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HomeMy WebLinkAbout2011-3300 REBECCA WELSH n/k/a : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF REBECCA RITTER, : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA Plaintiff : : NO. 11-3300 v. : : CIVIL ACTION – LAW JARED ADAMS, : Defendant : JURY TRIAL DEMANDED IN RE: MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT BEFORE HESS, P.J., EBERT, J., AND PECK, J. ORDER OF COURT th AND NOW, this 25 day of September, 2014, upon consideration of Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Plaintiff’s response, the briefs filed by the parties, and argument held on August 15, 2014; IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DIRECTED that Defendant’s Motion for Partial GRANTED Summary Judgment is . The Plaintiff is by operation of law, a limited tort selector, and thereby precluded from recovering noneconomic damages pursuant to the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law. By the Court, _________________________ M. L. Ebert, Jr., J. Zachary Campbell, Esquire Attorney for Plaintiff Kevin D. Rauch, Esquire Attorney for Defendant REBECCA WELSH n/k/a : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF REBECCA RITTER, : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA Plaintiff : : NO. 11-3300 v. : : CIVIL ACTION – LAW JARED ADAMS, : Defendant : JURY TRIAL DEMANDED IN RE: MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT BEFORE HESS, P.J., EBERT, J., AND PECK, J. OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT Ebert, J., September 25, 2014 – Defendant has filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, seeking to bind Plaintiff to the limited tort option under the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (hereinafter “MVFRL”). Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is granted for the following reasons. Statement of Facts This action stems from a motor vehicle accident that occurred on April 30, 2009, in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, when Defendant rear-ended Plaintiff’s vehicle. At the time of the accident, Plaintiff was driving a 1998 Saturn SL 2. Plaintiff admitted that 1 she was a co-owner of the Saturn vehicle with her boyfriend Roger E. Ritter. The vehicle’s Pennsylvania Certificate of Title listed both Plaintiff and Roger E. Ritter as the registered owners of the 1998 Saturn. At the time of the accident, the vehicle was insured under a policy with Permanent General Assurance Corporation (hereinafter “Policy”). The Policy listed 1 Since the time of the accident, Plaintiff has married Roger Ritter. 2 Roger E. Ritter as a named insured, but did not specifically list Plaintiff as a “named insured” or an “insured”. Roger Ritter selected the limited tort coverage for the Policy. Plaintiff had no other insurance policy on the vehicle. Defendant has filed this Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to prevent Plaintiff from pursuing any claims of noneconomic damages and limit Plaintiff to the limited tort option. Discussion Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions and affidavits on file demonstrate that there exists no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2(1), see also Weiner v. American Honda Motor, Co., 718 A.2d 305, 307 (Pa. Super. 1998). The court must construe the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must resolve all doubts and reasonable inferences as to the existence of genuine issues of material fact in favor of the non- moving party. Talega v. Security Bureau, Inc., 719 A.2d 372, 374 (Pa. Super. 1998). The purpose of summary judgment is to avoid unnecessary trials and to “eliminate the waste of time and resources of both litigants where a trial would be a useless formality”. Curan v. Children’s Service Center of Wyoming County, Inc., 578 A.2d 8, 9 (Pa. Super. 1990). Defendant argues that Plaintiff should be bound by the limited tort option for two reasons. Defendant’s first argument is that Plaintiff failed to maintain financial responsibility on the vehicle. Secondly, that even if it is found that Plaintiff had the proper financial responsibility she is bound by the Policy selected by her boyfriend. In 3 both cases, Defendant argues, Plaintiff would be restricted to the limited tort coverage and partial summary judgment should be granted to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for noneconomic damages. Plaintiff counters that she should not be bound by the limited tort option because she maintained proper insurance on the vehicle through the Policy, but because she was not a named insured on the Policy, the limited tort option does not apply to her. The MVFRL states that an owner of a vehicle who does not have financial responsibility shall be deemed to have chosen the limited tort alternative. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1705(a)(5). However, an individual who is not an owner of a currently registered vehicle and who is not a “named insured” or insured shall not be precluded from bringing an action for noneconomic loss. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1705(b)(3). A “named insured” is defined as any individual identified by name as an insured in a policy of private passenger motor vehicle insurance. