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HomeMy WebLinkAbout90-2424 CivilMICHAEL E. MEAGHER IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF to the use of CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA RUSSELL L. WANTZ, JR. Plaintiff CIVIL ACTION - LAW V. WILLIAM R. COOPER, JR. and NO. 2424 CIVIL 1990 MARY BETH HELMS COOPER, JURY TRIAL DEMANDED Defendants IN RE: PLAINTIFF,I S PETITION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT FOR SPECIFIC PROPERTY PURSUANT TO PA. R.C.P. 3148 BEFORE HOFFER and OLER, JJ. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this l q t� day of April, 19921, after careful consideration of the oral arguments and briefs of counsel, Plaintiff's Petition for Entry of Judgment for Specific Property Pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 3148 is DENIED. BY THE COURT, J. Audrey E. Woloshin, Esq. 345 East Market Street York, PA 17403 Counsel for Plaintiff Anna Marie Sossong, Esq. 204 State Street Harrisburg, PA 17101 Garnishee MICHAEL E. MEAGHER IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF to the use of CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA RUSSELL L. WANTZ, JR. Plaintiff CIVIL ACTION LAW V. WILLIAM R. COOPER, JR. and NO. 2424 CIVIL 1990 MARY BETH HELMS COOPER, JURY TRIAL DEMANDED Defendants IN RE: PLAINTIFF;'S PETITION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT FOR SPECIFIC PROPERTY PURSUANT TO PA. R.C.P. 3148 BEFORE HOFFER and OLER, JJ. OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT OLER, J. In the present case we are asked to determine whether a judgment for specific property, or in the alternative a money judgment, pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 3148 may be entered against Anna Marie Sossong (hereinafter Garnishee) in favor of Michael E. Meagher, to the use of Russell L. Wantz, Jr. (hereinafter Plaintiff). For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we answer in the negative. The relevant facts are stated as follows. A judgment in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Dollars, with interest, was entered in favor of the Plaintiff and against William R. Cooper, Jr. and Mary Beth Helms Cooper (hereinafter Defendants) on September 12, 1989, based upon a note signed bar the Defendants, dated September 11, 1989.' Subsequent to the entry of this judgment against the Defendants, the Garnishee came into possession 1 i Certification of Docket Entries and Judgment, Dauphin County, Pennsylvania, No. 2424 Civil 1990; Blrief in Support Plaintiff's Petition for Entry of Judgment (herein4fter Plaintiff's Brief), at 1. 2424 Civil 1990 of 1,535 shares of Class A stock in Cooper -Helms Chevrolet, Inc.2 The Garnishee contends that she inadvertently took possession of the stock certificate, which represented the 1, 535111 shares of stock, when she "sucked up all the papers on the table"Ill,at a meeting on March 16, 1990, between her clients' and Defendant, William R. Cooper.' At the March 16, 1990, meeting, the Garnishee's clients purchased an interest in Cooper -Helms Chevrolet, Inc., by paying a sum of approximately Two Hundred and Eleven Thousand Dollars to Motors Holding Corporation.' The stock certificate remained in the Garnishee's possession until approximately late September or early October of 1990.6 On August 15, 1990, the Plaintiff simultajneously filed a Praecipe for a Writ of Execution and served Initerrogatories in 2 Plaintiff's Brief, at 2; Garnishee alleges that the stock was owned by Motors Holding Corporation, a division of General Motors. (Deposition of Garnishee, at 6) ' The Garnishee's clients, Mr. Caffrey and Mi. Hartzell, were seeking to purchase Cooper -Helms Chevrolet, IInc., from the Defendant. (Deposition of Garnishee, at 4, 9) 4 Deposition of Garnishee, at 10. 5 The $211,000.00 represented the outstanding balance of the Defendant's mortgage, held by Motors Holding Corporation. Upon payment by the Garnishee's clients, a representative of Motors Holding signed the stock over to the Defendant. I Subsequent to this transaction, the Garnishee's clients owned a85% interest in Cooper -Helms Chevrolet while the Defendant owned tie remaining 15%. (Deposition of Garnishee, at 5, 8, 9) 6 Deposition of Garnishee, at 10, 11, 12. 