HomeMy WebLinkAbout94-6499 CIVILMICHAEL LIEBMAN, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
PLAINTIFF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
V.
KEEN LEASING, INC.,
DEFENDANT 94-6499 CIVIL TERM
IN RE: PLAINTIFF'S PETITION FOR COUNSEL FEES AND COSTS
BEFORE BAYLEY, J.
OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT
BAYLEY, J., January 10, 2002:--
Plaintiff, Michael Liebman, instituted this suit against defendant, Keen Leasing, Inc., for
damages for destruction of his truck/tractor. Plaintiff maintained (1) that defendant was
negligent in performing an in-frame overhaul of his Caterpillar diesel truck engine, and (2) that
negligence subsequently caused a fire in the engine compartment that destroyed the
truck/tractor. On September 15, 2000, a jury found that defendant was not negligent. Plaintiff
filed a motion for post-trial relief in which he claimed, inter alia, that he was entitled to a new
trial because Robert Laukaitis, who was qualified as an expert and testified for the defense,
presented false testimony as to his educational qualifications. Following a hearing on that
issue, we entered an order on March 15, 2001, supported by a comprehensive opinion,
granting plaintiff a new trial. We found that Robert Laukaitis committed perjury when he
testified at trial that he attended the University of Pennsylvania, from which he received a
degree in 1962 in aeronautical, design and stress engineering. In granting plaintiff a new trial
based on the after-discovered evidence of perjured testimony, we applied the standards in
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Cook Appeal, 107 Pa. Commw. 207 (1987). That resolution made it unnecessary to address
the other issues that were raised by plaintiff, and briefed by the parties, in plaintiff's motion for
post-trial relief.
Plaintiff now seeks to recover his counsel fees and costs incurred in (1) proving the
perjured testimony of Robert Laukaitis, and (2) securing a new trial based on that perjury. The
attorney fee sought is $4,155.00, with costs of $1,444.22, for a total of $5,599.22. Before trial,
plaintiff's counsel requested from defense counsel the curriculum vitae of Robert Laukaitis.
The defense did not give plaintiff's counsel the document until the day before the trial started.
During the trial, plaintiff's counsel became suspicious of the claimed degree in aeronautical,
design and stress engineering from the University of Pennsylvania. He probed Laukaitis on
cross-examination, but Laukaitis remained firm in his testimony that he had earned such a
degree in 1962. After the trial, plaintiff's counsel contacted the University of Pennsylvania as
to whether Robert Laukaitis had received that degree. On November 2, 2000, plaintiff's
counsel received a letter signed by a paralegal in the Office of General Counsel of the
University of Pennsylvania, advising that no records were located indicating that Robert
Laukaitis had ever matriculated at the University. Defense counsel was not willing, based on
that letter, to stipulate that Laukaitis had falsified his academic credentials. Plaintiff then, with
defense counsel present, in Philadelphia, took the deposition of an assistant registrar in
charge of student records at the University of Pennsylvania. That testimony revealed that
Robert Laukaitis never attended the University of Pennsylvania, much less earned any degree
in aeronautical, design and stress engineering. Thereafter, plaintiff's counsel, with defense
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counsel present, took the deposition of Robert Laukaitis. Laukaitis, with his own criminal
lawyer present, refused on Fifth Amendment grounds to answer any substantive questions.
On March 2, 2001, we conducted the hearing on the perjury issue which resulted in the order
for a new trial on March 15, 2001.1
Plaintiff suggests that once the letter of November 2, 2000, was received from the
paralegal in the Office of General Counsel from the University of Pennsylvania, advising that
there was no record indicating that Robert Laukaitis had ever matriculated to the University,
defendant's continued opposition to the claim of perjury was "baseless." Plaintiff maintains
that once that letter put defendant on notice of the perjury of its expert witness, the defense
had a duty to independently investigate whether Robert Laukaitis falsified his academic
credentials, and to advise plaintiff of the results of that investigation. By not doing that,
plaintiff argues that defendant's conduct necessitated the expense to him taking the
depositions of the University of Pennsylvania registrar in Philadelphia, and of Robert
Laukaitis, therefore, defendant's conduct was dilatory and obdurate.
