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HomeMy WebLinkAbout91-2851 CivilCARL W. TAVENNER, Plaintiff V. ALL AMERICAN TRUCK STOP and GLEN MITSTIFER, Defendants IN THE COURT OF OMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUN , PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW 2851 CIVIL 1991 f IN RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARI JUDGMENT BEFORE SHEELY, P.J., HESS -AND 0LEXj,-JJ. ORDER -OF COURT AND NOW, this 29th day of January, 1992, 1he Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. By the Cour , John L. Perry, Esquire For the Plaintiff William A. Addams, Esquire For the Defendant wcm Jf� Wesley 2,= L - ., J. HILE COPY CARL W. TAVENNER, Plaintiff V. ALL AMERICAN TRUCK STOP and GLEN MITSTIFER, Defendants IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNT)J, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - 2851 CIVIL 1991 IN RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR BEFORE SHEELY, P.J. JUDGMENT HESS AND OLElt, JJ . OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT This case is an action for slander, in wh4ch the Defendants have moved for summary judgment on the basis o4 collateral estoppel. For the reasons stated in this opinion, we grant the motion. Plaintiff's complaint avers that he was dffamed by an allegation of theft made by Defendant Mitstifei Defendant All American Auto/Truck Plaza, Inc. :, an officer of 'All American).1 All American was Plaintiff's former employer a�d the alleged victim of a $300.00 theft during his employment; the defamatory statement was alleged to have been made to a sfbsequent employer and to others unnamed. 1 All American appears to have been misnamed in Plaintiff's praecipe for a writ of summons as All American Truck Stop. See Plaintiff's Petition to Correct Name of Defendant; Defendants' Answer to Plaintiff's complaint. 2851 CIVIL 1991 Defendants' responsive pleading raises, iter alfa, the defense of truth and, on this issue, the defense of collateral estoppel. The defense of collateral estoppel is based upon an alleged determination in unemployment compensation proceedings between Plaintiff and All American of willful nisconduct on the part of Plaintiff in connection with the theft, rendering him ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits. Plaintiff's pleading in reply on the mattler of collateral estoppel is that the asserted applicability of the doctrine is a conclusion of law requiring no responsive pleading, that a determination in an unemployment compensation proceeding is, in any event, not a proper basis for collateral Estoppel, and that Plaintiff was eventually acquitted in a crimi al case of the theft in question. His pleading further replies that he was not in fact "found guilty" of willful misconduct in the unemployment compensation proceedings, his claim having be(n "disallowed based upon allegations made by Plaintiff[']s employ r, Defendant All American Auto/Truck Plaza, Inc.," and that he did not appear at an appeal hearing in the unemployment compens tion proceedings because of the constraints of new employment. In addition to the pleadings, the record in this case includes several documents from the unemployment compensation proceedings. These are the Request for Relief of Charges form filed by All American contesting Plaintiff's eligibility for unemployment compensation benefits because of the alleged theft, the determination of the Department of Labor nd Industry disapproving Plaintiff's application for unem loyment -2- 2851 CIVIL 1991 compensation benefits on the basis of willful) misconduct, and the decision of the referee on an appeal of Plain4iff from the initial determination. The decision of the referee, following alhearing at which Plaintiff did not appear and in which testimofy from representatives of All American was takenp suttained the Department's denial of benefits, noting interlalia: According to the testimony of the employ r witnesses the claimant was the only one that could hav been responsible for the $300.00 cash shortage on August 8, 1990. The claimant was eventually arrested and hel over for criminal court regarding this incident. The clai ant's actions in this case do rise to the level of willfu misconduct in connection with the work. The issues presented by the Defendants' otion for Summary Judgment involve the standard to be employed 'n consideration of a summary judgment motion, the applicability Df the doctrine of collateral estoppel in the case of an unemplo ment compensation finding, and the nature of the unemployment c mpensation finding in the present case. These issues will be di cussed seriatim. With respect to a motion for summary judgment, Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1035(b) provides that "[t]he judgment shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is e titled to judgment as a matter of law." In this regard, "[t]he moving party has the burden of proving the nonexistence of any ge uine issue of fact." Thompson Coal Co. v. Fire Coal Co., 488 Pa. 98, 204, 412 A.2d 466, 468-69 (1979). "The record must be exa4ined in the light -3- 2851 CIVIL 1991 most favorable to the nonmoving party." Scha# er v. Albert, 212 Pa. Super. 