HomeMy WebLinkAbout00-1749 CIVILROGER C. WATSON
SURVEYING SERVICES,:
INC.,
Plaintiff
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
CIVIL ACTION - LAW
WILLIAM M. GROSS,
ARNOLD FORBES and
ROBERT SAHI,
individually and t/a a
Parmership,
Defendants
NO. 00-1749 CIVIL TERM
IN RE: OPINION PURSUANT TO PA. R.A.P. 1925
OLER, J., April 30, 2002.
In this action at law, a surveying company sued three parmers or joint
venturers for breach of contract, violation of Pennsylvania's Contractor and
Subcontractor Payment Act, and unjust enrichment, as a result of unpaid services
performed by Plaintiff in connection with
Defendants. Defendants counterclaimed for
Plaintiff' s work was untimely and inadequate.
a
land development project of
damages on the grounds that
Following a nonjury trial, the court entered a verdict in favor of Plaintiff in
the amount of $12,110.00 on its claim against Defendants,~ and a verdict against
Defendants on their counterclaim. Defendants' motion for post-trial relief was
subsequently denied.
Defendants have filed an appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court from
the denial of their motion for post-trial relief.2 In a statement of matters
complained of on appeal, the grounds for the appeal have been expressed as
follows:
~ Attorney's fees were subsequently added to Plaintiff's award.
: Judgment was entered on the verdict about a month after the notice of appeal was filed. See
Campo v. St. Luke's Hospital, 755 A.2d 20, 21 n. 1 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (entertaining appeal
challenging denial of post-trial motion where judgment entered after filing of notice of appeal).
1. The Court erred and its Order was against the weight of
the evidence in holding that Defendants were liable under the
written agreement.
2. The Court erred and its Order was against the weight of
the evidence in holding that Defendants had liability beyond
the terms of the written agreement.
3. The Court erred and its Order was against the weight of
the evidence in holding that Defendants were liable under The
Contractor and Subcontractor Payment Act.
4. The Court erred and its Order was against the weight of
the evidence in holding that Defendants were liable for
attorneys' fees, whether under The Contractor and
Subcontractor Payment Act or otherwise.
5. The Court erred and its Order was against the weight of
the evidence in holding that Defendants were not entitled to
damages under its [sic] counterclaim.
6. The Court erred and its Order was against the weight of
the evidence in failing to consider the foregoing matters with
respect to each Defendant individually.3
This opinion in support of the order appealed from is written pursuant to
Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a).
STATEMENT OF FACTS; PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff is Roger C. Watson Surveying Services, Inc., a business
corporation having its offices in New Bloomfield, Perry County, Pennsylvania; the
company is operated by its President, Roger C. Watson, a professional land
surveyor licensed by the Commonwealth.4 Defendants are William M. Gross,
Esq., Arnold Forbes, and Bhubinder "Bob" Sahi. 5
~ Plaintiff's Statement of Matters Complained of And Intended to Be Argued on Appeal, filed
March 15, 2002.
4 N.T. 6-8, Trial, August 27, 2001 (hereinafter N.T. ~; see also Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, Trial,
August 27, 2001 (hereinafter Plaintiff's/Defendant's Exhibit __).
5 N.T. 97-98, 143.
2
Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants, individually and trading as a
parmership, on March 23, 2000.6 The complaint contained counts for breach of
contract,7 violation of Pennsylvania's Contractor and Subcontractor Payment Act,8
and unjust enrichment.9 The gist of the complaint was that Defendants had formed
a parmership for the purpose of developing a large tract of land in South
Middleton Township, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania,l° that Plaintiff had been
engaged to perform professional services in connection with the project,~ that
Plaintiff had done so,~2 and that Plaintiff remained unpaid for its work.~3 On
October 5, 2000, Defendants filed a counterclaim, alleging that the work was
neither properlyTM nor timely performed. ~5
A nonjury trial was held on August 27, 2001. The evidence presented at
trial may be summarized as follows:
Roger C. Watson, president of Plaintiff Roger C. Watson Surveying
Services, Inc., testified on behalf of Plaintiff that his company was in the business
of providing surveying services for large and small projects, "from huge highway
projects where bridges and new highways are built, to residential development[,]
... to maybe just a small convenience store.''~6 He stated that he became
6 Plaintiff's Complaint, filed March 23, 2000.
7 Id. paras. 1-28.
8Id. paras. 29-36.