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1705(f). An “insured” is any individual residing in the household of the named insured who is either a spouse or relative of the named insured or is a minor in the custody of the named insured or relative of the named insured. Id. It is clear that Plaintiff was not a named insured on the Policy nor fits the definition of an insured, as Plaintiff and the co-owner of the vehicle were not married at the time of the accident. Plaintiff argues that since she was not a named insured or an insured, she should not be bound by the limited tort option. Plaintiff relies on McWeeny v. Estate of Strickler, in which the Pennsylvania Superior Court found that the plaintiff, McWeeny, was not precluded from claiming full tort damages because she was not a named insured on the policy. McWeeny, 61 A.3d 1023, 1029 (Pa. Super. 2013). 4 In McWeeny, the plaintiff was driving a vehicle owed by her fiancé when she was involved in an accident. Her fiancé had a limited tort coverage policy on the vehicle. The plaintiff was not listed as a named insured on the policy, but was listed as a principal driver. The Superior Court held that to bind the plaintiff to the limited tort recovery would expand the definition of an insured or a named insured under the MVFRL. Since the plaintiff was not an insured or a named insured of the policy, but was only a principal driver, and she did not own the vehicle, she was not bound by the limited tort option selected by her fiancé. Instead, the Superior Court found that Section 1705(b)(3) of the MVFRL applied to the plaintiff and she was able to bring her noneconomic claims. Id. McWeeny is different from Plaintiff’s situation in one important respect. In McWeeny, the plaintiff was not an owner of the vehicle and therefore § 1705(b)(3) of the co-owner MVFRL applied to her. However, in this case, Plaintiff was a of the vehicle and § 1705(b)(3) does not apply to her. Instead, Plaintiff’s situation is closer to that of the plaintiff in Schwartzberg v. Greco, 793 A.2d 945 (Pa. Super. 2011). In Schwartzberg, the plaintiff was injured when he was struck by a vehicle while he was walking. At the time of the accident, the plaintiff was the owner of a vehicle. The plaintiff’s girlfriend had an insurance policy on the vehicle and the plaintiff was specifically listed as an excluded driver, because his driving privileges had been previously suspended. The girlfriend elected the limited tort coverage when she purchased the policy. Id. at 946. The Superior Court found that because the plaintiff was an owner of a vehicle and did not have an insurance policy, he did not have financial responsibility as required by the MVFRL and was therefore, deemed to have 5 chosen the limited tort alternative. Id. at 948; see also 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1705(a)(5). The Court stated that the proper emphasis is on the vehicle owner’s lack of financial responsibility and not the vehicle’s lack of financial responsibility. Schwartzberg, 793 A.2d at 948. Plaintiff argues that § 1705(a)(5) should not apply to her because it would not make sense for her to purchase an extra insurance policy in addition to the Policy her boyfriend had purchased for the vehicle. This Court agrees that Plaintiff was not required to have purchased an additional policy on the vehicle. Schwartzberg can be distinguished in that respect because in that case, the purchaser of the insurance policy on the vehicle was not an owner of that vehicle. In this case, both Plaintiff and the purchaser of the Policy were owners of the vehicle. However, the inquiry does not end there. In Schwartzberg, our Superior Court went on to say that the granting of summary judgment against the plaintiff was still appropriate “on the basis that under the circumstances…, it is reasonable to conclude that \[plaintiff’s girlfriend\] had \[the plaintiff’s\] consent and approval in choosing the limited tort coverage.” Schwartzberg, 793 A.2d at 948-49. Here, it can also be assumed, and perhaps even more so, that since Plaintiff was a co-owner of the vehicle with Roger Ritter, she consented to his selection of the limited tort coverage. See Ridley v. Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 745 A.2d 7, 14 (Pa. Super. 1999)(inferring that an unmarried couple was acting as one in determining the insurance coverage for one of their vehicles they owned together). In any case, Plaintiff cannot claim that she had proper financial responsibility on the vehicle but that 6 she is not bound by that Policy. Plaintiff is therefore bound by the Policy and the limited tort coverage selected by the co-owner of the vehicle. Conclusion Plaintiff is bound by the limited tort coverage selected by the co-owner of the vehicle. Since Plaintiff is an owner of a vehicle, § 1705(b)(3) of the MVFPL does not apply to her. Rather, Plaintiff is assumed to have consented to the selection of the limited tort coverage by her boyfriend and co-owner, Roger Ritter. Therefore, Defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment is granted and Plaintiff will be precluded from bringing any noneconomic claims. Accordingly, the following Order will be entered: ORDER OF COURT th AND NOW , this 25 day of September, 2014, upon consideration of Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Plaintiff’s response, the briefs filed by the parties, and argument held on August 15, 2014; IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DIRECTED that Defendant’s Motion for Partial GRANTED Summary Judgment is . The Plaintiff is by operation of law, a limited tort selector, and thereby precluded from recovering noneconomic damages pursuant to the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law. By the Court, _________________________ M. L. Ebert, Jr., J. 7 Zachary Campbell, Esquire Attorney for Plaintiff Kevin D. Rauch, Esquire Attorney for Defendant 8