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HomeMy WebLinkAbout92-1655 CivilALETHA J. GINGRICH, Plaintiff V. WILLIAM C. HALL and DAVID L. CHARLESTON, Defendants IN THE COURT OF COMMC CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PE CIVIL ACTION - LAW NO. 1655 CIVIL 1992 'S MOT BEFORE BAYLEY and OLER JJ. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this l3�4day of November, 1992, upon Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on Pleadings, GRANTED. BY THE COURT, Diane G. Radcliff, Esq. Counsel for Plaintiff Francis A. Zulli, Esq. Counsel for Defendants :rc LJi PLEAS OF SYLVANIA sideration of Motion is ALETHA J. GINGRICH, Plaintiff V. WILLIAM C. HALL and DAVID L. CHARLESTON, Defendants IN THE COURT OF COP CUMBERLAND COUNTY, CIVIL ACTION - LAW NO. 1655 CIVIL 1992 BEFORE BAYLEY and OLER. JJ. OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT PLEAS OF SYLVANIA At issue in the present mortgage foreclosure action is whether judgment on the pleadings should be granted in favor of Plaintiff mortgagee and against Defendant mortgagors. After a careful review of the pleadings, we believe that Plaintiff's motion must be granted. Statement of facts. On April 1, 1985, Willic-Im C. Hall and David L. Charleston (Defendants) executed a balloon note and mortgage (mortgage)' in the amount of forty thousa favor of Aletha J. Gingrich (Plaintiff)'. By the tex ' A balloon mortgage is "[a] mortgage providi payments at stated regular intervals, and final I than twice any of the periodic payments." Black's 183 (4th ed. 1968). dollars' in of the note for specific nent of more w Dictionary ' Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraphs 3, 4; Def en ants' Answer, paragraphs 3, 4. The mortgaged property is investment property as opposed to residential property occupied by mortgagors. Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraph 12; Defendants' Ans er, paragraph 12. s A second mortgagee, Plaintiff's husband, diedl. Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraph 8; Defendant's Answer, paragra h 8. No. 1655 Civil 1992 and mortgage, the balloon payment was due on March 1, 1990.1 However, the parties agreed to extend the date for payment to December 31, 1991.5 "[T]he Defendants were unable to pay the balance due to Plaintiff on that date, but they continued to make regular payments until March of 1992 when they Were advised by Plaintiff that she would not accept any addition1 payments. i6 Plaintiff's Notice of Default and Intent To Foreclos was mailed to Defendants on March 4, 1992.' The present Complai t in mortgage foreclosure was filed on May 6, 1992. In their defense in this action, Defendants rote that they "have made continuing mortgage payments on the ... mDrtgage up and until March 1, 1992";8 that they "have offered to ay the sum of $10,000.00 to Plaintiff to reduce the outstandin balance and continue to make regular monthly mortgage payments, but the Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraphs 3, 4, Ehibits A, B; Defendants' Complaint, paragraphs 3, 4; Plaintiff' Brief, at 2; Defendants' Brief, at 2. 5 Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraph 10; Def en ants' Answer, paragraph 10 (no specific denial); Plaintiff's Brief, at 2; Defendants' Brief, at 2. 6 Defendants' Brief, at 2; Plaintiff's Complant, paragraph 11, Exhibits C, D; Defendants' Answer, paragraph 1 ; Defendants' New Matter, paragraphs 18, 19; Plaintiff's Reply, aragraphs 18, 19. ' Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraph 11, Ex Defendants' Answer, paragraph 11. a Defendants' Answer, paragraph 10. 2 is C, D; No. 1655 Civil 1992 Plaintiff has refused to accept [the same]";9 that they "have made and are continuing to make diligent efforts to obtain mortgage financing to satisfy the balance due Plaintiff";10 t at they "have made substantial repairs to the mortgaged premises which has contributed to a substantial increase in the value of the property";11 and that "Plaintiff's refusal to a cept regular monthly payments has prevented the Defendants from mitigating their damages which would occur if they were permitted to make regular monthly payments and pay a $10,000.00 payment to Pl intiff.,12 In their brief, Defendants argue that Plaintiff was receiving a good rate of return on the mortgage, that she "does not need the principal sum of this mortgage at this time and her financial position would not be jeopardized if she contin ed to accept regular monthly payments and the $10,000.00 principa payment from Defendants until they can secure the necessary financing to satisfy this obligation," and that interest continues to 5Lccrue on the money she refuses to accept.13 Defendants argue furter that they have taken no steps to jeopardize Plaintiff's securi interest in 9 Defendants' New Matter, paragraph 20. 