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HomeMy WebLinkAbout89-1721 CivilDONALD L. STONER, Plaintiff V. DONNA L. STONER, Defendant IN THE COURT ( CUMBERLAND COT CIVIL ACTION NO. 1721 CIVI IN DIVORCE ORDER OF COURT ? COMMON PLEAS OF JTY, PENNSYLVANIA LAW 1989 AND NOW, this day of 10 19)2, it is ordered and directed as follows: (1) All right, title, and interest 'n the following items of marital property is herewith transferred to the Plaintiff, Donald L. Stoner: (a) Various items of household oods, already in Plaintiff's possession, valued at $2,420.00; (b) Plaintiff's pension at the Patriot News, valued at $8,191.00; (c) Various items of Antique Inventory, valued at $30,000.00; (d) A non-interest bearing second mortgage on the marital home from Defendant Donna L. Stoner, valued at $15,233.40. (2) All right, title, and interest in the following items of marital property is herewith transferred to the Defendant, Donna L. Stoner: (a) The marital residence located at 290 Hillside Drive, New Cumberland, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, valued at $90J00.00; (b) Various items of household Defendant's possession, val (3) Defendant is ordered to give cods, already in d at $8,900.00; laintiff a non- interest bearing second mortgage on the marital residence in the amount of $15,233.40, payable in full within ninety days of the death of the parties' son, Jason P. Stoner (bora June 28, 1977), the date that Jason P. Stonor is emancipated, or the date that Jason P. Stoner reaches 18 years of age, i.e whichever of the foregoing shall first occur. , June 28, 1995, (4) Each party shall pay his or her respective counsel fees and expenses. (5) Defendant shall pay $875.75 toward the Master's fee and costs, representing one-half of the total fee and costs of $1,751.50. (6) Plaintiff, having already paid $700.00 toward the Master's fee and costs, shall pay a balance of $175.75. (7) The parties shall execute and deliver such documents and instruments as are necessary or convenient of this Order. BY THE COURT, P. Richard Wagner, Esq. Counsel for Plaintiff Samuel L. Andes, Esq. Counsel for Defendant rc: the effectuation J. DONALD L. STONER, Plaintiff V. DONNA L. STONER, Defendant FMD OLER, Judge. IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION LAW NO. 1721 CIVI 1989 IN DIVORCE OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT The parties in this divorce action were marr. 1974, and separated on April 13, 1985. Plaintif L. Stoner, is 49 years of age (d.o.b. 7/03/42), ar on November 8, Husband, Donald Defendant Wife, Donna L. Stoner, is 41 years of age (d.o.b. 12/05/50). This is Husband's second and Wife's first marriage. The parties have two children, Jamie' (d.o.b. 4/23/73) and Jason P. (d.o.b. 6/28/77). On May 15, 1989, Plaintiff Husband filed a complaint in divorce alleging indignities and irretrievable br akdown.2 On July 6, 1989, Defendant Wife filed her petition for economic relief, including counts for equitable distribution, alimony and alimony pendente lite, and counsel fees and expenses, together with her counter -affidavit under Section 3301(d) of the D vorce Code. A Master was appointed on February 6, 190, and master's hearings were held on October 15, 1990, and Ma 20, 1991. The Master filed his report on September 17, 191, in which he recommended a distribution plan that would award sixty percent of ' Jamie was born to Wife prior to her adopted Jamie in 1979. 2 23 Pa. C.S. §3301(a)(6), (d). triage. Husband No. 1721 Civil 1989 the marital estate, including the marital reside forty percent to Husband. Husband's share incluc form of a second mortgage from Wife on the marita: Master further recommended no award of alimony, costs. Both Husband and Wife filed exceptions report, which exceptions were argued before the 15, 1992. Husband raises two exceptions to the Master, e, to Wife and a lien in the residence. The counsel fees or to the Master's Court on January 's report. First, he alleges that the Master failed to consider Husband's contribution of $21,000.00 in the acquisition of he marital home. Second, he argues that the Master erred in not awarding Husband interest on the deferred distribution of his shafe of the marital residence. Wife argues three exceptions to the Master' she alleges that the Master erred in not includ asset subject to equitable distribution, the Husband's interest in his partnership in an an Second, Wife contends that the Master erred in r the significant assets at the same valuation alleges that the Master erred in denying Wife's on the basis of Husband's current, diminished, i DISCUSSION In a divorce action, a Master's report and 3 Wife filed four exceptions but chose to ] Under C.C.R.P. 210-7, exceptions not briefed are 2 report.3 First, ng, as a marital ent value of s business. t valuing all of .e. Third, Wife laim for alimony ome. recommendations, ief only three. :erred abandoned. No. 1721 Civil 1989 while entitled to great consideration, are advi binding on the Court. Morschhauser v. Morschhaus ory only and not r, 357 Pa. Super. 