HomeMy WebLinkAbout2015-1048
FLIGHT SYSTEMS INDUSTRIAL : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
PRODUCTS COMPANY, : CUMBERLAND COUNTY,
Plaintiff, :
:
v. :
:CIVIL ACTION - LAW
MICHAEL OHRUM, :
Defendant : 2015-01048 CIVIL TERM
IN RE: OPINION PURSUANT TO Pa. R.A.P. 1025(a)
Peck, J., October 29, 2015.
Hearings were held on March 18, 2015 and March 26, 2015 regarding a Motion
for Emergency Preliminary Injunction filed by Appellee Flight Systems Industrial
Products Company (hereinafter “FSIP”) and opposed by Appellant Michael Ohrum
(hereinafter “Ohrum”). In an Order dated April 16, 2015, this Court granted FSIP’s
Motion for Emergency Preliminary Injunction in part, and enjoined Ohrum from
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working, either directly or in a supervisory capacity, on Curtis and Danaher products for
his current employer, Controller Test Services (hereinafter “CTS”). This Court did not,
however, grant FSIP’s request to entirely enjoin Ohrum from working at all CTS. Ohrum
appealed this Court’s decision and filed a Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on
appeal, stating the following:
1.The Honorable Trial Court erred when it implicitly determined that the post-
employment Employee Confidentiality and Non-Competition Agreement between
Ohrum and FSIP was a valid and enforceable contract.
2.The Honorable Trial Court erred when it implicitly determined that the post-
employment Employee Confidentiality and Non-Competition Agreement between
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The Court notes that as explained herein, FSIP had exclusive agreements with Sevcon, Curtis and Danaher. This
Court limited the injunction to Curtis and Danaher because testimony was presented that CTS did not market any
Sevcon controllers. See March 26, 2015 Notes of Testimony, at pg. 98. Following the grant of the preliminary
injunction, FSIP filed a motion for reconsideration in requesting that this Court extend the injunction to include
Sevcon products. The instant appeal was filed stripping this Court of jurisdiction to enter any order disposing of the
matter.
1
Ohrum and FSIP was supported by adequate consideration, specifically the one-
time, cash payment of $2,000.00.
3.The Honorable Trial Court erred when it determined the post-employment
Employee Confidentiality and Non-Competition Agreement protected a legitimate
business interest of FSIP.
4.The Honorable Trial Court erred when it determined that FSIP has a legally
protectable, legitimate interest in information it has obtained by way of its
Original Equipment Manufacturer (“OEM”) agreements with Sevcon, Danaher
and/or Curtis.
5.The Honorable Trial Court erred when it determined that FSIP’s OEM agreements
with Sevcon, Danaher and/or Curtis were exclusive to FSIP.
6.The Honorable Trial Court erred when it determined that the information FSIP has
obtained, by way of its OEM agreements with Sevcon, Danaher and/or Curtis, was
proprietary to FSIP, confidential and/or a trade secret of FSIP.
7.The Honorable Trial Court erred when it determined that the information FSIP has
obtained, by way of its OEM agreements with Sevcon, Danaher and/or Curtis, was
not readily discoverable by third parties through proper means.
8.The Honorable Trial Court erred when it determined that the knowledge that
Ohrum gained while working with FSIP was proprietary to FSIP, confidential
and/or a trade secret of FSIP.
9.The Honorable Trial Court erred when it determined that the knowledge that
Ohrum gained while working with FSIP was not readily discoverable by third
parties through proper means.
10.The Honorable Trial Court erred when it determined that enforcement of the post-
employment Employee Confidentiality and Non-Competition Agreement is
reasonably necessary for the protection of FSIP.
11.The Honorable Trial Court erred when it determined that FSIP had met the
necessary requirements to grant a preliminary injunction. This Court addresses all
of the above complained of errors as a whole analysis.
