HomeMy WebLinkAbout92-3450 CivilTHOMAS M. MARPOE, II
and MELINDA M. MARPOE,
his wife,
Petitioners
V. ;
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Respondent :
IN THE COURT OF gOMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTT, PENNSYLVANIA
CIVIL ACTION -
3450 CIVIL 1992
BEFORE OLER, J.
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this %2t4 day of November, 1992, uponlconsideration
of Petitioners' Petition for Review of Order of (Department of
Transportation Suspending Vehicle Registration, a4d following a
hearing, the orders of suspension of Petitioners( registration
privileges for a period of three months dated August 31, 1992, are
REVERSED.
BY THE COURT,
J.
Keith 0. Brenneman, Esquire
44 West Main Street
Mechanicsburg, PA 17055
For the Petitioners
Matthew X. Haeckler, Esq.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
Department of Transportation
Transportation and Safety Building
Harrisburg, PA
For the Respondent
:rc
THOMAS M. MARPOE, II
and MELINDA M. MARPOE,
his wife,
Petitioners
OAF
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA .
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, :
Respondent
IN THE COURT OF qOMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNT ,PENNSYLVANIA
CIVIL ACTION -
3450 CIVIL 1992
VI
BEFORE OLER, J.
OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT
This case is an appeal by petitioners f rc m three-month
suspensions of motor vehicle registration privileg s with respect
to a 1986 Ford Mercury Lynx and a 1985 Mitsubishi Staron. A
hearing on the matter was held on October 29, 1992. jBased upon the
stipulations of counsel and evidence presented at t
following Findings of Fact, Discussion and Order of
and entered:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Petitioners are Thomas M. Marpoe, II,
Marpoe, husband and wife, adult individuals
Mechanicsburg, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania.
hearing, the
Court are made
Melinda M.
residing in
2. Respondent is the Commonwealth of Pennsylvatia, Department
of Transportation, having offices in Harrisburg, Dauphin County,
Pennsylvania.
3. Petitioner Thomas M. Marpoe, II, curren
valid Pennsylvania registration for a 1986 For
automobile, title number 41674964, which aut
identified by Pennsylvania plate number 370628.
y possesses a
Mercury Lynx
le is further
3450 Civil 1992
4. Petitioner Melinda M. Marpoe currently possesses a valid
registration for a 1985 Mitsubishi Staron automobil , title number
38961222, which automobile is further identified b Pennsylvania
plate number THZ332.
5. On August 31, 1992, Petitioner Thomas M. Marpoe, II, was
notified by the Department of Transportation that the registration
on his 1986 Ford Mercury Lynx would be suspended for three months
effective October 6, 1992, for the reason that the i surance policy
covering the vehicle was terminated effective April 24, 1992,
resulting in a lapse of insurance on the automobile.
6. By a letter dated August 31, 1992, Petiticner Melinda M.
Marpoe was notified by the Department of Transport tion that the
registration on the 1985 Mitsubishi Staron would be suspended for
three months effective October 6, 1992, for the r ason that the
insurance policy covering the vehicle was termin ted effective
April 24, 1992, resulting in a lapse of instrance on the
automobile.
7. The lapse in financial responsibility coverage with
respect to both vehicles was for a period in excesE of 21 days.
8. Insurance with respect to both vehicles was reinstated
effective May 30, 1992.
9. Petitioner Thomas M. Marpoe, II, did n t operate the
Mercury Lynx vehicle from April 24, 1992, to May 30 1992, nor did
he permit its operation during that period by any dther person.
2
3450 Civil 1992
DISCUSSION
The present three-month suspensions of registration privileges
are said by the Respondent to be provided for in Section 1786 of
the Vehicle Code. Petitioners argue that the Respondent has
misinterpreted the statute in this respect, and that a suspension
of registration privileges for lack of insurance coverage was not
intended by the legislature to extend beyond the lapse period. The
position advocated by Petitioners has been accepted by the
Honorable Edgar B. Bayley of this Court in Department of
Transportation, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Sas aman, No. 3060
Civil 1992 (Cumberland Co.) (filed October 22, 1992).
