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HomeMy WebLinkAbout2016-0488 UPMC ALTOONA, UPMC : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF BEDFORD D/B/A UPMC : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA BEDFORD MEMORIAL, UPMC : EAST, UPMC HAMOT, UPMC : HORIZON, MAGEE-WOMENS : CIVIL ACTION – LAW HOSPITAL OF UPMC, UPMC : MCKEESPORT, UPMC MERCY, : UPMC NORTHWEST, UPMC : NO. 2016-0488 CIVIL PASSAVANT, UPMC PRESBY- : TERIAN SHADYSIDE, UPMC : ST. MARGARET, AND UPMC, : Plaintiffs : : vs. : : HIGHMARK INC. D/B/A : HIGHMARK BLUE CROSS BLUE : SHIELD IN WESTERN : PENNSYLVANIA D/B/A : HIGHMARK BLUE SHIELD IN : CENTRAL PENNSYLVANIA, : AND KEYSTONE HEALTH : PLAN WEST, INC., : Defendants : IN RE: PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT BEFORE EBERT AND BREWBAKER, J.J. OPINION AND ORDER FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Plaintiffs are a collective group of twelve non-profit hospitals, all operating under the umbrella of the thirteenth plaintiff, the non-profit University of Pittsburgh Medical Center 1 (“UPMC”). Defendant Highmark, Inc. (“Highmark”) is a non-profit corporation providing 1 Plaintiffs’ Complaint, ¶¶ 5-17, filed January 27, 2016, and Defendants’ Answer, ¶¶ 5-17, filed July 28, 2016. health insurance in the United States, while Defendant Keystone Health Plan West, Inc. 2 (“Keystone”) is a non-profit subsidiary of Highmark which processes health insurance claims. Beginning in 1999, UPMC, on behalf of most of its hospitals, and Highmark entered into Medicare Advantage (“MA”) Agreements under which Highmark administers the provision of health care services to Medicare beneficiaries on a managed care basis, known as Medicare part C, or Medicare Advantage, for the Federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 3 (“CMS”). The original 1999 agreements, in Exhibit I, state that “\[p\]ayment under this Agreement will be derived from the amounts reimbursed to Health Plan \[Keystone\] by the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA)….These rates shall be recalculated annually, based on the payment received by Health Plan from HCFA, and on the federal regulations in 4 effect for each year….” Furthermore, the agreements state that “¶ 7.1: Payment. Health Plan agrees that Provider’s payment for Covered Services shall be at the rates set forth in the Provider payment rates attached hereto as Exhibit I and made a part hereof.” However, the agreements were subsequently amended by the parties multiple times, with the most recent amendment in 2008. The MA Agreements between UPMC and Defendants establish the rate at which 56 Highmark will reimburse Plaintiffs for the services provided. With one exception, the language from the 2008 amendment, in relevant part, reads as follows: Exhibit I (Inpatient Services) : All applicable Inpatient Payment elements are taken from the Medicare Inpatient PPS Pricer, as updated on October 1 of each year, to be effective January 1 through December 31 of the following year. If Health Plan determines, in its sole discretion, that 2 Plaintiffs’ Complaint and Defendants’ Answer, ¶¶ 18-19. 3 Plaintiffs’ Complaint and Defendants’ Answer, ¶¶ 22-23, 25. 4 UPMC Northwest entered into its Agreement with Highmark in 2005, and thus it does not have this 1999 language; instead, the contractual payment language mimics that seen in the 2008 amendments with the other plaintiffs. Plaintiffs’ Appendix pg. 798. 5 Plaintiffs’ Complaint with Exhibits and Defendants’ Answer, ¶ 27. 6 The Agreement with UPMC Northwest ¶ 7.1 reads: “Health Plan agrees that Provider’s payment for Covered Services shall be in accordance with the methodologies and payment rates set forth in the Provider payment rates attached hereto as Exhibit I and made a part hereof.” (Emphasis in original). 2 there has been a material change in the Medicare inpatient reimbursement methodology, Health Plan and Provider agree to renegotiate the terms of the inpatient reimbursement methodology. Exhibit I (Outpatient Services): Payment will be at (under seal) percentage* of the Health Plan Institutional Outpatient Fee Schedule. *The fee schedule multiplier will be adjusted on January 1, 2008 and annually each subsequent January 1 by the CMS conversion factor update percentage. This percentage is defined as the total percentage change in the CMS Outpatient Prospective Payment System Ambulatory Payment Classification conversion factor, when compared to the prior year, 7 inclusive of all adjustments and/or other factors applied by CMS. Exhibit I : By the signature below, Health Plan and Provider agree that Exhibit I is hereby amended by modifying payment rates and other payment terms and conditions for those covered inpatient and outpatient hospital services provided to eligible Members of Health Plan as of the Effective Date of this Amendment and thereafter through the remaining Exhibit I