HomeMy WebLinkAboutCP-21-SA-0085-2006
COMMONWEALTH
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
v.
CHARGES: MAXIMUM SPEED LIMITS
VIT ALlY SIVCHUK
CP-21-SA-0085-2006
IN RE: OPINION PURSUANT TO P A. R.A.P. 1925
OLER, 1., October 9,2006.
In this appeal from summary, Defendant was found guilty following a de
novo trial in this court of speeding at the rate of 79 miles per hour in a 65 mile per
hour zone. 1 He was sentenced to pay a fine of $60.50?
From the judgment of sentence, Defendant has filed a pro se appeal to the
Pennsylvania Superior Court.3 He has failed to comply with an order of this court
pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b) to file a statement
of matters complained of on appeal. 4
This opinion in support of the judgment of sentence is written pursuant to
Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The evidence presented at the de novo trial by the Commonwealth, in the
form of testimony of Pennsylvania State Trooper John S. Beaken, may be
summarized as follows. On Thursday, January 19, 2006, at 11:57 a.m., Trooper
Beaken was monitoring eastbound traffic on the Pennsylvania Turnpike at
milepost 203.8 in Hopewell Township, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania,
utilizing an approved, properly functioning radar unit. 5 At that time and place, a
1 Order of Court, August 8, 2006.
2 Order of Court, August 8, 2006.
3 Notice of Appeal, September 7,2006.
4 Order of Court, September 8, 2006.
5 NT. 5-7, 8-9, Trial, August 8, 2006 (hereinafter NT.~.
red Toyota Camry sedan6 being driven by Defendant approached the trooper at a
radar-determined speed of 89 miles per hour7 in a 65 mile-per-hour zone.8
The trooper stopped Defendant's vehicle and advised Defendant that he had
been speeding at the rate of 89 miles per hour. 9 Defendant asked the trooper to
write him up at 70 miles per hour, so that he would avoid points as a result of the
incident.10 The trooper responded that in view of the speed as measured, he could
not accede to this request. 11
Defendant pursued the issue, "beg[ging] and plead[ing]" with the trooper to
reduce the speed charged because "he was trying to get ajob with UPS and he was
afraid he would not be able to get his job.,,12 The trooper finally acquiesced to a
degree and issued a citation charging a reduced speed of 79 miles per hour. 13
The testimony of Defendant at trial was to the effect that he had speeded up
prior to entering the radar unit's zone of coverage because his wife, who was a
passenger, wanted to use a bathroom. 14 He also testified that he did not feel he
had been speeding to the degree measured. 15
At the conclusion of the trial, the court found Defendant guilty as charged.
DISCUSSION
In an evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case, the
evidence is to be viewed "in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth" and
6 NT. 10.
7 NT. 9.
8 NT. 11.
9 NT. 10.
10 NT. 11.
11 NT. 11.
12 NT. 11.
13 NT. 11-12.
14 NT. 15. Defendant, whose country of origin was Ukraine and whose command of English was
only fair, utilized his spouse as an interpreter at the trial. NT. 4, 13.
15 NT. 15.
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"all reasonable inferences in the Commonwealth's favor" are to be entertained.
Commonwealth v. Jones, 449 Pa. Super. 58, 61, 672 A.2d 1353, 1354 (1996),
quoting Commonwealth v. Carter, 329 Pa. Super. 490, 495-96, 478 A.2d 1286,
1288 (1984). The trier of fact is "free to believe all, part or none of the evidence."
Commonwealth v. Griscavage, 512 Pa. 540, 543, 517 A.2d 1256, 1257 (1986)
(citations omitted).
In the present case, the testimony of Trooper Beaker, which the court found
entirely credible, amply supported a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that
Defendant was speeding at a rate of at least 79 miles per hour in a 65 mile per hour
zone. In the absence of a timely statement of matters complained of on appeal, the
court is not in a position to address the matter further.
BY THE COURT,
1. Wesley Oler, Jr., J
Daniel 1. Dye,
Certified Legal Intern
Office of the District Attorney
Vitaliy Sivchuk
1411 Wrightstown Road
Newtown, PA 18940
Defendant, pro Se
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