58, 62, 239 A.2d 841, 843 (1968). IAnd 11[a]11 doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of a material fact must be resolved against the moving party." Thompson Coal Co. v. Fire Coal Co., 488 Pa. 198, 204, 412 A.2d 466, 469 (1979). "Summary judgment is [to be] granted only in the clearlst of cases, where the right is clear and free from doubt." Id. With respect to the applicability of theldoctrine of collateral estoppel in the case of an unemplolment compensation finding, it may be noted that the doctrine itelf has been set forth as follows: To invoke collateral estoppel, five elements must be present: 1) the issue decided in the prior case must be identical to the issue in the present case; 2) there was a final judgment on the merits; 3) the iss a must be essential to the judgment; 4) the party against whom the estoppel is asserted must have had a full and fair c ance to litigate on the merits; and 5) the party against who the estoppel is asserted must be a party or in privity w th a party in the prior case.[21 Commonwealth, Department of Transportation v.lMartinelli, 128 Pa. Commw. 448, 453, 563 A.2d 973, 976 (1989); cf. Restatement (Second) of Judgments S 27 (1980). The doctrine has the salutary effect of barring, in certain circumstances, he relitigation of issues previously decided. See People v. Wat , 115 Mich. App. 172, 320 N.W.2d 333 (1982). "Courts have increasingly given res judicata and collateral estoppel effect to the determinations of administrative agencies acting in a judicial kapacity.11 Id. at [21 The requirement of mutuality of estoppel has been abandoned in Pennsylvania in civil cases. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation v. Martinelli, 128 Pa. Commw. 448, 563 A.2d 973 (1989). -4- 2851 CIVIL 1991 178, 320 N.W.2d at 335 (1982), quoting United tates V. Lasky, 600 F.2d 765, 768 (9th Cir. 1979). "Thus, in 1989 the Pennsylvania Superior court held that a referee's finding in an unemployment compensation case that certain employees had been discharged for willful misconduct3 had collateral estoppel effect in a subsequent. suit by the employees against their employer for wrongful discharge Frederick v. American Hardware Supply Co., 384 Pa. Super. 12, 557 A.2d 779 (lower court's grant of summary judgment in favor of employer on basis of collateral estoppel upheld), allocatgr denied, 565 A.2d 445 (Pa. 1989) . With respect to the nature of the unemployment compensation finding in the present case, it cannot fairly be disputed that the record shows a determination by the unemployment compensation referee that the Plaintiff herein had committ d willful misconduct in the form of theft during his em loyment;4 nor can it be fairly disputed that such a determination was material to the decision in the proceedings. In a defamation action in Pennsylvania, truth is a defense. See U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Grater Philadelphia, 3 The burden of showing willful miscondu t is upon the employer in unemployment compensation proceedings. Brant v. Commonwealth, Unemployment Compensation Bd. oE Review, 83 Pa. Commw. 373, 477 A.2d 596 (1984). 4 Although a finding in the referee's de ision states that "[t1he claimant was not responsible for the $300.00 shortage," a reading of the entire decision makes it apparent that this wording was a typographical or scrivener's error, or represented an attempt by the referee to indicate that the theft was conducted in a manner which involved a shorta e in the cash register of another employee. -5- CARL W. TAVENNER, Plaintiff , V. ALL AMERICAN TRUCK STOP and GLEN MITSTIFER, Defendants IN RE: DEI IN THE COURT OF i CUMBERLAND COUNT' CIVIL ACTION - L, 2851 CIVIL 1991 'MOTION FOR OMMON PLEAS OF , PENNSYLVANIA W ' JUDGMENT BEFORE SHEELY---, P .J , HESS- AND OLE JJ. ORDER -OF COURT AND NOW, this 29th day of January, 1992, the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. By the Cour , John L. Perry, Esquire For the Plaintiff William A. Addams, Esquire For the Defendant wcm J f/ Wesley FI�.E COPY CARL W. TAVENNER, Plaintiff V. ALL AMERICAN TRUCK STOP and GLEN MITSTIFER, Defendants IN THE COURT OF gOMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTI, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW 2851 CIVIL 1991 IN RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUNMARJ JUDGMENT BEFORE SHEELY, P.J., HESS AND OLEIC, JJ. OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT This case is an action for slander, in which the Defendants have moved for summary judgment on the basis o4 collateral estoppel. For the reasons stated in this opinion, we grant the motion. Plaintiff's complaint avers that he was d4famed by an allegation of theft made by Defendant Mitstife4, an officer of Defendant All American Auto/Truck Plaza, Inc. +All American).1 All American was Plaintiff's former employer add the alleged victim of a $300.00 theft during his employment; the defamatory statement was alleged to have been made to a sgbsequent employer and to others unnamed. 1 All American appears to have been misn med in Plaintiff's praecipe for a writ of summons as All American Truck Stop. See Plaintiff's Petition to Correct Name of Defendant; Defendants' Answer to Plaintiff's complaint. 2851 CIVIL 1991 Defendants' responsive pleading raises, 4nter alfa, the defense of truth and, on this issue, the defe se of collateral estoppel. The defense of collateral estoppel is based upon an alleged determination in unemployment compensation proceedings between Plaintiff and All American of willful misconduct on the part of Plaintiff in connection with the theft, rendering him ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits. Plaintiff's pleading in reply on the mater of collateral estoppel is that the asserted applicability of the doctrine is a conclusion of law requiring no responsive pleading, that a determination in an unemployment compensation proceeding is, in any event, not a proper basis for collateral Estoppel, and that Plaintiff was eventually acquitted in a crimi al case of the theft in question. His pleading further replies that he was not in fact "found guilty" of willful misconduct in the unemployment compensation proceedings, his claim having beEn "disallowed based upon allegations made by Plaintiff[']s employ r, Defendant All American Auto/Truck Plaza, Inc.," and that he did not appear at an appeal hearing in the unemployment compensation proceedings because of the constraints of new employment. In addition to the pleadings, the record lin this case includes several documents from the unemploym nt compensation proceedings. These are the Request for Relief of Charges form filed by All American contesting Plaintiff's Eligibility for unemployment compensation benefits because of the alleged theft, the determination of the Department of Labor nd Industry disapproving Plaintiff's application for unem loyment -2- 2851 CIVIL 1991 compensation benefits on the basis of willful) misconduct, and the decision of the referee on an appeal of Plaintiff from the initial determination. The decision of the referee, following alhearing at which Plaintiff did not appear and in which testimony from representatives of All American was taken, suptained the Department's denial of benefits, noting interlalia: According to the testimony of the employ r witnesses the claimant was the only one that could hav been responsible for the $300.00 cash shortage on August 8, 1990. The claimant was eventually arrested and hel over for criminal court regarding this incident. The clai ant's actions in this case do rise to the level of willfu misconduct in connection with the work. The issues presented by the Defendants' lotion for Summary Judgment involve the standard to be employed n consideration of a summary judgment motion, the applicability f the doctrine of collateral estoppel in the case of an unemplo ment compensation finding, and the nature of the unemployment c mpensation finding in the present case. These issues will be di cussed seriatim. With respect to a motion for summary judoment, Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1035(b) provides that "[t]he judgment shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositio s, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, toge her with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no gen ine issue as to any material fact and that the moving partly is en itled to judgment as a matter of law." In this regard, "[t]he noving party has the burden of proving the nonexistence of any gen ine issue of fact." Thompson Coal Co. v. Fire Coal Co., 488 Pa. 1)8, 204, 412 A.2d 466, 468-69 (1979). "The record must be exam'ned in the light -3- 2851 CIVIL 1991 most favorable to the nonmoving party." Schaper v. Albert, 212 Pa. Super. 