term of the Agreement as set forth on the additional pages of Exhibit I attached hereto, which additional pages shall become a part of to the Agreement. Whole Agreement : No representation, promises or inducements have been made by the parties other than as appear in this Amendment. The Agreement remains in full force and effect, except as amended herein or as previously amended by the parties as evidenced by a formal written executed amendment. This Amendment, upon execution by the parties, becomes part of the Agreement. This Amendment constitutes the entire understanding of the parties hereto and supersedes any prior oral or written communications, representations or agreements pertaining to the 8 subject matter hereof. In 2011 and 2012, Congress passed laws requiring a reduction in federal government spending under Title I of the Budget Control Act of 2011; as a result and pursuant to the Sequestration Law and Presidential Order of March 1, 2013, CMS began to apply a 2% reduction 7 UPMC Bedford and UPMC Northwest have arrangements requiring reimbursement on the basis of CMS’s Ambulatory Payment Classification (“APC”) methodology; but this is a distinction without a difference, as neither allow for a reduction based on CMS’ sequestration reduction. 8 Plaintiffs’ Complaint with Exhibits and Defendants’ Answer, ¶ 7. 3 9 to payments made by CMS to MA plans. In order to explain the effect of this reduction, CMS issued a memorandum on May 1, 2013, which noted in relevant part: Reducing Payments to Contracted Providers Section 1854(a)(6)(B)(iii) of the Social Security Act prohibits CMS from interfering in the payment arrangements between MAOs and contract providers. The statute specifies that CMS ‘may not require any MA organization to…require a particular price structure for payment under such a contract…’ Thus, whether and how sequestration might affect an MAO’s payments to its contracted providers are governed by the terms of the contract between the MAO and the provider. We note that MAOs must follow the prompt pay provisions established in their contracts with providers and to pay 10 providers under the terms of those contracts…. On or about October 28, 2013, Highmark notified UPMC that as of January 1, 2014 it would be applying the 2% sequestration reduction to all claims submitted under the MA 11 agreements. UPMC responded with a letter to Highmark, also dated October 28, 2013, in 12 which they contested the reductions under the terms of their contract. Highmark then responded on December 30, 2013, indicating that the payment reductions were “necessary and 13 appropriate.” Highmark began applying the 2% payment reduction for all claims that UPMC 14 has submitted under the MA agreements as of January 1, 2014. Plaintiffs’ Complaint and Defendants’ Answer thereto do not reveal that there was any negotiation between the parties regarding Highmark’s passing on of the 2% reduction to UPMC. UPMC filed a complaint on January 27, 2016, alleging three counts, all sounding in breach of contract. Highmark filed preliminary objections and oral argument on the objections occurred on June 3, 2016. On June 13, 2016, the Court overruled the preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer as to Counts II and III, and sustained the preliminary objection for 9 Plaintiffs’ Complaint and Defendants’ Answer, ¶¶ 38-39. 10 Plaintiffs’ Complaint with Exhibit and Defendants’ Answer, ¶ 41. 11 Plaintiffs’ Complaint and Defendants’ Answer, ¶ 42. 12 Plaintiffs’ Complaint and Defendants’ Answer, ¶ 44. 13 Plaintiffs’ Complaint and Defendants’ Answer, ¶ 45. 14 Plaintiffs’ Complaint and Defendants’ Answer, ¶ 46. 4 failure to conform to a law or rule of court to Count III, ordering UPMC to submit copies of the underlying agreements to Highmark. Highmark filed an Answer and New Matter on July 28, 2016, and UPMC filed a reply on August 17, 2016. UPMC then moved for partial summary judgment on September 12, 2016, and listed the matter for oral argument on December 2, 2016. DISCUSSION UPMC and Highmark’s relationship is purely contractual; indeed, it is the contracts that provide the connection between the two organizations, and counsel for both sides admit that the contracts control the outcome of this motion. Furthermore, given the notification provided by CMS accompanying its 2% reduction, it is clear that the issue before this Court involves a purely contractual analysis. A motion for summary judgment is proper where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Pa. R.C.P. 1035.2. “A motion for summary judgment may be properly granted only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Washington Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Stein, 515 A.2d 980, 981 (Pa. Super. 