9Id. paras. 37-39.
lo Id. para.5.
~ Id. para. 6.
~:Id. para. 7.
~3 Id.. para. 27.
14 Defendant's Answer to Complaint, New Matter and Counterclaim, filed October 5, 2002, para.
40.
~5Id. para. 41.
16 N.T. 8.
3
involved with the project sub judice around November 10, 1998,17 when a friend
introduced him to Defendant Arnold Forbes. ~8 Defendant Forbes showed him the
site of the proposed development,~9 which was a multi-acre tract located in South
Middleton Township, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania,2° and introduced him to
Defendant William Gross, who, in mm, introduced him to Defendant Bhubinder
"Bob" Sahi,2~ according to his testimony.
Mr. Watson indicated that he was led to believe that the owner of the land
in question (Hewitt Line22) had granted rights with respect to purchase of the tract
whereby Defendants could, it they chose to exercise those rights, either develop
the property themselves or sell it to a third party with a land development plan in
place.23 According to Mr. Watson's testimony, the parties were under the
impression from tax maps that the tract was about 60 acres in area.24 He testified
that the enterprise was intended to proceed rapidly so that necessary township
approvals would be in place by January 1, 2000.25 The tract was zoned residential
medium density, according to his testimony.26
Mr. Watson testified that, on behalf of Plaintiff, he forwarded the following
written proposal, dated November 24, 1998, to Defendant Gross:
RE: Hewitt Line Property
The following is a proposal for the above mentioned project:
1. Boundary survey of entire tract.
~7 N.T. 14.
~8 N.T. 9.
19 N.T. 9.
2o N.T. 40, 24.
2~ N.T. 9.
22 N.T. 15-16.
23 N.T. 9, 11, 14, 28, 32, 56, 59, 69-70, 76.
24 N.T. 40.
25 N.T. 35, 58-59.
26 N.T. 24.
4
2. Topographic survey of entire tract plus 100 feet outside of
property lines and necessary drainage areas.
3. All utilities located - (above and below the surface).
4. Topo and boundary survey done on AutoCAD 14 file
showing 1 foot contours.
5. Payment 30 days after completion.
6. Above tasks will be finished 15 working days after notice to
proceed.
7. Total amount of proposal - $6,000.00.
By signing and returning it to our office that will be notice to
proceed.27
Defendant Gross responded with a letter dated January 8, 1999, but
received in late January, 1999, according to Mr. Watson's testimony, which read
as follows:
Re: Proposed Development
South Middleton Township
60+ acres
Dear Roger:
I believe [Defendant] Arnold [Forbes] explained to you
that we have now taken steps to move forward with this
project. As you and he discussed, the proposal set forth for
him in your letter to me of November 24, is fine with a few
changes, as follows:
(a) In addition to the items listed in your letter, your
work will include a new "sketch plan," tied into your
surveys, etc., that we will be able to use in preliminary
discussions with the Township and possibly with other
governmental bodies;
(b) We will pay you $3,000.00 for your work; and
(c) If we decide to proceed with the development, then
we will pay you an additional $3,000.00 and we will
also give you an opportunity to negotiate with us for
additional work needed for the project. We also will
pay you the additional $3,000.00 if, without
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1; see N.T. 10.
5
proceeding with the development, we sell the project,
utilizing your work in connection with that sale.
Assuming all this is satisfactory, please consider this letter
as our "Notice to Proceed." If there are any questions, please
get in touch with me.
Please note that until you are notified to do otherwise, all
surveys and invoices should be prepared in the name of Arnold
Forbes. At some point, the project will be transferred to a
parmership but the name and other details of the parmership
have not yet been established.