339, 349, 516 A.2d 10, 15 (1986). On issues of credibility, the Master's report will be given full consideration, because it is the Master who had the opportunity to observe the p rties' demeanor. Margolis v. Margolis, 201 Pa. Super. 129, 192 k.2d 228 (1963). However, in fashioning a final order, the Court mist independently review the record and consider the evidence de novo. Herwig v. Herwig, 279 Pa. Super. 65, 420 A.2d 746 (1980) discretion to deviate from the recommendatio regardless of whether either party has raised a pa an exception. Morschhauser v. Morschhauser, 357 350, 516 A.2d at 10, 15. It is with this standar will address the parties' several exceptions. HUSBAND'S EXCEPTIONS In his first exception, Husband contends failed to consider Husband's contribution of acquired through the dissolution of his first acquisition of the parties' marital residence. that there is nothing in the Master's re The Court has of the Master icular issue in Pa. Super. 339, in mind that we that the Master L sum of money, :carriage, to the Husband asserts to indicate consideration of this contribution. We disagree[ On pages 10-11 of his report, in the analysis of the eleven factors set forth in 3 No. 1721 Civil 1989 Section 3502 of the Divorce Code,' relat to equitable distribution of marital property, the Master expr ssly acknowledged that "husband contributed approximately $21,000.0 from the sale of a home from his prior marriage to the constructs n of the marital home currently owned by the parties hereto." Altf ough Husband does not so state in his brief, he,obviously considers himself entitled to a credit of sorts for the $21,000.00 contribution. With respect to contributions to a marital e4tate, the general rule has been stated as follows: Where an account is placed in th husband and wife, a gift, and th an estate by the entireties is p though the funds used to acquire or to establish the account were those of [one spouse].... In Re Holmes Estate, 414 Pa. 403, 406, 200 A.2d s names of a s creation of resumed even the property exclusively 745, 747 (1964). While this presumption of the creation of an entireties estate may 4 The relevant factors which the Court is required to consider are: (1) the length of the marriage; (2) any prior marriage of either party; (3) the age, health, station, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties; (4) the contribution by one party to the education, training or increased earning power of the other party; (5) the opportunity of each party for future acquisitions of capital assets and income; (6 the sources of income of both parties, including, but not limited to, medical, retirement, insurance or other benefits; (7) the contribution or dissipation of each party in the acquisition, preservation, depreciation or appreciation of the marital property, including the contribution of a party as homemaker; (8) the vallLe of the property set apart to each party; (9) the standard of living of the parties established during the marriage; (10) the economid circumstances of each party, including Federal, State and local tax ramifications, at the time of the division of property is to became effective; and (11) whether the party will be serving as the custodian of any dependent minor children. 23 Pa. C.S. §3502(a). 4 No. 1721 Civil 1989 be overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, no such evidence has been proffered in the instant case. Husband testified that he applied the approximately $21,000.00 proceeds from the sale of a home he owned, pursuant to a property distribution upon the dissolution of his first marriage, to the construction of the marital residence currently owned jointly by Husband and Wife. (N.T. 66-67, Master's Hear ng, October 15, 1990). Husband's contribution of those proceedE to the parties' acquisition of a jointly owned residence clearly constituted a gift to the marital estate, and the Master took into a count the source of the funds in making his recommendation is to equitable distribution of the marital assets. Accordingly Husband's first exception is dismissed. Husband's other exception to the Master's Report is that the Master erred in not awarding Husband interest on the deferred distribution of his share of the marital home. For the reasons set forth below, we sustain the Master's recommendation of a non- interest bearing mortgage. As a starting point in any discussi n of equitable distribution, we recognize that the purpose of the equitable distribution provisions of the Divorce Code i to "effectuate economic justice between parties who are divorced or separated and [to] insure a fair and just determination ol their property rights." 