Loading...
HomeMy WebLinkAbout87-20 CivilJ. EDWARD CLOUSE, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. CIVIL ACTION - LAW RODNEY RICE and SANDRA J. RICE, NO. 20 EQUITYI1987 Defendants IN RE: DEFENDANTS' PETITION TO AMEND COUNTER -CLAIM BEFORE: BAYLEY, HESS, and OLER, JJ. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this ?((J day of March, 1992, upon consideration of Defendants' Petition To Amend Counter -claim, for the reasons stated in the Court's Opinion, the Petition is GRANTED., Alan R. Boynton, Jr., Esq. Carol A. Steinour, Esq. Attorney for Plaintiff Carol J. Lindsay, Esq. Attorney for Defendants BY THE COURT, FILE COPY J. EDWARD CLOUSE, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. CIVIL ACTION - LAW RODNEY RICE and SANDRA J. RICE, NO. 20 EQUITYI1987 Defendants IF PE OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT OLER, J. In the present action involving a dispute between a lessor and lessees of a dairy farm, Defendant lessees have petitioned to amend their counterclaim and Plaintiff lessor has ,objected to the proposed amendment on the basis of the statute of ,limitations. The facts are as follows. On April 20, 1981, Defendants leased a dairy farm in North Newton Township, Cumberland County, Pennsylvaniay from Plaintiff.' On June 26, 1987, Plaintiff filed a complaint in equity' against Defendants, seeking recovery for negligent dajmage to a shed, construction of an unlawful barrier to a waterway, expenses for equipment repair to which Defendants had obligated themselves under the lease, unjust enrichment relating to the equipment repairs, and ' See Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, paragraphs 4, 5; Defendants' Answer to Amended Complaint, paragraphs 4, 5. z The complaint was styled "Civil Action-LAw and Equity" and bore an Equity docket number. Following preli"inary objections, the reference to "law" was deleted from the capt�on. See Order of Court, October 27, 1987. No. 20 Equity 1987 unpaid rent.' A second action, in ejectment, was also filed by the Plaintiff in 1987.° "Once Defendants answered both [c]omplaints, the attorneys for Plaintiff and Defendants [attempted] to place the matter in a posture for resolution by the courts.... Both parties contemplated that because Defendants had vacated the [p]remises, the ejectment action should be discontinued and the equity action would be amended to an action at law.i5 By the fall of 1990, however, in spite of repeated prodding by Defendants' counsel, the amended pleading had not 'yet been filed by Plaintiff.6 The case escaped being purged under; Pa. R.J.A. 1901 on the basis of Plaintiff's representation that counsel for the parties were working toward a resolution of collateral issues and that Plaintiff would be filing an amended complaint.' Finally, on October 30, 1990, with the support of Defendants'in the form of a ' Plaintiff's Complaint, No. 20 Equity 1987, in assumpsit and trespass. ° Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Amend, at 1; Defendants' Reply to Answer with New Matter to Petition of Defendants to Amend Their Counter -claim, paragraph 11(b). 5 Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Amend, at 1; see Defendants' Reply to Answer with New Matter to Petition of Defendants To Amend Their Counterclaim, paragraph 11(d). 6 See Deposition of Rodney E. Rice, December 9, 1991, at 1- 13, and exhibits. ' See Plaintiff's Objections to Termination under Pa. R.J.A. No. 1901, October 19, 1990. 2 No. 20 Equity 1987 consent of record, Plaintiff filed the amended complaint.$ On January 28, 1991, Defendants filed an Answer to the amended complaint, with new matter and counterclaims.9 Although a number of the counterlcaims could have been time-barred had the statute of limitations been deemed applicable by the parties to Defendants' pleading,10 the aforesaid process involved an understanding between counsel that supplemental pleadings would be' allowed,11 and consistent therewith no defenses on limitations grounds were interposed by Plaintiff. 12 s The amended complaint retained an equity caption. It contained counts seeking recovery for unpaid runt, expenses for equipment repair, damages to the vacated premises, unjust enrichment, and lost rent. 9 The counterclaims consisted of counts seeping recovery for silo contents wrongfully withheld following vacation by Defendants, failure to reimburse Defendants for certain expenses and labor, unjust enrichment in connection with property and liability insurance proceeds, heating expenses resulting ,from failure to repair buildings damaged by fire, equipment wrongfully withheld following vacation by Defendants, unjust enrichmejnt in connection with Plaintiff's refusal to allow Defendants to use a certain bin and ground area leased to them, negligent installation of a waste removal system, failure to adjust rent downward iql accordance with the lease, and failure to bear a one-half share of ',certain expenses in accordance with the lease. to See, e.g, Count I of Defendants' counterclaim alleging a wrongful withholding of silo contents from Defendants by Plaintiff; Count V alleging a wrongful withholding of equipment, and Count VII alleging a negligent installation of a waste removal system. Act of July 9, 1976, P.L. 586, §2, 42 Pa. C.S. §5524 ('1991 Supp.)(two- year statute of limitations). 11 Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion To Amend, at 7. 12 Id., at 5; Reply of Plaintiff to New Mather and Reply to Counterclaim, filed February 25, 1991. 3 No. 20 Equity 1987 Several months later, however, 13 when Defendants attempted to amend their pleading to include three additional counterclaim counts,14 Plaintiff objected to the proposed amendment on the basis of the statute of limitations." "In Pennsylvania there is ample authority that a statutory 13 See Defendants' September 10, 1991. Petition To Amend Counter -Claim, filed 14 Id. One count sought recovery for manure wrongfully withheld by Plaintiff following vacation by Defejndants; a second sought recovery for loss of interest on certain payments due Defendants but wrongfully claimed by Plaintiff'; and the third sought recovery for losses due to Plaintiff's breach of a lease provision respecting lessor selection of crop plalntings. 