HomeMy WebLinkAbout92-981 Criminala(L
10/16/92
COMMONWEALTH
V.
PAUL B. OWENS,
Defendant
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, P NNSYLVANIA
981 CRIMINAL 1992
CHARGE: APPEAL FROM SUMMARY:
SPEEDING
AFFIANT: PTL. LON S RAYER
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this ii J� day of October, 1992
consideration of Defendant's Post -Verdict Motion
submitted thereon, Defendant's Motion is DENIED, an
is directed to appear for sentencing at the call
Attorney.
upon careful
.nd the briefs
the Defendant
E the District
BY THE COURT,
J.( iWesley OlerIrr- r.', J:
Kathleen Dick Leslie, Intern
Office of the District Attorney
Paul B. Owens, Pro Se
660 Boas Street
Apartment 1501
Harrisburg, PA 17102
:rc
COMMONWEALTH
V.
PAUL B. OWENS,
Defendant
Oler, J.
IN THE COURT OF COMM N PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
981 CRIMINAL 1992
CHARGE: APPEAL FROM SUMMARY:
SPEEDING
AFFIANT: PTL. LON SRAYER
UnAMM / Q DnCM XTVDnTnM MnMT M
BEFORE OLER, J.
OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT
At issue in the present case is a Post -Verdict otion filed by
Paul B. Owens (Defendant) after a trial on a summary appeal in the
Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County. The facts of this case
are as follows:
On April 11, 1992, Patrolman Lon Strayer of the Lemoyne
Borough Police Department was using an Acutrak system. to monitor
the speeds of passing vehicles on Lowther Street in Lemoyne.
Patrolman Strayer. testified that at 9:45 a.m., while using this
system, he observed Defendant travelling at a speei of 53.8 miles
per hour in a 35 mile per hour zone. Subsequently, the officer
stopped Defendant and issued a citation to him for speeding.
Defendant testified that he had asked to see the reading on
the Acutrak device, and that Patrolman Strayer had refused to show
it to him. On the other hand, Patrolman Strayer testified that
Defendant had not asked to see the Acutrak reading. Additionally,
the officer stated that, had Defendant request d to see the
reading, he would have been permitted to do so.
At the conclusion of the trial, Defendant was Ifound guilty of
981 Criminal 1992
speeding, in violation of Section 3362(a)(1) of the' Vehicle Code.'
Specifically, it was determined that he was travel ng at the rate
of 53.8 miles per hour in a 35 mile -per -hour zone.
Defendant has filed pro se the present post -Verdict motion,
requesting that the Court "vacate the judgment," contending that
Patrolman Strayer's alleged refusal to show the Acu rak reading to
him was a violation of his right to view the Commonwealth's
evidence against him. Since we find that Def en ant has shown
neither a violation of a constitutional right nor a violation of a
right under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, Def4ndant's motion
must be denied.
Defendant first contends that, in failing to a low him to see
the Acutrak reading, Patrolman Strayer denied Defendant's due
process right to view the Commonwealth's evidenCE against him .2
In making this contention, Defendant relies upon the holding of the
United States Supreme Court that "the suppr ssion by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accuse
violates due process where the evidence is material
or to punishment." Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,
1194, 1196-97, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215, 218 (1963). '
prevail on a claimed violation of Brady, ... proof
each of the following: '(a) suppression by the pros4
' 75 Pa. C.S. §3362(a)(1).
2 Defendant's Post -Verdict Motion, at 2.
E
upon request
either to guilt
87, 83 S. Ct.
In order to
is required of
scution after a
981 Criminal 1992
request by the defense; (b) evidence's favorable character for the
defense; and (c) the materiality of the evidence.' Commonwealth
v. York, 319 Pa. Super. 13, 18, 465 A.2d 1028, 1031 1983), quoting
Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 794-95, 92 S. Ct. 2562, 2568, 33
L. Ed. 2d 706, 713 (1972).3 The circumstances in the present case
militate against a conclusion that the Defendant has met his burden
in this regard.
First, the element of a request for exculpatory information
has been placed in serious question by the testi ony of Officer
Strayer. Second, the Defendant's proof as to the exculpatory
nature of the information sought is insufficient. n this regard,
it is well settled that in order to succeed on a claimed violation
of the Brady doctrine a defendant must establish that the evidence
which he or she was seeking was favorable to the defense.
