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HomeMy WebLinkAbout01-6243 CIVILCHRISTIAN N. MCADOO, Plaintiff VS. COM. OF PENNSYLVANIA, DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION, BUREAU OF DRIVER LICENSING: Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 01-6243 CIVIL CIVIL ACTION - LAW LICENSE SUSPENSION APPEAL OPINION AND ORDER On March 2, 2001, the petitioner, Christian N. McAdoo, a resident of Pennsylvania, was a college student. He was stopped in Star City, West Virginia, and charged with driving under the influence. The same day, he entered a no contest plea. He was not advised by anyone that his plea would result in any action by the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation pertaining to his Pennsylvania driving privileges. Following his graduation from college, Mr. McAdoo returned to Carlisle, Pennsylvania. He accepted a job on June 10, 2001, with the offices ofM & T Bank at their regional headquarters in Carlisle. As part of his employment, it was anticipated that he would have the ability to call on various clients by driving his own vehicle. By notice dated October 9, 2001, the petitioners drivels license was suspended, effective November 13, 2001, as a result of the Star City conviction. He has filed the instant appeal from his license suspension. Were Mr. McAdoo's conviction to have occurred in Pennsylvania, he would have had available to him the various permutations of ARD which include, in this county, a one-month suspension and the subsequent installation of a guardian interlock device. He would, thereby, be able to retain his employment. We note, however, the holdings of the Commonwealth Court in Sutherland v. Com., 45 Pa. Cmwlth. 490, 407 A.2d 1364 (1979) and its several progeny to the 01-6243 CIVIL effect that no equal protection rights are violated just because ARD would have been available to a licensee in Pennsylvania. In this case, Mr. McAdoo entered his nolo contendre plea on March 2, 2001. He received a notice of suspension a little more than seven months later. In the meantime, he had obtained employment which requires the operation of an automobile. He contends that he is entitled to relief because of the delay of his suspension. In order to sustain an appeal of a license suspension based on delay, the licensee must prove that: (1) an unreasonable delay chargeable to PennDOT led the licensee to believe that his operating privileges would not be impaired; and (2) prejudice would result by having the operating privileges suspended after such delay. Terraciano v. Com., Dept. of Transp., 562 Pa. 60, 66, 753 A.2d 233,236 (Pa. 2000). In Grover v. Com., Dept. of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 734 A.2d 941 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999), the court discussed the matter of attributing delay to PennDOT. The court noted: Id., m 943. When a licensee challenges such a suspension by offering the defense of delay, we conclude that DOT must then prove that the delay was caused not by administrative inaction but by some other factor not chargeable to DOT. Clearly, it would be illogical to force a licensee to prove at what time DOT received the notice of conviction. Because DOT has more ready access to the resources necessary to prove this crucial point, and has attempted to present such evidence in this and other suspension hearings, we do not believe that we are articulating a new rule of law. 2 01-6243 CIVIL In this case, the Department has offered the so-called WID date as at least circumstantial evidence of when it received paperwork from West Virginia. This is the date on which paperwork was processed by the Pennsylvania authorities. It is, however, by no means conclusive as to when record of the suspension was received. As part of routine processing procedures, the material from West Virginia was microfilmed. Clearly, the best evidence of the receipt of the material from West Virginia would be the postmark on the envelope. While postmarks are routinely microfilmed, no postmark appears in this case. This is because the processing clerk was, in the words of the Departmenfs witness,"not careful? We have considered at length the testimony proffered by the Department mindful of the disastrous consequences for Mr. McAdoo if he loses his driver's license. We conclude that, in this particular case, the receipt date by the Department has not been established by a preponderance of the evidence. Thus, we will treat this case as one involving a delay of at least seven months. Having reached this conclusion, we are satisfied that the case of Bennett v. Com., Dept. ofTransp.. Bureaur of Driver Licensing, 163 Pa. Cmwlth. 664, 642 A.2d 1139 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994) is analogous. In that case, the appellant was convicted of driving under suspension. His employment as a tractor-trailer operator was terminated as a result of the conviction. Later, Bennett secured new employment as a truck driver only to learn that his drivers license was again subject to suspension as a result of the driving under suspension conviction. He appealed, alleging that the delay of over eight months between his conviction and his suspension was prejudicial. The Commonwealth Court agreed that the loss of employment requiring an operators license is prejudicial. Id. at 1141. The court went on to opine: While the eight-month delay in the present case is less than those experienced by licensees in either 01-6243 CIVIL Rea or Walsh, we conclude that Bennett's detrimental reliance on the delay is equally prejudicial. Although a change from unemployment compensation recipient to truck driver is not a change in employment status in the same manner as addressed in Walsh or Rea, the resulting detriment is the same. Moreover, we view the change in status from unemployment compensation recipient to gainfully employed truck driver as the most substantial change in employment status one may contemplate. In this case, Mr. McAdoo not only changed his status from that of a student to that of a full-time bank employee, but has, in fact, embarked on his first career. This essentially ministerial act would end that career only months after it had begun. ORDER AND NOW, this day of April, 2002, the appeal of the plaintiff from the order suspending his driver's license is SUSTAINED. BY THE COURT, David E. Hershey, Esquire For the Plaintiff George Kabusk, Esquire For PennDOT :rlm Kevin A. Hess, J. 4 CHRISTIAN N. MCADOO, Plaimiff VS. COM. OF PENNSYLVANIA, DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION, BUREAU OF DRIVER LICENSING: Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 01-6243 CIVIL CIVIL ACTION - LAW LICENSE SUSPENSION APPEAL IN RE: LICENSE SUSPENSION APPEAL ORDER AND NOW, this day of April, 2002, the appeal of the plaimiff from the order suspending his driver's license is SUSTAINED. BY THE COURT, David E. Hershey, Esquire For the Plaimiff George Kabusk, Esquire For PennDOT :rlm Kevin A. Hess, J.