DISCUSSION
The Judicial Code at 42 Pa.C.S. Section 2503(7), provides for an award of "[c]ounsel
fees as a sanction against another participant for dilatory, obdurate or vexatious conduct
during the pendency of a matter." Black's Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, defines "dilatory"
as, "Tending to cause delay." Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, Tenth Edition, defines
1 Robert Laukaitis has pled guilty to a criminal count of perjury.
pending.
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His sentence is
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"obdurate," as, "stubbornly persistent in wrongdoing; hardened in feelings; resistant to
persuasion or softening influences."
Initially, we reject plaintiff's claim that he could be entitled to his costs and attorney fees
for having the record transcribed, and briefing and arguing his motion for a new trial. First, the
motion included five grounds other than the perjury claim, one of which was that the verdict
was against the "weight of the credible evidence." Defendant opposed all of plaintiff's
grounds for a new trial. Second, defendant's legal position was that even if the court
concluded that Robert Laukaitis had falsified his academic credentials and committed perjury
at trial, such perjury still did not warrant the grant of a new trial. While we found that the
perjury warranted the grant of a new trial under the standards set forth in Cook Appeal,
supra, this was a legitimate issue as asserted by defendant. Thus, defendant's conduct in
opposing plaintiff's motion to post-trial relief was not dilatory or obdurate.
Plaintiff maintains that he is entitled to attorney fees and costs because defendant
would not stipulate that Robert Laukaitis falsified his academic credentials after defendant
was informed of the letter of November 2, 2000, from the paralegal in the Office of General
Counsel of the University of Pennsylvania. Plaintiff maintains the letter was evidence that
proved the truth of the matter asserted. The Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act at 42
Pa.C.S. Section 6108(b), provides:
A record of an act, condition or event shall, insofar as relevant, be
competent evidence if the custodian or other qualified witness testifies to its
identity and the mode of its preparation, and if it was made in the regular course
of business at or near the time of the act, condition or event, and if, in the
opinion of the tribunal, the sources of information, method and time of
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preparation were such as to justify its admission.
The letter from the paralegal of the Office of General Counsel of the University of
Pennsylvania was not an admissible document under 42 Pa.C.S. § 6108(b). Plaintiff
obviously recognized that the letter would not be admissible at a hearing on the issue of
whether Robert Laukaitis committed perjury at trial because he chose to take the depositions
of the University of Pennsylvania Registrar and Robert Laukaitis. We find no legal basis for
awarding attorney fees against defendant simply because it refused to stipulate to the truth of
the contents of a letter that was inadmissible into evidence.
Plaintiff, citing Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3, maintains that "defense counsel's
active and continuing opposition to plaintiff's truth-finding procedure has at least passively, if
not actively, made him a participant in deception toward the Court." Rule 3.3, provides:
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly...
(4) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer has offered
material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take
reasonable remedial measures. (Emphasis added.)
The letter of November 2, 2000, from the Office of General Counsel of the University of
Pennsylvania, clearly put defendant on notice of the falsity of the academic credentials
testified to at trail by its expert witness.2 Thereafter, any reasonable investigation by the
defense would have confirmed that fact. Defense counsel did not take any remedial
measures. The Note on Scope of the Rules of Professional Conduct states:
Failure to comply with an obligation or prohibition imposed by a
2 There is no evidence that at trial, defendant, or its counsel, was aware that Robert
Laukaitis had not, as he testified, earned a degree in 1962 from the University of
Pennsylvania in aeronautical, design and stress engineering.
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Rule is a basis for invoking the disciplinary process ....
