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HomeMy WebLinkAbout01-6612 CIVILMARK GEBAUER, Appellant V. COUNCIL OF THE BOROUGH OF CAMP HILL, Appellee and CAMP HILL UNITED METHODIST CHURCH, Intervenor IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 01-6612 CIVIL CIVIL ACTION - LAW LAND USE APPEAL IN RE: LAND USE APPEAL BEFORE BAYLEY AND HESS, JJ. OPINION AND ORDER On July 3, 2001, the Camp Hill United Methodist Church (hereinafter "UMC") filed a subdivision and land development application with the Zoning Hearing Board of the Borough of Camp Hill, Cumberland County. The application sought approval for the construction of a surface parking lot on the UMC property. The UMC property is located in an R-1 residential Zoning District; all adjacent property is likewise zoned R-1. The neighborhood to the west of the church is made up of single family homes, though an adjacent property to the north and east consists of athletic fields owned by the Camp Hill School District. The Borough considered the UMC application at two separate public meetings held respectively on September 12, 2001 and October 10, 2001. At both of these meetings the church's application was opposed by several local residents, including Mark Gebauer, the owner of a home across the street to the west of the church and the appellant in the instant matter. Gebauer's primary contention was and is that the UMC application should be denied on the grounds that the parking lot violated the Borough's zoning ordinance. At the October 10th 61-6612 CIVIL meeting, the Borough voted unanimously to approve the church's application. Subsequently, on November 26, 2001, Gebauer filed the instant land use appeal; on December 17, 2001, UMC filed a Notice of Intervention. The chief argument of Mr. Gebauer centers around whether the proposed parking lot is an "accessory use," as opposed to a "principal use." If it is an "accessory use," then it can only be constructed in the rear yard of the church property; the parking lot sub judice is not to the "rear" of the church in any sense of that word. The Camp Hill Zoning Ordinance, Mr. Gebauer points out, defines as an accessory use that which is "subordinate to the principal use of land or of a building on a lot and customarily incidental thereto." Zoning Ord Section 200-6 ("Terms Defined"). He claims that, in this instance, the principal use of the property is that of a church, with the proposed parking lot serving as an accessory use to that purpose. If, indeed, the parking lot were to be characterized as an accessory use, the Borough's zoning ordinance, in Section 200-29D, would permit such a use if it were "customarily incidental" to the listed permitted uses in an R-1 district. However, any accessory use--if it does not entail "structurally attached garages or carports"--must be located in the rear yard of the principal use.~ Gebauer thus concludes that, because the proposed parking lot is an accessory use that is "customarily incidental" to the principal use of the property as a church, it must be located in the rear yard: "[t]he subject land development plan specifies construction of the parking lot on the north side of the subject property, which is not the rear yard of the lot... [i]t is, therefor [sic], in violation of Section 200-29D." Land Use App. at 4. The Borough Council concedes the point that parking lots must be either a "main" use or an accessory use in order to be permitted in an R-1 district. Appellee Brief in Opposition to ~ Interestingly, § 200-17 of the zoning ordinance ("Accessory buildings, structures and uses"), in which permitted accessory uses are listed, makes no mention of churches. 2 61-6612 CIVIL Appeal at 4. It argues, however, that there is substantial evidence to support the position that the term "church" can be interpreted to include the church's parking lot as part of the principal use, and that ambiguity exists in the zoning ordinance with respect to whether a parking lot should be considered an accessory use. On the first point, the Council states that the zoning ordinance does not define "principal use." Hence, reliance is placed on the Borough's Subdivision and Land Development Ordinance ("SALDO"), wherein "principal use" is defined as "the basic purpose for which a building or land area is occupied as opposed to accessory or incidental uses; usually classifiable as residential, commercial, manufacturing or public in nature." SALDO Section 3-8. The Council argues that it would be erroneous to conclude that, since the principal building on the property in question is a church, "the 'principal' or 'main' use of the lot must therefore be the church building only and anything else located on the lot is automatically 'accessory.'" Appellee Brief in Opposition to Appeal at 6. Instead, the Council proposes that the principal use of the land could encompass not just that of the church structure itself, but also that of separate pieces of the whole lot, "including the building, the parking areas, the lawn, and the yards." Id. Hence, the reasoning goes, that which comprises the principal use of the "church" could conceivably include any uses of the lot which may be considered indispensable to the fulfillment of the property's use as a church. A parking lot would thus be considered to be one of the aspects that, when taken together, constitute the principal use of the property. At the very least, according to the Borough, there is ambiguity on this point. It is on the existence of ambiguity that this case turns. The Municipalities Planning Code, 53 P.S. Section 10603.1, provides that "[i]n interpreting the language of zoning ordinances to determine the extent of the restriction upon the use of the property, the language shall be interpreted, where doubt exists as to the intended meaning of the language written and enacted 61-6612 CIVIL by the governing body, in favor of the property owner and against any implied extension of the restriction." Any doubt in the language of an ordinance must be resolved in favor of the landowner and the least restrictive use of the land. Tobin v. Radnor Township Bd. of Commissioners, 142 Pa. Cmwlth. 567, 578, 597 A.2d 1258, 1264 (1991) (citing Appeal of Mt. Laurel Racing Ass'n., 73 Pa. Cmwlth. 531,534-35, 458 A.2d 1043, 1044-45 (1983)). As noted by the Borough in its brief, the general rules of statutory construction are applicable to an interpretation of zoning ordinances. Board of Supervisors of Richland Township v. Tohickon Creek Assoc., 123 Pa. Cmwlth. 