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This Court did not immediately file its opinion as the parties indicated they may
have reached an agreement on the matter. No agreement has been filed of record as of
yet and this Court accordingly files the within opinion in support of its April 16, 2015
Order granting a preliminary injunction. This Court addresses all of the above
complained of errors as a whole analysis.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURALHISTORY
For roughly nine and a half years, from 2005 until 2015, Ohrum was an employee
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of FSIP, starting as an electronics technician and eventually being given a supervisory
3
role as a team lead. FSIP is in the business of manufacturing and remanufacturing
electronic controls for battery-powered equipment, such as golf carts and fork lifts, for
4
customers throughout North America. The present case is specifically focused on FSIP’s
remanufacturing operations. In the remanufacturing industry, Original Equipment
Manufacturers (“OEMs”) will manufacture a product and provide their own product
support on that product for a period of time; however, once the OEM stops production on
the product, it turns to remanufacturing companies such as FSIP to provide service and
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repairs on the product for the duration of the product’s useful life. Within the industry,
some remanufacturing companies have exclusive agreements in place with the OEMs to
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receive information and training on the product directly from the OEM. Companies with
OEM agreements can advertise their remanufactured product as “OEM Certified,” or
7
state that it has been remanufactured to “OEM Specifications.” Receiving information
directly from the OEM allows a remanufacturing company to upgrade the equipment
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much like upgrading software at the time it is repaired. In order to secure exclusive
2
Notes of Testimony (hereinafter “N.T.”), March 18, 2015 and March 26, 2015, p. 71-72.
3
N.T., p. 5-6.
4
N.T., p. 5.
5
N.T., p. 18-19.
6
N.T., p.14-15, 18, 82.
7
N.T., p. 96.
8
N.T., p. 17.
3
9
OEM agreements, remanufacturing companies must pay money to the OEM, as well as
10
execute confidentiality agreements.
In contrast, remanufacturing companies which do not have OEM agreements in
place are able to remanufacture OEM products through a process of reverse
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engineering. This process includes taking a product apart, extracting useful information
from an electronic chip, developing a new set of specifications for the product, rebuilding
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the product, and testing the rebuilt product. In other words, reverse engineering
requires the remanufacturer seeking to use the OEM updates (who do not otherwise have
an exclusive agreement with the OEM), to figure out in reverse from finished product
what the updates were, as they did not have access to the information directly from the
OEM. Using reverse engineering to remanufacture a product takes more time and
requires additional capital investment than remanufacturing a product pursuant to OEM
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agreements. Furthermore, companies that do not have OEM agreements in place are
limited in the way they market their products; Products can still be advertised as
remanufactured, but they cannot say that the remanufactured product has been tested on
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the OEM specifications.
As the team lead at FSIP, Ohrum was responsible for overseeing operations on
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three of FSIP’s exclusive OEM remanufacturing agreements, including Sevcon,
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Danaher, and Curtis. The agreements FSIP has with the Sevcon, Danaher, and Curtis
are exclusive agreements within the United States, meaning that these companies
exclusively turn to FSIP for their domestic remanufacturing needs, but may use other
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companies for their remanufacturing needs internationally. FSIP has paid money to
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establish these OEM agreements and maintains their confidentiality even within their
9
N.T., p. 18.
10
N.T., p. 15.
11
N.T., p. 94.
12
N.T. 94-96.
13
N.T., p. 95.
14
N.T., p. 96.
15
N.T., p. 8.
16
N.T., p. 11.
17
N.T., p. 14.
18
N.T., p. 18.
4
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company. During his time at FSIP, Ohrum had access to, and was intimately familiar
with, all of the information and training made available to FSIP as a result of its OEM
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agreements.
Due to the nature of its business and the exclusive information it obtains through
its OEM agreements, FSIP made a significant investment into signing its most valuable
2122
employees to non-competition and non-disclosure agreements. In September of 2013,
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after Ohrum previously considered leaving FSIP to work for a competitor, FSIP
approached Ohrum about signing a non-competition and non-disclosure agreement. After
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a week of considering the proposed contract, Ohrum signed the Employee
Confidentiality and Non-Competition Agreement (hereinafter the “Agreement”) in
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exchange for a one-time payment of $2,000. The Agreement prevents Ohrum from
working for any of FSIP’s competitors in the United States or Canada for a period of two
years following the end of his employment with FSIP. The Agreement specifically
mentions certain competitors for whom Ohrum would not be allowed to work, including
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CTS. Not only is CTS mentioned by name in the Agreement, but Ohrum and FSIP also
specifically discussed the fact that FSIP did not want Ohrum working for CTS during
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negotiations for the Agreement . In February of 2015, Ohrum voluntarily resigned from
FSIP and went to work for CTS, with full knowledge that the Agreement forbid him from
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working for CTS.
