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HomeMy WebLinkAbout99-7691 CIVILWILLIAM SCOTT EVANS, Plaintiff VS. BRIAN ROWLES and EXEL LOGISTICS, Defendants IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW 99-7691 CIVIL IN RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BEFORE HOFFER, P.J., HESS AND OLER, J.J. OPINION AND ORDER Pending before the court is the motion of defendant, Brian Rowles, for summary judgment. He contends that the claim of the plaintiff is barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Act, 77 P.S. Section 1 et seq. Interrogatories have been propounded and depositions have been taken and the facts necessary to the disposition of the instant motion are not in dispute. In the meantime, by order of June 14, 2002, the case was dismissed as to defendant, Exel Logistics. On January 19, 1998, the plaintiff was injured when a vehicle, driven by the defendant, struck him from behind. The accident occurred just prior to 5:00 a.m. in a parking lot provided for the parties by their employer, Exel. The plaintiff and defendant were both employed as forklift operators for Exel. As permitted by company policy, the plaintiff went out to the parking lot to start and warm up his vehicle prior to the end of his shift. The defendant struck the plaintiff while the latter was walking back to the building to complete his shift. The defendant had left his work station not only to warm up his vehicle but also to move it closer to the 99-7691 CIVIL building. The movement of the vehicle was a violation of company policy. Neither plaintiff nor defendant had "punched out" at the time of the accident. The legal principles surrounding the grant of summary judgment are well established: [T]he pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admission[s] on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law .... The record must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party .... Summary judgment may be entered only in those cases where the right is clear and free from doubt. Albright v. Fagan, 448 Pa. Super. 395, 398-399, 671 A.2d 760, 761-762 (1996) (quoting Ducjai v. Dennis, 540 Pa. 103, 113,656 A.2d 102, 107 (1995)). The Workers' Compensation Act sets forth the immunity that an employee receives where his actions injure a fellow employee: If disability or death is compensable under this act, a person shall not be liable to anyone at common law or otherwise on account of such disability or death for any act or omission occurring while such person was in the same employ as the person disabled or killed, except for intentional wrong. 77 P.S. Section 72 (Emphasis added). As noted inApple v. Reichert, 443 Pa. 289, 294, 278 A.2d 482, 485 (1971), the Act is "clearly phrased to protect all co-employees in all situations where negligent conduct of one employee may cause injury to a fellow employee, provided only that the injury in question is one that is compensable under the Act." In Gardner v. Erie, 456 Pa. Super. 563, 691 A.2d 459 (1997), the court noted: 2 99-7691 CIVIL What emerges from a careful analysis of Ducjai when read in conjunction with Apple, supra, and with § 72 of the Act is the inescapable, and uncontested, conclusion that a co-employee who is injured in the course of employment cannot hold another co-employee liable for injuries occasioned by his or her "act or omission "(negligence); rather, such co-employee can only be held liable for injuries resulting from intentional acts. Id._ at 571-572, 691 A.2d at 463-464. Thus, the question, in this case, is whether the plaintiff and defendant were in the course of their employment when the plaintiff was injured. Several cases in Pennsylvania have dealt specifically with the issue of accidents occurring in an employee parking lot. In Epler v. North American Rockwell Corp, 482 Pa. 391, 393 A.2d 1163 (1978), an employee had punched out of work and was crossing a public street on his way to the employee parking lot. He was struck and killed "by one or two automobiles somewhere near the middle of the road." Id at 394, 393 A.2d at 1164. The court, noting that several cases before it had recognized that a parking lot could constitute an integral part of the employer's business, decided that the sole avenue of compensation for the deceased's wife was through the Workers' Compensation Act. The court announced the requisite amount of scrutiny to be used in determining the available remedy for claimants: "Our cases have consistently recognized that the phrase 'course of employment' is to receive a liberal construction." Id at 397, 393 A.2d at 1166. In Epler, it was determined that the plaintiff was covered by the Act even though he had already punched out and was injured on a public road. In Cekovsky v. Baker, 50 Cumb. L.J. 208 (2001), an employee was struck by a vehicle operated by a co-employee, on a parking lot provided by the employee. Judge Bayley of this court analyzed both Epler and Dana Corp. v. 144. C.A.B._, 120 Pa. Commw. 