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HomeMy WebLinkAbout01-1784 CRIMINALCOMMONWEALTH TIMOTHY J. DECKER IN RE: IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 01-1784 CRIMINAL TERM MOTION OF DEFENDANT TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE BEFORE BAYLEY, J. OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT Bayley, J., January 3, 2002:-- Defendant, Timothy J. Decker, is charged with a count of driving under the influence.~ He filed a motion to suppress evidence upon which a hearing was conducted on December 18, 2001. We find the following facts. On July 8, 2001, at approximately 2:00 a.m., Officer Shawn Adolini, of the Shippensburg University Police Department, was in a University patrol car at an entrance to the University. He saw a Jeep approach the University grounds at the speed that he estimated at approximately 50 miles per hour. The speed limit on the road outside the University was 35 mile per hour. The Jeep continued at approximately 50 miles per hour as it entered the University grounds. The speed limit on all roads within the University complex is 15 miles per hour. The Jeep continued on a University road at approximately 50 miles per hour. It went past Adams Drive, which is about 30 or 40 yards beyond the University entrance. Still travelling at the same speed, it ~ 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731(a)(1) & (4). 01-1784 CRIMINAL TERM approached a dead end approximately 100 yards beyond Adams Drive. Officer Adolini, who was following the Jeep, thought that the driver would not be able to turn either right or left before the dead end. Officer Adolini then heard the tires of the Jeep "slide" as it went into a parking lot. At that point, the Jeep was approximately 20 yards from the dead end. The driver turned the Jeep around and started back toward the campus entrance. Officer Adolini stopped the Jeep, which defendant was driving, because he believed that the vehicle was being driven carelessly, and at an unsafe speed. After the stop, an investigation led to the charge of driving under the influence against defendant. DISCUSSION Defendant maintains that the stop of his vehicle by Officer Adolini was illegal; therefore, all evidence obtained by the police after the stop must be suppressed. The Commonwealth maintains that Officer Adolini legally stopped defendant's vehicle because he had probable cause to believe that defendant had violated the Vehicle Code at 75 Pa.C.S. Sections 3714 (careless driving), and 3361 (driving at an unsafe speed). Section 3714 of the Vehicle Code provides: Any person who drives a vehicle in careless disregard for the safety of persons or property is guilty of careless driving, a summary offense. In Commonwealth v. Cathey, 435 Pa. Super. 162 (1994), the Superior Court of Pennsylvania stated: -2- 01-1784 CRIMINAL TERM The language "careless disregard," as used in this statute, set the level of culpability of the statutory offense at less than willful and wonton conduct, but more than ordinary negligence or the mere absence of care under the circumstances. (Emphasis added.) In the present case, defendant, while driving on a Shippensburg University road in the middle of the night with no one around, was travelling approximately 35 miles per hour above the speed limit of 15 miles per hour when he slid into a parking lot to avoid a dead end. Negligence is the absence of ordinary care which a reasonably prudent person would exercise in the circumstances presented. While defendant's conduct may have been negligent, we conclude, that with no other factors present, there was no probable cause for Officer Adolini to believe that his conduct constituted more than ordinary negligence. Thus, Officer Adolini did not have probable cause to believe that defendant violated Section 3714 of the Vehicle Code. Section 3361 of the Vehicle Code provides: No person shall drive a vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing, nor at a speed greater than will permit the driver to bring his vehicle to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead. Consistent with the foregoing, every person shall drive at a safe and appropriate speed when approaching and crossing an intersection or railroad grade crossing, when approaching and going around curve, when approaching a hill crest, when traveling upon any narrow or winding roadway and when special hazards exist with respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by reason of weather or highway conditions. (Emphasis added.) In Commonwealth v. Heberling, 678 A.2d 794 (Pa. Super. 1996), the Superior Court of Pennsylvania stated that: -3- 01-1784 CRIMINAL TERM There is no question that speeding alone does not constitute a violation of [Section 3361]. There must be proof of speed that is unreasonable or imprudent under the circumstances (of which there must also be proof), which are the "conditions" and "actual and potential hazards then existing" of the roadway. These circumstances may include not only the amount of traffic, pedestrian travel and weather conditions, but also the nature of the roadway itself (e.g., whether four-lane, interstate, or rural; flat and wide, or narrow and winding over hilly terrain; smooth-surfaced, or full of potholes; clear, or under construction with abrupt lane shifts.) It is these circumstances under which one's speed may be found sufficiently unreasonable and imprudent to constitute a violation of section 3361, even if the driver has adhered to the posted speed limit. (Footnote omitted.) In Heberling, a police officer saw the appellant travelling at an extreme rate of speed in a 45 mile per hour zone. Appellant was nearing an intersection approximately one-tenth of a mile down the road, and the crest of a hill approximately two to three- tenths of a mile ahead. In affirming appellant's conviction for violating Section 3361 of the Vehicle Code, the Superior Court concluded: "Approaching a hill crest" and "approaching ... an intersection" are "conditions" specifically enumerated in the statute that require a driver to proceed at a safe and appropriate speed. When appellant drove at an excessive speed under these conditions, she violated section 3361. In reaching this conclusion, the Superior Court emphasized that excessive speed must be coupled with "conditions" or "potential hazards" in order to sustain a conviction. In the case sub judice, defendant was driving at approximately 35 miles per hour over the 15 mile per hour speed limit on a Shippensburg University road for approximately 110 to 120 yards approaching a dead end about 20 yards ahead. He then slid into a parking lot. That maneuver prevented him from running into the dead -4- 01-1784 CRIMINAL TERM end, a hazard, which would have violated the assured clear distance ahead rule. That rule, and the hazard, are conditions specifically enumerated in Section 3361. When defendant drove at an excessive speed under those conditions, Officer Adolini had probable cause to believe that he violated Section 3361 of the Vehicle Code. the stop was legal. AND NOW, this suppress evidence, IS DENIED. Thus, ORDER OF COURT day of January, 2002, the motion of defendant to By the Court, Jonathan R. Birbeck, Esquire For the Commonwealth H. Anthony Adams, Esquire For Defendant :saa Edgar B. Bayley, J. -5-