3 2424 Civil 1990 Attachment on the Garnishee.' Interrogatory number two (2) stated as follows: At the time you were served or atlany subsequent time was there in your possession,, custody or control or in the joint possession, custody or control of yourself and one or mote other persons any property of any nature owned solely or in part by:the defendants? The Garnishee answered in the affirmative but did not identify the property of either of the Defendants in her possession or control.' The Plaintiff subsequently filed Interrogatories in Aid of Execution on September 24, 1990, seeking to identify the property in the Garnishee's possession.9 Interrogatory in'Aid of Execution number one stated as follows: Describe the property admitted tolbe in your possession in your Answer Number to Plaintiff's Interrogatories in Attachment. To which, the Garnishee answered as follows:10 The property that was in my possession when the Interrogatories were answered was,1,535 Class A shares of stock in Cooper -Helms Chevrolet, Inc. These shares were cancelled pursuant to in- structions from Chevrolet Motor Division to their licensed dealer/franchise. Plaintiff's Brief, at 1; Interrogatories served pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 3144. a Garnishee's Answer to Interrogatories in Attachment, dated September 17, 1990. 9 Plaintiff's Brief, at 2; Interrogatories served pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 3117. io Garnishee's Answer to Plaintiff's Interrogatories in Aid of Execution, dated October 15, 1990. 4 2424 Civil 1990 Thereafter, the Plaintiff filed a Petition for Entry of Judgment for Specific Property Pursuant to Pa. R}C.P. 3148(a) and (c) 11 on May 15, 1991, seeking the specific property acknowledged by the Garnishee to be in her possession, that property being 1,535 Class A shares of stock in Cooper -Helms Chevrolet,, Inc., or, in the alternative, a money judgment in the amount of Twd Hundred Thousand Dollars, plus interest, against the Garnishee., A Rule to Show Cause, ordered by this Court, was issued on the �arnishee to show cause why judgment should not be entered against her.12 In response to the Rule, the Garnishee answered that, she believed the stock to be valid, issued stock when she answered the Interrogatories in Attachment; however, she alleged that she subsequently learned that the stock had been cancelled, effective March 16, 1990, prior to answering the Interrogatories in Aid of Execution.13 The Garnishee, consequently, hast asked that the Plaintiff's Petition be set aside. These issuers were argued on February 26, 1992. "Garnishment is a proceeding wherein the judgment creditor (Plaintiff) seeks to determine whether the garnishee owes a debt to the judgment debtor (Defendant) or has property, of the judgment 11 Pa. R.C.P. 3146(b) was also cited by the Plaintiff in support of entry of judgment. 1990. lz Rule to Show Cause, No. 2424 Civil 199 0, dated May 16, I 13 Garnishee's Answer to Petition for Entry, of Judgment for Specific Property pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 3148, dated June 7, 1991. 5 2424 Civil 1990 debtor in his possession. The garnishment proceeding starts with service upon the garnishee of a Writ of Execution and Interrogatories, the object of which is to determine whether the suspected debt exists." Wheatcroft v. Smith, 239 Pa. Super. 27, 32, 362 A.2d 416, 419 (1976) (citations omitted); "The procedure between the plaintiff and garnishee shall, as far as practicable, be the same as though the interrogatories were a complaint and the answer of the garnishee were an answer in a civil l,action. "14 Where the garnishee admits to possession of property of the judgment debtor (defendant), the prothonotary may, upon praecipe of the plaintiff, enter judgment against the garnishee ',for the property admitted in the answer(s) to interrogatories, to be in the garnishee's possession.15 However, "[a]dmissiong of a garnishee in answers to a judgment creditor's interrogatories will support the entry of a judgment thereon 'only in a clear case, where there is a distinct admission of liability by the garnishee to the defendant."' Ruehel v. Maxwell Steel Co., Inc., 327 Pa. Super. 