23 Pa. C. S. §3102(a)(6). To carry out his purpose, the Court must "equitably divide, distribute or as ign, in kind or 5 No. 1721 Civil 1989 otherwise, the marital property between the parties ... in such proportions and in such manner as the Court deems just after considering all relevant factors 23 Pa. C S. §3502(a). The Master heard the testimony of the parties over two days of hearings and conducted a thorough analysis of t e aforementioned statutory factors. Subject to one exception of a minor nature,' we adopt the Master's findings of fact in their entirety. Specifically, the Master found that Wife's economic future is a limited one with little prospect for advancement. Wife is employed as a bookkeeper and earns a net weekly income of $300.00. In contrast, Husband possesses an earning dapacity greatly surpassing that of Wife, which affords Husband the opportunity for a higher standard of living and a better opportunity for the future acquisition of assets. During 1987, his laEt full year of employment as circulation supervisor at the Patriot News, Husband earned a gross income of $31,000.00. Husband's total gross income for the first quarter of 1987 amounted to $18,000.00 in salary, bonuses, and vacation pay up to his retirement OIL March 25, 1987. He is one of two partners in an antiques business, and, although Husband's earnings from this partnership are lesf than clear, the 1988 partnership return showed $52,000.00 in guaranteed payments to his partner, who is his paramour. Accordingly, based on the disparity of earring capacity and ' The Master found that this was Wife's secs in fact it was her first. See N.T. 88, Master's 1991. nd marriage when Hearing, May 20, No. 1721 Civil 1989 opportunity for future economic growth, we agree with the Master's recommendation that Wife receive a sixty pence t share and that Husband receive a forty percent share of the mar'tal estate. To effectuate this 60/40 division of property, the Master awarded the marital residence to Wife subject I.o a non-interest bearing second mortgage in favor of Husband, payable in full within ninety days of the earliest of the death of the youngest child, Jason P. Stoner (d.o.b. 6/28/77); the date of ema cipation of Jason P. Stoner; or June 28, 1995, the date that Jason P. Stoner reaches age eighteen. The Master recognized the "critical child-rearing period" for Jason, who is learning disabled, and expressed his opinion that every effort should be made to preserve the marital residence as a home and familiar surroundings for Jason until he reaches the age of majority on June 28, 1995. The Master correctly acknowledged that Wife might be required to sell the marital home after that date. Husband argues that the Master should have a arded interest on the second mortgage to Husband from Wife. Were we to view this matter in isolation from the rest of the Master' recommendation, we might agree that inclusion of interest tould have been appropriate. However, after considering the recommended order in its entirety, we find that failure to include interest was neither unfair nor unjust. We have found no Pennsylvania appellate ca es which support the theory that interest is required in every situation where one 7 No. 1721 Civil 1989 spouse is to make installment payments or a futurE lump sum payment to the other spouse pursuant to an equitable division of marital property. In Wayda v. Wayda, 395 Pa. Super. 94, 576 A.2d 1060 (1990), the lower court's order called for installment payments to be paid from one spouse to another, over a period of ten years, and the amount of marital property subject to the payment plan was the recipient/spouse's share of the entire marital estate, not just of the marital home. There was nothing in the record to indicate that the lower court had considered the effect of inflation and the recipient/spouse's inability to have use of the m ney on the value of the award over the ten-year period, nor was the a any indication that the court had compensated the recipient spouse for this reduction elsewhere in the distribution scheme. In remanding the case to the trial court, thB Superior Court, aware that the issue was one of first impression in Pennsylvania, held not that a court must always award interest where payment is deferred, but rather that the trial court had abused its discretion by failing to account for the effect of such a deferral. The court further stressed that its decision was based on the narrow facts of that case. In the instant case, the latest possible dat of distribution of the deferred award is June 28, 1995, and tie mortgage will encompass slightly more than one-fourth of Husband's total share of the marital estate. Based on our revised distribution scheme, Wife shall be required to give a mortgage to Husband in the amount of L No. 1721 Civil 1989 $15,233.40, payable at the earliest of three sp cified dates as outlined above. Based on a statutory rate of six percent, interest on the principal amount of $15,233.40 amortized over a 39 -month period would be $3,458.19, or $88.67 per month f r 39 months. The Master expressly predicated his reconmiended denial of Wife's claim for alimony upop the overall equit le distribution plan of sixty percent to Wife and forty percent to Husband. Were this balance to be altered unfavorably to Wife bj the exaction of interest on the mortgage, the predicate upon wich a denial of alimony was based would no longer be correc . Under these circumstances, we are not disposed to disturb the the Master by awarding interest upon the mortgage issue in isolation. plan proposed by on a view of the Our appellate courts have recognized that the particular circumstances of each case will determine the best means of making equitable distributions when a party is without p esent means, and that the trial court is free to be both flexible and creative in establishing an equitable distribution plan. Zollars v. Zollars, 397 Pa. Super. 