58, 62, 239 A.2d 841, 843 (1968). And "[a]ll doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of a m terial fact must be resolved against the moving party." Thompson Coal Co. v. Fire Coal Co., 488 Pa. 198, 204, 412 A.2d 466, 469 (1979). "Summary judgment is [to be] granted only in the clear(st of cases, where the right is clear and free from doubt." Id. With respect to the applicability of the doctrine of collateral estoppel in the case of an unemployment compensation finding, it may be noted that the doctrine itself has been set forth as follows: To invoke collateral estoppel, five elements must be present: 1) the issue decided in the prior case must be identical to the issue in the present case; 2) there was a final judgment on the merits; 3) the issue must be essential to the judgment; 4) the party against whom the estoppel is asserted must have had a full and fair chance to litigate on the merits; and 5) the party against whort the estoppel is asserted must be a party or in privity with a party in the prior case.[2] Commonwealth, Department of Transportation v. Martinelli, 128 Pa. Commw. 448, 453, 563 A.2d 973, 976 (1989); cf, Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 (1980). The doctrine has the salutary effect of barring, in certain circumstances, the relitigation of issues previously decided. See People v. Watt, 115 Mich. App. 172, 320 N.W.2d 333 (1982). "Courts have increasingly given res judicata and collateral estoppel effect to the determinations of administrative agencies acting in a judicial lapacity." Id. at [2] The requirement of mutuality of estoppel has been abandoned in Pennsylvania in civil cases. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation v. Martinelli, 128 Pa. Commw. 448, 563 A.2d 973 (1989). -4- 2851 CIVIL 1991 178, 320 N.W.2d at 335 (1982), quoting United States v. Lasky, 600 F.2d 765, 768 (9th Cir. 1979). "Thus, in 1989 the Pennsylvania SuperiorlCourt held that a referee's finding in an unemployment compensation case that certain employees had been discharged for willful misconduct3 had collateral estoppel effect in a subsequent. suAt by the employees against their employer for wrongful discharge Frederick v. American Hardware Supply Co., 384 Pa. Super. 2, 557 A.2d 779 (lower court's grant of summary judgment in favor of employer on basis of collateral estoppel upheld), allocat r denied, 565 A.2d 445 (Pa. 1989) . With respect to the nature of the unemployment compensation finding in the present case, it cannot fairly be disputed that the record shows a determination by the unemployment compensation referee that the Plaintiff herein had committ d willful misconduct in the form of theft during his em loyment;4 nor can it be fairly disputed that such a determinate n was material to the decision in the proceedings. In a defamation action in Pennsylvania, truth is a defense. See U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Gr4ater Philadelphia, 3 The burden of showing willful miscondu t is upon the employer in unemployment compensation proceed ngs. Brant v. Commonwealth, Unemployment Compensation Bd. off Review, 83 Pa. Commw. 373, 477 A.2d 596 (1984). 4 Although a finding in the referee's de4ision states that "[t]he claimant was not responsible for the $1:00.00 shortage," a reading of the entire decision makes it appar nt that this wording was a typographical or scrivener's er, or, or represented an attempt by the referee to indicate that th theft was conducted in a manner which involved a shorta a in the cash register of another employee. -5- 2851 CIVIL 1991 898 F. 2d 914 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, U.S. , 111 S. Ct. 58, 112 L. Ed. 2d 33 (1990). In this defamation tction, the issue of the truth of the defamatory statement in question was determined adversely to the Plaintiff in unemployment compensation proceedings, such issue being the su ject of a final adjudication on the merits, being essential to th decision, being the object of litigation or the opportunity for litigation by the Plaintiff, and being resolved in proceedins in which the Plaintiff was a party; under the doctrine of coli teral estoppel, the determination is binding upon the Plaintiff ir the present action. Consequently, an examination of the reco d in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff reveals the existence of no genuine issue of material fact upon which a judgmnt against the Defendants could be premised, and the motion of tie Defendants for summary judgment must be granted. ORDER --OF -C—OURT AND NOW, this 29th day of January, 1992, the Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. John L. Perry, Esquire For the Plaintiff William A. Addams, Esquire For the Defendant wcm 0 By the Court, Defendants' s-.__3.._..Wesl- ler. _Jr.,. J. Wesley Oler A Jr., J.