motion for Mistrial. In the present case, the "passing reference" by Foster to her fear that Defendant might become violent toward her did not mandate a declaration of a mistrial. With respect to the denial of a mistrial motion, an abuse of discretion may be found only when the record clearly indicates a prejudicial effect, upon consideration of factors such as the clarity of the remark, the purposefulness of the Commonwealth in eliciting the remark, and the immediacy of a curative instruction. Here, the remark in question occurred when Foster, asked about the reasons for her prior inconsistent testimony, stated that she had been frightened because "if I said something to incriminate him that he would be violent with me later at home.''46 This comment did not identify, expressly or implicitly, any prior act of misconduct on the part of Defendant. Further, this testimony was elicited unintentionally and in response to a valid line of questioning regarding Foster's prior inconsistent statements. Before the testimony, Defendant and the Commonwealth had agreed that Foster would testify only to being fearful, not the reasons why she was fearful, and the Commonwealth instructed Foster in this regard. When Foster made the aforementioned remark, the Commonwealth agreed to a curative instruction, which was given immediately to the jury. The ambiguity in the 46 N.T. 132. 13 passing reference, the unintentional nature of the elicitation of the remark, and the immediacy of the curative instruction suggest that the reference had little, if any, impact. Thus, it is believed that the court acted within the limits of its allowable discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial. See Bonace, 391 Pa. Super. at 610, 571 A.2d at 1083 (finding no abuse of discretion in denying motion for mistrial when remark did not specify past criminal conduct, the testimony was not elicited purposefully, and the court issued an immediate curative instruction). BY THE COURT, Jaime M Keating, Esq. Chief Deputy District Attorney Linda S. Hollinger, Esq. Assistant Public Defender Attorney for Defendant J. Wesley Oler, Jr., J. 14