111, 117, 553 A.2d 492, 494 (1989). Thus, the general rule that portions of a statute must be read to be consistent with each other applies to zoning ordinances. A zoning ordinance is to be construed, if possible, to give effect to all of its provisions. Fidler v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Upper Macungie Township, 408 Pa. 260, 267, 182 A.2d 692, 695 (1962); Appeal of Neshaminy Auto Villa Ltd., 25 Pa. Cmwlth. 129, 133,358 A.2d 433,435 (1976). In interpreting the meaning of an ordinance, an interpreter should not presume that the drafters of an ordinance intended a result that is absurd, unreasonable, or impossible of execution. Rudolph v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of College Township, 80 Pa. Cmwlth. 28, 34, 470 A.2d 1104, 1107 (1984). Section 200-29D regulates accessory uses within the residential district. It allows as a permitted use an "accessory use on the same lot with and customarily incidental to any of the foregoing permitted uses, including private garages." (Ordinance Section 200-29D, R. at 043) (emphasis added). The accessory use section of the R-1 district goes on to further regulate accessory uses by indicating the following: A private garage or carport structurally attached to a main building is considered to be part of the building for yard purposes. Accessory uses other than structurally attached garages or carports shall 4 61-6612 CIVIL be located within the rear yard of the principal use. Accessory uses other than home occupation shall be located in accordance with the provisions of Section 200-17B. Section 200-29D implies that "private garages" are an example of an accessory use. It does not state, however, that all parking must be an accessory use. Instead, the section itself indicates that parking structures could be considered part of the principal building. If the garage or carport is attached to a "main" building, they are considered part of that building for yard purposes. Thus even within the section regulating accessory uses itself, the ordinance indicates there are times when parking may be considered part of the principal structure. Under a literal interpretation of the zoning ordinance, if the UMC were to propose a 4-tiered parking garage attached to its building, such a garage could be located in any yard. In addition, the zoning article regulating off-street parking specifically refers to parking occurring in front yards of residential districts. Section 200-91D limits the "front yard parking area and driveway" to twenty feet in width in a residential district. (R. at 109). If appellant's argument were to be followed, parking in residential districts would never be permitted in the front yard because parking would always have to be an "accessory use" and located in the rear yard, yet the zoning ordinance clearly anticipates parking occurring in front yards of residential districts and limits the size of such parking to twenty feet. An interpretation that parking is always an "accessory use" requiring it to be located in the rear yard and the ordinance section permitting parking areas up to 20' in a front yard cannot be reconciled without acknowledging that (1) there are times when parking will occur in yards other than the rear yard, and (2) parking cannot therefore always be an "accessory use." Appellee Brief in Opposition to Appeal, pp. 9, 10, 11. 61-6612 CIVIL The appellant's other argument is that the proposed parking lot would be in the "front yard" of the church property and, given its size (62 feet by 387 feet), would violate Section 200- 91D of the Zoning Ordinance. That section provides that "[i]n residential districts, the front yard parking area and driveway shall not exceed twenty (20) feet in width." The Borough's zoning ordinance does not define "front yard." Where a term is not defined, one must look to the plain, ordinary meaning of the term. Appeal of Mt. Laurel Racing Ass'n., 73 Pa. Cmwlth. 531,534, 458 A.2d 1043, 1044 (1983). One indication of where the front yard of the property is located can be determined from the address of the church itself: 417 South 22nd Street. It is commonly understood that the street address of a property correlates to the location of the front yard. The street runs along the west side of the property. The proposed parking lot would be situated on the north side. Located between the church building and 22nd Street is, in fact, a yard and play area. In the record forwarded by the Borough are comments regarding whether "parking is an accessory use under the R-1 residential zoning district regulations of the Borough of Camp Hill." Appellee's Exhibit 39. Those comments note that in other recent land development approvals, the Borough has not required all parking lots in residential districts to be located in the rear yard. Admittedly, this occurred in cases where the issue of parking being an "accessory use" was not raised in the land development process. These land development approvals include the Cleve Friedrickson Library and the new Borough Hall. In this, the matter of the United Methodist Church, the Borough has confronted the parking issue for the first time and determined that there is doubt concerning the meaning of the ordinance. This doubt must be resolved in favor of the applicant. In land use appeals where no additional evidence is taken, the scope of review in this court is limited to determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion or commission of 61-6612 CIVIL an error of law. In re Appeal of Hoffman, 66 Pa. Cmwlth. 7, 9, 444 A.2d 764, 765 (1982). find neither in this case. AND NOW, this We ORDER day of June, 2002, the appeal of Mark Gebauer from the decision of the Council of the Borough of Camp Hill to approve the land development plan of the United Methodist Church of Camp Hill is DENIED. BY THE COURT, Mark Gebauer, Pro Se Appellant Dylan Painter Dayton, Esquire For Appellee David R. Getz, Esquire For Intervenor :rlm Kevin A. Hess, J. 61-6612 CIVIL MARK GEBAUER, Appellant V. COUNCIL OF THE BOROUGH OF CAMP HILL, Appellee and CAMP HILL UNITED METHODIST CHURCH, Intervenor AND NOW, this IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 01-6612 CIVIL CIVIL ACTON - LAW LAND USE APPEAL IN RE: LAND USE APPEAL BEFORE BAYLEY AND HESS, JJ. ORDER day of June, 2002, the appeal of Mark Gebauer from the decision of the Council of the Borough of Camp Hill to approve the land development plan of the United Methodist Church of Camp Hill is DENIED. BY THE COURT, Mark Gebauer, Pro Se Appellant Dylan Painter Dayton, Esquire For Appellee David R. Getz, Esquire For Intervenor :rlm Kevin A. Hess, J.