Commonwealth v. York, 319 Pa. Super. 13, 465 A.21 1028 (1983).
Under Brady, the prosecution's duty to make evidence available to
the defense applies only to evidence that is "truly exculpatory,
rather than merely favorable." Commonwealth v. Ges,, 467 Pa. 123,
131, 354 A.2d 875, 878 (1976).
"A piece of evidence cannot be said to be Exculpatory, or
potentially exculpatory, merely because the defense chooses to call
3 See also Commonwealth v. Powell, 449 Pa. 126, 295 A.2d 295
(1972). Where a defendant alleges that the prosecution has
violated the constitutional mandates of Brady, the defendant bears
the burden of proving all three elements of a Brady claim.
Commonwealth v. McCleaf, 11 Adams L.J. 115 (1969).
3
981 Criminal 1992
it so." Commonwealth v. Favinger, 358 Pa. Super. 245, 251, 516
A.2d 1386, 1389 (1986). It is not sufficient f r a defendant
merely to contend that the evidence in question could have been
favorable to the defense. Rather, the defendant Aust prove that
the evidence "extrinsically tends to establish the defendant's
innocence of the crimes charged." Id. at 251, 516 A.2d at 878.
In the present case, the Defendant can argue at most that a view of
the reading might have been exculpatory.
Defendant also contends that, pursuant to Penns lvanials Rules
of Criminal Procedure, he has a right to view the evidence against
him.° He further contends that Patrolman Strayer's refusal to show
him the Acutrak reading constituted a violation of this right.
When a summary conviction is appealed to a court of common
pleas, the court treats the proceeding as a trial de novo, and "all
general provisions of the criminal rules become ap licable to the
trial ... unless specifically made inapplicable." Commonwealth v.
Koch, 288 Pa. Super. 290, 294, 431 A.2d 1052, 1054 (1981). In
Koch, the Superior Court referred to Pennsylvania Rale of Criminal
Procedure 1100 as an example of a criminal rule specifically made
inapplicable to an appeal from a summary convicti n. Id. at 294
n.5, 431 A.2d at 1054 n.5. Since Rule 1100 is applicable to trials
in "a court case," and since Pennsylvania Rue of Criminal
Procedure 3(f) defines a court case "as a case in wl ich one or more
° Defendant's Post -Verdict Motion, at 2.
4
981 Criminal 1992
of the offenses charged is a misdemeanor, felony
first or second degree," Rule 1100 was held inappli
proceedings. Id.
murder of the
le to summary
In the present case, Defendant's asserted rigkit to view the
Acutrak reading is premised upon Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal
Procedure 305(B)(1), which provides that " [ i ] n all *ourt cases, on
request by the defendant, ... the Commonwealth sh 11 disclose to
the defendant's attorney all of the following req sted items or
information (emphasis added). As in the exa
Koch, Rule 305(B)(1) requires disclosure of ev,
cases. As such, it is generally considered inappli
from summary convictions.'
Without suggesting that there are no circu
summary offense which might warrant pretrial discove
under Brady, this Court does not believe the
presents a compelling case for such relief. For
reasons, the following Order will be entered:
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this /(& day of October, 1992,
consideration of Defendant's Post -Verdict Motion
)le provided in
fence in court
able to appeals
mstances of a
ry not required
ent litigation
the foregoing
upon careful
ind the briefs
' The Comment to Rule 305 states that "[ ]his rule is
intended to apply only to court cases. [However, the
constitutional guarantees of the Brady doctrine] apply to all
cases, including court cases and summary cases, and nothing tp the
contrary is intended." See also Commonwealth v.Y st, 29 D. & C.
3d 251 (Clinton Co. 1984) (holding Pennsylvania Ru a of Criminal
Procedure 305 inapplicable to an appeal from summa convictions).
5
981 Criminal 1992
submitted thereon, Defendant's Motion is DENIED, ano the Defendant
is directed to appear for sentencing at the call df the District
Attorney.
BY THE COURT,
J. Wesley Oler, Jr.,
Kathleen Dick Leslie, Intern
Office of the District Attorney
Paul B. Owens, Pro Se
660 Boas Street
Apartment 1501
Harrisburg, PA 17102
:rc
51
IJ.