39, 43, 474 A.2d 1162, 1163-64 (1984) (citations omitted). When a plaintiff is unsatisfied with the garnishee's answers to his original interrogatories, he may: put the issue down for trial immediately; move for judgment for any property or amount admitted to be in the garnishee's possession; or attack the form of 14 Pa. R.C.P. 3145. 15 Pa. R.C.P. 3146(a). 0 2424 Civil 1990 the answer and seek additional information from the garnishee. Hanchley v. Elliot Truck Brokerage Company, Inc., ,421 Pa. 131, 134, 218 A.2d 743, 745 (1966). One method of attacklavailable to the plaintiff is found in Pa. R.C.P. 3117(a), which authorizes the plaintiff to file additional written interrogatories16 to "discover "assets of the defendant."' Id. at 135, 218 A.2d at 745. Interrogatories served pursuant to Pa. R.,C.P. 3144 are distinguishable from those served pursuant to Pay. R.C.P. 3117 in that they serve as pleadings in addition to a discovery device. 17 Additionally, interrogatories properly served and containing a notice to answer pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 3144 subject the garnishee to a default judgment if he fails to ansWer;18 whereas, interrogatories served pursuant to Pa. R.C.P., 3117 are pure discovery proceedings that do not subject the garnishee to such a risk. Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Obney, 122 Pitts. Leg. J. 294, 295 (1974). In the present case, the Plaintiff filed Interrogatories in Aid of Execution pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 3117 after receiving the Garnishee's unspecific response to his Interrogatories in Attachment. The Garnishee's response thereto was -inconsistent with 16 Pa. R.C.P. 3145 does not authorize the filing of supplemental interrogatories pursuant to Pa. R.,'C.P. 3144; see also, Hanchley v. Elliot Truck Brokerage Company, Inc., 421 Pa. 131, 134, 218 A.2d 743, 745 (1966). 17 Pa. R.C.P. 3145. 18 Pa. R.C.P. 3144(a), 3146(a). 7 2424 Civil 1990 her initial answer; therefore, it cannot be said that the Garnishee "distinctly admitted" to being in possession of property of the defendant. Furthermore, the Garnishee contends that she was unaware, when she answered the interrogatories inlAttachment, that the stock certificate in her possession had been cancelled, effective March 16, 1990. A question of fact anises, therefore, concerning the Garnishee's knowledge, or lack thereof, as to the value of the stock at the time she answered the Interrogatories in Attachment. Factual issues between the Plaintiff and Garnishee are more appropriately resolved by trial. 19 Because lof the existence of a factual issue, entry of judgment, by this Court, against the Garnishee pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 3146(b) would not be proper. With respect to the Plaintiff's request forljudgment against the garnishee pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 3148, it may be noted that the rule deals with the content and execution of a judgment against a garnishee. Moreover, Pa. R.C.P. 3148 provides thelprocess by which a plaintiff may execute his judgment against the g g garnishee after judgment in the garnishment proceeding has been entered in favor of the plaintiff. Marine National Bank v. Northwest Pennsylvania Bank & Trust Company, 308 Pa. Super. 154, 158-159 n.3,,454 A.2d 67, 69- 70 n.3 (1982)(emphasis added). In the case sub judice, the Plaintiff hast not procured a judgment in his favor against the Garnishee; therefore, Pa. R.C.P. 19 II 9 Goodrich Amram 2d §3144(a): 1, at 517 (1977). 8 2424 Civil 1990 3148 is neither relevant nor dispositive. If the Plaintiff seeks a judgment against the Garnishee, he must do so at trial. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this day of April, 1992, after careful consideration of the oral ;arguments and briefs of counsel, Plaintiff's Petition for Entry of Judgment for Specific Property Pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 3148 is DENIED. Audrey E. Woloshin, Esq. 345 East Market Street York, PA 17403 Counsel for Plaintiff Anna Marie Sossong, Esq. 204 State Street Harrisburg, PA 17101 Garnishee BY THE COURT, ��Gc-cam J. 0