HomeMy WebLinkAboutCP-21-CR-0001581-2012
COMMONWEALTH : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
: CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
AARON JOSEPH RICHARDS : CP-21-CR-1581-2012
IN RE: OPINION PURSUANT TO PA.R.A.P. 1925(a)
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Peck, J., June 18, 2015.
On February 21, 2012, Appellant Aaron Richards (hereinafter “Richards”) was
arrested and taken into custody for selling oxycodone pills to a confidential police
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informant. Richards was charged with Unlawful Delivery, Manufacture, Possession with
Intent to Deliver a Schedule II Controlled Substance, as well as Criminal Use of a
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Communication Facility.
A bench warrant was issued for Richards’s arrest on August 2, 2012 when he
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failed to appear for his arraignment. Richards was eventually arrested in California by
the Costa Mesa Police Department on November 17, 2013; Richards refused extradition,
and a governor’s warrant was obtained in order to bring Richards to Cumberland
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County. On March 25, 2013, Richards was arraigned, ordered to appear on May 1, 2013
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for a pretrial conference, and bail was reset at $5,000 unsecured. Richards once again
failed to appear before this Court for his May 1, 2013 pretrial conference, and another
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bench warrant was issued on May 2, 2013. The second bench warrant was vacated when
Richards voluntarily appeared before the Court on December 27, 2013, at which time he
was once again ordered to appear before this Court on January 15, 2014 for a pretrial
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conference. On January 15, 2014, Richards pled guilty to Unlawful Delivery of a
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Affidavit of Probable Cause, Trooper Douglas Rost, April 25, 2012.
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Criminal Information, August 1, 2012.
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Order of the Court, August 2, 2013.
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Presentence Investigation Report, February 22, 2014, p. 2, incorporated into the record by reference in both the
sentencing proceedings and this Court’s Sentencing Order dated March 10, 2015. See also Transcript of the March
10, 2015 Sentencing Hearing, p. 2-4.
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Order of the Court, March 25, 2013.
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Order of the Court, May 2, 2013.
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Order of the Court, December 27, 2013.
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Schedule II Controlled Substance, in full satisfaction of the remaining charges. Richards
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was ordered to appear for sentencing on March 11, 2014. On March 11, 2014, for the
third time, Richards failed to appear as ordered, and a bench warrant was issued for his
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arrest. On February 11, 2015, Richards was again arrested in California on a bench
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warrant. This time, Richards waived extradition and was brought before this Court for
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sentencing on March 10, 2015.
At the March 10, 2015 sentencing hearing, this Court indicated on the record that
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it had reviewed the applicable presentence investigation. The sentencing guidelines
indicated that the standard sentencing guideline range for Richards’s offense was
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between three (3) and twelve (12) months of imprisonment. After consideration of the
sentencing guidelines, the details contained in the presentence investigation report, the
serious nature of Richards’s crime, and the failure by Richards to comply with several of
this Court’s orders directing him to appear for court, this Court sentenced Richards to
twelve (12) to twenty-four (24) months imprisonment with credit for a period of time
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served.
On April 9, 2015, Richards filed a Notice of Appeal. In his Concise Statement of
Errors Complained of on Appeal, Richards listed the following reasons for his appeal:
1.The sentence of this Honorable Court of Mr. Richards, a first-time offender, to
state prison was harsh, excessive and disproportionate to the nature of the
crime and Richards otherwise law-abiding behavior and efforts at
rehabilitation; and
2.Additionally, a state sentence grounded solely upon the “seriousness of the
offense” is an illegal sentence without additional supporting reasons of record.
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Guilty Plea Colloquy, January 15, 2014.
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Order of the Court, January 15, 2014.
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Order of the Court, March 11, 2014.
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Transcript of the March 10, 2015 Sentencing Hearing, p. 3.
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Transcript of the March 10, 2015 Sentencing Hearing, p. 3.
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Transcript of the March 10, 2015 Sentencing Hearing, p. 5.
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Presentence Investigation Report, February 22, 2014, p. 1.
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Said sentence was within the standard range of the sentencing guidelines.
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Order of the Court, March 10, 2015.
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The following Opinion is written in support of this Court’s sentencing decision,
pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a).
DISCUSSION
I. Richards’s appeal has not raised a substantial question as to the
appropriateness of his sentence, and his appeal, therefore, should be
quashed.
In general, sentencing is left to the sound discretion of the sentencing judge.
Commonwealth v. Perry, 883 A.2d 599, 602 (Pa.Super. 2005). Where an appellant has
challenged the discretionary aspects of a sentence, the Superior Court has held that the
right to pursue such a claim is not absolute, and the “appeal” must instead be treated as a
petition for permission to appeal. Commonwealth v. Garcia-Rivera, 983 A.2d 777, 779
(Pa. Super. 2009)(quoting Commonwealth v. Childs, 664 A.2d 994, 995-996 (Pa. Super.
1995)). Furthermore, “\[a\]llowance of appeal may be granted at the discretion of the court
where it appears that there is a substantial question that the sentence imposed is not
appropriate under \[the Sentencing Code\].” Id. A “substantial question” exists “when the
appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were either:
(1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code or (2) contrary to the
fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth
v. Bullock, 868 A.2d 516, 528 (Pa. Super. 2005)). Furthermore,
\[O\]nly where the appellant's… statement \[of errors\] sufficiently articulates
the manner in which the sentence violates either a specific provision of the
sentencing scheme set forth in the Sentencing Code or a particular
fundamental norm underlying the sentencing process, will such a statement
be deemed adequate to raise a substantial question so as to permit a grant of
allowance of appeal of the discretionary aspects of the sentence.
