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HomeMy WebLinkAbout00-395 CIVILLCL INCOME PROPERTIES, L.P., II, t/d/b/a BLINKER ASSOCIATES, Plaintiff IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW HARVEY HOFFMAN, Defendant NO. 00-395 CIVIL TERM IN RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR POST-TRIAL RELIEF BEFORE OLER, J. OPINION and ORDER OF COURT OLER, J., May 17, 2002. In this quasi-contract action, Plaintiff has sued an adjoining landowner for $4,900.00~ on a theory of unjust enrichment2 arising out of Defendant's use of a sewage pumping station situated on Plaintiff's land. Following a bench trial the court entered a verdict in favor of Defendant.3 Plaintiff thereafter filed a motion for post-trial relief in the form of a motion for a new trial and a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.4 Although the trial was relatively brief,5 the court was able to commit more than seventeen reversible errors, according to the motion. The following grounds were enumerated in support of the motion for a new trial: 1. The learned Trial Judge erred in admitting into evidence a certain Agreement and Release, dated May 30, 1972, said ~ See N.T. 12, Trial, February 27, 2002 (hereinafter N.T. ~.. : See N.T. 42. 3 Order of Court, February 28, 2002. 4 Plaintiff, LCL Income Properties, L.P., II, Motion for Post-Trial Relief, filed March 12, 2002 (hereinafter Plaintiff's Motion for Post-Trial Relief); Plaintiff's Additional Grounds for Relief, filed April 9, 2002 (hereinafter Plaintiff's Supplemental Motion for Post-Trial Relief). 5 Forty-five minutes. In Agreement and Release having been objected to by LCL legal counsel as hearsay evidence. [61 2. The learned Trial Judge erred in admitting into evidence a certain Agreement and Release, dated May 30, 1972, said Agreement and Release being irrelevant and immaterial, and not being binding on successors in title by its very terms. 3. The learned Trial Judge erred in admitting into evidence a certain Agreement and Release, dated May 30, 1972, said Agreement and Release being irrelevant and immaterial, since the Release by its very terms was limited to claims "from the beginning of the world to the date of these presents", that being May 30, 1972. 4. The learned Trial Judge erred in admitting into evidence a certain Agreement and Release, dated May 30, 1972, said Agreement and Release being irrelevant and immaterial, since the Defendant could not have relied on the Release because, as presented at trial, the Defendant did not know of its existence at the time he purchased the property at issue at trial. 5. The Trial Court's verdict is against the weight of the evidence. 6. The Trial Court's verdict is not supported by substantial evidence. 7. The verdict is, in form and substance, inconsistent with the law of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. [Ta]. The learned Trial Judge erred in admitting into evidence a certain Agreement and Release dated May 30, 1972 by virtue of Defendant having failed to plead the existence of such Agreement and Release in Defendant's Answer and new Matter in accordance with Order of Court making Rule Absolute filed by Defendant to permit Defendant to amend his defense to plead release, which Order was signed by the learned Trial Judge on February 27, 2002.7 support of the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, Plaintiff enumerated the following grounds: 6 A review of the record reveals that the objection was based on relevancy grounds. See N.T. 35- 36. 7 Plaintiff's Motion for Post-Trial Relief, paragraphsl-7; Plaintiff's Supplemental Motion for Post-Trial Relief, paragraph 8. 2 8. The learned Trial Judge erred in admitting into evidence a certain Agreement and Release, dated May 30, 1972, said Agreement and Release having been objected to by LCL legal counsel as hearsay evidence. [81 9. The learned Trial Judge erred in admitting into evidence a certain Agreement and Release, dated May 30, 1972,said Agreement and Release being irrelevant and immaterial, and not being binding on successors in title by its very terms. 10. The learned Trial Judge erred in admitting into evidence a certain Agreement and Release, dated May 30, 1972, said Agreement and Release being irrelevant and immaterial, since the Release by its very terms was limited to claims "from the beginning of the world to the date of these presents", that being May 30, 1972. 11. The Learned Trial Judge erred in admitting into evidence a certain Agreement and Release, dated May 30, 1972, said Agreement and Release being irrelevant and immaterial, since the Defendant could not have relied on the Release because, as presented at trial, the Defendant did not know if its existence at the time he purchased the property at issue at trial. 12. The Trial Court's verdict is against the weight of the evidence. 13. The Trial Court's verdict is not supported by substantial evidence. 