277, 548 A.2d 669 99-7691 CIVIL (1989) and concluded that the plaintiff' s exclusive remedy was under the Workers' Compensation Act. In Epler, the Supreme Court stated unequivocally that an employee parking lot is part of an employer's business premises, and injuries occurring to an employee on the lot are compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act when the employee's presence on the lot was temporally proximate to the hours of work .... A fortiori, plaintiff herein was injured by a co-worker in the employee parking lot as he was preparing to walk to his place of employment, therefore, the injury falls under the Workers' Compensation Act even though it was not caused by a condition of his employer' s premises. Cekovsky, 50 Cumb. at 212. Plaintiff first argues that he was not in the course of his employment because he was not furthering the business of his employer. InPesta v. 144. C.A.B, 153 Pa. Commw. 616, 621 A.2d 1221 (1993), the court found that the employee was not in the course of his employment when he left on an authorized break to take aluminum cans out to his car, and was struck by a vehicle. The court in Pesta made a distinction between traveling employees and stationary employees. In the case at bar, because no assertion was made that the decedent's position was one requiring travel, the proper analysis to follow is whether the decedent left Employer's premises for purely personal reasons or whether he left for reasons related to the duties he was required to perform. The record shows that the decedent's conduct in collecting the aluminum cans was purely personal in nature. The decedent collected cans during his break for his own financial benefit, not the benefit of Employer. Moreover, the parties stipulated that the decedent's act in collecting the cans was not in furtherance of the business or affairs of Employer. The decedent was merely a member of the general 4 99-7691 CIVIL public on a public street and was not on a mission directly related to his employment. Given that the decedent left Employer's premises for personal reasons which had no relation to the business of Employer, we hold that the decedent was not fatally injured while in the course of his employment. Id. at 620-621,621 A.2d at 1223 (Emphasis added). In the present case, although plaintiff arguably left for personal reasons, he cannot be characterized as a member of the general public. Many of the employees did the same thing on a regular basis, and the plaintiff was on the employer parking lot at the time of the accident. Plaintiff also relies upon the decisions of Wasserman v. Fifth & ReedHosp., 442 Pa. Super. 563, 660 A.2d 600 (1995), and Tatrai v. Presbyterian University Hospital, 497 Pa. 247, 439 A.2d 1162 (1982), contending that because his job did not require him to go out and warm up his car, he was not in the course of his employment. In Tatrai, a hospital employee who suddenly became ill was taken to the emergency room for x-rays. In the process, the x-ray table collapsed and the employee was injured. In Wasserman, a hospital employee was injured on her lunch break in the hospital cafeteria, when she ingested a liquid oven cleaner that was marked on the counter as vinegar. In both of these cases, the courts relied on the fact that there was no way to distinguish the injured employee from a member of the general public. In the present case, by contrast, the employee was injured on a private lot, under the control of his employer. In Pesta and Wasserman, the employees were on an authorized and scheduled break, as opposed to the present case, where the plaintiff simply ran out to his car while he was still "on the clock." The Plaintiff cites Gertz v. Temple University, 443 Pa. Super. 