Thanks again for your help so far and we look forward to
continuing to work with you.28
The proposal of Plaintiff which had been forwarded to Defendant Gross
was returned with this letter, executed by Defendant Gross with the date January
8, 1999, and the notation "Modified by WMG letter of 1/8/99."29 Mr. Watson
testified that, upon receipt of the letter, he received a clarification by telephone
from Defendant Gross that, notwithstanding the direction that bills should refer to
Defendant Forbes, all three Defendants "would take care of this matter.''3° His
company promptly proceeded with the work, according to his testimony.3~
This phase of the project involved field work by Plaintiff on the site, he
stated.32 As the site work progressed, it was determined that the area of the tract
was 77.1 acres rather than 60, as the parties had assumed, according to his
testimony.33 He stated that the work covered by Plaintiff's proposal dated
November 24, 1998, as modified by the letter received at the end of January 1999,
from Defendant Gross, was completed by February 20, 1999.34 It included a
:8 Plaintiff's Exhibit 1; see N.T. 10-11.
29 Plaintiff's Exhibit 1.
so N.T. 11; see N.T. 14-15.
si N.T. 12.
s: N.T. 21, 26; see Plaintiff's Exhibit 2.
ss N.T. 22.
34 N.T. 15-27, 35.
6
sketch plan, his testimony indicated, utilizing contours, boundary lines, and other
information obtained in the field, depicting a design for a development of 484
townhouses on the site.35 The work was completed within 15 working days of
receipt of notice to proceed, according to his testimony, and Defendants made no
complaint that it was either untimely or unsatisfactory.36
Subsequently, Mr. Watson testified, his company was asked by one or more
of the Defendants to perform a number of services in furtherance of the project
that were beyond the scope of the original agreement.37 His testimony supported
the proposition that additional work, with values as indicated, was accomplished
by Plaintiff for the benefit of Defendants, including the following: new sketch plan
($900.00),38 meetings with township officials ($360.00),39 meetings with an
engineering firm known as Navarro & Wright Consulting Engineers ($720.00),4°
meetings with an engineer named Zeke Morrow ($960.00),41 meetings with an
engineering firm known as Walter Hein and Associates ($960.00),42 meetings with
one or more of the Defendants ($1,170.00),43 and drafting services ($4,040.00).44
Mr. Watson testified that, during this time, he was assured by both Defendant
3s N.T. 225-26, 55; Plaintiff's Exhibit 4.
36 N.T. 21.
37 N.T. 27-56.
38 N.T. 41-42; PlaintifFs Exhibit 7. According to Mr. Watson's testimony, the original sketch
plan had been for townhouses only, but eventually a combination of townhouses and garden
apartments was decided upon. N.T. 32.
39 N.T. 54-55.
4o N.T. 48-49.
4~ N.T. 49-51.
42 N.T. 51-52.
43 N.T. 52-54.
44 N.T. 45-46.
7
Gross and Defendant Sahi that Plaintiff would be paid for its work,45 but that no
money had ever been paid to Plaintiff by Defendants.46
Testimony of Defendant Gross, on behalf of Defendants, was to the effect
that he (Defendant Gross) was an attorney and real estate broker,47 that Defendant
Forbes was one of his clients, that a few months prior to November, 1998, an
agreement existed between Defendant Forbes and the owner of the tract in
question wherein Defendant Forbes was purchaser of the tract, that Defendant
Forbes "was unable to put together whatever he was going to do with the project,"
and that he (Defendant Gross) and Defendant Forbes entered into an agreement
whereby Defendant Gross "would try to move on this [project] as a principal" but
Defendant Forbes would remain as "the only [pro]spective purchaser.''48 He
testified further that Defendant Forbes had contemplated a mobile home project,
that "we wanted to know whether that would fly or what would fly," and that he
(Defendant Gross) was surprised to find out that the tract was as large as it turned
out to be.49
At a meeting of the township planning commission on April 8, 1999, the
staff of the township presented a report relating to the project, he stated.5° This
report indicated various prerequisites to eventual approval of the project, such as a
traffic impact study, an environmental impact assessment, payment of recreation
fees, approval of sewage capacity by a certain municipal authority, a stormwater
management plan acceptable to a certain regional authority, and other tasks that
suggested the prospect of major undertakings on the part of the applicant.~
45 N.T. 30, 53.
46 N.T. 53.
47 N.T. 98.
48 N.T. 98-99.
49 N.T. 100-01.
50 N.T. 106-08.
5~ Defendants' Exhibit 1; N.T. 108.