1986). The reviewing court must view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, resolving all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact against the moving party. Basile v. H & R Block, Inc., 761 A.2d 1115, 1118 (Pa. 2000). The court may grant summary judgment only where the right to such a judgment is clear and free from doubt. Marks v. Tasman, 589 A.2d 205, 206 (Pa. 1991). 5 Under the terms of the agreements, amended last in 2008, and as applied to inpatient services, the parties agreed that if there was “a material change in the Medicare inpatient reimbursement methodology,” they would renegotiate the terms of their contract. In regard to outpatient services, amended last in 2008, the parties agreed either that the “payment would be at (under seal) conversion factor update percentage of the Health Plan Institutional Outpatient Fee Schedule,” or that they would be based on the Health Plan Methodology, under which if there was a material change, they would again renegotiate the terms of their contract. In direct contravention of this agreement, when facing a reduction in its contract with CMS, Highmark unilaterally reduced its payments to UPMC. Highmark argues that the 2008 amendment is not in effect, but that instead, the terms of 15 the 2008 amendment merely supplement the original 1999 contract. While a reading of the 2008 amendment indicates that additional pages of Exhibit I, shall become “a part of” Exhibit I, an examination of the specific provisions included in the 2008 amendment provides some clarity in this regard. The 1999 agreement, Exhibit I, Section 1.1 provides as follows: “Payment under this Agreement will be derived from the amounts reimbursed to Health Plan by the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA)….These rates shall be recalculated annually, based on the payment received by Health Plan from HCFA, and on the federal regulations in effect for each year which govern how Health Plan is paid by HCFA….” As previously noted, the 2008 amendment, which is not limited to a single year duration, as were previous amendments, sets forth the exact methodology used to determine the reimbursement rates mentioned in the provision above. Assuming arguendo that the 1999 language still has any effect, it is clearly 15 Previous amendments to the Agreements speak in terms of “superseding and replacing” Exhibit I from the 1999 agreements. While the 2008 amendment does not have this same language, what it does say is significant, as is discussed in the remainder of this opinion. 6 supplemented by the 2008 amendment which provides specific formulas to determine the rates of 16 reimbursement. As a result, the reduction mandated by CMS did not affect the reimbursement 17 calculations from Highmark to UPMC. In further support of this conclusion, the 2008 amendment to the agreements provides Exhibit I that “ is hereby amended by modifying payment rates and other terms and conditions….” (emphasis in original). The specifics of Exhibit I in the 2008 amendment thereafter provide the formulae under which the payments are calculated. Additionally, the amendment mandates that the parties renegotiate the terms if there is a material change in the reimbursement methodology. Even if the CMS reduction had affected the reimbursement calculations, the 2008 amendment mandated that before unilaterally passing on the reduction Highmark would renegotiate with UPMC. As there is absolutely no claim that Highmark ever attempted to engage in any negotiations with UPMC, it acted in breach of their agreement. Highmark next argues, somewhat hypocritically, that paragraph 8 of the 1999 agreement, stating that the parties “shall at all times maintain an effective liaison and close cooperation…to provide Covered Services…at the most reasonable cost consistent with the quality standards of care,” requires UPMC to accept Highmark’s passing-on of CMS’ 2% reduction. Not only does the contract explicitly require renegotiation in such a situation, but contractual language requiring cooperation in no way implies that UPMC should suffer alone, while Highmark continues on without consequence. While implying that UPMC is being unreasonable in not 16 It is a widely accepted principle of contract law that the specific controls the general. See e.g., Minnotte’s Appeal, 411 Pa. 492, 496, 192 A.2d 394, 396 (Pa. 1963), “specific provisions ordinarily will be regarded as qualifying the meaning of broad general terms in relation to a particular subject.” (Further citations omitted). 