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Commonwealth v. Bullock, 868 A.2d at 528 (quoting Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 571
Pa. 419, 812 A.2d 617, 627 (Pa. 2002)).
In the present case, Richards challenges a discretionary aspect of his sentence, so
his appeal must be treated as a petition for permission to appeal. For the reasons that
follow, Richards’s Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal does not raise a
substantial question as to whether his sentence was appropriate under the Sentencing
Code, and the petition for permission to appeal must therefore be denied. As previously
noted, this Court’s sentence of 12 to 24 months imprisonment was within the standard
range of the sentencing guidelines. Richards failed to identify a single provision of the
Sentencing Code which this Court has violated. Thus, a substantial question as to the
appropriateness of the sentence has not been raised under the first prong of Bullock.
Additionally, under the second prong of Bullock, Richards has failed to articulate
how this Court’s sentence violates a particular fundamental norm underlying the
sentencing process, except to the extent he makes a general statement that the sentence
was harsh and disproportionate to the crime. However, when considering whether an
appellant has raised a substantial question as to the appropriateness of his or her sentence,
the Superior Court has noted that “this Court is not persuaded by bald assertions or the
invocation of special words in a concise statement of reasons. To the contrary, a concise
statement must articulate the way in which the court's conduct violated the sentencing
code or process.” Commonwealth v. Kalichak, 943 A.2d 285, 290 (Pa. Super.
2008)(citing Commonwealth v. Malovich, 903 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2006)).
Richards’s general statement that the sentence was harsh and disproportionate to the
crime is precisely the type of bald assertion that the Superior Court deemed to be
unpersuasive in Kalichak. Therefore, Richards falls far short of raising a substantial
question as to whether his sentence violates a fundamental norm underlying the
sentencing process.
Richards also claims that the record does not contain reasons for his sentence other
than the “seriousness of the offense.” Richards is mistaken. The record, when viewed in
its entirety, clearly indicates that this Court considered the relevant sentencing guidelines,
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the presentence investigation report, including Richards’s repeated failure to comply with
orders to appear, and the seriousness of the offense when sentencing Richards. As
required by 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b), Pa. R. Crim. P. 704(c)(2), and 204 Pa. Code § 303.1(d),
the Court stated, on the record, the reasons for Richards’s sentence. Therefore, for all of
the reasons set forth above, Richards has failed to raise a substantial question as to the
appropriateness of his sentence under the Sentencing Code, and his petition for
permission to appeal should be denied.
II. This Court did not commit an abuse of discretion in sentencing Richards.
Even if Richards is deemed to have raised a substantial question as to the
appropriateness of his sentence such that the petition for permission to appeal is granted,
this Court’s sentence should be affirmed on appeal. In general, “\[s\]entencing is a matter
vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be
disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Perry, 883
A.2d 599, 602 (Pa.Super. 2005). A sentence constitutes an abuse of discretion if:
the sentence imposed . . . either exceed\[s\] the statutory limits
or \[is\] manifestly excessive. In this context, an abuse of
discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment.
Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the
record, that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the
law, exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality,
prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly
unreasonable decision.
Id. “In determining whether a sentence is manifestly excessive, the appellate court must
give great weight to the sentencing court's discretion, as he or she is in the best position
to measure factors such as the nature of the crime, the defendant's character, and the
defendant's display of remorse, defiance, or indifference.” Commonwealth v. Mouzon,
828 A.2d 1126, 1128 (Pa. Super. 2003). Accordingly, the sentencing court “has broad
discretion in choosing the range of permissible confinements which best suits a particular
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defendant and the circumstances surrounding his crime.” Commonwealth v. Boyer, 856
A.2d 149, 153 (Pa. Super. 2004), affirmed at 891 A.2d 1265 (Pa. 2006).
As noted above, Richards was sentenced to twelve (12) to twenty-four (24)
months imprisonment, with credit for some time served. Since this sentence is within the
standard range of the sentencing guidelines, it falls well short of being manifestly
excessive, and it does not exceed any statutory limitations. Simply put, this Court did not
misapply the law when sentencing Richards. Furthermore, the record contains no facts
which indicate that this Court exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice,
or ill will, nor did Richards identify any claim of such in his Statement of Errors. The
record shows that this Court exercised its judgment based on the sentencing guidelines,
the presentence investigation report, the seriousness of the offense, and the repeated
failure of Richards to appear before the Court as ordered. This Court merely followed the
sentencing guidelines, and such sentence cannot be said to be manifestly unreasonable
given Richards’s irreverence to the law that is attempting to rehabilitate him. Thus, this
Court did not commit an abuse of discretion when it sentenced Richards to 12 to 24
months imprisonment, and Richards’ sentence should be affirmed on appeal.
CONCLUSION
Richards’s appeal should be dismissed because he has failed to raise a substantial
question as to the appropriateness of his sentence under the sentencing guidelines or
under any fundamental norm of the sentencing process. Furthermore, this Court’s
sentence should be upheld in the event that an appeal is permitted, because this Court did
not commit an abuse of discretion.
BY THE COURT,
__________________________
Christylee L. Peck, J.
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Matthew P. Smith, Esq.
Chief Deputy District Attorney
John M. Shugars, Esq.
Senior Assistant Public Defender
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