On February 24, 2015, FSIP filed suit against Ohrum, bringing claims for Breach
of Contract and Breach of Common Law Fiduciary Duties. The next day, February 25,
2015, FSIP filed a Motion for Emergency Preliminary Injunction, seeking to prevent
Ohrum from working for CTS. After hearings on March 18, 2015 and March 26, 2015,
19
N.T., p. 15-16.
20
N.T., p. 19.
21
N.T., p. 21.
22
N.T., p. 78.
23
N.T., p. 81.
24
N.T., p. 80.
25
N.T., p. 12.
26
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2, Employee Confidentiality and Non-Competition Agreement.
27
N.T., p. 79.
28
N.T., p. 21-23, 79, 83.
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this Court issued an Order on April 16, 2015 granting a preliminary injunction to prevent
Ohrum from working on the Curtis and Danaher product lines for CTS. This Court did
not, however, prevent Ohrum from working for CTS altogether. Despite the limited
nature of the preliminary injunction, this appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
In Pennsylvania, the standard of review of a trial court’s grant or denial of a
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preliminary injunction is abuse of discretion. Summit Towne Ctr., Inc. v. Shoe Show of
Rocky Mt., Inc., 828 A.2d 995, 1000 (Pa. Super. 2003). The Superior Court in Summit
Towne further explained the standard of review as follows:
We recognize that on appeal from the grant or denial of a preliminary
injunction, we do not inquire into the merits of the controversy, but only
examine the record to determine if there were any apparently reasonable
grounds for the action of the court below. Only if it is plain that no grounds
exist to support the decree or that the rule of law relied upon was palpably
erroneous or misapplied will we interfere with the decision of the \[trial
court\].
…
Thus, in general, appellate inquiry is limited to a determination of whether
examination of the record reveals that “any apparently reasonable grounds”
support the trial court’s disposition of the preliminary injunction request.
Summit Towne, 828 A.2d at 1000-01 (citing Roberts v. Board of Dirs. Sch. Dist., 341
A.2d 475, 478 (Pa. 1975)). Additionally, the Summit Towne case established the
following factors for determining whether a trial court had reasonable grounds for
granting or denying a preliminary injunction request:
1.Whether the injunction is necessary to prevent immediate and irreparable harm
that cannot be adequately compensated by damages.
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Counsel for the Appellant correctly points out that a stricter standard of review applies to mandatory injunctions
compared to prohibitory injunctions. Overland Enter. V. Gladstone Partners, LP, 950 A.2d 1015, 1019 (Pa. Super
2008). However, counsel erroneously contends that the preliminary injunction at issue in the present case is a
mandatory injunction. The Overland case properly defines mandatory injunctions as one which commands the
performance or some positive act to preserve the status quo, while a prohibitory injunction enjoins the doing of an
act which will change the status quo. Id. In the present case, this Court’s injunction seeks to maintain the status quo
by prohibiting Ohrum from working on Danaher and Curtis products for CTS. As such, the injunction is clearly a
prohibitory injunction, and the usual standard of review applies.
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2.Whether greater injury would result from refusing an injunction than from
granting it.
3.Whether a preliminary injunction will properly restore the parties to their status
as it existed immediately prior to the alleged wrongful conduct.
4.Whether the activity an injunction seeks to restrain is actionable, that the right
to relief is clear, and that the wrong is manifest, or, in other words, whether the
party seeking the injunction is likely to succeed on the merits.
5.Whether the injunction sought is reasonably suited to abate the offending
activity.
6.The preliminary injunction must not adversely affect the public interest.
Id. at 1001. The party seeking the injunction must establish each of these six factors in
order for the injunction to be properly granted, and when even a single factor is not
established, a reviewing court need not address the others. Overland Enter. v. Gladstone
Partners, LP, 950 A.2d 1015, 1019 (Pa. Super. 2008). In the present case, for the reasons
that follow, this Court found that FSIP established its right to a preliminary injunction
under each of the six required factors.