Violation of a Rule should not give rise to a cause of action nor should it
create any presumption that a legal duty has been breached. The Rules are
designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating
conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are not designed to be a basis for
civil liability. Furthermore, the purpose of the Rules can be subverted when they
are invoked by opposing parties as procedural weapons. The fact that a Rule is
a just basis for a lawyer's self-assessment, or for sanctioning a lawyer under the
administration of a disciplinary authority, does not imply that an antagonist in a
collateral proceeding or transaction has standing to seek enforcement of the
Rule. Accordingly, nothing in the Rules should be deemed to augment any
substantive legal duty of lawyers or the extra-disciplinary consequences of
violating such a duty.
Notwithstanding the scope of the Rules, a violation of an ethical rule that also violates
the law may still form a basis for relief. See Maritrans GP, Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton &
Scheetz, 529 Pa. 241 (1992); Capozzi v. Latsha & Capozzi P.C., 50 Cumberland L.J. 119
(2001). Here, defendant's failure to take reasonable remedial measures once it had reason to
know of the falsity of material evidence that it had offered at trial was dilatory in that it tended
to cause delay.3 We believe that the defense failed to appreciate the significance of the dual
issues, and that resulted in its stubborn persistence and the hardening of feelings based on its
position that even if Laukaitis committed perjury (the first issue), it made no difference
because plaintiff was still not entitled to a new trial (the second issue). Thus, under 42
Pa.C.S. Section 2503(7), defendant's conduct was obdurate as well as dilatory. Plaintiff is
entitled to his reasonable counsel fees and costs in proving the perjury of Robert Laukaitis.
3 Following receipt of the letter of November 2, 2000, from the Office of the General
Counsel of the University of Pennsylvania, the deposition of the University Registrar
was taken on February 26, 2001, and the deposition of Robert Laukaitis was taken on
February 27, 2001. The parties agreed that those depositions would be admitted into
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We will make an award as follows:4
ATTORNEY FEES
DATE DESCRIPTION HOURS AMOUNT
Nov-02-2000 Receipt and review of response to 0.30 45.00
subpoena issued to Penn registrar;
letter to Atty. Shilling re: same.
Jan-16-2001 Preparation and service of discovery 0.40 60.00
requests to Defendant seeking
documents pertaining to Mr. Laukaitis'
alleged college education.
Feb-23-2001 Telephone calls w/counsel, court 0.40 60.00
reporter and University of Pa.
Registrar confirming February 26 and
27 depositions.
Feb-26-2001 Travel to Philadelphia and return and 5.50 825.00
taking deposition of Asst. Registrar at
University of Pennsylvania (Janet Ansert).
Feb-27-2001 Taking deposition or Robert Laukaitis 1.20 180.00
in Harrisburg.
TOTAL 7.80 1,170.00
COSTS
Feb-26-2001 Travel to Philadelphia- train, taxi, 50.50
parking at Hbg. Station (Univ. of Penn.
deposition).
evidence at the hearing on the perjury issue which was on March 2, 2001.
4
Because plaintiff's post-trial motion had to be briefed and argued on the issue of
whether the perjury of Robert Laukaitis warranted a new trial, and on the other four
issues that were raised by plaintiff, we have not awarded counsel fees and costs for the
briefing and arguing of the motion or the preparation of the transcript.
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Feb-28-2001
Feb-28-2001
Deposition transcript of Janet Ansert,
University of Penn. Asst. Registrar.
Deposition transcript of Robert Laukaitis
131.02
132.35
TOTAL 313.87
TOTAL 1,483.87
ORDER OF COURT
day of January, 2002, the petition of plaintiff for an
AND NOW, this
award of attorney fees and costs, IS GRANTED. Plaintiff is awarded attorney fees of
$1,170.00 and costs of $313.87 for a total of $1,483.87.
By the Court,
G. Thomas Miller, Esquire
For Plaintiff
C. William Shilling, Esquire
For Defendant
:saa
Edgar B. Bayley, J.
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