Defendant Gross testified that the project "eventually died because we
didn't come up with [a certain payment of $16,500.00 to the owner of the tract
which would have extended the right to purchase the property for an additional six
months] on July lst[, 1999].''s2 The gist of his testimony regarding liability of his
group to Plaintiff was (a) that his (Defendant Gross's) letter dated January 8, 1999,
had been faxed to Mr. Watson on January 8, 1999,53 (b) that Plaintiff's
performance was not so prompt as Mr. Watson indicated,54 and (c) that any
payment being requested in excess of the $3,000.00 figure contained in the letter
dated January 8, 1999,55 was attributable either to work that the figure was
intended to cover or to work which Plaintiff donated to the project in the hope that
its efforts would lead to the second $3,000.00 payment and a further engagement
in the project,s6
He also testified that Defendant Sahi was merely a "potential investor" in
the project,57 who would have contributed to the July 1, 1999, payment to the
owner as well as to the purchase price had the project gone forward,sa Finally, he
stated that, although Defendant Forbes "was actually the person on the contract"
with the owner:59
[W]hen we took the project away from him, so to speak, we
gave--he gave it to us [with] an oral understanding, never
reduced to writing, that [he] would be involved with anything
that was done if [it] went forward.
s2 N.T.
middle
and we
s~ N.T.
s4 N.T.
ss N.T.
56 N.T.
s7 N.T.
s8 N.T.
s9 N.T.
114. He also stated that "[t]he project actually died in my mind somewhere around the
of August [1999] after we made some attempts to revise the agreement with the owner
were unable to come up to a meeting of the minds." N.T. 114-15.
104.
105.
116.
117-28.
128.
128-29.
129.
9
He is basically a contractor and he might have been a
contractor with regard to the actual development; or if we sold
the project, we would have had some obligation to give him
some portion of the proceeds, but we never really discussed
that.®
When asked whether "this enterprise cause[d] the Defendants to lose any
money," Defendant Gross testified that they had lost $21,500.00, which they had
paid to the owner of the tract on January 1, 1999 (to extend the right to purchase
the tract until July 1, 1999).61
Defendant Sahi testified that his background was that of a professional
engineer62 and that he had been involved in other real estate transactions.63
According to his testimony, he had attended meetings with Mr. Watson and had
been "kept... in the loop" with respect to the project at issue by Defendant
Gross.64 He stated that he had never heard Mr. Watson expressly state that he
would be charging for work not covered by the written documents, and that
Defendant Gross had never said that any of the Defendants would be obligated to
Plaintiff for more than for which those documents provided.65
Defendant Arnold Forbes did not testify at the trial. At the conclusion of
the evidentiary phase of the nonjury trial, the court took the matter under
advisement.66 On September 6, 2001, the court issued the following verdict:
AND NOW, this 6th day of September, 2001, upon
consideration of Plaintiff's complaint in the above-captioned
case, and of Defendants' counterclaim, following a nonjury
trial held on August 27, 2001, and for the reasons stated in the
accompanying opinion, the verdict of the court is as follows:
60 N.T. 129.
61 N.T. 129-30.
62 N.T. 145.
63 N.T. 144.
64 N.T. 143-44.
65 N.T. 145.
66 N.T. 159.
10
1. On Plaintiff's complaint, the court finds in
favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants, jointly
and severally, in the amount of $3,000.00, with
interest at the rate of 1% per month commencing
May 30, 1999, and with a penalty at the rate of
1% per month commencing May 30, 1999, and in
the additional amount of $9,110.00, with interest
at the legal rate from April 23, 2000, plus costs
of suit.