As the Pennsylvania Superior Court has noted, “\[a\]n injury is regarded as
‘irreparable’ if it will cause damage which can be estimated only by conjecture and not
by a pecuniary standard.” Anchel v. Shea, 762 A.2d 346, 351 (Pa. Super.2000). In the
present case, the damage caused by continuing to allow Ohrum to work on the Danaher
and Curtis product lines for CTS would indeed be speculative. The advantage of FSIP’s
business model is its ability to remanufacture controllers without having to spend the
time, money, and effort to reverse engineer the product, thus beating its competitors to
the market. In addition, FSIP’s exclusive agreements with the respective OEM allow the
company to market their services as being tested to OEM specifications, allowing their
clientele to be assured of such quality measures. If Ohrum is allowed to provide the
knowledge and training he received on Danaher and Curtis products exclusive to FSIP to
his new employer CTS, the reverse engineering process employed by CTS will be
streamlined, allowing CTS to put their competitive product on the market sooner and
7
cheaper than they otherwise would have been able to do. Testimony was given that the
reverse engineering process can take weeks, months, or even years, depending on the
sophistication of the product. Thus, the extent to which FSIP would be injured is not
readily ascertainable by a pecuniary standard. FSIP stands to lose its customers and its
place in the market from being an OEM exclusive remanufacturer if Ohrum is permitted
to use that knowledge he gained at FSIP to short change the process at CTS. This Court
found that immediate and irreparable harm would result from failing to grant the
preliminary injunction, and that such harm could not be adequately compensated by
damages.
Greater injury would result from refusing the injunction than from its grant.
The preliminary injunction ordered by this Court does not prevent CTS from
continuing its reverse engineering processes on Danaher on Curtis products, by someone
other than Ohrum. It likewise does not prevent Ohrum from working for CTS altogether.
The injunction solely prevents Ohrum from working on or supervising CTS’s work with
Danaher and Curtis products. This Court heard testimony that CTS has other product
lines on which Ohrum can, and does, work, including Mitsubishi and Jungheinrich
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products. Therefore, this Court’s preliminary injunction results in relatively little injury
to CTS and Ohrum, in contrast to the immediate and irreparable harm that FSIP would
suffer if this Court did not grant the preliminary injunction. Therefore, greater injury
would result from refusing the injunction than from granting it.
Restoration of the between the parties, as it existed prior to the
status quo
wrongful conduct
As mentioned above, CTS is free to continue its reverse engineering on Danaher
and Curtis products during the present litigation, albeit without Ohrum’s help on the
project. This is precisely the position CTS was in prior to hiring Ohrum; CTS testified
they could reverse engineer Danaher and Curtis products without the information that
could be gained only through OEM agreements, but could not market itself as being
tested to OEM specifications. Likewise, FSIP will be restored to the position it held prior
30
N.T., p. 87-88.
8
to CTS hiring Ohrum will be able to continue to work on Danaher and Curtis products
with the benefit of its OEM agreements while competitors such as CTS must take the
time and effort to reverse engineer the products. The status quo, as it existed prior to the
wrongful conduct, will be restored by the preliminary injunction.
Likelihood of success on the merits.
Among the six Summit Towne, supra,, factors, this is, perhaps, the most
contentious in the present litigation. Ohrum argues that the right to relief is not clear, and
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the wrong is not manifest. This Court disagrees and finds that FSIP is likely to succeed
on the merits of the case, as explained below.
In Pennsylvania, an employee’s duty not to use or disclose his employer’s trade
secrets may arise from a restrictive covenant, such as a non-competition agreement, or
may be implied from a confidential employment relationship. Christopher M. Hand’s
Poured Fudge v. Hennon, 699 A.2d 1272, 1276 (Pa. Super. 1997)(citations omitted). In
the present case, counsel for FSIP made it clear that its argument for a preliminary
32
injunction was based solely on the Agreement formed between FSIP and Ohrum.
Although non-competition agreements are disfavored as a restraint of trade in
Pennsylvania, they will be enforced where their terms are reasonable and bargained-for
by the parties. Kramer v. Robec, Inc., 824 F. Supp. 508 (E.D. Pa. 1992)(applying
Pennsylvania law). The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held that restrictive
covenants are enforceable if they are incident to an employment relationship between the
parties, the restrictions imposed by the covenant are reasonably necessary for the
protection of the employer, and the restrictions imposed are reasonably limited in
duration and geographic extent. Hess v. Gebhard & Co., 808 A.2d 912, 917 (Pa.
2002)(citations omitted). Additional consideration for the restrictive covenant is required
where the covenant is executed after the employment has commenced. Bilec v. Auburn &
Assoc., Inc. Pension Trust, 588 A.2d 538, 542 (Pa. Super. 1991).
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The first ten of Ohrum’s eleven errors complained of on appeal detail reasons why he does not believe that the
Agreement is a valid contract or why he does not believe that FSIP has a legitimate, protectable business interest in
the information gained by virtue of its OEM agreements.