204, 579 A.2d 1328 (1990).6 Moreover, it must be noted that alimon and equitable distribution are interrelated in the Divorce Code. Uhler v. Uhler, Pa. Super. , 594 A.2d 688 (1991). Specifically, under 6 Husband cites Zollars for the proposition that interest on deferred payments is required in all cases. We disagree and conclude that the Court was merely illustratinc one of several possible methods of distribution. D No. 1721 Civil 1989 §3701(b)(16), the court must consider the proparty distributed under §3502 in determining entitlement to alimony. Thus, in Williams v. Williams, 373 Pa. Super. 143, 540 A.2d 563 (1988), the Superior Court approved the trial court's award of rental income to one spouse to counter -balance an award of alim ny, an approach analogous to the one taken by the Master in the Instant case. Because we conclude that the legislative intent of the Divorce Code, the effectuation of economic justice between the parties, has been accomplished, we approve the 60/40 division of marital property and the non-interest bearing mortgage rcommended by the Master. WIFE'S EXCEPTIONS In her first exception, Wife contends that the Master erred in not including in the marital estate the current v lue of Husband's one-half interest in the aforesaid antiques partnership. While the Master charged Husband with the receipt of the parties' inventory removed by Husband at separation and placed in the business which he now owns in partnership, the Master determin d that Husband's interest in the partnership was not marital pro erty. We agree with Wife that the Master should have included as a marital asset, subject to equitable distribution, the value ofHusband's current interest in his new business, which interest was derived initially from the inventory from the marital business. "Marital property" under the Divorce Code means "all property acquired by either party during the marriage .., except: (4) 10 No. 1721 Civil 1989 Property acquired after final separation until the date of divorce, except for property acquired in exchange for mar tal assets." 23 Pa. C.S. §3501(a)(4). For the following reasons we believe that under the above exception to the marital property exception ("property acquired in exchange for marital property"), Husband's interest in the partnership qonstitutes marital property. In the instant case, the parties owned and operated an antiques business known as "Stoner's Antiques" at the time of separation, April 1985. The purpose of that business was the purchase, restoration, and resale of items of intique and used furniture. It is undisputed that when Husband left the marriage he took all of the parties' inventory at Stoner's Antiques, then valued at $14,436.50, and placed the inventory in the new business. In that business, known as "Country Collectibles,' Husband and his new partner engaged in the purchase, restoratio , and resale of antiques and in the sale of other "collectibles " Husband is a one-half owner of Country Collectibles, and the parties stipulated that the value of Husband's one-half interest in that business, at the time of the Master's hearing, was $30,000.00 In the hearing before the Master, Wife testitied, and Husband did not refute, that several months prior to separ tion Husband had asked Wife not to go to the parties' business be ause she did not "need to go up there anymore." (N.T. 52, Master's Hearing, May 20, 1991.) Husband testified that during this same period of time, January through March 1985, he and his partner were in the process 11 No. 1721 Civil 1989 of taking inventory of the parties' inventory. (N.T. 118-120, Master's Hearing, October 15, 1990.) With regard to that inventory from the parties' business, it is undisputed that when the parties separated in April 1985, Husband took and continu d to sell all of the parties' antiques inventory. Husband's partner testified that Husband was involved in Country Collectibles "frOlIL the beginning." (N.T. 13, Master's Hearing, October 15, 1990.) Wife testified that as recently as one to two months following separation she observed numerous items of antique furniture on display at Country Collectibles and that she recognized most of them as being from the parties' business. (N.T. 57, Master's Hearing, May 20, 1991.) Finally, Husband testified that he received any and all proceeds from the sale of that inventory and that as of the date of the first hearing before the Master on October 15, 1)90, some of the inventory was probably still in his possession, although he was unable to state conclusively which of the parties inventory items had not been sold. (N.T. 77, Master's Hearing, October 15, 1990.) On these facts, we conclude that Husband's interest in Country Collectibles was acquired in exchange for his contribution of marital assets and that, therefore, Husband's interest in the partnership constitutes marital property. We note that our appellate courts hava approved the application of "tracing" of assets in equitable di tribution cases. Sutliff v. Sutliff, 361 Pa. Super. 