2. On Defendants' counterclaim, the court
finds in favor of Plaintiff and against
Defendants.67
The verdict was accompanied by a memorandum opinion which
summarized the bases for the verdict. The opinion stated, in part, as follows:
The verdict entered by the court is indicative, inter alia, of its
findings as to the amount of Defendants' liability encompassed
by the Contractor and Subcontractor Payment Act (and thus
subject to the interest and penalty provisions of the act), the
date that interest and penalties began to accrue under the
act,[68] the amount of Defendants' liability for unjust
enrichment, and the date that interest at the legal rate began to
accrue on that liability.
[69]
In awarding Plaintiff a total of $12,110.00, plus interest and costs of suit,
the court rejected Plaintiff's claim for additional sums of $1,350.00 (relating to the
amount of unanticipated acreage),7° $3,000.00 (based upon a theory that
Defendants had "proceeded with the development" within the meaning of the
written agreement),TM and $3,000.00 (based apparently upon Mr. Watson's view
that the written agreement contemplated a total payment to Plaintiff of $9,000.00
67 Order of Court, September 6, 2001.
68 I.e., eight days following the due date on Plaintiff's invoice. See Plaintiff's Exhibit 6; Act of
February 17, 1994, P.L. 73, 783 P.S. §§505, 512 (2001 Supp.).
69 I.e., a month after the filing of the complaint herein, where a demand was first made upon
Defendants for payment on the claim of unjust enrichment. See Plaintiffs Complaint, filed
March 23, 2000.
70 See N.T. 41.
7~ See N.T. 56-58.
11
if Plaintiff's initial work was satisfactory, if Defendants proceeded with the
development, and if the project was saleable).TM in this regard, the court was of the
view (a) that, in the absence of a term relating to acreage in Plaintiff's proposal,
the relatively modest deviation in acreage from expectations did not warrant a
reformation of the written agreement, (b) that Defendants had not "proceeded with
the development" so as to cause a second $3,000.00 payment to be due Plaintiff
under the written agreement, (c) that the $3,000.00 payment to Plaintiff provided
for in the written agreement in the event Defendants sold the project was in the
alternative (and not in addition) to the said second $3,000.00 payment, and (d)
that, in any event, the sale which would cause the latter $3,000.00 payment to be
due Plaintiff under the written agreement had not occurred.
inasmuch as $3,000.00 of the aforesaid award to Plaintiff had been
determined by the court to be encompassed by the Contractor and Subcontractor
Payment Act,73 Plaintiff petitioned for a determination of the amount of attorney's
fees due under the act; in the petition, it requested such fees in the amount of
$19,777.75.TM Following a hearing held on November 19, 2001, the court added
attorney's fees in the amount of $2,500.00 to Plaintiff's verdict.75
in a motion for post-trial relief, Defendants set forth the following grounds
for relief:
1. The Court erred in finding in favor of Plaintiff and
against Defendants in the amount of $3,000.00 and in an
72 See N.T. 56-58.
73 This was clear from the award of interest consistent with the act at the rate of 1% per month on
the sum of $3,000.00 and the award of interest at the legal rate on the balance of the award, and
from the accompanying Memorandum Opinion. See Adjudication and Memorandum Opinion,
September 6, 2001.
74 Plaintiff's Petition for Award of Attorneys Fees and Expenses, filed September 24, 2001.
75 Order of Court, November 19, 2001. Defendants have not directed the stenographer to
transcribe the proceeding regarding attorney's fees, and it is assumed that the amount of the
award in this regard (as opposed to its propriety in a legal sense) is not at issue on appeal. Cf
Gargano v. Terminexlnt'l. Co., L.P., 784 A.2d 188, 194 n.3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001).
12
additional amount of $9,110.00 plus interest and in failing to
find in favor of Defendants on their counterclaim.
2. The Court erred in finding that the Contractor and
Subcontractor Payment Act is applicable to this matter.
3. The Court's findings were against the weight of the
evidence.