32
N.T., p. 104-105.
9
10
Agreement is incident to the employment relationship between Ohrum and
FSIP.
In the present case, the Agreement clearly is incident to Ohrum’s employment
with FSIP. The Agreement was signed during the course of Ohrum’s employment with
FSIP and its terms related to work specific to the type done by FSIP. Ohrum was working
for FSIP in a supervisory capacity, thereby obtaining the specialty knowledge at issue
here and sought to be prevented by the Agreement for such information’s release. Ohrum
admitted that he signed the Agreement to stay on and work for FSIP after FSIP paid him
additional money. He also testified he asked for a copy of the agreement prior to
terminating his employment with FSIP.
Agreement is reasonably necessary to protect FSIP’s legitimate business
Interests.
Despite Ohrum’s arguments to the contrary, this Court found that the Agreement
is reasonably necessary to protect a legitimate business interest of FSIP. Ohrum
vehemently argues that the information gained by Ohrum through FSIP’s OEM
agreements is not proprietary or confidential, and is not a trade secret because it is readily
ascertainable through reverse engineering. This Court does not agree with Ohrum’s
classification of this information.
A trade secret is defined as follows:
Information, including a formula, drawing, pattern, compilation including a
customer list, program, device, method, technique or process that: (1)
derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means
by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use.
(2) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy.
12 Pa. C.S. §5302. In the present case, the information obtained through the OEM
agreements has value precisely because it is not available to all remanufacturing
companies. While the reverse engineering process does allow companies such as CTS to
work on a product, this Court heard testimony that the remanufacturing process used by
11
CTS after reverse engineering a product is not necessarily the same remanufacturing
process used by companies such as FSIP who obtain information and training from an
OEM under an OEM agreement. The reverse engineering process gives CTS the ability to
create their own set of specifications for the product, not necessarily the same OEM
specifications that a company such as FSIP would have by virtue of its OEM
33
agreements. In fact, CTS’s own employee admitted that CTS does not have the OEM
34
information even at the end of the reverse engineering process. Additionally, this Court
heard testimony about how FSIP must pay for its OEM agreements, must sign
confidentiality agreements with the OEMs, and has implemented internal and external
security protocols in order to ensure the confidentiality of the information gained from
35
the OEM agreements. Therefore, this Court does finds that the information gained
through FSIP’s OEM agreements would qualify for protection as a trade secret.
Even if this Court found that the information contained in the OEM agreements
does not qualify for protection as a trade secret, it can still be protected by a restrictive
covenant. Restrictive covenants do not give protection only to trade secrets, but instead
also give protection to any legitimate business interests of the employer. Kramer v.
Robec, 824 F. Supp. at 511 (“although a legally protected interest is included in the
legitimate objects of a restrictive covenant, the legal standard for evaluating a restrictive
covenant encompasses not only legally protected interests, but also ‘legitimate business
interests of the employer.’”)(citing Thermo-Guard, Inc. v. Cochran, 596 A.2d 188, 194
(Pa. Super. 1991)(superseded by statute on other grounds)). Furthermore, the
Pennsylvania Superior Court has held that “specialized knowledge and training is a
legitimate interest as to which a restrictive covenant may be enforced.” Thermo-Guard,
596 A.2d at 194. Thus, even if the knowledge and information Ohrum received as a result
of FSIP’s OEM agreements is not protected as a trade secret, it is still able to be protected
by a restrictive covenant. This Court finds that the Agreement is reasonably necessary
for the protection of FSIP’s legitimate business interests.
33
N.T., p. 96.
34
N.T., p. 96.
35
N.T., p. 15-16, 18.
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Breadth of the Agreement and whether the preliminary injunction imposed
by this Court is narrowly tailored
Regarding the geographic scope and duration of restrictive covenants, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated that the restrictions imposed by a non-
competition agreement must be no broader than necessary to protect the employer’s
interests. Sidco Paper Co. v. Aaron, 351 A.2d 250, 253 (Pa. 1976). Where the restrictions
imposed by the employer are broader than necessary, courts are able to limit the scope of
enforcement of the agreement. Id. In the present case, the Agreement between Ohrum and
FSIP had a geographic scope of the entire United States and Canada, and a duration of
two years. Based on testimony about how the information obtained by Ohrum might be
36
useful to a competitor for as long as ten or fifteen years, this Court found that the two
year duration was not overly broad on its face. Likewise, based on testimony that FSIP
37
has exclusive OEM agreements in both the United States and Canada, the geographic
scope of the Agreement is not overly broad on its face.