504, 522 A.2d 11 44 (1987) , rev'd on other grounds, 518 Pa. 378, 543 A.2d 534 (198 ). In Gioia v. 12 No. 1721 Civil 1989 Gioia, 382 Pa. Super. 538, 555 A.2d 1330 (1989), the husband and his brother founded a coal mining partnership, to which the husband contributed some $40,000.00 in marital property. The partnership was formed in the same year as the parties separated.' Six years later, the assets of the partnership were transferred to a corporation, the business of; which was the samE as that of the partnership - the mining of coal. The Superior Co rt held that the trial court had properly determined that the husb nd's interest in both the partnership and in its corporate successor was marital property subject to equitable distribution. The trial court reached this conclusion by tracing the husband's ownership interest in the corporation back to the partnership which had been purchased, at least partially, with marital assets. In the present case, by tracing Husband's ore -half ownership in the antiques business, to which Husband undispu edly contributed all of the parties' antiques inventory, back to the marital antiques business, we conclude that Husband's urrent business interest should be included as marital property. Wife's second exception is that the Master erred in not valuing all of the significant assets at the samE valuation date. Because we have determined that Husband's interest: in the antiques partnership "Country Collectibles" constitutes marital property, we now must determine as of what date that partnership interest should ' It is unclear from the court's opin'on whether the partnership was formed before or after the part es separated on November 29, 1981. 13 No. 1721 Civil 1989 be valued. While the Divorce Code contains no express provision which governs the selection of a date to be used for val ation of marital property in an equitable distribution matter, our Supreme Court, in Sutliff v. Sutliff, 518 Pa. 378, 543 A.2d 534 (1988), found it "implicit ... in the statutory provisions governing equitable distribution that a valuation date reasonably pro imate to the date of distribution must, in the usual case, be utili ed." Id. at 381, 543 A.2d at 536. The Court analyzed the languag of the relevant factors set forth in the Divorce Code and found that the factors focus on the present needs and financial situations of the parties, including the parties' "employability," "estate, liabilities and needs," "opportunity for future acquisitions of capital assets and income," "standard of living ... established during the marriage," and "economic circumstances ... at the time he division of property is to become effective." 23 Pa. C.S. §35D2(a) . The Court in Sutliff found the last factor, which express focuses on the parties' financial circumstances at the time of the distribution of marital property, to be of critical importance tc the issue under the circumstances therein, and found it "inconceivable" under the facts presented that the legislature intended that marital property should be valued without reference to that ti Sutliff V. Sutliff, 518 Pa. at 378, 543 A.2d at 536. The appropriate date for valuation of marital assets was considered in Staz v. Staz, Pa. Super. , A.2d (No. 14 No. 1721 Civil 1989 00790 Harrisburg 1990) (1992), where the Superior Court affirmed the trial court's selection of the date of distribution as the correct valuation date. In Staz, the appellant husband was the co- owner with his brother of a dairy corporation. The husband's one- half interest was valued at $105,000.00 at the t me of separation and at $300,000.00 at the time of distribution, a difference in time of four years. In spite of his finding that the husband's of Eorts contributed to the success and increase in value of the dairy business, the master had concluded that Sutliff controlled an accordingly had valued the business as of the date of distribution. On review, the trial court sustained the master's selection of the date of distribution as the appropriate valuation date Dut made its own independent determination that the increase in value of the corporation was due both to the husband's managerial decisions to reinvest operating profits as well as to uncontrollable market conditions. On the husband's appeal from the lower court's order, the Superior Court held that the court below had not abused its discretion in its selection of the date of distribution as the proper date for valuation purposes. The court premised its affirmance on the established rule that the fluctuation in value of marital assets from the date of separation to the date of distribution must be calculated as part of the marital estate. Staz v. Staz, Pa. Super. , , A.2d , (No. 00790 15 No. 1721 Civil 1989 Harrisburg 1990, at 10) (1992), citing Berringtoi v. Berrington, Pa. Super. , 598 A.2d 31, 37 (1991). In