15 Plaintiff's Answer with New Matter to Petition To Amend Counterclaim, filed October 3, 1991; With respect to the count seeking recovery for manure wrongfully withheld by Plaintiff following vacation by Defendants, Plaintiff characterized the claim as one for conversion, noted the two-year statute applicable to such tort under Section 5524 of the Judicial Code, and identified March 31, 1988, as the approximate date of vacation by Defendants. With respect to the count seeking recovery for loss of interest on certain payments due Defendants but wrongfully claimed by Plaintiff, Plaintiff characterized the claim as ',one for tortious interference with contractual relations, noted theltwo-yearstatute applicable to such tort under Section 5524 of the Judicial Code, and identified the spring of 1987 as the time of alleged occurrence. With respect to the count seeking recovery for losses due to Plaintiff's breach of a lease provision respecting lessor selection of crop plantings, Plaintiff characterized the claim as one for breach of contract, noted the four-year statute applicable to such a cause under Section 5525 of the Judicial Code, and identified the alleged time of accrual of the cause of action as prior to the 1987 planting season. Id., paragraphs 14-29. It was thus said that the counts had respective statute of limitations expiration dates of April 1, 1990, June 21, 1989, and March 31, 1991. Id. If Plaintiff's analysis is correct, the applicable statutory periods had already expired as to two of the counts prior to the filing of Plaintiff's amended complaint on October 30, 1990, and Defendants' answer to the amended complaint, with new matter and other counterclaims, on January 28, 1991. 4 No. 20 Equity 1987 time limitation may be waived by consent or conduct of the one [for] whose benefit it is intended to operate."Valley Seeding Co., Inc. v. Norco Construction Co., 41 Northampton Co. Rep. 55, 59 (1971); See Bellotti v. Spaeder, 433 Pa. 219, 249A.2d 343 (1969); Smith v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 304 Pa. 294, 156 A. 89 (1931). "[I]t is a well recognized legal principle that the statute of limitations is for the benefit of individuals, and not to secure general objects of policy; hence a statute of limitations may be waived by express contract or by necessary implications, or its benefits may be lost by conduct invoking the established principles of estoppel in pais. X16 With respect to waiver by agreement, the consent of the party for whose benefit the statute exists may be implicit in permission to file a certain pleading." In this regard,' "[a]n agreement will, if possible, be construed so as to be effective." Smith v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 304 Pa. 294, 297, 156 A. 89, 91 (1931). A "reasonable construction" of a party's conduct may be employed in discerning its implications as to the statute, of limitations. Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Rexnord, Inc., 37 Pa.'Commonwealth 20, 24, 389 A.2d 246, 248 (1978). With respect to loss of the benefits of a statute of limitations by conduct warranting estoppel, it has been said that 16 Jackson v. Kemp, 365 S.W.2d 437, 439 (Tann. 1963). 17 Smith v. Pennsylvania RR., 304 Pa. 294, 1156 A. 89 (1931). 5 No. 20 Equity 1987 "[e]quitable estoppel applies where, because of something that has been done, a party is denied the right to plead or prove an otherwise important fact .... It is based upon the principle that 'a person is held to a representation made or a position assumed, where otherwise inequitable consequences would result to another who, having the right to do so under all the circumstances of the case, has in good faith relied thereon."' Nesbitt v. Erie Coach Co., 416 Pa. 89, 95-96, 204 A.2d 473, 476 (1964),Iquoting Antone v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 335 Pa. 134, 140,',6 A.2d 566, 569 (1939). Intent to deceive is not a prerequisite to application of estoppel in connection with the statute of limitations; "[i]t is not the intention of the party estopped but the natural effect upon the other party which gives vitality to an estoppel.1118 In summary, a general rule as to the availability of a statute of limitations to a party may be stated as follows: "If in the course of the negotiations [a party gives] the [other party] reasonable grounds for believing that the time limit [prescribed in a statute of limitations will] be extended or that such provision [will] not be strictly enforced, it [can] not subsequently insist on its strict enforcement without giving him a reasonable time thereafter to bring his action McMeekin vl11 Prudential Ins. 18 Nesbitt v. Erie Coach Co., 416 Pa. 89, 96, 204 A.2d 473, 477 (1964). In the present case, there was cle4rly no intent on the part of either side to mislead the other, and nothing in this opinion is intended to question in any way the good faith of the contestants or counsel. 6 No. 20 Equity 1987 Co., 348 Pa. 568, 572, 36 A.2d 430, 432 (1944). In the present case, it appears clear that an agreement existed that Defendants would be permitted to assort counterclaims following the filing of Plaintiff's amended complaint, notwithstanding the passage of time periods provided for in applicable statutes of limitations. Although the Court can agree with Plaintiff that "[t]he parties' agreement to alllow supplemental pleadings did not constitute a permanent waiver of the statute of limitations,"19 it did imply assent on the part of, Plaintiff to the proposition that the statute would not be strictly enforced and that a reasonable period of time would be afforded to Defendants to plead their claims following the submission of Plaintiff's amended complaint. In view of the circumstances recited heretofore, which include a belated filing of the amended complaint more than three years after commencement of suit, we believe that Defendants have moved to plead the three counterclaims within a treasonable time. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this day of March, 1992, uponl consideration of Defendants' Petition To Amend Counter -claim, for the reasons stated in the Court's Opinion, the Petition is GRANTED., 19 Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Defendants, Motion to Amend, at 7. 7 No. 20 Equity 1987 Alan R. Boynton, Jr., Esq. Carol A. Steinour, Esq. Attorney for Plaintiff Carol J. Lindsay, Esq. Attorney for Defendants BY THE COURT, 8 J.