10 Defendants' New Matter, paragraph 21. 11 Defendants' New Matter, paragraph 23. 12 Defendants' New Matter, paragraph 24. 13 Defendants' Brief, at 3-4. 3 No. 1655 Civil 1992 the property.14 Defendants conclude that Plaint estopped from foreclosure of the mortgage by acceptance of several payments after the December 3 payment date." Statement of law. Pennsylvania Rule of Civil permits a court to enter judgment on the pleadings. a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court mal the pleadings themselves and documents properly att Capuzzi v. Heller, 125 Pa. Commw. 678, 683, 558 allocatur denied, 523 Pa. 650, 567 A.2d 653 (1989). the pleadings should be entered only when there a facts in dispute and, after accepting all of the well -pleaded facts as true, the case is free from c would be a fruitless exercise. Id. Where a case interpretation of a written contract, judgment on may be appropriate,16 provided that the contract court as a proper attachment to the pleadings.17 "[T]he essence of contract law is the objective parties and where there has been no allegation of 14 Defendants' Brief, at 5. 15 Defendants' Brief, at 5-6. 16 DiAndrea v. Reliance Savings and Loan Ass'n, 537, 546, 456 A.2d 1066, 1070 (1983). 17 Groff v. Pete Kingsley Building, Inc., 374 P 383, 543 A.2d 128, 131 (1989). 0 Lff should be irtue of her , 1991, final ocedure 1034 In passing on consider only ached thereto. .2d 596, 598, Judgment on e no material sing party's bt and trial :urns upon the the pleadings is before the intent of the istake, fraud, 310 Pa. Super. 3. Super. 377, No. 1655 Civil 1992 overreaching or the like, it is not the function o the court to redraft a contract to be more favorable to a given Darty than the agreement he chose to enter." Borrell v. Borrell, 346 Pa. Super. 1, 10, 498 A.2d 1339, 1344 (1985), quoting Brokers Title Co. v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co., 610 F.2d 1174, 1181 (3d Cir. 1979). This rule applies to mortgages. Warwick Iron Co. v. Mort n, 148 Pa. 72, 23 A. 1065 (1892). A mortgagee in Pennsylvania is not obligated to accept less than the full amount of a loan when it is due. Bell Federal Savings and Loan Association of Bellevue v. Laura Lanes, Inc., 291 Pa. Super. 395, 435 A.2d 1285 (1981). "Equitable estoppel arises when a party by acts or representations intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe that certain facts exist and the other justifiably relies and acts upon such belief, so t at the latter will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts." Cosner v. United Penn Bank, 358 PiL. Super. 484, 488, 517 A.2d 1337, 1339 (1986), quoting Straup v. Times Herald, 283 Pa. Super. 58, 71, 423 A.2d 713, 720 (1980), all catur denied, 283 Pa. Super. 58, 423 A.2d 713 (1981). In order fr a mortgagee to be equitably estopped from foreclosure, "it is lecessary that [he or she] have done some act or made a declaration inconsistent with the truth, with the design of injuring anot er, that the [mortgagor) was ignorant of the truth and relied on ke good faith 5 No. 1655 Civil 1992 of such acts and declarations, and that injury will result to [the mortgagor] by the denial of estoppel." Sellersville Savings and Loan Association v. Kelly, 29 B.R. 1016, 1019 (E D. Pa. 1983). "[M]ere delay of suit, or neglect [of a mortgagee] to rigorously exact his money on the day it was due, is not evide a of a waiver of the creditor's contract right First Federa S. & L. Assn. v. Street Road Shopping Center, Inc., 68 D. & C.2d 751, 755 (Bucks Co. 1975); cf. Bailey v. Williams, 45 D. & C.3d 349 1987) (waiver of right to accelerate mortgage by acceptance of half payments for 31 months). Application of law to facts. In the present case, the material facts are not in dispute. An acceptance of the Defendants' position that, on these facts, Plaintiff may not be entitled to relief, would depend upon the Court's willingness to redraft the parties' agreement in order to render it nore favorable to the mortgagors, a disregard of the principle that a mortgagee is not obligated to accept less than the full amount of loan when it is due, and an application of the doctrine of es oppel in the absence of any declaration or act inconsistent with the truth on the part of the mortgagee, or any reliance upon an inaccuracy on the part of the mortgagors -- an application that wo ld discourage acts of forbearance by mortgagees. For these reasons, the following Order will be entered: 2 No. 1655 Civil 1992 ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this l3t4day of November, 1992, upon co Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on Pleadings, GRANTED. Diane G. Radcliff, Esq. Counsel for Plaintiff Francis A. Zulli, Esq. Counsel for Defendants :rc BY THE COURT, rA 1 isideration of he Motion is J.