Even if the scope of the restrictive covenant is found to be too broad, the
preliminary injunction imposed by this Court is narrowly tailored such that CTS and
Ohrum are still able to continue their working relationship. As noted above, CTS is not
prevented from running its normal business. Nor is Ohrum prevented from working for
CTS in any capacity. This Court specifically considered Ohram’s employment, and
tailored the resultant temporary injunction to allow Ohrum to continue his work, while
protecting FSIP’s proprietary information. The preliminary injunction ensures that
Ohrum is not using the knowledge he gained from FSIP for the benefit of his new
employer until the present litigation has concluded and the rights of the respective parties
have been established.
Adequate consideration
Finally, this Court found that the one-time payment of $2,000 was adequate
consideration for Ohrum’s execution of the Agreement. Pennsylvania’s case law is clear
36
N.T., p. 16.
37
N.T., p. 5.
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that “in order for a restrictive covenant entered into subsequent to the commencement of
the employee's service to be ‘ancillary,’ it must be supported by new consideration,
which can be in the form of a corresponding benefit or a beneficial change in
employment status.” Insulation Corp. of Am. v. Brobston, 667 A.2d 729, 733 (Pa. Super
1995) (citing Bilec, 588 A.2d at 542). Although Pennsylvania’s jurisprudence contains
many cases which discuss what is, and what is not, adequate consideration for a non-
competition agreement, none of the cases this Court found provide a definite answer in
the present case. In Kramer, the Federal District Court applying Pennsylvania law held
that $1,000 plus a change in employment status was adequate consideration for a three-
year, nationwide restrictive covenant, though dicta in that case strongly suggested that the
$1,000 without the corresponding status change would not have been sufficient
consideration. Kramer v. Robec, 824 F. Supp. at 511.
In the present case, without the advisement of any binding precedent, this Court
found that $2,000 was adequate consideration for the two-year Agreement between
Ohrum and FSIP. This Court considers that amount in the context of Ohram’s salary at
FSIP. At the time that he signed the Agreement, Ohrum’s salary was $45,000 per year
38
(after recently receiving a raise from $37,941). At that time, the $2,000 payment
represented more than two weeks salary for Ohrum. Furthermore, Ohrum had roughly
one week to consider the proposed agreement and $2,000 payment before deciding to
39
execute the Agreement. Under these circumstances, this Court found that the
Agreement was reached in an arms-length transaction between Ohrum and FSIP, and that
$2,000 was adequate consideration.
The injunction is reasonably suited to abate the offending activity.
As discussed above, the injunction imposed by this Court is designed to ensure
that Ohrum does not disclose information regarding Danaher and Curtis products to his
new employer before the pending litigation is resolved. At the same time, the injunction
38
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1, Salary Information for Michael Ohrum.
39
N.T., p. 79.
14
allows Ohrum to continue to practice his trade. Therefore, the injunction will abate the
offending activity.
Public Interest
The granting of the preliminary injunction will not adversely affect the public
interest. While restrictive covenants are disfavored in the eyes of the law as a restraint on
trade, they will be enforced by the law under the circumstances detailed above. In the
present case, Ohrum and FSIP entered into an arms-length transaction for the execution
of the Agreement. This Court tailored a solution to the issue in its injunction that is
specific to the parties to the instant litigation. The public interest will therefore not be
harmed by the enforcement of that Agreement under the present circumstances.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, this Court found that FSIP met its burden of proving that a
preliminary injunction should be granted under the required six factors. Of particular
interest in this case, the Court found that FSIP is likely to prevail on the merits because
the Agreement entered into between Ohrum and FSIP protected a legitimate business
interest belonging to FSIP, and because the Agreement was supported by adequate
consideration. This Court did not abuse its discretion when it granted the narrowly-
tailored preliminary injunction, nor did it base its decision on an erroneous understanding
of the law. This Court respectfully submits its decision to grant the preliminary injunction
should be affirmed on appeal.
BY THE COURT,
__________________________
Christylee L. Peck, J.
Sean Shultz, Esq.
26 West High Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
Attorney for Plaintiff
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Peter J. Russo, Esq.
5006 East Trindle Road
Suite 203
Mechanicsburg, PA 17050
Attorney for Defendant
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