"It is well-settled that, absent the mot compelling
circumstances, a judge should follow the decision of a colleague on
the same court when based on the same set of facts." Yudacufski v.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, 499 Pa.
605, 612, 454 A.2d 923, 926 (1986). There being no such compelling
circumstances in this case, the opinion of Judge Bayley in Sassaman
is adopted in pertinent part herein, mutatis mutan s:
"The Department acted on what it claims is a nandatory three
months suspension of registration privileges under S b -chapter H of
the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Responsibility Einancial Law,
entitled, 'Proof of Financial Responsibility' at 75 Pa. C.S.A.
Section 1786. The Act provides in pertinent part:
3
3450 Civil 1992
(d) Suspension of registration and operating pr,
The Department of Transportation shall sus en
registration of a vehi nI e if ii- -t-he
vilege. -
financial responsibility was not secured as r auired by
t
operating privilege shall not be restored
restoration fee for the operating privilege pi
section 1960 (relating to reinstatement of
privilege or vehicle registration) is paid. Wh
department revokes or suspends the reaistrati
e
R
c
y. The
ntil the
)vided by
)perating
never the
,n of any
hall not
.e owner
aetermined bv the de artment and submits an arplication
for registration to the department, accom ani d by the
fee for restoration of registration Drovided hy section
1960. This subsection shall not apply in the following
circumstances:
(1) The owner or registrant proves to the satisfaction
of the department that the lapse in financial
responsibility coverage was for a period of leE s than 21
days and that the owner or registrant did not cperate or
permit the operation of the vehicle during the period of
lapse in financial responsibility. (Emphasis added).'
"Section 1786(d) of the Financial Responsibility Law does not
authorize a specific three month suspension of registration
privilege for failure to maintain financial xesponsibility.
Rather, the suspension authorized for that conduct is indefinite.
' Section 1786(g)(2) provides:
No person shall be penalized for maintain,
registered motor vehicle without finaj
responsibility under subsection (d) if
registration and license plates
surrendered to the Department
Transportation at the time insurance cov(
terminated or financial responsibility lal
4
g a
ial
the
of
rage
sed.
3450 Civil 1992
By imposing a three month suspension of petitioner[s[] registration
privilege[sj, as contrasted to an operating privilege, the
Department has misapplied the specific penalty for t e operation of
a vehicle that lacks financial responsibility by co fusing it with
the penalty for maintaining an uninsured registered vehicle. As
noted in Koch v. Pennsylvania Department of Trans ortation, 111
Dauphin 28 (1991), the confusion arises due to:
[t]he incorporation of two separate penalties within the
single opening sentence of 75 Pa. C.S.A. S 1786 d) -- the
right to suspend a motorist's registration if he fails to
maintain financial responsibility, and the se ond, and
distinct, power to suspend his operating priv' eges for
three months if he operates his vehicle, or allows it to
be operated, without insurance coverage. The latter
penalty is the only one to which the three-month period
applies; and we see nothing in the statute's language
that indicates that this time limit can be, or was meant
to be, transferred to any other sanction. This
determination to maintain a distinction between these two
penalties is further underlined by the fact that the
second sentence of § 1786(d) provides for the nethod of
reinstating one's operating privileges while he third
sentence sets forth a parallel, but separate, aFproach to
securing a restoration of one's registration. Since this
statute was drawn to allow for the fact that one can
allow one's insurance to lapse, without compou ding the
offense by driving the uninsured vehicle in the interim,
it would blur the legislative purpose of this Law if we
were to treat those two transgressions as
interchangeable.'
"The title to subsection (d) of Section 1786 fu ther supports
the above analysis because it specifically provides for the
suspension of two types of privileges, "registration and
' Koch is currently before the Commonwealth C
CD 1991.
5
irt. No. 2168
3450 Civil 1992
operating., (Emphasis added). Operating a motor v hicle without
financial responsibility is a summary offense under 75 Pa. C.S.A.