14. The verdict is, in form and substance, inconsistent with the law of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. [14a]. The learned Trial Judge erred in admitting into evidence a certain Agreement and Release dated May 30, 1972 by virtue of Defendant having failed to plead the existence of such Agreement and Release in Defendant's Answer and New Matter in accordance with Order of Court making Rule Absolute filed by Defendant to permit Defendant to amend his defense to plead release, which Order was signed by the learned Trial Judge on February 27, 2002.9 8 A review of the record reveals that the objection was based on relevancy grounds. See N.T. 35- 36. 9 Plaintiff's Motion for Post-Trial Relief, paragraphs 8-14; Plaintiff's Supplemental Motion for Post-Trial Relief, paragraph 15. 3 In support of both the motion for a new trial and the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, Plaintiff set forth the following ground: 15. LCL further assigns as error and as grounds for modifying the judgment, or in the alternative, for the granting of a new trial, each of the matters offered by the Petitioner during trial and refused by the Trial Court, in each objection made by the Petitioner during trial and overruled by the Trial Court, and hereby incorporates into this Motion by reference, such points in the trial record,l° Briefs have now been submitted by counsel for the parties in support of their respective positions on Plaintiff's motion for post-trial relief. For the reasons stated in this opinion, Plaintiff's motion will be denied. STATEMENT OF FACTS Plaintiff is a limited partnership known as LCL income Properties, L.P. II, which trades and does business as Bunker Associates.~ It owns and operates a garden apartment~2 complex known as Bunker Hill Apartments~3 located in Wormleysburg Borough, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania,TM and having a mailing address of 1100 Yverdon Drive, Camp Hill, Pennsylvania.~5 Defendant is an adult individual named Harvey Hoffman.~6 He owns a townhouse apartment complex adjacent to Bunker Hill Apartments,~7 known as l0 Plaintiff's Motion for Post-Trial Relief, paragraph 15. ix N.T. 37, 40. l: N.T. 32. is N.T. 32. 14 N.T. 31. ~5 See Plaintiff's Complaint, filed January 21, 2000, paragraph 1 (hereinafter Plaintiff's Complaint). The notes of testimony contain an obviously incorrect address for the complex, probably as a result of a transcription error. See N.T. 15. 16 Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraph 2; Defendant's Answer with New Matter to the Complaint of the Plaintiff LCL Income Properties, L.P., II, t/d/b/a Bunker Associates, filed February 8, 2000, paragraph 2 (hereinafter Defendant's Answer with New Matter). ~7 Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraph 2; Defendant's Answer with New Matter, paragraph 2. 4 Yverdon Manor~8 and having a mailing address of 1200 Yverdon Drive, Camp Hill, Pennsylvania. 19 At one time, the land owned by Plaintiff and the land owned by Defendant comprised a 52-acre tract owned by a common grantor in the respective chains of title named Arthur R. Rupley.2° On part of the land, Mr. Rupley or his predecessor in interest, A.R. Rupley Development Company, built about 60 garden apartments2~ and a sewage pumping station which served the units.22 This complex is known as Bunker Hill Apartments.23 On March 7, 1969, Mr. Rupley (and his spouse) conveyed 2.47 unimproved acres of the tract to Defendant's predecessor in interest, Elston L. Wickenheiser (and his spouse).24 When Mr. Wickenheiser (who had served as construction supervision manager in connection with the Rupley development25) constructed 14 townhouses on his tract in 1972,26 these townhouses were also served by the pumping station on the land retained by Mr. Rupley.27 This complex is known as Yverdon Manor.28 An agreement dated Jaunary 30, 1972, between Arthur R. Rupley (and his spouse) and Elston L. Wickenheiser (and his spouse) confirmed and ratified this arrangement whereby sewage from the Wickenheiser property was permitted to 18 N.T. 32. 19 N.T. 19. 2o N.T. 33. 21 N.T. 33; Exhibit 22 N.T. 33. 23 N.T. 32. 24 Defendant's Exhibit 1. 25 N.T. 34. 26 N.T. 10-11. 27 N.T. 33-34. 28 N.T. 32. see N.T. 10; Defendant's Exhibit 1, Trial, February 27, 2002 (hereinafter Defendant's ). 5 flow without charge through the pumping station on the Rupley property en route to the municipal sewer authority treatment plant.29 The agreement inured to the benefit of the parties and "their heirs, executors, administrators and assigns.''3° This arrangement has existed for the last 30 years.3~ In 1986, Plaintiff purchased the Bunker Hills Apartments portion of the Rupley tract.32 Shortly thereafter, according to Mr. Wickenheiser's testimony, he was contacted by an attorney on behalf of Plaintiff who inquired about the use of the pumping station on Plaintiff's property for the benefit of the Wickenheiser property.33 Mr. Wickenheiser stated that he furnished a copy of the 1972 agreement to Plaintiff' s counsel, that he received no further communications from the attorney, and that the use of the pumping station continued thereafter without incident or charge.34 On August 16, 1996, Defendant (and his spouse) purchased the Yverdon Manor portion of the Rupley tract, from Mr. Wickenheiser (and his spouse).35 In 1998, Plaintiff's regional manager,36 who had been associated with management of the Bunker Hills Apartments since 1988,37 contacted Plaintiff's counsel with a 29 N.T. 20-21; Defendant's Exhibit 3. 