177, 661 A.2d 13 (1995), arguing that plaintiff' s presence on the parking lot was not required by his employment. That 99-7691 CIVIL case also involved a hospital employee, who, upon completion of work, was walking back to her car when she was injured. Temple University technically owned the sidewalk, but the court determined that the injury was not compensable under the Act. The employee's car was not parked in an employee parking lot. Again, the court in Gertz founded its decision on the fact that the employee was simply part of the general public at the time of the accident. [A]n employee with employer-provided parking is not going his or her own way as a member of the general pedestrian public, but rather is being directed to a pre-determined location. When such direction is given, the employee's presence is "required by the nature of his or her employment." In the absence of such direction, the off-duty employee becomes a member of the general public and is no longer entitled to compensation under the Act .... When she left the building, she was no longer being guided by anything related to her employment. As she proceeded down Watts Street, she was simply a member of the general public, and was not in any place that she was required to be by the nature of her employment. Gertz's injury therefore did not occur in the course of employment, as the term is defined in the Act. Id. at 183-184, 661 A.2d at 16 (Emphasis added). It has been established that the plaintiff in the present case was not off duty when the injury occurred. In arguing that the defendant is not immune from liability for the accident, plaintiff argues that defendant was not in the course of his employment because he was violating the company rule that disallows the moving of an employee's car to a closer parking spot. In Dickey v. Pittsburgh &Lake Erie R.R. Co., 297 Pa. 172, 146 A. 543 (1929), the court determined that the plaintiff was not entitled to worker's compensation benefits even though the injury occurred on the employer' s premises, because the employee had violated work rules. The court made it 99-7691 CIVIL clear, however, that not every violation of a work rule would deny an employee the benefits of the Act. "It was not our intention to deny recovery under the Workmen's Compensation Act for all violations of positive orders, and the cause mentioned ... as taking the employee out of the course of employment must be considered in connection with the facts in the cases to which it relates." Id. at 174-175, 146 A. at 544. The court further qualified its holding by stating that a violation of positive orders does not prohibit compensation under the Act, "where the employee's duties were so connected with the act that caused the injury, that as to it he was not in the position of a stranger or trespasser." Id at 175, 146 A. at 544. In the present case, defendant's actions did not bring him to the level of"trespasser" or "stranger." The court in Dickey concluded: Where an employee violates a positive rule as to entering forbidden parts of the owner's premises about which he has no duty to perform, or disobeys instructions against starting machinery or other dangerous agencies with which his work is not connected, and with which he has no business, and an injury results, he not only violates the orders of his employer, but is in the position of a trespasser, who without right, authority, or permission enters forbidden ground. Id. at 176, 146 A. at 545 (Emphasis added). Defendant in the present case was not engaged in a dangerous activity when he moved his car, nor was he in a location forbidden to employees. More importantly, the defendant would not be the claimant in any underlying Workers' Compensation Act. Under 77 P.S. Section 72, fellow employees are not liable if the "disability or death is compensable under this Act." This language clearly has reference to the status of the claimant, who is the plaintiff in this case. The question then is not whether the defendant was violating a rule of his employer but rather was the plaintiff guilty of some sort of misconduct. There is no evidence in this case that Mr. Evans was violating a rule of his employment when he was injured. 99-7691 CIVIL ORDER AND NOW, this day of July, 2002, the motion of the defendant, Brian Rowles, for summary judgment, is GRANTED and the complaint, as to him, is DISMISSED. BY THE COURT, Stephen M. Greecher, Jr., Esquire For the Plaintiff Michael B. Scheib, Esquire For Defendant Rowles Stephen E. Geduldig, Esquire For Defendant Exel Logistics :rlm Kevin A. Hess, J. WILLIAM SCOTT EVANS, Plaimiff VS. BRIAN ROWLES and EXEL LOGISTICS, Defendants AND NOW, this IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW 99-7691 CIVIL IN RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BEFORE HOFFER, P.J., HESS AND OLER, J.J. ORDER day of July, 2002, the motion of the defendant, Brian Rowles, for summary judgmem, is GRANTED and the complaim, as to him, is DISMISSED. BY THE COURT, Stephen M. Greecher, Jr., Esquire For the Plaintiff Michael B. Scheib, Esquire For Defendant Rowles Stephen E. Geduldig, Esquire For Defendant Exel Logistics :rlm Kevin A. Hess, J.