Section 1786(f). If the Department determines the vehicle has been
operated during any period of lapse of insurance, it must suspend
the operating privileges of the owner or registrant for three
months under 75 Pa. C.S.A. Section 1786(d).... Maintaining, as
contrasted to operating, a registered vehicle wit out financial
responsibility subjects the registrant to an indefinite suspension
of the registration of the vehicle under 75 Pa. CS.A. Section
1786(d).3 However, the registrant may secure a restoration of
registration from an indefinite suspension at any time upon
furnishing proof of financial responsibility and submitting an
application to the Department with the required fee The purpose
in allowing the suspension of the registration of an uninsured
vehicle for an indefinite period is to prevent anyone from
operating it when there is a lack of financial r sponsibility.
[Any] reliance [of the Department] on Department of Transportation
v. Riley, Pa. Commw. , (No. 2175 C.D. slip opinion filed
August 31, 1992), is misplaced. In Riley, the Commnwealth Court
held that no element of intent can be infused into 75 Pa. C.S.A.
3 Maintaining a registered vehicle during any Period of time
without financial responsibility also prevents the registrant from
recovering first -party benefits arising out of any accident
involving a motor vehicle. 75 Pa. C.s.A. § 1714; Mowery v.
Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance Company, 4 D.&C.3d 652
(1987), aff'd., 369 Pa. Super. 494 (1988).
1.1
3450 Civil 1992
Section 1786(d), nor can there be a collateral attack on the
cancellation of the insurance in an appeal from the Department's
suspension of a registration privilege. While th Commonwealth
Court did conclude that 'the statute ... does not excuE e...failure to
retain proper insurance coverage because the or ly exceptions
available are renewed coverage within 20 days and not driving the
vehicle during the uninsured period,' or the urrender [of]
registration card and plate as provided for in Sectic n 1786(g)(2),'
or a qualification 'under the Act of military duty personnel
exemption of Section 1786(d)(2),' it did not have before it an
issue as to the type or length of the two dist'nct types of
suspensions authorized in the statute for diffe ent types of
conduct. Thus, ... the issue we resolve was not d cided in that
case. Accordingly, as we have done in Crouse v. Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation;4 Co onwealth of
Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation v Doolan 5 and Forsythe
v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of TransDortation,6we
will reverse the three month suspensions] upon which
notification[s were] provided to petitioner[s] on [August 31],
1992. Since petitioners are] now insured [they] ned not submit
a fee and file an application for restoration o registration
4 No. 3554 Civil 1991 (slip opinion filed Dece
5 No. 3504 Civil 1991 (slip opinion filed Dece
6 No. 100 Civil 1992 (slip opinion filed Marct
7
nber 6, 1991).
nber 6, 1991).
5, 1992).
3450 Civil 1992
privileges." Department of Transportation, c
Pennsylvania v. Sassaman, No. 3060 Civil 1992
(filed October 22, 1992).
alth of
rland Co.)
For the foregoing reasons, the following Order will be
entered:
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this day of November, 1992, upon
of Petitioners' Petition for Review of Order of
Transportation Suspending Vehicle Registration, an
hearing, the orders of suspension of Petitioners'
privileges for a period of three months dated August
REVERSED.
BY THE COURT,
Keith O. Brenneman, Esquire
44 West Main Street
Mechanicsburg, PA 17055
For the Petitioners
Matthew X. Haeckler, Esq.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
Department of Transportation
Transportation and Safety Building
Harrisburg, PA
For the Respondent
:rc
consideration
Department of
i following a
registration
31, 1992, are
J.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYL
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
BUREAU OF DRIVER LICENSING,
Appellant
V.
THOMAS M. MARPOE, II and MELINDA
M. MARPOE, his wife,
NO. 2797
SUBMITTED
BEFORE: HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Judge
HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, Judge
HONORABLE GEORGE T. KELTON, Senior Ju
OPINION BY JUDGE PELLEGRINI
..D. 1992
July 9, 1993
FILED:August 36, 1993
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of
Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (Penn)OT) appeals an
order of the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberlan County (trial
court) sustaining the appeal of Thomas M. Marpoe, I and Melinda M.