30 Defendant's Exhibit 3, paragraph 3. The record does not contain evidence that the agreement was ever recorded. See N.T. 35. 31 N.T. 9-12, 24-25. 32 N.T. 14-15, 33. The deed for this conveyance is not part of the record, and it is not clear whether the grantor in the conveyance was Rupley or a successor in interest to Rupley. A reference in the record to an undefined purchase by "Elliott Leibowitz" is otherwise unexplained. N.T. 11-12. 33 N.T. 24-25. 34 N.T. 24-25. Plaintiff disputed Mr. Wickenheiser's testimony that he had dealt with an attorney who had contacted him on behalf of Plaintiff. N.T. 38-39. 35 N.T. 15; Defendant's Exhibit 2. Defendant received a special warranty deed. Defendant's Exhibit 2. 36 N.T. 9. 37 N.T. 9. 6 view toward extracting payment from Defendant for use of the pumping station.38 Based upon past expense records, she concluded that a fair pro rata share of the 39 cost of the station for Defendant was $900 per year. On January 21, 2000, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant for unjust enrichment,4° demanding payment in the amount of $900 per year retroactive to the date Defendant purchased his property in 1996.4~ After the filing of an answer and new matter, Defendant filed a motion to amend that pleading to include the aforesaid agreement among his defenses.42 No answer was filed by Plaintiff to the rule issued by the court in response to the motion,43 nor to a rule subsequently issued by the court on Defendant's motion to make the original rule absolute.44 Upon motion of Defendant, and in the absence of objection by Plaintiff, the amendment was permitted.45 It is clear from the trial record that Plaintiff acquiesced in the court's allowance of this amendment to the pleading.46 Following a nonjury trial, the court took the matter under advisement.47 On February 28, 2002, a verdict was entered in favor of Defendant: AND NOW, this 28th day of February, 2002, upon consideration of Plaintiff's complaint in the above-captioned matter, and following a non-jury trial held on February 27, 38 N.T. 10-12. 39 N.T. 12. 4o See N.T. 42. 4~ Plaintiff's Complaint, ad damnum clause. 42 Motion of Defendant To Amend Answer and New Matter, filed December 4, 2000. 43 Order of Court, December 11, 2000 (Bayley, J.). 44 Order of Court, February 4, 2002. The second rule was issued because it appeared that neither counsel had pursued the issue of amendment actively at the time of the original motion. 45 Order of Court, February 27, 2002. 46 N.T. 16. 47 Order of Court, February 27, 2002. 7 2002, the court finds in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff.48 Plaintiff's motion for post-trial relief was filed on March 12, 2002.49 It was supplemented by a second filing on April 9, 2002.50 DISCUSSION Statement of Law Motion for post-trial relief specificity. Under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 227. l(b)(2), a motion for post-trial relief"may not be granted unless the grounds therefor.., are specified in the motion." Pa. R.C.P. 227.1(b)(2). A "boilerplate" ground, such as a general assertion that a verdict was against the weight of the evidence, is not normally considered specific enough to satisfy this rule. See, e.g., Dauphin Deposit Bank and Trust Co. v. Pifer, 383 Pa. Super. 275, 282, 556 A.2d 904, 907 (1989). Sufficiency of the evidence. "In considering the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, granting that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences, and determine whether the evidence introduced at trial was sufficient to sustain the verdict." Weir v. Weir, 428 Pa. Super. 515, 530, 631 A.2d 650, 657 (1993) (quoting Snyder v. Snyder, 427 Pa. Super. 494, 505, 629 A.2d 977, 982 (1993)). A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence represents, in essence, a contention that no reasonable trier-of-fact could have found in accordance with the verdict as a matter of law. See In re Estate of Ellis, 460 Pa. 281,285 n.5, 333 A.2d 728, 730 n.5 (1975). As a general rule, judgment n.o.v, may not be entered upon a diminished record. Trach v. Fellin, No. 1921 EDA 2000, 2002 WL 65633, at 5 (Pa. Super. Ct. January 18, 2002). 48 Order of Court, February 28, 2002. 49 Plaintiff, LCL Income Properties, L.P., II, Motion for Post-Trial Relief, filed March 12, 2002. 50 Plaintiff's Additional Grounds for Relief, filed April 9, 2002. Weight of the evidence. "Granting a new trial on the ground that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence is generally committed to the sound discretion of the trial court." Dierolfv. Slade, 399 Pa. Super. 9, 15, 581 A.2d 649, 652 (1990). The test is whether the verdict "was so contrary to the evidence as to shock one's sense of justice and 'to make the award of a new trial imperative, so that right may be given another opportunity to prevail." Id (quoting Commonwealth v. Taylor, 324 Pa. Super. 