Following the filing of the trial transcript and submission of briefs,
Defendants' motion for post-trial relief was denied, on January 29, 2002.76
Defendants filed a notice of appeal from the order denying the motion for post-
trial relief on March 1, 2002. Judgment on this court's verdict was eventually
entered upon praecipe of the Plaintiff on April 2, 2002.77
DISCUSSION
Statement of Law
Motions for post-trial relief specificity. Under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil
Procedure 227. l(b)(2), a motion for post-trial relief"may not be granted unless the
grounds therefor.., are specified in the motion." A "boilerplate" ground, such as
a general assertion that a verdict was against the weight of the evidence, is not
normally considered specific enough to satisfy this rule. See, e.g., Dauphin
Deposit Bank and Trust Co. v. Pifer, 383 Pa. Super. 275, 282, 556 A.2d 904, 907
(1989).
Weight of the evidence. "Granting a new trial on the ground that the verdict
is against the weight of the evidence is generally committed to the sound
discretion of the trial court." Dierolfv. Slade, 399 Pa. Super. 9, 15, 581 A.2d 649,
652 (1990). The test is whether the verdict "was so contrary to the evidence as to
shock one's sense of justice and 'to make the award of a new trial imperative, so
that right may be given another opportunity to prevail.'" Id (quoting
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 324 Pa. Super. 420, 425, 471 A.2d 1228, 1230 (1984))
76 Order of Court, January 29, 2002; see Order of Court, September 24,
preparation of trial transcript).
77 See supra note 1.
2001 (relating to
13
"In a bench trial, it is the duty of the trial judge to judge credibility of the
witnesses and to weigh their testimony." Gasper ex tel. Weir v. Estate of Ciao,
521 Pa. 491, 503, 556 A.2d 819, 824 (1989). "[T]he trial court is free to believe
all, part, or none of the evidence that is presented .... "Hodges v. Rodriquez, 435
Pa. Super. 360, 366, 645 A.2d 1340, 1343 (1994).
Contractor and Subcontractor Payment Act. Pennsylvania's Contractor
and Subcontractor Payment Act78 is "[a]n act requiring timely payment to certain
contractors and subcontractors; and providing remedies to contractors and
subcontractors." 73 P.S. §501. In pertinent part, the Act requires that an "owner
shall pay [a] contractor strictly in accordance with the terms of [a] construction
contract." Id §505(a) (emphasis added).
An owner is "[a] person who has an interest" in the affected real estate. Id
§502 (emphasis added). A person includes a "partnership... [or] other
association.., or a natural individual." Id A contractor is one who is
"authorized or engaged by an owner to improve real property." Id. To improve
includes "[t]o design... [or] provide professional...services [for] any
improvement upon [or] connected with.., any real property." Id A construction
contract is "[a]n agreement, whether written or oral, to perform work on any real
property located within this Commonwealth." Id (emphasis added).
Where an owner violates an obligation of payment under the Act, and the
contractor is forced to commence litigation to enforce his, her or its rights,
attorney's fees and interest penalties are provided for in the Act. Id §512.
Partnership/joint venture. As a general rule, an act of one partner or joint
venturer in furtherance of the business of the partnership or joint venture operates
to obligate the other partners or joint venturers as well. Holt's Cigar Co. v. 222
Liberty Associates, 404 Pa. Super. 578, 580-81, 591 A.2d 743, 744 (1991);
Snelbaker v. Herrmann, 315 Pa. super. 520, 526-27, 462 A.2d 713, 716 (1983);
78 Act of February 17, 1994, P.L. 73, 73 P.S. §§501-16 (2001 Supp.).
14
see Act of December 21, 1988, P.L. 1444, §103, 15 Pa. C.S.A. §8325(2001
Supp.). A parmership or joint venture may be formed by oral or written
agreement. Snelbaker, 315 Pa. Super. at 526-30, 462 A.2d at 716-18; see Tyson v.
Commomvealth, 684 A.2d 246, 247 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996); see also 15 Pa.