Marpoe, husband and wife, (Marpoes)l to two three-month automobile
registration suspensions imposed pursuant to Secti 178.6(d) of the
Financial Responsibility Law (Law).2
Thomas M. Marpoe is the sole registered
Mercury Lynx automobile. Melinda M. Marpoe is the
owner of a--i-9-8-5-Mits-ubishi -Staron -automobile.-- -Eff
'The Marpoes were precluded from filing a
matter, having failed to comply with the briefing
275 Pa: C.S..§1786(d).
owner of .a 1986
sole registered
ive April 24,
brief in this
schedule.
1992, insurance coverage for both vehicles lap
refrained from operating either vehicle until Ma
both vehicles were reinsured. However, becau
insurance coverage was longer than 21 days, Pe;
notices of registration suspension on August 31, 1
automobile, each to begin on October 6, 1992, and
of three months.
I. The Marpoes
30, 1992, when
the lapse in
issued two
2, one for each
st for a period
Marpoes appealed both vehicle registratisuspensions to
the trial court in a single appeal. The Marpoes co tended that the
suspensions were improper because Section 1786(d), the provision
under which PennDOT acted, authorizes the suspension of
registration only until new insurance is obtained not for the 90
days imposed by PennDOT. The trial court agreed And vacated both
of the three-month suspensions imposed by
order, PennDOT appealed.3
I.
Initially, we must resolve PennDOT's
because the Marpoes filed only a single appea
separate notices of suspension, only one of th
properly before the trial court and subject to rev
3Our scope -of- -review -is -1-imited--to-det-erinin:
trial court's findings of fact are supported by con
and whether the lower court made an error of law
abuse of discretion in coming to a decision.
Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v M
Commonwealth Ct. 163, 166, 596 A.2d 1269, 1270 (19
2.
From this
tention that
from the two
se notices was
1. Although
Ling whether the
petent evidence
or committed an
Department of
onsav, 142 Pa.
91) .
I
PennDOT admits that it did not raise this issue
rt it contends that under our holding in
efore the trial
cou ,
120 Pa.
Penns lvania De artment of Trans i
ortation v. nto,
Commonwealth Ct. 211, 548 A.2d 385 (1988),
the fi ng of a single
of suspension constituted jurisdictional
appeal to two notices
defect which may be raised at any, time.
PennDOT's reliance on Vento is misplaced. Vento
concerned a case where a single suspension was appealed to the
rule on other
trial court, which, on its own, proceeded t
unlike the
suspensions not raised in' the appeal. Here,
eal filed by the Marpoes
circumstances presented in Vento,
the app
specifically
addressed each suspension separat ly, praying that
each be reversed. In Posel v. Redevelo m nt Authorit of
Philadelphia, 72 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 115,
456 .2d 243 (1983), a
we
case dealing with two orders appealed from in a single filing,
pointed out that although this practice was c isapproved, where
�� appellant] made no motion to this Court t quash the appeal
[the aPP
or any part of it", certain circumstances justif ed such a combined.
filing. Id. at 117, n.5, 456 A.2d at 244,
n.5 (citing Philadelphia
Federation of Teachers v. Board of Education,
45 Pa. 342, 327 A.2d
47 (1974). In Philadel hia Federation of Teache s, while we stated
- r,..,.,,..,,nmcal th of
4PennDOT -a-lsO -rel-ies on -Our-decision A` •,�•�u,•., Slaqk Pa.
Penns lnV-
vania De artment of Trans ortati over uled Commonwealth
Commonwealth Ct. 623 A.2d 364 (1992), Buss
Pa.
of Penns lvania De a623eAtof 2d 369 (1993).
g been overruled,
Commonwealth Ct. ,
it is of no precedential value.
3.
again that the practice was not to be condoned
addressed the merits of two separate orders ra'
filing, its impropriety not having been raised be
n.5, 327 A.2d at 50, n.5. In neither of these ca
the cases dealing with this issues has it been hel
at issue is jurisdictional, merely that it is im
rules. Accordingly, a motion to quash not having
trial court, we will not address this issue. Ac
Commonwealth Ct. 98, 508 A.2d 1306 (1986).