420, 425, 471 A.2d 1228, 1230 (1984)). "In a bench trial it is the duty of the trial judge to judge credibility of the witnesses and to weigh their testimony." Gasper ex tel. Weir v. Estate of Ciao, 521 Pa. 491, 503, 556 A.2d 819, 824 (1989). "[T]he trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence that is presented .... "Hodges v. Rodriguez, 435 Pa. Super. 360, 366, 645 A.2d 1340, 1343 (1994). Evidenc~relevancy. "Relevant evidence" means "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of conseqence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Pa. R.E. 401. Real property principles. Certain easements can arise by implication. Where an owner of land subjects part of it to a servitude or easement in favor of another part under appropriate circumstances and "then conveys either part, the purchaser takes subject to the burden or with the benefit, as the case may be, even though not mentioned in the deed." 1 Ladner, Conveyancing in Pennsylvania § 11.02(d) (John Makdisi ed., 4th ed. 1979) (footnotes omitted). "The easement is implied when (1) there is a separation of the title to two or more parts of the real estate, (2) there is such an obvious and continued user before the separation as to show intent to make the apparent easement permanent, (3) the easement is reasonably necessary to the beneficial enjoyment of the dominant tenement, and (4) the servitude is continuous and self-acting." Id By statute in Pennsylvania, it is provided as follows: 9 All deeds or instruments in writing for conveying or releasing land hereafter executed, granting or conveying lands, unless an exception or reservation be made therein, shall be construed to include all the estate, right, title, interest, property, claim, and demand whatsoever of the grantor or grantors, in law, equity, or otherwise howsoever, of, in, and to the same, and every part thereof, together with all and singular the improvements, ways, waters, watercourses, rights, liberties, privileges, hereditaments and appurtenances whatsoever thereto belonging, or in anywise appertaining, and the reversions and remainders, rents, issues and profits thereof. Act of April 1, 1909, P.L. 91, §2, as amended, 21 P.S. §3. Verdict in nonjury civil action at law. Under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1038(c), in a nonjury civil action at law "[t]he decision [of the trial judge] may be made orally in open court at the end of the trial.., or it may be made [thereafter] in writing and filed forthwith .... The trial judge shall render a decision within seven days after the conclusion of the trial except in protracted cases or cases of extraordinary complexity." "The decision of the trial judge may consist only of general findings as to all parties but shall dispose of all claims for relief." Pa. R.C.P. 1038(b). Specific findings of fact, conclusions of law and discussion are not required. Id. Unjust enrichment. The doctrine of unjust enrichment is a doctrine founded upon equitable principles whereby "the law implies a contract, which requires the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the value of the benefit conferred." Mitchell v. Moore, 729 A.2d 1200, 1203 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999). Unjust enrichment requires proof of several elements: (1) benefits conferred on defendant by plaintiff; (2) appreciation of such benefits by defendant; and (3) acceptance and retention of such benefits under such circumstances that it would be inequitable for defendant to retain the benefit without payment of value. Id. (quoting Schenck v. K.E. David, Ltd, 446 Pa. Super. 94, 97, 666 A.2d 327, 328 (1995)). 10 The application of the doctrine of unjust enrichment "depends upon the particular factual circumstances of the case at issue." Id at 1203-04 (quoting Schenc/c, 446 Pa. Super. at 97, 666 A.2d at 328. To sustain a claim of unjust enrichment, a claimant must show that the party against whom recovery is sought either wrongfully secured or passively received a benefit that it would be unconscionable for [him or] her to retain. Id at 1204 (quoting Torchia v. Torchia, 346 Pa. Super. 229, 233, 499 A.2d 581, 582 (1985) (citation omitted)). Application of Law to Facts SufJiciency of the evidence. To the extent that Plaintiff's post-trial motion challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict, and on this basis requests entry of judgment in its favor notwithstanding the verdict, the motion may be addressed by noting a number of factors tending to negate the proposition that Defendant "wrongfully secured or passively received a benefit that it would be unconscionable for [him] to retain." Id These include the consensual origin of the use of the pumping station for the benefit of Defendant's land, the written agreement to that effect, the assignability and succession of the agreement by its terms, the statutory general rule that a conveyance of land will pass all of the owner's rights therein without regard to an absence of an express assignment in the deed of conveyance, the equitable principles underlying the implied easement doctrine, the