C.S.A. §8503 (defining parmership agreement as "[a]ny agreement, written or
oral"). The existence of a parmership or joint venture may be proven by direct or
circumstantial evidence. See e.g., Snelbaker, 315 Pa. Super. at 526-30, 462 A.2d
at 716-18; cf. 15 Pa. C.S.A. §8312 (stating that evidence of shared profits is proof
of a parmership agreement). Particularly, the existence of a joint venture may be
proven by circumstantial evidence relating to several factors:
(1) [E]ach party to the venture must make a contribution, not
necessarily of capital, but by way of services, skill,
knowledge, materials or money; (2) profits must be shared
among the parties; (3) there must be a "joint proprietary
interest and right of mutual control over the subject matter" of
the enterprise; [and] (4) usually, there is a single business
transaction rather than a general and continuous transaction.
McRoberts v. Phelps, 391 Pa. 591, 599, 138 A.2d 439, 443 (1958) (footnotes
omitted).
Unjust enrichment. The doctrine of unjust enrichment is a doctrine founded
upon equitable principles whereby "the law implies a contract, which requires the
defendant to pay to the plaintiff the value of the benefit conferred." Mitchell v.
Moore, 729 A.2d 1200, 1203 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999). Unjust enrichment requires
proof of several elements:
(1) benefits conferred on defendant by plaintiff: (2)
appreciation of such benefits by defendant; and (3) acceptance
and retention of such benefits under such circumstances that it
would be inequitable for defendant to retain the benefit without
payment of value.
Id quoting Schenck v. K.E. David, Ltd, 446 Pa. Super. 94, 97, 666 A.2d 327, 328
(1995)).
15
Application of Law to Facts
In the present case, the grounds advanced in Defendants' motion for post-
trial relief were largely unspecific and, in that sense, incompatible with the
requirements of Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 227.1(b)(2). More
significantly, in the court's view, they lacked merit.
In this regard, in its capacity as trier-of-fact, the court found the testimony
of Plaintiff's president to be credible in terms of the work performed by Plaintiff,
within and without the scope of the parties' written agreement, and of the
reasonable value of the benefits conferred upon Defendants attributable to services
beyond those contemplated by the written agreement. It did not find credible
Defendants' contention that services requested by Defendants and performed by
Plaintiff outside the scope of the written agreement were tendered gratuitously, or
that the acceptance and retention of such benefits by Defendants under the
circumstances without payment would have been equitable. The court further
concluded, on the basis of the circumstantial evidence presented, that Defendants
had been engaged in a partnership or joint venture in connection with the project,
resulting in liability on the part of all Defendants for obligations incurred to
Plaintiff on behalf of the enterprise.
While a closer question, the court was also of the view that the work
performed by Plaintiff pursuant to the written agreement, which was on-site and
resulted in the design of improvements to the real estate in the form of 484
townhouses, was within the purview of Pennsylvania's Contractor and
Subcontractor Act. Accordingly, the verdict included interest as provided for in
the Act on the $3,000.00 amount determined to be encompassed by the Act and,
following a hearing on Plaintiff's petition, an award of attorney's fees determined
to be reasonably related to the said $3,000.00.79
79 The court has found no authority for a position advanced by Defendants that a determination as
to attorney's fees could not be made on a petition for such a determination after the trial had
16
In summary, without regard to the effect of the generalized nature of
Defendants' motion for post-trial relief, the verdict was not, in the court's view,
either erroneous as a matter of law or so contrary to the weight of the evidence as
to be shocking to one's sense of justice.
post-trial relief was denied.
For these reasons, Defendants' motion for
BY THE COURT,
Gerald Pisarcik, Esq.
20 Erford Road
Lemoyne, PA 17043
Attorney for Plaintiff
Albert J. Hajjar, Esq.
3003 N. Front Street
Harrisburg, PA 17110
Attorney for Defendants
J. Wesley Oler, Jr., J.
concluded. Rarely will a court be able to assess the propriety of such an award, or the amount to
be awarded, prior to a determination on the underlying cause of action.
17