II.
we nonetheless
ed in a single
W. Id. at 346,
s nor in any of
that the matter
er under the
en filed in the
Rutledge v.
:ion, 97 Pa.
The main issue on appeal is whether ection 1786(d)
authorizes PennDOT to impose a vehicle registration suspension
until new insurance is obtained, or, as PennDOT con -ends . , for a set
period of three months. Section 1786(d) provides [in part:
(d) Suspension of registration and opeting
privileges.
and
5See, e.a., General Electric Credit Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 437 Pa. 463, 263 A.2d 448 (1970); Clark v. Cla , 411 Pa. 251,
191 A.2d 417 (1963); Frailey Twy. School Distric v. Schuylkill
Mining CO., 361 Pa. 557, 64 A.2d 788 (1949).
4.
required financial responsibility. The
operating privilege shall not be restored
until the restoration fee for the ope ating
privilege provided by section 1960 (re sting
to reinstatement of operating privilege or
vehicle registration) is paid. Whenever the
department revokes or suspends the
registration of any vehicle under this
chapter, the department shall not restore the
registration until the vehicle owner fur ishes
proof of financial responsibility in a manner
determined by the department and submits an
application for registration to the
department, accompanied by the fed for
restoration of registration provid d by
section 1960. This subsection shall not apply
in the following circumstances:
(1) The owner or registrant prove
to the satisfaction of th
department that the lapse i
financial responsibility coverag
was for a period of less than 2
days and the owner or registrant di
not operate or permit the operatio
of the vehicle during the period o
lapse in financial responsibility.
75 Pa. C.S. §1786(d) (emphasis added).
PennDOT argues that Section 1786(d) au
vehicle registration suspension once there has bee
in insurance coverage, i.e., once registration i;
vehicle cannot be operated for 90 days. It conte
day suspension penalty set forth in the seconc
provision applies to both registration and operat
PennDOT's contention is based on the s
from a model of clarity and ... ambiguous to
5.
orizes a 90 -day
a 21 -day lapse
suspended, the
that the 90 -
clause of the
privileges.
tute being "far
e length of a
vehicle registration's suspension as a result in 1
e of insurance
coverage". Because of this perceived ambiguity, it states that we
must resort to statutory construction principles to interpret the
statute, which would result in a construction of Section 1786(d)
imposing a 90 -day suspension. Specifically, Pen OT argues that
the trial court failed to afford the proper deference to the
interpretation it has given the Law and an examinat'on of prior law
and regulation and the practical effect that not suspending for 90
days shows that the Legislature intended the vehicle registration
suspension to be for 90 days.
Unlike PennDOT, We do not believe that w� must resort to
the principles of statutory construction becauselthe statute is
unambiguous. See 1 Pa. C.S. §1921(b). By its plain language, it
only authorizes a vehicle registration suspension
for the vehicle is obtained. As the trial court)
manner:
til insurance
stated in this
By imposing a three-month suspensioa of
petitioner[sl] registration privilege[s , as
contrasted to am operating privilege, the
Department has misapplied the specific penalty
for the operation of a vehicle that lacks
financial responsibility by confusing it with
the penalty for maintaining an unirsured
registered vehicle. As noted in Koh v.
Pennsylvania Department of T ans ortatio , 111
Dauphin -28 - (-1991) ,-- fie ---confusion -arise due
to:
[t]he incorporation of two separate
penalties within the single openinc
sentence of 75 Pa. C.S. §1786(d) --
the right to suspend a motorist'.-
3
otorist':
3
registration if he fails to maintaii
financial responsibility, and the
second, and distinct, power tc
suspend his operating privileges foi
three months if he operates hi:
vehicle, or allows it to be
operated, without insurance
coverage. The latter penalty is the
only one to which the three -mond
period applies; and we see nothinc
in the statute's. language thai
indicates that this language can be,
or was meant to be, transferred tc
any other sanction. Thi:
determination to maintain
distinction between these twc
penalties is further underlined b3
the fact that the second sentence o]
§1786(d) provides for the method of
reinstating one's operatinc
privileges while the third sentence
sets forth a parallel, but separate,
approach to securing a restoration
of one's registration. Since thi:
statute was drawn to allow for the
fact that one can allow one':
insurance to lapse, without
compounding the offense by drivinc
the uninsured vehicle in the
interim, it would blur the
legislative purpose of this law if
we were to treat those twc
transgressions as interchangeable.