the present case, the marital assets in question are antiques, which by their very nature generally increase in value. During the six-year lapse in time between the date of separation, April 1985, and the Master's Hearing, May 1991, h ghly significant value fluctuations may have occurred. To distribute property without regard to those fluctuations "would undermine the legislative intent of making the equitable distribution process responsive to the contemporaneous needs and financial al situations of the parties." Sutliff v. Sutliff, 518 Pa. at 378, 384, 543 A.2d at 537 (1988). Finally, we note that Husband presented no evidence as to when and for what amount he sold the parties' antiques inventory following the parties' separation. Nevertheless, it is Husband who opposes a valuation of that inventory as of the date of distribution. "[I]t is an accepted principle of law that when evidence of a particular fact in issue is particularly within the control of a party, that party may be subjected to a burden of production." Aletto v. Aletto, 371 Pa. Super. 230, 237, 537 A.2d 1383, 1386 (1988). To assign a value as of the date of se aration would in effect deprive Wife of the benefit of almost si years' worth of appreciation. We do not believe that Husband's fa lure to maintain adequate records of the parties' inventory should edound to Wife's 16 No. 1721 Civil 1989 detriment. Accordingly, our equitable distribution order will include the current value of Husband's business interest, stipulated by the parties to be $30,000.00. Finally, Wife argues that the Master erred in not awarding her alimony and that the Master should have considered Husband's earning capacity and not hisactual earnings. The overriding goal of alimony is the effectuation of economic justice between the parties, Nuttal v. Nuttal, 386 Pa. Super. 148, 562 A.2d 841 (1989), and alimony may be awarded on y upon a showing of necessity and upon consideration of several f ctors, including earning capacity, many of which are identical to the factors regarding equitable distribution. 23 Pa. C. §3701(a),(b). Furthermore, alimony is available only where economic justice and the reasonable needs of the parties cannot be achieved by way of equitable distribution and development of appropriate employment skills. Uhler v. Uhler, Pa. Super. , , 594 A.2d 688, 691 (1991). As we have already noted above, the Mastex predicated the award of a deferred interest-free loan to Husband on the denial of alimony to Wife. Given that Wife's income will remain fairly steady over the 39-month period before she must pay Husband the full amount of his mortgage, $15,233.40, we conclude that if Wife were required to pay the additional interest of $ ,458.19, alimony in that amount might well be warranted. Because we agree with the Master, however, that economic justice has alreadd been done to the 17 No. 1721 Civil 1989 parties, and because we believe that the equit4ble distribution award provides for the parties' reasonable needs, we conclude that alimony is not appropriate in this case. Based upon our disposition of the parties' exceptions, we arrive at a revised equitable distribution plan s follows: ORDIR OF COURT AND NOW, this /yf day of , 19 2, it is ordered and directed as follows: (1) All right, title, and interest 'n the following items of marital property is herewith transferred to the Plaintiff, Donald L. Stoner: (a) Various items of household oods, already in Plaintiff's possession, valu d at $2,420.00; (b) Plaintiff's pension at the Patriot News, valued at $8,191.00; (c) Various items of Antique Inv ntory, valued at $30,000.00; (d) A non-interest bearing secon mortgage on the marital home from Defendant Donna L. Stoner, valued at $15,233.40. (2) All right, title, and interest in the following items of marital property is herewith transferred to the Defendant, Donna L. Stoner: (a) The marital residence located at 290 Hillside No. 1721 Civil 1989 Drive, New Cumberland, Cunberland County, Pennsylvania, valued at $90,100.00; (b) Various items of household goods, already in Defendant's possession, valu d at $8,900.00; (3) Defendant is ordered to give Plaintiff a non- interest bearing second mortgage on the marital residence in the amount of $15,233.40, payable in full within ninety days of the death of the parties' son, Jason P. Stoner (born June 28, 1977), the date that Jason P. Stoner is emancipated, cr the date that Jason P. Stoner reaches 18 years of age, i.e, June 28, 1995, whichever of the foregoing shall first occur. (4) Each party shall pay his or her r spective counsel fees and expenses. (5) Defendant shall pay $875.75 toward the Master's fee and costs, representing one-half of the total lee and costs of $1,751.50. (6) Plaintiff, having already paid $700.00 toward the Master's fee and costs, shall pay a balance of $175.75. (7) The parties shall execute and deliver such documents and instruments as are necessary or convenient to the effectuation of this Order. BY THE COURT, J. 19 No. 1721 Civil 1989 P. Richard Wagner, Esq. Counsel for Plaintiff Samuel L. Andes, Esq. Counsel for Defendant rc :