Loading...
HomeMy WebLinkAbout91-4072 CivilDONALD L. DeMUTH, Plaintiff V. DANIEL C. MILLER Defendant IN THE COURT F COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND CO TY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION LAW NO. 4072 CIVIL 1991 BEFORE HOFFER AND OLER, JJ. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this 151. day of April, 1992, upon Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Plaintiff's Complaint, the Motion is DENIED. BY THE COURT, Samuel L. Andes, Esq. Attorney for Plaintiff Daniel L. Sullivan, Esq. Attorney for Defendant :rc consideration of lAs to Count I of C.� J. DONALD L. DeMUTH, Plaintiff M DANIEL C. MILLER Defendant OLER, J. IN THE COURT PF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND C NTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION1- LAW NO. 4072 CIVIL 1991 BEFORE HOFFER AND OLER JJ. OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT In this action between an employer (Plaintiff) and former employee (Defendant), the Defendant employee has moved for judgment on the pleadings as to a contract claim arising cut of his alleged breach of a covenant not to compete. At issue is the question of survival of contract terms where a formal contr ct of employment for a definite time has expired, but a working rel tionship between the parties has continued. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Plaintiff is a certified public accountant w o trades and does business as "Donald L. DeMuth Professional Managem nt Consultants." Defendant is a certified public accountant who was employed by Plaintiff beginning in December 1985. Written employment agreements existed for the one-year periods of 986-87, 1987-88, and 1988-89. Although the parties disagree as 4o whether a No. 4072 Civil 1991 written contract for 1989-90 existed,' Plaint ff continued to employ Defendant through May 31, 1990. After May 31, 1990, Plaintiff similarly continued to employ Defendant. and to pay him a salary and other compensation for such employment. On October 17, 1990, Plaintiff terminated Defendant's employmen . Following Defendant's termination by Plaintiff on October 17, 1990, Defendant established his own professional c nsulting company and at present competes with Plaintiff in this business. Apparently, some of Plaintiff's clients have transferred their accounts to Defendant's company. On November 21, 1991, Plaintiff filed suit gainst Defendant for breach of contract (Count I) and misappropriation (Count II). Plaintiff alleged in the contract count that Defendant is bound and obligated by the terms of a noncompetition provision which apparently was part of one or more prior written ontracts between the parties.Z On December 16, 1991, Defendant filed an An4wer, New Matter, ' In paragraph 4 of his Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that a written employment agreement existed between the parties and attached as Exhibit A to his Complaint a copy of what purports to be an employment contract between the parties for the 1989-90 period. In his Answer, Defendant denied that a ritten contract existed for the 1989-90 period and alleged that although Plaintiff's Exhibit A was similar to the parties' prior contracts, it contained terms and various handwritten notations and interlineations that were not part of prior wr tten agreements entered into by the parties. 2 See note 1, supra. 2 No. 4072 Civil 1991 and Counterclaim. In his Answer, Defendant pled any contracts which may have existed between the May 31, 1990. On January 28, 1992, Defendant filed a Mot inter alia, that es expired on for Judgment on the Pleadings as to the contract count of Plaintiff's Complaint. Both parties submitted briefs to the Court, and heard on February 26, 1992. DISCUSSION The issue before the Court is whether pleadings in favor of a Defendant is proper on a violation of a noncompetition clause where it is contract had not been renewed after expirati parties continued a working relationship beyond the stated term. Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1034 oral argument was judgment on the ontract claim for eded that the but where the he expiration of is a court to enter judgment on the pleadings. In passing upon a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court may co Sider only the pleadings themselves and any documents properly ttached thereto. Capuzzi v. Heller, 125 Pa. Commw. 678, 683, 5E8 A.2d 596, 598 (1989). Judgment on the pleadings should not be entered unless there are no material facts in dispute and, after accepting all of the opposing party's well -pleaded facts as true, the case is free from doubt and trial would be a fruitless exercise. Id. With this standard in mind, it is apparent that the Defen 3 can not prevail No. 4072 Civil 1991 upon his motion unless it is clear that the issue did not survive the expiration of th agreement. ract provision at parties' formal With regard to contracts of employment, the Superior Court has held that "'[w]here a contract of employment for a definite time is made and the employee services are continued aft r the expiration of the time, without objection, the inference is that the parties have assented to another contract for a term ol the same length with the same salary and conditions of service."' Burge v. Western Pennsylvania Higher Education Council, Inc., 39 Pa. Super. 108, 112, 570 A.2d 536, 538 (1990), quoting Smith v. Sh llcross, 165 Pa. Super. 472, 475, 69 A.2d 156, 158 (1949) (emphasis added). Although the language in Burge may leave ope the possibility that in some cases a continued relationship between parties to an employment contract will not have the effect of extending the contract or particular terms thereof,' it certainly cannot be said that it is clear that the Defendant will prevail in his position that the noncompetitive provision was extinguished when the formal contract expired. For this reason, the Defend nt's motion for 3 The use of the phrase "without objectio " in connection with a continuation of the employer/employee relationship and of the word "inference" as to the putative resultant status suggests this possibility. An inference, for instance, has been interpreted as "simply a clear, logical, reasonable and natural conclusion which the trier of fact may embrace or reject base on the evidence of the case." Bixler v. Hoverter, 89 Pa., Commw. 88, 91, 491 A.2d 958, 959 (1985), citing Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 147 Pa. 91, 105- 106, 288 A.2d 727, 735-36 (1972). 4 No. 4072 Civil 1991 judgment on the pleadings must be denied. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this /J- day of April, 1992, upon Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Plaintiff's Complaint, the Mgtion is DENIED. Samuel L. Andes, Esq. Attorney for Plaintiff Daniel L. Sullivan, Esq. Attorney for Defendant BY THE COURT, s/J. Wesley Oler, 61 consideration of As to Count I of J.