.(Opinion of Oler, J., at 5).6
The General Assembly has only made it
operate a vehicle which is not registered, not f
6 In- -Koch- -v.- -Commonwealth --of Pennsylvania
Transportation, 13 D.&C.4th 97 (Dauphin Co. 199:
remanded, Pa. Commonwealth Ct. , 616 A.2d 20!
not reach the merits of the issue. We quashed the:
the notice of suspension issued at that time did r.
final order.
7.
a violation to
not having the
.), vacated and
(1992), we did
appeal because
of constitute a
money to pay insurance premiums or f orgettini I to renew an
automotive insurance policy. Under this provision, when proof of
financial responsibility is submitted to PennDOT ( nd the required
fees paid), registration will be reissued. We ca not ignore this
plain expression of the General Assembly to envisage a penalty
where none exists.
Having concluded that Section 1786(d) i unambiguous on
its face and giving the Section its plain and natural meaning, it
is clear that the trial court did not err in its h lding that only
an indefinite suspension of registration is author zed upon a mere
lapse in financial responsibility.
Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of t1he well -reasoned
order of Judge Oler of the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland
County.
8.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSY
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
BUREAU OF DRIVER LICENSING,
Appellant .
v.
THOMAS M. MARPOE, II and MELINDA
M. MARPOE, his wife, .
O R D E R
NO. 27971
AND NOW, this ibth day of August
of the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County
1992, dated November 12, 1992, is affirmed
DAN
AUG 1
Deputy Prat!
C.D. 1992
1993, the order
No. 3450 Civil
EDGE
a
1993
- Chief Cleric
�upremt T oux# of 1hunsgIv
�ibble ptistrid
CHARLES W. JOHNS. ESQUIRE
PROTHONOTARY
H
February 10, 1994
Timothy P. Wile, Esq.
Dept. of Trans. - Off. of Chief Counsel
103 T & S Bldg.
Harrisburg, PA 17120
Re: COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
v. THOMAS M. MARPOE, II AND MELINDA M. MARPOE,
HIS WIFE
No. 0398 M.D Allocatur 1993
Dear Petitioner:
Enclosed please find certified copy of order for the ab
matter.
Sincerely yours,
Office4�1Yhe Pe--onota--y
)/
Supreme Court of Pennsylvan
CWJ/sjp
c: Colins, Pellegrini & Kelton, JJ.
Commonwealth 02797CD92
Oler, J. Wesley, Jr., J. Cumberland
Civil 3450CV92
Thomas M. and Melinda M. Marpoe
7-1E S
(�;£ A'L
MAIN CAPITOL BUILDING
P.O. BOX 624
URG. PENNSYLVANIA 17108
(717) 7876181
i -captioned
La
FES ! 1 I^'
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLV.
MIDDLE DISTRICT
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, :
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, :
BUREAU OF DRIVER LICENSING,
Petitioner
V.
THOMAS M. MARPOE, II and .
MELINDA M. MARPOE, his wife,
Respondents
PER CURIAM
No. 398 Middle D strict
Allocatur Docket 1993
Petition for Allwance
of Appeal from t e
Commonwealth Cou t
O R D E R
AND NOW, this 9th day of February, 1994, the Petition for
Allowance of Appeal from the Commonwealth Court is hereby denied.
Mr. Justice Montemuro is sitting by designa ion as Senior
Justice pursuant to Judicial Assignment Docket No. 9k R1800, due to
the unavailability of Mr. Justice Larsen, see No 127 Judicial
Administration Docket No. 1, filed October 28, 199 .
A TRUE AND CORRECT COPY
ATTEST: 02/10/94.
ASST. C I F CLE