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HomeMy WebLinkAbout2002-5032 Civil JOHN F. LYONS, Plaintiff IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA v. W ACHOVIA BANK NATIONAL NO. 2002 - 5032 CIVIL TERM ASSOCIATION, Successor by Merger to First Union National Bank, flk/a Core States Bank, N.A., Successor by Merger to Meridian Bank Successor by Merger to Hill CIVIL ACTION - LAW Financial Savings Association, Defendant IN RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BEFORE BAYLEY, GUIDO, JJ. OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT Plaintiff has brought the instant action under Sections 681 and 682 of the Mortgage Satisfaction Act. 1 Currently before us is defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons hereinafter set forth, the motion will be granted. Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1035.2 provides, in relevant part, as follows: After the relevant pleadings are closed, but within such time as not to unreasonably delay trial, any party may move for summary judgment in whole or in part as a matter of law (1) whenever there is no genuine issue of any material fact as to a necessary element of the cause of action or defense which could be established by additional discovery or expert report Pa. RC.P. 1035.2(1) 121 P.S. ~ 681 & 682. The Mortgage Satisfaction Act of 2002, 21 P.S. ~ 721-1, effective February 7, 2003, repealed these Sections in part. However, they are still applicable to this case because the mortgage at issue was satisfied prior to the effective date of the new act. NO. 2002 - 5032 CIVIL TERM In determining whether to grant a motion for summary judgment we must view the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Ertel v. Patriot News Co., 544 Pa. 93, 674 A.2d 1038 (1966). Summary judgment may only be granted in cases that are clear and free from doubt. JH Ex Rei. Hoffman v. Pellak, 764 A.2d 64 (Pa.Super 2000). FACTUAL BACKGROUND The material facts in this case are not in dispute. In March of 1991 plaintiff purchased a residential property in Mechanicsburg. The previous owners had granted a mortgage on the premises to defendant's predecessor in interest. The mortgage was paid in full more than two months before plaintiff closed on the property. At the request of the former owners (mortgagors) the defendant's predecessor in interest agreed to satisfy the mortgage. Based upon the assurances that the mortgage had been paid and would be satisfied of record, plaintiff proceeded with closing. Despite its assurances defendant's predecessor in interest never satisfied the mortgage of record. Between 1992 and 2001 plaintiff made several written requests to have the mortgage record marked "satisfied". The mortgage at issue remained on the record until July of2001 when a satisfaction price was finally recorded DISCUSSION Section 681 of the Mortgage Satisfaction Act provides: Any mortgagee of any real or personal estates in the Commonwealth, having received full satisfaction and payment of all such sum and sums of money as are really due to him by such mortgage, shall, at the request of the mortgagor, enter satisfaction either upon the margin of the record of such mortgage recorded in the said office or by means of a satisfaction piece, which shall forever thereafter discharge, defeat and release the same; and shall likewise bar all actions brought, or to be brought thereupon. 2 NO. 2002 - 5032 CIVIL TERM 21 P.S. S 681 (emphasis added) Section 682 goes on to provide: And if such mortgagee, by himself or his attorney, shall not, within forty- five days after request and tender made for his reasonable charges, return to the said office, and there make such acknowledgement as aforesaid, he, she or they, neglecting so to do, shall for every such offence, forfeit and pay, unto the party or parties aggrieved, any sum not exceeding the mortgage-money to be recovered in any Court of Record within this Commonwealth, by bill, complaint or information. 21 P.S. S 682, (emphasis added). Defendant has brought the instant motion for summary judgment under two separate theories. In the first instance it contends that plaintiff has no standing to bring this action under the Mortgage Satisfaction Act because he was not the mortgagor as required by Section 681. Plaintiff concedes that he was not the mortgagor, but argues that he has standing as a "party aggrieved" under Section 682. Unfortunately for plaintiff this particular issue was recently decided against him by the Superior Court in Noel v. First Financial Bank, 855 A.2d 90 (Pa. Super 2004). As the Superior Court stated: Our review of the plain language of Section 681 and Section 682, and of the cases construing those sections, reflects that only three requirements are necessary: 1) the mortgagor has paid all sums due and owing; 2) the mortgagor has requested the mortgagee to satisfy the mortgage; and 3) the mortgagee has failed to mark the mortgage satisfied within 45 days of the request. No other requirements are indicated as necessary under these sections. The sections, for example, do not require that a party own the property to pursue a cause of action Rather, the purpose of the statute and Sections 681 and 682 is to ensure that the bank or financial institution clear up title within 45 days of the request of the former borrower and to compensate the former borrower for the bank's failure to do so. Section 681 explicitly uses the term "mortgagor" when referencing the party making the request for satisfaction of the mortgage. Section 682 references the "party or parties aggrieved" when referencing who is entitled to the civil penalty for failure of the mortgagee to satisfy the mortgage. From a plain reading of Section 681 and 682, these terms 3 NO. 2002 - 5032 CIVIL TERM are interchangeable and reference the party with the fully-paid mortgage who has requested the bank to mark the fully-paid mortgage satisfied on the public record. 855 A.2d at 94 (citations and footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). Plaintiff does not attempt to distinguish Noel from the case at bar. Rather, he argues that "(a) careful reading of the Noel case reveals that the Superior Court's decision is based upon a gross misreading of the Supreme Court decision in Pantuso Motors, Inc. v. Corestates Bank, N.A., 568 Pa. 601, 798 A.2d 1277 (2002).,,2 He then goes on to make several additional arguments as to why the Superior Court's interpretation of the statute would defeat its purpose. However, since we are bound by Noel, plaintiff will need to convince a higher authority of the soundness of those arguments. In the alternative, defendant contends that even if plaintiff has standing as an aggrieved party his claim is time barred because of the two year statute of limitations. 3 Plaintiff counters that each request for satisfaction and each failure to satisfy gives rise to a separate cause of action. Therefore, he argues that this action is not time barred because it was commenced within two years of his last unfulfilled request for satisfaction. However, Section 681 specifically provides that the request for satisfaction must be made by the "mortgagor". Only one such request was ever made in this case. That was in 1991, more than a decade before the instant action was commenced. To be timely, this action must have been commenced within two years of the mortgagor's request for satisfaction. 2 See "Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant Wachovia Bank, N.A.", p. 9. 3 See 42 Pa. C.S.A. ~ 5524 (5) which provides that a two year statute oflimitations applies to an action "upon a statute for a civil penalty or forfeiture." 4 NO. 2002 - 5032 CIVIL TERM For the reasons set forth in the foregoing opinion, we will enter the order that follows. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this 21 ST day of JUNE, 2006, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. By the Court, Isl Edward E. Guido Edward E. Guido, 1. Anthony Stefanon, Esquire 407 North Front Street P.O. Box 12027 Harrisburg, Pa. 17108-2027 Barbara S. Magers, Esquire 1818 Market Street, Suite 2910 Phila., Pa. 19103 :sld 5