acceptance by Plaintiff and its predecessors in interest of the existing arrangement for almost a quarter of a century, and the equitable qualities of an action for unjust enrichment. Although the case is admittedly a difficult one, the circumstances did not, in the court's view, militate in favor of a finding that Plaintiff had met its burden of proving either that Defendant had wrongfully secured a benefit or that he had received a benefit which it would be unconscionable for him to retain. Exclusion of the agreement from consideration on this point would not be proper, because of 11 the rule that a sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument may not be based upon a diminished record. Admission of agreement. Given the equitable issues underlying a claim for unjust enrichment, including the propriety of the origin of the benefit conferred upon a defendant in such an action, and the implied easements which may arise from a common grantor's actions, the court is unable to agree with Plaintiff's position that the agreement in the present case was inadmissible on relevancy grounds. In addition, it is clear from the record that Defendant's amendment of his responsive pleading to include the agreement as part of his defense was acquiesced in, and prepared for, by Plaintiff. Any prejudice to Plaintiff from Defendant's failure to promptly file a formal pleading incorporating the amendment following authorization by the court for inclusion of the agreement among the defenses to be litigated was purely illusory. Weight of the evidence. As noted, a boilerplate motion requesting a new trial on the basis of the "weight of the evidence" is not specific enough to satisfy the requirements of Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 227.1(b)(2). In addition, on the merits, the motion is not persuasive in view of the evidence supporting the verdict as recited above and the province of court, as trier-of-fact, to judge the credibility of the witnesses, to weigh their testimony, and to believe all, part or none of the evidence presented. The court's finding that Plaintiff had not proven the elements of unjust enrichment was not, it is believed, so shocking as to mandate the award of a new trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice. Consistency of verdict in form and substance with law of Commonwealth. The verdict in the present case constituted a general finding in Defendant's favor, and against Plaintiff, on the issue of whether Plaintiff had proven the elements of unjust enrichment. The verdict was in writing and was entered within seven days of the trial date. The court is not aware of any inconsistency of the verdict in form or substance with the law of the Commonwealth. 12 Unspecified trial errors. As noted, a boilerplate assignment of error will generally be held insufficient to raise an issue for purposes of Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 227.1(b)(2). It is believed that Defendants' assignment of "each of the matters offered by the Petitioner (sic) during trial and refused by the Trial Court, in each objection made by the Petitioner during trial and overruled by the Trial Court," as "error and as grounds for modifying the judgment, or in the alternative, for the granting of a new trial" is encompassed by that limitation. A contrary ruling would be incompatible with the obvious purpose of the Rule to focus the issues being pursued on a post-trial motion for the benefit of opposing parties and the court. Consequently, no attempt has been made herein to review the record in order to identify and defend every ruling adverse to Plaintiff made during the course of the trial. For the foregoing reasons, the following order will be entered: ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this 17th day of May, 2002, upon consideration of Plaintiff's motion for post-trial relief in the form of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a motion for a new trial, and for the reasons accompanying opinion, the motion is denied. stated in the BY THE COURT, Richard Friedman, Esq. P.O. Box 984 Harrisburg, PA 17108 Attorney for Plaintiff Darrell C. Dethlefs, Esq. 3805 Market Street P.O. Box 368 Camp Hill, PA 17011 Attorney for Defendant s/J. Wesley Oler, Jr._ J. Wesley Oler, Jr., J. 13 14 LCL INCOME PROPERTIES, L.P., II, t/d/b/a BLINKER ASSOCIATES, Plaintiff IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA Vo CIVIL ACTION - LAW HARVEY HOFFMAN, Defendant NO. 00-395 CIVIL TERM IN RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR POST-TRIAL RELIEF BEFORE OLER, J. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this 17th day of May, 2002, upon consideration of Plaintiff's motion for post-trial relief in the form of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a motion for a new trial, and for the reasons accompanying opinion, the motion is denied. stated in the BY THE COURT, Richard Friedman, Esq. P.O. Box 984 Harrisburg, PA 17108 Attorney for Plaintiff Darrell C. Dethlefs, Esq. 3805 Market Street P.O. Box 368 Camp Hill, PA 17011 Attorney for Defendant J. Wesley Oler, Jr., J.