17 An examination of Exhibit 1 to Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the Affidavit of Joseph T. Chuba, reveals that the 2% reduction by CMS did not affect the Medicare Inpatient PPS Pricer or the Highmark Medicare Advantage hospital outpatient fee schedule, which are the bases of the two formulas used to calculate the reimbursement from Highmark to UPMC as established in the 2008 amendment. This Affidavit was not countered or argued against by Highmark, nor did it present a counter-affidavit in any of the numerous filings and briefs in this case. 7 simply accepting full responsibility for the 2% reduction, Highmark ignores the fact that the basis of this lawsuit is its attempt to do the very same thing. Highmark’s final argument is that UPMC waived its right to object to Highmark’s unilateral action. Highmark argues that because UPMC and Highmark settled other contractual issues arising under a consent agreement, and Highmark did not “preserve” this issue during that negotiation and settlement, they have waived their right to further pursue it. This argument is disingenuous for two reasons. First, UPMC clearly objected to Highmark’s unilateral change in reimbursement by its letter of October 28, 2013, in which it responded to Highmark’s notification of the reduction. Second, and perhaps more significant, is the fact that UPMC filed its claim well before the statute of limitations had run. As this action rests in breach of contract, 18 there is a four-year statute of limitations. Highmark began reducing its payments to UPMC on January 1, 2014, and UPMC filed the instant suit on January 27, 2016. Waiver is clearly inapplicable to this case. Highmark also argues that because discovery is incomplete and remains open until April 17, 2017, summary judgment is inappropriate at this time. This is incorrect. No additional discovery is required regarding the terms of the MA Agreements and the interpretation of that language is clear and free from doubt. Therefore, summary judgment is appropriate at this time on Count I of the complaint. Finally, while UPMC argues collateral estoppel on the basis of the Allegheny Court decision in Butler Healthcare Providers, et al. v. Highmark, Inc. and Keystone Health Plan West, Inc., GD-14-016452 (Ct. Com. Pl. Allegheny Cty., May 6, 2015), because UPMC prevails 18 42 Pa.C.S. § 5525(a). 8 on the merits of its first issue, the Court will not be addressing the applicability of Butler to the instant case. ORDER nd AND NOW, this 22 day of December, 2016, upon consideration of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, along with the briefs and arguments related thereto, the Motion is GRANTED hereby . Judgment is entered in favor of Plaintiffs as to Count I of the Complaint, ORDERED and the parties are hereby to meet and discuss regarding the final amount of damages to be awarded to UPMC. A conference with the Court will be scheduled to address the results of that discussion on Wednesday, March 1, 2017 at 1:30 p.m., unless the parties notify the Court that such a conference is not necessary. BY THE COURT, __________________________ Jessica E. Brewbaker, J. Hubert X. Gilroy, Esquire George B. Faller, Jr., Esquire 10 East High Street Carlisle, PA 17013 Leon F. DeJulius, Jr., Esquire Rebekah B. Kcehowski, Esquire 500 Grant Street, Suite 4500 Pittsburg, PA 15219 Matthew E. Hamlin, Esquire 1700 Bent Creek Blvd., Suite 160 P. O. Box 659 Mechanicsburg, PA 17055-0659 Daniel I. Booker, Esquire P. Gavin Eastgate, Esquire William J. Sheridan, Esquire 225 Fifth Avenue Pittsburgh, PA 15222 9 UPMC ALTOONA, UPMC : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF BEDFORD D/B/A UPMC : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA BEDFORD MEMORIAL, UPMC : EAST, UPMC HAMOT, UPMC : HORIZON, MAGEE-WOMENS : CIVIL ACTION – LAW HOSPITAL OF UPMC, UPMC : MCKEESPORT, UPMC MERCY, : UPMC NORTHWEST, UPMC : NO. 2016-0488 CIVIL PASSAVANT, UPMC PRESBY- : TERIAN SHADYSIDE, UPMC : ST. MARGARET, AND UPMC, : Plaintiffs : : vs. : : HIGHMARK INC. D/B/A : HIGHMARK BLUE CROSS BLUE : SHIELD IN WESTERN : PENNSYLVANIA D/B/A : HIGHMARK BLUE SHIELD IN : CENTRAL PENNSYLVANIA, : AND KEYSTONE HEALTH : PLAN WEST, INC., : Defendants : IN RE: PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT BEFORE EBERT AND BREWBAKER, J.J. ORDER nd AND NOW, this 22 day of December, 2016, upon consideration of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, along with the briefs and arguments related thereto, the Motion is GRANTED hereby . Judgment is entered in favor of Plaintiffs as to Count I of the Complaint, ORDERED and the parties are hereby to meet and discuss regarding the final amount of damages to be awarded to UPMC. A conference with the Court will be scheduled to address the results of that discussion on Wednesday, March 1, 2017 at 1:30 p.m., unless the parties notify the Court that such a conference is not necessary. BY THE COURT, __________________________ Jessica E. Brewbaker, J. Hubert X. Gilroy, Esquire George B. Faller, Jr., Esquire 10 East High Street Carlisle, PA 17013 Leon F. DeJulius, Jr., Esquire Rebekah B. Kcehowski, Esquire 500 Grant Street, Suite 4500 Pittsburg, PA 15219 Matthew E. Hamlin, Esquire 1700 Bent Creek Blvd., Suite 160 P. O. Box 659 Mechanicsburg, PA 17055-0659 Daniel I. Booker, Esquire P. Gavin Eastgate, Esquire William J. Sheridan, Esquire 225 Fifth Avenue Pittsburgh, PA 15222 :rlm